Women’s Experiences with Intimate Partner Violence

Published: May 6, 2025

Introduction

Intimate partner violence (IPV) is a persistent public health crisis that affects many women in the United States. IPV affects disproportionately affects women but also affects people of all genders. It has a wide range of negative effects on women’s physical and mental health, such as physical injuries, pregnancy complications, and substance use. IPV also has psychosocial impacts, affecting women’s safety, economic security and freedom, isolation, and ability to care for themselves and their children.

The 2024 KFF Women’s Health Survey provides data on women experiencing IPV in the past five years. This group includes women who said that in the past five years a current or former partner did at least one of the following: made them fear for their or their family’s safety, tried to control most or all of their daily activities, hurt them physically, forced them into sexual activity. However, this population does not include those who had experiences with IPV at earlier points in their lives or other forms of IPV and should not be used as an estimate of overall lifetime IPV prevalence Many women, particularly those who are older, may have experienced IPV prior to the last five years.

This analysis reports on a range of health topics affecting women who experienced IPV in the past five years, including their health care needs and use, barriers, and mental health. The impact on women who have been historically marginalized by society and health care systems, including those who are LGBTQ+, experience physical and mental disabilities, and those who are low-income is also examined. The survey was conducted from May 13 – June 18, 2024, online and by telephone among a nationally representative sample of 5,055 women ages 18 to 64.

Key Takeaways

  • One in five (19%) women ages 18 to 64 say they have experienced intimate partner violence (IPV) in the last five years. Higher shares of women with lower incomes, LGBT+ women, and those who identify as disabled report recent IPV.
  • Many women who have experienced IPV in the past five years contend with health challenges. Large shares characterize their physical (27%) and mental (46%) health as fair or poor. One in four say that a health condition keeps them from fully participating in work or other activities. Almost half of women who have experienced IPV in the past five years incurred a physical injury as a result.
  • Over one in ten (14%) women who have experienced IPV in the past five years say that at some point they did not receive health care services they needed related to IPV. Privacy concerns, fear, and intimidation are leading reasons why people experiencing IPV do not obtain health care.
  • There are differences in where women affected by IPV usually get health care. More than a third (35%) say their usual site of care is a clinic or health center. One in ten (9%) say it is the emergency room.
  • IPV is a major concern during women’s reproductive years. Among women who experienced IPV in past five years, four in ten said they experienced violence during their most recent pregnancy or in the year before or after the pregnancy.
  • Emergency contraception is an important back-up contraceptive for reproductive age women affected by IPV. One in five report using emergency contraception in the past year. One in ten also say they have obtained it since the Dobbs ruling in case they need it. These shares are approximately double the rates reported by women who have not experienced IPV in past five years.

Rates of IPV

One in five women ages 18 to 64 say they have experienced IPV in the past five years.

IPV presents in many forms, including physical, sexual, emotional, coercion, and online. The KFF Women’s Health Survey asked about a subset of IPV experiences that women have reported experiencing in the past five years. Approximately one in ten women say that in the past five years, a current or former partner has made them fear for their or their family’s safety (11%), tried to control most or all of their daily activities (11%), hurt them physically (9%), or forced them into sexual activity (9%) (Figure 1). In total, one in five (19%) women ages 18 to 64 said they have experienced at least one of these forms of IPV in the past five years.

Throughout this brief, this is the group referenced when discussing women who have experienced IPV.

One in Five Women ages 18 to 64 Report Experiencing Some Form of Intimate Partner Violence (IPV) in Past Five Years

Larger shares of women who are younger and have lower incomes consistently report experiencing IPV compared to those who are older and have higher incomes. Conversely, women who are Asian American or Pacific Islander report lower rates of IPV compared to women of other racial and ethnic groups. While women of all subpopulations experience IPV, rates are higher among some groups (Figure 2). More than one in four (27%) women who have lower incomes say they have experienced IPV in the past five years, about twice the share of those with higher incomes (14%). One in ten (9%) AAPI women report IPV in the past five years, which is lower than women of other racial/ethnic backgrounds.

One-third of women who are LGBT+ and one in four who identify as disabled report experiencing IPV in the past five years. Rates of all the IPV questions in the survey are higher among LGBT+ women compared to those who are not LGBT+ (Figure 2). Approximately one in five LGBT+ women said that in the past five years a current or former partner has made them fear for their or family’s safety (19%), tried to control most or all of their daily activities (20%), hurt them physically (18%), or forced them into sexual activity (18%). In total, twice as many LGBT+ women (32%) said they have experienced one of these forms of IPV in the past five years compared to non-LGBT+ women (16%). One in five women with a disability say they have feared for their or their family’s safety at the hands of a current or former partner (19%).  Overall, one in four (27%) women who identifies as disabled reports experiencing at least one form of IPV in the past five years.

Higher IPV Rates Among Women Who Are Black, Hispanic, Disabled, LGBT+, Have Lower Incomes. Rates are Lower Among Asian or Pacific Islander Women.

On average, women who have experienced IPV in the past five years have lower incomes and lower rates of private health insurance.

More than half (54%) of women affected by IPV in the past five years have low incomes, compared to one-third of those who have not (Figure 3). Insurance profiles also differ between women affected by IPV and those who have not, with a lower rate of private insurance coverage and higher rate of Medicaid coverage among those who have experienced IPV in the past five years compared to those who have not.  Almost half (45%) of women who have experienced IPV in the past five years have young children, and half (54%) are not married. This is in part a reflection of the fact that many women experience IPV at young ages.

More Than Half of Women Reporting IPV in Past Five Years Have Low Incomes and One-Third Are Covered by Medicaid

Women who have experienced IPV report higher rates of some health challenges, including disability and poorer health status. One in four women who have experienced IPV in the past five years rates their health as “fair” or “poor” (Figure 4). One in four (25%) also report having a chronic condition that keeps them from participating fully in work, school, or other activities. One in five (19%) say they identify as disabled. IPV may be a cause or contributor to these conditions or could exacerbate any of them.

One in Four Women Who Have Experienced IPV in Past Five Years Have a Health Condition that Limits Work, School and Activity

Health Care Access and Barriers

Women who have experienced IPV in the past five years have heavier reliance on clinics and emergency rooms for their health care. Just under half (47%) of women who have experienced IPV in the past five years say they usually get health care in a private doctor’s office, whereas this is the site of care for the majority (62%) of those who have not experienced IPV recently (Figure 5). Three in ten (31%) women who have experienced IPV in the past five years say they usually obtain health care at a neighborhood clinic or health center, and one in ten (9%) usually get care at an emergency room. These differences in site of care may be driven by income, given that women who have experienced IPV are disproportionately lower-income.

One in Ten Women Who Have Experienced IPV in Past Five Years Usually Seek Care in an Emergency Room

Almost half of women who have experienced IPV in the past five years incurred a physical injury as a result. Some of the most common injuries reported by people who experience IPV include head trauma, gynecologic conditions, and fractures. Overall, 45% of women who experienced IPV in the past five years say that their IPV experience resulted in physical injury, which translates to about one in ten (9%) among all women ages 18 to 64 (Figure 6). Among women who experienced IPV in the past five years, majorities of those who identify as having a disability (61%) and have lower incomes (52%) report having physical injuries from IPV. The shares are similar across White, Black, and Hispanic women.

Almost Half of Women Who Reported Experiencing IPV in Past Five Years Say They Had A Physical Injury As a Result

Over one in ten (14%) women who have experienced IPV in the past five years did not receive health care services they needed. Women who experience IPV may need a wide range of health care services related to the impact of IPV. However, 14% of women who recently experienced IPV were not able to get medical or mental health care services related to IPV (Figure 7). Three in ten women say they needed health care services and did obtain them, and more than half (56%) of women who experienced IPV in the past five years say they did not need health services related to their IPV experience.

Among Women Who Experienced IPV in Past Five Years, 14% Did Not Receive Health Care They Needed

Privacy concerns, fear, and intimidation are leading reasons why women experiencing IPV do not get care. People who experience IPV are typically dealing with multiple, complicated circumstances that can affect whether, when, and if they can disclose IPV and seek and obtain care. Among women who experienced IPV in the past five years and did not receive care that they needed, nearly six in ten (58%) say it is because they did not want anyone to find out (Figure 8). For some, fear of retribution from a partner is too high to seek care. Almost four in ten (37%) women who did not receive care say they feared the police or child protective services would get involved. Prior research finds that some women affected by IPV report that involvement of police authorities can backfire on them because they lose care of their children or are accused of crimes they did not commit. Health system barriers affect women experiencing IPV too. Almost four in ten (38%) say they could not afford to get care and one in ten (12%) say services were unavailable, which may be tied to their higher rates of uninsurance. Medical billing practices can make confidentiality challenging as violent partners may get a hold of billing statements and patient records.

Concerns About Privacy, Fear, and Intimidation Keep Many Women Experiencing IPV From Obtaining Needed Health Care

IPV and Mental Health Care

Violence, control, and coercion have severe negative effects on an individual’s mental health and well-being.  IPV is associated with higher rates of depression, anxiety, and substance use.  Mental health care has been identified as one of the essential health services needed for women affected by IPV.

Women who have been affected by IPV in the past five years have poorer self-reported mental health status and emotional well-being than those who have not. Almost half (46%) of women who have experienced IPV in the past five years describe their mental health and emotional well-being as “fair” or “poor,” twice the share of those who have not (Figure 9). Conversely, 42% of women who have not been affected by IPV in the past five years describe their mental health as “excellent” or “very good,” over twice the share of women affected by IPV (18%). Just over one-third of each group rates their health as “good.”

Nearly Half of Women Who Have Experienced IPV in Past Five Years Rate Their Mental Health as Fair or Poor

Many women encounter barriers to mental health care, particularly those affected by IPV. Among women who have experienced IPV in the past five year who rate their health as fair or poor, two-thirds (66%) say that in the past year they did not obtain mental health care they thought they needed. This is also the case for half (50%) of women with fair or poor mental health who have not experienced IPV recently.

IPV and Reproductive Health

IPV often begins during women’s reproductive years, and research has documented associations between IPV and several sexual and reproductive health challenges, including higher risk for sexually transmitted infections, inconsistent use of contraception, and high rate of unplanned pregnancies.

Among reproductive age women who experienced IPV and were pregnant in the past five years, four in ten say they experienced violence around the time of pregnancy. Pregnancy can be a risky period for people experiencing IPV, as some people report that violence increases or intensifies during and after pregnancy. Experiences with IPV have been linked with greater risk for negative maternal and fetal health complications, including preterm birth, low birthweight, as well as maternal and fetal death in the most severe cases.  Among women of reproductive age (18 to 49 years old) who were pregnant and experienced IPV in the past five years, one in five say they experienced IPV in the year prior to their last pregnancy (21%), during their most recent pregnancy (22%), and in the year after (20%). Overall, four in ten women of reproductive age who have experienced IPV say they experienced IPV during one of these periods (Figure 10).

Four in Ten Reproductive Age Women Who Report Experiencing IPV in Past Five Years Said They Experienced Violence Around the Time of Pregnancy

Among women who were pregnant in the past five years, a higher share of those who also experienced IPV (65%) said they needed mental health services during or within the first year after pregnancy, compared to those who were not affected by IPV (44%).

Eight in ten women of reproductive age who have experienced IPV in the past five years report using contraception in the past year. Preventing pregnancy is the leading reason for using contraception for this group, but one in five women who have experienced IPV in the past five years use it to prevent an STI.

The majority of reproductive age women who have experienced IPV, as well as those who have not, used contraception in the past year (Figure 11).  For most contraceptive methods, rates of use are similar between women who have experienced IPV in the past five years and those who have not. However, more women affected by IPV report using condoms (38%, 33% respectively) and withdrawal (32%, 21%) compared to those not affected by IPV, which is surprising given that these methods are controlled by men. One in four women affected by IPV report they have had a sterilization procedure, one in five use IUDs and one in five say they used EC. One notable difference is why women use contraception. One in five women who have experienced IPV in the past five years say they use it to prevent an STI, twice the share among women who have not experienced IPV in the past five years (9%).

Reproductive coercion, control by an intimate partner over reproductive health issues such as use of contraception or an abortion, is also a form of IPV. More than one in ten (13%) women who have experienced other forms of IPV in the past five years also report that a partner has tried to stop them from using contraception so they would become pregnant against their will (data not shown).

A Higher Share of Women Who Have Experienced IPV Report Using Contraception to Prevent Sexually Transmitted Infections

One in four reproductive age women who have experienced IPV in past five years says they or their partner made a change in contraception practices because of the overturning of Roe v. Wade. Since the 2022 Supreme Court ruling that overturned Roe v. Wade, many states have banned or severely restricted abortion access, which has prompted some people to make changes in their use of contraception. Overall, nearly twice as many women affected by IPV (26%) say they’ve made a change than those who have not recently experienced IPV (14%). In particular, 10% of reproductive age women who have experienced IPV in the past five year has obtained EC to have on hand in case they need it. Almost one in ten (8%) report starting contraception or switching to a more effective method (Figure 12).

One in Four Reproductive Age Women Who Have Experienced IPV in the Past Five Years Report Changing Contraceptive Practices Because of Overturn of Roe

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Report on Pediatric Gender Dysphoria and Gender Conversion Efforts

Author: Lindsey Dawson
Published: May 6, 2025

On May 1, 2025, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) released Treatment for Pediatric Gender Dysphoria: Review of Evidence and Best Practices, a report issued following the Executive Order, “Protecting Children From Chemical and Surgical Mutilation,” which directed the HHS Secretary to publish an evidence review related to gender dysphoria in young people within 90 days.

Access to gender affirming care has becoming increasingly contested political territory in the United States. A growing number of states have laws that ban youth access (27 to date), and there are numerous legal challenges underway, including a case that is before the Supreme Court. The issue also figured prominently in the presidential election cycle, with President Trump campaigning on promises to end access to such care. The Executive Order and report are in line with a range of other executive actions that question evidence around gender affirming care, aim to limit access to these medical services, particularly for youth, and, in some cases, promote misinformation or deny the existence of transgender people.

The report states that it is a review of the evidence and best practice regarding information about treatment of gender dysphoria. Its main conclusion is that the quality of evidence on the effects of any intervention is low, and evidence on harms is “sparse.” Still the report cites what it identifies as significant risks of medical transition, marking a departure from most medical associations and widely used guidelines in the U.S. Instead, the report supports the use of psychotherapeutic approaches, including an approach termed “exploratory therapy”, which can include conversion therapy.

Shortly after its release, the review received criticism by researchers, advocates, and medical association for its methods, lack of alignment with current guidance, promotion of misinformation, support of certain practices, and decision not to disclose the authors. A particular concern was raised about the review’s support of “exploratory therapy” Other groups including the Christian legal advocacy group Alliance for Defending Freedom and the Center for American Liberty supported the review’s assessment.

This policy brief reviews the main points raised by the report regarding its emphasis on psychotherapy, and recommendations around “exploratory therapy”, which could include gender conversion practices, as well as the current legal and policy environment across the country.

What does the report say about psychotherapy as treatment for gender dysphoria and conversion practices?

Psychotherapy is one of five dedicated parts in the review and a theme that receives significant attention is support for gender identity conversion based practices, sometimes called “conversion” or “reparative” “therapy,” which the report calls “exploratory therapy.” The report counters this description stating that “equating ‘exploratory therapy’ with ‘conversion therapy’ is misguided and that equating any “approach focused on reducing a minor’s distress about their body or social role [with conversion therapy] is a problematic.” Other reasons provided include: pointing to Dutch practices, stating that all therapy is exploratory, and noting that the label “conversion therapist” is damaging.

Conversion practices aim to “suppress or alter an individual’s sexual orientation or gender to align with heterosexual orientation, cisgender identity, and/or stereotypical gender expression. [These]…efforts are premised on or motivated by the belief that diversity in sexual orientation and/or gender identity and expression is a deficit, mental illness, or pathology.” Major medical associations (described in detail below) in the U.S. conclude that conversion practices lack evidence and are, at best, unfair or ineffective and at worst, harmful. The United Kingdom’s Cass Review, like the HHS report, reviewed evidence around gender affirming care for minors and made recommendations to the National Health Service. While it ultimately led to restrictions on access to this care in the UK, in discussing psychotherapy, it stated “that no LGBTQ+ group should be subjected to conversion practice.”

The review describes “exploratory psychotherapy,” in part, as “trying to help children and adolescents come to terms with their bodies” and goes on to equate the distress related to gender dysphoria with general “discomfort with the sexed body or with societal sex-based expectations is common during puberty and adolescence.” This goes against identified best practice which encourages clinicans to recognize to recognize that transgender and gender non-conforming people “are more likely to experience positive life outcomes when they receive social support or trans-affirmative care.”

The report promotes therapeutic approaches as first line treatment and suggests that they can be an “alternative to endocrine and surgical interventions for the treatment of pediatric gender dysphoria.” This runs contrary to guidelines which suggest a range of approaches to gender affirming care, which is highly individualized, to be delivered as clinically appropriate. The review presents therapeutic modalities and describes how they can be applied to treat gender dysphoria, noting especially their potential to interrogate the wish for gender transition. For example, of psychodynamic therapy, the review states that this modality “can help patients gain deeper understanding of their personal identity, including any external factors that may contribute to their cross-sex identification and desire for medical/surgical interventions…”

The report, and the Executive Order, also question Standards of Care issued by the World Professional Association for Transgender Health (WPATH), which are widely relied on guidelines that providers look to in delivering evidence based best practice gender affirming care. These standards are regularly referenced by major medical associations including the American Psychological Association. While the report suggests that psychotherapy is not common in delivering gender affirming care to minors, psychological wellbeing is promoted within WPATH’s guidance. WPATH recommends “health care professionals working with gender diverse adolescents undertake a comprehensive biopsychosocial assessment of adolescents who present with gender identity-related concerns and seek medical/surgical transition-related care, and that this be accomplished in a collaborative and supportive manner.”

What is the aim of conversion efforts and what does evidence say about them?

Gender conversion practices are based on the premise that non-cisgender identities are a pathology and that transgender people would benefit from changing their gender identity. Medical evidence does not support this and, as noted below, most major medical associations have concluded that such interventions stand to cause harm. Yet, the efficacy of and ability to provide these services, due to local regulations, remains somewhat contested.

Research has shown that lifetime exposure to gender identity conversion efforts are associated with adverse mental health outcomes, including higher odds of depression, suicidality, and suicide attempts and substance abuse.

Where does the medical establishment stand on conversion practices?

Sexual orientation and gender identity have a long history of being pathologized, including in the mental health field. It was not until 1994 that “transsexualism” was removed from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) when it was replaced with “gender identity disorder.” This diagnosis was then replaced with “gender dysphoria” in 2013. Today, it is widely accepted by established medical groups that the full spectrum of sexual orientations and gender identities are not pathologies and do not need treatment. The American Academy of Pediatrics, for example writes “variations in gender identity and expression are normal aspects of human diversity, and binary definitions of gender do not always reflect emerging gender identities.” Rather, some gender diverse people experienced distress “caused by the body and mind not aligning and/or societal marginalization of gender-variant people.” Thus, care is typically provided to relieve distress, not to try to treat certain gender identities.

Broadly, gender affirming care is supported by practically all major medical associations in the U.S., including, the American Medical AssociationAmerican Academy of Pediatrics, and the American Psychological Association. It is also supported through guidance from the Endocrine Society and the World Professional Association for Transgender Health (WPATH).

Specifically, conversion approaches to gender dysphoria contrast with recommendations from these medical associations, which criticize conversion practices, stating that they lack evidence, are ineffective, and can create harm. In August 2023, 28 medical and mental health associations signed onto a joint statement opposing conversion practices. Additionally, many have provided independent statements addressing their concerns regarding these practices. For example:

  • An American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) policy statement (reaffirmed in 2023) states that “reparative approaches have been proven to be not only unsuccessful but also deleterious and are considered outside the mainstream of traditional medical practice. The AAP described reparative approaches as ‘unfair and deceptive.’”
  • In a 2018 policy statement The American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry (AACAP) wrote of “conversion therapies” that “these interventions are provided under the false premise that homosexuality and gender diverse identities are pathological. They are not; the absence of pathology means there is no need for conversion or any other like intervention. Further, there is evidence that ‘conversion therapies’ increase risk of causing or exacerbating mental health conditions in the very youth they purport to treat…AACAP asserts that such ‘conversion therapies’ (or other interventions imposed with the intent of promoting a particular sexual orientation and/or gender as a preferred outcome) lack scientific credibility and clinical utility. Additionally, there is evidence that such interventions are harmful. As a result, ‘conversion therapies’ should not be part of any behavioral health treatment of children and adolescents.”
  • The American Psychological Association (APA) writes that “to consider …[gender identity change efforts (GICE)]…as therapies or treatments is inaccurate and inappropriate because, the incongruence between sex and gender in and of itself is not a mental disorder…so, any behavioral health or GICE technique or treatment that seeks to change an individual’s gender identity or expression is not indicated; thus, any behavioral health or GICE effort that attempt to change an individual’s gender identity or expression is inappropriate.”
  • National Association of Social Workers (NASW) states that “NASW upholds that sexual orientation, gender identity, and gender expression are real and irrefutable forms of identity. Thus, NASW condemns any and all forms of conversion practices, as they are harmful to the mental health and well-being of LGBTQIA2S+. These practices stand in direct conflict with NASW’s professional code of ethics, and these practices represent a significant risk of harm by subjecting individuals to forms of treatment.”

How common is it for transgender people to experience conversion practices?

While conversion practices are widely discredited, KFF polling finds that one-in-ten transgender adults report having attended “conversion” or “reparative” therapy that tried to change their sexual orientation or gender identity as a teen or child. Since the share is much lower among LGBT adults as a group (1%), it is likely that many of these experiences were aimed at gender identity. Similarly, the Trevor Project finds that “13% of LGBTQ+ young people reported being threatened with or subjected to conversion therapy.”

One in Ten Transgender Adults Attended "Conversion" or "Reparative" Therapy That Tried to Change Their Sexual Orientation or Gender Identity as a Teen or Child

As noted, while medical consensus is against the use of conversion practices, this matter has not been settled in the policy realm. States have increasingly stepped in to regulate the practice in clinical settings, with almost half banning it in full or in part. According to data from the Movement Advancement Project, currently:

  • 19 states and DC have bans on the practice of conversion therapy.
  • 4 states have a partial ban in their state (e.g. banning the practice among those with only certain licenses or banning the use of state funds in the provision conversion therapy).
  • 4 states prohibit local level bans on conversion therapy either via state law or a court ruling.
  • 19 states have no policy.

Beyond these state actions, some cities and counties have enacted policies prohibiting at least certain conversion practices.

Notably, states currently have the ability to regulate therapeutic practice and prohibit conversion efforts by certain mental health professionals but conversion efforts also take place within religious settings and those are not included in these prohibitions. KFF polling finds that 25% of transgender adults report that they attended religious services that tried to change their sexual orientation or gender identity as a child or teen.

The ability of states to ban conversion therapy will soon be reviewed by the Supreme Court, which, on March 10, 2025, granted certiorari in Chiles v. Salazar, a case challenging Colorado’s conversion therapy ban for minors. The state’s ban, which prohibits mental health professionals from attempting or purporting to change a minor’s sexual orientation or gender identity, was upheld by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in September 2024. Chiles, a Christian counselor, has appealed this decision and asked the Supreme Court to review “whether a law that censors certain conversations between counselors and their clients based on the viewpoints expressed regulates conduct or violates the Free Speech Clause.” A decision in Chiles’ favor could limit the ability of states to regulate such practices.

This review could be used as support for other actions the administration seeks to take (some described here) aimed at limiting minor access to gender affirming care. With respect to therapeutic practices, it could shift how some practitioners approach gender affirming care or potentially provide support to those using conversion related approaches. The report could also fuel misinformation in other areas, particularly around regret rates and the share of transgender young people seeking a medical transition.

Access and Coverage for Mental Health Care for Women

Published: May 6, 2025

Mental health continues to be a growing area of health concern for people, with 90% of Americans saying there is a mental health crisis in the U.S. in a 2023 KFF-CNN poll. Women’s mental health often differs from men’s, with women experiencing some mental health symptoms more commonly than men but also conditions that are unique to women, such as perinatal and perimenopausal depression.

This brief analyzes data from the 2024 KFF Women’s Health Survey (WHS), a nationally representative survey of 6,246 adults ages 18 to 64, including 5,055 women and 1,191 men, conducted from May 15 to June 18, 2024. In addition to several topics related to reproductive health and well-being, the survey asked respondents about their mental health and their experiences accessing mental health services in the past year. This issue brief presents KFF WHS data on access to mental health services among women and men ages 18 to 64, and it also takes a closer look at mental health coverage among women. See the Methodology section for details.

Key Takeaways

  • Nearly three in ten women ages 18 to 64 (28%) describe their mental health or emotional well-being as “fair” or “poor”, including higher shares of women with low incomes (38%) and those who identify as LGBT+ (45%). Nearly three quarters of those who say they have a mental health-related disability (73%) report having “fair/poor” mental well-being.
  • Three in ten (29%) women say they received mental health services in the past 12 months. About half of women who describe their mental health as “fair/poor” say they received mental health care in the past year (48%). While eight in 10 ten women with a self-reported mental health-related disability (81%) say they received care, one in five did not.
  • Among women who report receiving mental health services, the most commonly reported services are one-on-one care with a provider, in-person (60%) and/or via telehealth (55%). Just over half of this group report receiving a prescription for medication (52%). Few women say they received care through a mental health therapy app (7% of those who report receiving services) or other services like in-patient hospitalization or group therapy (8%).
  • Four in ten women overall (38%) say it is difficult for women to get mental health services in their state. One-third (32%) of all women say they did not get mental health services despite needing them, citing barriers such as cost, stigma, or inability to get time off from work.
  • Among women who were able to get mental health care, half (50%) say it is difficult for women to access mental health services in their state, and more than half say they experienced barriers during care-seeking (55%). These challenges include trouble finding a provider that was accepting new patients (25%) or one that accepted their insurance (21%). The large majority of women with Medicaid say their most recent mental health care visit was covered completely by Medicaid (85%), whereas most women with private insurance had to pay some (48%) or all (14%) costs out-of-pocket.
  • Cost is a significant barrier to obtaining mental health services. More than one in ten women 18 to 64 (13%) say they did not get mental health care or could not continue to afford the mental health care they were receiving because of cost. More than twice as many women without insurance (29%) cite cost as a reason for not getting care.

Self-Described Mental Health

In general, slightly larger shares of women describe their mental health status as “fair” or “poor” compared to men (28% vs. 23%). Most women (72%) and men (77%) describe their mental health as either “good” or “excellent/very good” (Figure 1).

As other research has found, younger adults report mental health challenges at higher rates than older adults. Over one third of younger women ages 18 to 25 describe their mental health status as “fair” or “poor” (36%), compared to a smaller share of women ages 50 to 64 (21%). A higher share of 50 to 64 — about half (49%) – describe their mental well-being as “excellent” or “very good,” which is considerably higher than just three in ten (30%) younger women ages 18 to 25.

About 4 in 10 women (38%) who have low incomes (below 200% of the federal poverty level (FPL)) report fair or poor mental health status, nearly double the rate reported by those with higher incomes (21%). Nearly two times as many women who identify as LGBT+ (45%) say their mental health is “fair” or “poor” compared to those who do not identify as LGBT+ (24%). Not surprisingly, nearly three-quarters of women who identify as having a mental health-related disability (73%) say they have “fair” or “poor” mental health, three times the rate of those who do not identify as being disabled (24%) or who have another non-mental health disability (27%).

Nearly Three Quarters of Women Who Identify as Having a Mental Health-Related Disability Report Fair/Poor Mental Health

Mental Health Care Utilization

Not only do a slightly larger share of women than men report poorer mental health status, but compared to men, a somewhat larger share of women report receiving mental health care in the past 12 months (Figure 2). Roughly three in the ten women (29%) say they received mental health services from a mental health professional, compared to 22% of men.

Younger women are also more likely to use mental health services than older women. One in three women under the age of 50 say they received professional mental health care in the past year, compared to just 22% of women between age 50 and 64. Compared to their White counterparts (31%), smaller shares of Asian (19%) and Hispanic (24%) women say they received mental health care in the past year, consistent with previous mental health findings from KFF polling. Black (30%) and White women report obtaining mental health care at similar rates.

Consistent with the findings on self-described mental well-being, nearly twice as many women who identify as LGBT+ (45%) than those who do not (27%) say they received mental health care in the past 12 months. Similarly, eight in ten women who identify as having a mental health-related disability (81%) say they received mental health services, compared to 27% of women who identify as having another disability and 18% of women who do not identify as disabled.

Higher shares of women with lower incomes and those covered by Medicaid say they obtained mental health services compared to their higher income and privately insured counterparts. While mental health services can be very costly and private insurance coverage is often limited and associated with high out-of-pocket costs, Medicaid, a program designed for people with low incomes, typically has nominal or very low out-of-pocket costs for enrollees.

While use of mental health services is higher among many of the subpopulations that rate their mental health lower, still about half (48%) of women who rate their mental health as “fair” or “poor” say they obtained mental health care, suggesting that many women with “fair” or “poor” mental health who could benefit from care are not getting it. The survey also shows that mental health services are used by people across the mental health continuum. Three in ten (31%) women who rate their mental health as “good” and more than one in ten (13%) who describe it as “excellent” or “very good” say they received care in the past year.

Less Than Half of Women With Fair or Poor Mental Health Report Receiving Mental Health Services in the Past 12 Months

When asked what kind of mental health services they received in the past 12 months, most women who say they received care say they received 1-on-1 care with a provider, either in-person (60%) or via telehealth (55%). About half of women who say they received mental health care in the past year report getting a prescription for a medication (52%).

Fewer than one in ten women who report receiving care (7%) say they received care through a mental health therapy app, like BetterHelp or Talkspace, which connect patients to a clinician for virtual appointments but outside of the traditional medical system, or through another avenue (8%) such as inpatient hospitalization or group therapy (Table 1).

The types of mental health services women use vary by demographics. While similar shares of women across all age groups say they received in-person 1-on-1 care with a provider, larger shares of women ages 26 to 35 compared to women ages 50 to 64 say they used digital services for care, such as telehealth services (59% vs. 49%, respectively) and care through a mental health therapy app (8% vs. 3%, respectively). One in ten women ages 18 to 25 who say they received care say they received care through a mental health therapy app. There were no statistically significant differences by age for prescription medications and other mental health services.

Among those who report receiving mental health services in the past year, nearly six in ten (59%) women who rate their mental health as “fair” or “poor” report receiving a prescription medication, as do half (50%) of women who describe their mental health as “good” and more than a third (37%) of those who rate it as “excellent/very good.”

Among those who report receiving mental health care, larger shares of women who identify as LGBT+ than those are not LGBT+ say they accessed mental health care through telehealth service (65% vs. 52%) or through a mental health therapy app (12% vs 6%). More women who identify as LGBT+ also say they received a prescription for a medication compared to their non-LGBT+ counterparts (60% vs. 50%).

Over half of women say they received more than one type of mental health service in the past 12 months (58%). Higher shares of women with “fair” or “poor” mental health (65%) and/or who identify as having a mental health-related disability (73%) say they received more than one type of service in the past year.

Mental Health Services Used By Women 18 to 64

Coverage of Mental Health Services

While federal laws require parity for insurance coverage of mental health care, gaps in coverage remain. All state Medicaid programs provide coverage for mental health services for beneficiaries with low incomes, and the Affordable Care Act (ACA) requires most individual and small group insurance insurers to cover behavioral health care, which includes mental health services. However, the scope of coverage varies, provider networks are limited in many plans, and mental health providers may not accept all insurance plans or in some cases, any insurance.

The large majority of women with Medicaid coverage who access care say their most recent visit was completely covered by Medicaid (85%) (Figure 3). Of the remaining 15%, 4% say they received free services at a clinic or health center. Medicaid is the single largest payer of behavioral health services, which includes mental health care and substance use services. By design, Medicaid charges very little cost-sharing.

Most women with private insurance say they had to pay at least some out-of-pocket costs for their most recent mental health care. Nearly half (48%) paid some of the cost out-of-pocket while their insurance covered part of the cost and 14% paid the full cost out-of-pocket. About one in three (32%) women with private insurance say their most recent visit was completely covered by their insurance plan.

Only One Third of Women With Private Insurance Say Their Insurance Covered the Full Cost of Their Most Recent Mental Health Service

Barriers to Accessing Mental Health Care

Overall, four in ten women (38%) say it is difficult to access mental health services in their state, but this share rises to half (49%) among women who say they recently received mental health care in the past year (Figure 4).

Among Women Who Say They Received Mental Health Care in the Past 12 Months, Half Say It Is Difficult to Get Mental Health Services in Their State

One in three women (32%) say they did not get mental health services in the past year even though they needed them (Figure 5). More than one third of women younger than 50 say they did not get the care they needed compared to 22% of women 50 to 64. Four in ten uninsured women (40%) say they needed mental health care but did not get it, compared to 31% of women with private insurance. Half of women who identify as LGBT+ (50%) say they needed mental health care but did not get it, compared to three in ten who do not identify as LGBT+ (29%). Similarly, nearly half of women with a mental health disability (47%) say they did not get mental health care even though they needed it. More than half of women with “fair” or “poor” mental health did not get the care they say they needed (55%).

One in Three Women Say They Did Not Get Mental Health Services Even Though They Needed Them, Including Over Half of Those Who Describe Their Mental Health as Fair or Poor

When asked to indicate the reason(s) why they did not get the care they needed, many women say they did not get care because they felt better or dealt with their mental health issues by themselves (38%) (Figure 6). However, three in ten women who say they did not get needed care cite cost (32%), being unable to take time off from work or being too busy (29%), or feeling afraid, embarrassed, or ashamed to seek care (31%). A small share of women cites some other reason (8%), such as transportation barriers or challenges with reaching providers to coordinate a visit.

While Some Women Say They Dealt With Their Mental Health Themselves, Many Cite Cost, Time-off From Work, and Shame as Reasons They Did Not Receive Care

It is not uncommon for those who receive care to also experience challenges while trying to find care. Among women who received mental health care in the past 12 months, more than half (55%) say they experienced a barrier during their care seeking journey (Figure 7). One in four women who say they received care say they had trouble finding a provider that was accepting new patients (25%) and about one in five had trouble finding a provider that accepted their insurance (21%). One in four women who received mental health care in the past year say they had trouble scheduling an appointment in a reasonable amount of time (24%).

There were few differences between women of different subgroup, with the exception of higher shares of LGBT+ women experienced challenges getting mental health services (66%) compared to 52% of women who do not identify as LGBT+, including trouble finding a provider, and affording the cost. These findings reflect well documented shortages, burnout, and high demand among clinicians in the mental health profession.

More Than Half of Women Say They Experienced Barriers When Trying To Get Care

While only 5% of all women say they had difficulty finding a provider who spoke their language or one from a similar racial or ethnic background as themselves, these findings vary by race/ethnicity. Significantly larger shares of Hispanic (11%) and Black (8%) women report facing this challenge, compared to just 1% of White women (Figure 7). These findings are consistent with previous KFF polling, underscoring the additional and disproportionate challenges people of color face when accessing mental health care.

Larger Shares of Women of Color Say They Had Difficulty Finding a Mental Health Care Provider From a Similar Racial/Ethnic Background As Themselves

Cost continues to be a commonly reported barrier to mental health care. More than one in ten women 18 to 64 (13%) say they did not get mental health care or could not continue to afford the mental health care they were receiving because of cost (Figure 9). Thirteen percent (13%) of women with private insurance say they did not get care because of cost, and more than twice as many women without insurance (29%) cite cost as reason for not getting care. The share is lower among women with Medicaid, reflecting the program’s important role in providing access to mental health services, but still 8% cite cost as a barrier. The barriers are multi-pronged. Insurance networks can be very narrow for mental health care, and a significant portion of mental health clinicians do not participate in insurance networks. These findings on cost barriers underscore the ongoing challenges with affordable mental health care, especially among the uninsured, but even for those with coverage.

Cost Of Mental Health Services Is A Barrier to Care Especially For Uninsured Women, But Also For Those With Insurance
Poll Finding

KFF Tracking Poll on Health Information and Trust: Vaccine Safety and Trust

Published: May 6, 2025

Findings

Key Findings

  • As the Trump administration attempts to overhaul many government health agencies, the latest KFF Tracking Poll on Health Information and Trust finds that partisans’ trust in these agencies as sources of reliable vaccine information has shifted from where it stood under the Biden administration with trust declining among Democrats and rising among Republicans. While Democrats remain more likely than Republicans to trust the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the share of Republicans who have a “great deal” or “fair amount” of trust in these agencies to provide vaccine information has increased by about 10 percentage points from 2023. Concurrently, trust in these agencies as reliable sources of vaccine information has fallen among Democrats by double digits, including for the CDC (70% now v. 88% in 2023) and the FDA (67% v. 86%).
  • Less than half of the public express confidence in government health agencies like the CDC and FDA to carry out many of their core responsibilities, including just three in ten (32%) who have confidence in them to act independently without interference from outside interests. Six in ten adults — including three in four Democrats and nearly half of Republicans — say these agencies are not paying enough attention to science when it comes to making decisions and recommendations about vaccines. In addition, at least three in ten say these agencies are paying “too much attention” to the beliefs of officials running the agencies (34%) and the interests of pharmaceutical companies (30%) when making vaccine-related decisions.
  • Most adults say they are at least “somewhat confident” in the safety of many routine vaccines, including those for measles (83%), the flu (74%), and — among adults ages 50 and older for whom these vaccines are recommended — pneumonia (82%) and shingles (79%). The public, however, remains less confident in the safety of the COVID-19 vaccine amid continued partisan disagreement. Just over half (56%) of adults say they are at least “somewhat confident” that the COVID-19 vaccines are safe, including nearly nine in ten Democrats (87%), about half of independents (55%), but just three in ten Republicans.
  • With the public split in their confidence of the safety of COVID-19 vaccines, the oft-politicized mRNA technology that many of these vaccines rely on remains obscure to much of the public. About twice as many adults think vaccines that use mRNA technology are “generally safe” (32%) as say they are “generally unsafe” (16%), but about half (52%) report not knowing enough about this technology to say. In addition, nearly half of the public (45%) report having heard the false claim that mRNA vaccines can alter a person’s DNA – a myth related to COVID-19 vaccines that began circulating early in the pandemic. While just 3% think this claim is “definitely true,” most are uncertain, saying it is either “probably true” (26%) or “probably false” (45%). However, there are important differences by party identification and ethnicity when it comes to believing or leaning toward believing the myth that mRNA vaccines alter DNA, with at least one-third of Republicans (37%), independents (33%), and Hispanic adults (38%) saying the claim is either “definitely true” or “probably true.”

Partisan Trust in Government Health Agencies and Officials as Reliable Sources of Vaccine Information

The latest Tracking Poll on Health Information and Trust finds that partisan trust in government health agencies on vaccines has shifted notably since the Biden administration, with trust declining among Democrats and rising among Republicans.

Overall, doctors remain the most trusted source of reliable vaccine information among the public with eight in ten adults (83%) saying they trust their doctor or health care provider a “great deal” or “fair amount” to provide reliable information about vaccines and a similar share (81%) of parents saying they trust their child’s pediatrician. Smaller shares of the public, but still a majority, say they trust government health agencies, including their local public health department (66%), the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, or CDC (59%), or the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, or FDA (57%) to provide reliable information about vaccines. About half of the public (51%) say they trust pharmaceutical companies at least a “fair amount” as source of reliable vaccine information. Fewer than half of adults – or about four in ten – say they trust Health and Human Services Secretary Robert F. Kennedy Jr. (41%) or President Trump (37%) to provide reliable information about vaccines.

Doctors and Pediatricians Are the Most Trusted Sources of Vaccine Information Among the Public and Parents, While Fewer Than Half Trust Trump or RFK Jr. on Vaccines

The share of adults who say they have a “great deal” or “fair amount” of trust in the CDC and the FDA to provide reliable information about vaccines is similar to the share who said so in September 2023. However, this apparent stability masks some notable shifts in partisan trust amid a change in leadership at these agencies. Fewer Democrats – though still a majority — now say they have a “great deal” or “fair amount” of trust in the CDC (70% now v. 88% in 2023) and the FDA (67% v. 86%) to provide reliable information on vaccines. Conversely, the share of Republicans who express trust in these agencies has risen by about ten percentage points, with about half of Republicans now saying they trust the CDC (51% now up from 40% in 2023) and the FDA (52% v. 42%) to provide information on vaccines.

While Democrats are still more likely than Republicans to trust either the CDC or FDA as a source of vaccine information, the shifts in trust mark a notable reversal in partisan trends first observed during the start of the COVID-19 pandemic. In 2022, KFF tracking polls showed declining trust in government health agencies to provide information about COVID-19 vaccines – a change largely driven by declining trust among Republicans alongside consistently higher levels of trust among Democrats. More recent KFF polling has shown declining trust in government agencies to provide health information in general among the public, with trust declining among both Democrats and Republicans in some cases. The most recent uptick among Republicans and decline among Democrats in trust of the CDC and FDA may be a reflection of polarized views on the Trump administration’s efforts to overhaul government health agencies and shift vaccine policy and messaging, including the way vaccines are tested.

The Share of Democrats Who Trust the CDC and FDA as a Source of Reliable Vaccine Information Has Declined Significantly, While Republican Trust Has Risen

While individual doctors garner the highest shares of trust across partisan groups, there are partisan gaps in trust in nearly all sources of vaccine information. At least eight in ten Democrats, independents and Republicans say they trust their own doctor or health care provider “a great deal” or “fair amount” to provide reliable information about vaccines; however, Democrats are more likely than Republicans to say this (93% v. 78%). Similarly, while majorities of parents regardless of partisanship trust their child’s pediatrician at least a fair amount to provide reliable vaccine information, Democratic parents are more likely than Republican parents to say so (91% v. 73%). Notably, about one in four (27%) Republican parents say they trust their child’s pediatrician “not much” or “not at all” to provide reliable information about vaccines.

Beyond the CDC and FDA, there are additional divides in trust between Democrats and Republicans on the share who trust their local public health department (83% of Democrats v. 51% of Republicans), pharmaceutical companies (69% v. 39%), and among parents, their child’s school or day care (71% v. 33%). These partisan divides in trust are consistent with findings from previous KFF polling.

Republicans are much more likely than both independents and Democrats to say they trust President Trump and Health and Human Services Secretary Robert F. Kennedy Jr. as reliable sources of vaccine information. Three quarters of Republicans say they have a “great deal” or “fair amount” of trust in President Trump (74%) and Robert F. Kennedy Jr. (73%) to provide reliable information about vaccines. This is considerably larger than the share of independents and Democrats who say they trust either as reliable sources of vaccine information: 30% of independents and 10% of Democrats say they trust President Trump, while 35% of independents and 16% of Democrats say they trust Secretary Kennedy.

Notably, Republicans are as likely to say they trust President Trump and Secretary Kennedy as they are to say they trust their own doctor as a source of reliable vaccine information.

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Confidence in Federal Government Health Agencies To Carry Out Responsibilities

Even as majorities of the public express trust in government health agencies to provide information on vaccines, less than half of the public express at least some confidence in agencies like the CDC and FDA to carry out many of their responsibilities, such as ensuring the safety and effectiveness of prescription drugs (46%) or to ensure the safety and effectiveness of vaccines approved for use in the U.S. (45%). About four in ten (42%) have confidence in government health agencies to respond to outbreaks of infectious diseases. Even fewer, or one-third (32%), express at least “some” confidence in government health agencies to act independently without interference from outside interests. Fewer than one in five adults say they have “a lot” of trust in these agencies to fulfill each of these tasks.

Fewer Than Half of the Public Express Confidence in Government Health Agencies To Ensure Safety of Prescription Drugs or Vaccines, Respond to Disease Outbreaks, or Act Independently

Less than half of Democrats, independents, and Republicans have at least “some” confidence in government health agencies to ensure the safety of prescription drugs, respond to infectious disease outbreaks, or act independently without outside interference. Democrats, however, are more likely than Republicans to say they have “some” trust in government health agencies to ensure the safety and effectiveness of vaccines (52% v. 43%). However, similar shares of Democrats and Republicans express confidence in these agencies to ensure the safety of prescription drugs, respond to infectious disease outbreaks, or act independently.

Across Partisanship, Half or Fewer Are Confident in Government Health Agencies To Carry Out Key Responsibilities, but Democrats Are More Likely Than Republicans To Express Confidence on Vaccine Safety

One reason behind a lack of confidence in government health agencies may be that most of the public, including larger shares of Democrats, say that under the Trump administration, government health agencies like the CDC and FDA are not paying enough attention to science when making decisions about vaccines. Six in ten adults say these agencies are not paying enough attention to science when making decisions about vaccines, while one-third say they are paying “about the right amount of attention” (34%) and fewer than one in ten say they pay “too much attention” to science (6%). The share of adults who now say government health agencies are not paying enough attention to science when making decisions about vaccines is higher than the share who expressed similar sentiments in September 2020, when just under half of adults said that under the Trump administration, the CDC and FDA were not paying enough attention to science when reviewing and approving treatments for coronavirus.

Health and Human Services Secretary Robert F. Kennedy Jr. has raised question about pharmaceutical companies’ influence and conflicts of interest within government health agencies, while Kennedy himself has faced criticisms over how his own views on vaccines might influence government policy. The public is split over whether government health agencies are paying the right amount of attention to pharmaceutical companies or the beliefs of officials running the agencies when making decisions about vaccines. Three in ten adults say government health agencies are paying “too much attention” to the interests of pharmaceutical companies and similar shares say they are paying “about the right amount of attention,” while four in ten say they are paying “not enough attention.” Adults are similarly divided over whether government health agencies are paying the right amount of attention to the beliefs of officials running these agencies, with similar shares saying they’re either paying “too much attention” (34%), “not enough attention” (36%) or “about the right amount of attention” (29%) when it comes to making decisions or recommendations about vaccines.

Six in Ten Adults Say Government Health Agencies Like the CDC and FDA Are Not Paying Enough Attention to Science

Democrats are much more likely than Republicans to say government health agencies like the CDC and FDA are not paying enough attention to science when making decisions about vaccines (73% v. 45%). On the other hand, Republicans are more than twice as likely as Democrats to say government health agencies are paying about the “right amount of attention” to the beliefs of officials running these agencies (45% v. 19%).

Most Democrats and Independents Say Government Health Agencies Are Not Paying Enough Attention to Science Compared to Just Under Half of Republicans

Confidence in Vaccine Safety and Views of mRNA Vaccines

A majority of the public continues to express confidence in the safety of most routine vaccines; however, nearly four years since they were first approved for use, views on the COVID-19 vaccines remain divisive and largely partisan, consistent with prior KFF polling.

At least three in four adults, including majorities across partisans, say they are either “very confident” or “somewhat confident” that vaccines for measles, mumps, rubella (83%) or the flu (74%) are safe. Among adults ages 50 and older – for whom the CDC currently recommends both the pneumonia and shingles vaccines – eight in ten say they think vaccines for pneumonia (82%) or shingles (79%) are safe, including majorities across partisans.

However, confidence in the safety of the COVID-19 vaccine is much lower than these other routine vaccines. About half (56%) of adults say they are at least “somewhat confident” that the COVID-19 vaccines are safe, including nine in ten (87%) Democrats compared to just three in ten Republicans. The share of the public and partisans who express confidence in the safety in the flu and COVID-19 vaccines has not changed notably since September 2023. For more information on the public’s views on measles and the MMR vaccines, see KFF’s prior release from the April Tracking Poll on Health Information and Trust.

Majorities Are Confident in the Safety of Many Routine Vaccinations, but the Safety of COVID-19 Vaccines Remain Divisive

Many of the COVID-19 vaccines – including other vaccines under development for diseases including cancer – rely on a vaccine technology known as messenger-RNA (mRNA). COVID-19 vaccines that use mRNA technology have been proven safe and effective but have long been the subject of misinformation and recently come under attack, with Republican legislators in some states recently attempting to ban or limit the use of mRNA vaccines and the National Institutes of Health (NIH) reportedly urging scientists to remove references to the technology from their grant applications.

The latest poll finds that while few adults think mRNA vaccines are unsafe, many say they don’t know enough about the technology to have an opinion. Overall, one-third (32%) of adults say vaccines that use mRNA technology are “generally safe” compared to about one in six (16%) who say they are “generally unsafe.” But at the same time, about half of the public (52%) say they do not know enough about this technology to say. At least one in five Republicans (23%) and independents (18%) say they think mRNA vaccines are “generally unsafe” compared to far fewer Democrats (3%), but still, most Republicans (61%) and roughly half of independents and Democrats say they do not know enough to say whether mRNA vaccines are safe or not.

At Least Half of the Public and Partisans Don’t Know Enough About mRNA Vaccines To Say Whether They Are Safe, Though Democrats Are Less Likely To Believe They Are Unsafe

Large shares of the public report having heard the false claim that mRNA vaccines alter your DNA – a persistent myth that began circulating early on during the COVID-19 pandemic — and while few think this is definitely true, most are uncertain. Exposure to and uncertainty surrounding this false claim has existed since early on in the COVID-19 pandemic, when KFF polling found that about one in five adults who had heard the claim believed or were unsure whether COVID-19 vaccines could change your DNA.

About half of the public (45%) say they have read or heard the false claim that mRNA vaccines can change your DNA, including about half of Republicans (48%) and independents (47%) and four in ten Democrats (38%). Exposure to the false claim also differs across race and ethnicity. About half (51%) of White adults say they have heard the myth that mRNA vaccines can alter DNA compared to fewer Hispanic adults (35%) and Black adults (27%).

About Half of the Public Say They Have Heard the False Claim That mRNA Vaccines Can Change Your DNA, Including Larger Shares of Republicans, Independents, and White Adults

With about half the public saying they have heard the myth that mRNA vaccines alter your DNA, just 3% of all adults say they think this claim is “definitely true,” and a quarter (24%) say it is “definitely false.” However, as previous KFF polling has found on a wide array of misinformation topics, most adults express uncertainty and fall in the “malleable middle” with seven in ten saying it is either “probably true” (26%) or “probably false” (45%) including majorities of Republicans and independents, and about half of Democrats.

While at least four in ten across party and race and ethnicity say they think this false claim is “probably false,” larger shares of Republicans, independents, and Hispanic adults believe or lean toward believing it, saying it is “probably true” or “definitely true.” Overall, three in ten adults say it is “definitely” or “probably true” that mRNA vaccines can change your DNA, but this increases to 37% of Republicans and one in three independents (compared to 13% of Democrats). About four in ten (38%) Hispanic adults believe or lean toward believing the myth that mRNA technology alters DNA, compared to about a quarter of White adults (28%) and Black adults (26%).

Large Majorities of the Public and Partisans Are Uncertain if the Myth That mRNA Vaccines Can Change Your DNA Is True

Believing or leaning toward believing the myth that mRNA vaccines can alter your DNA is tied to negative perceptions of the COVID-19 vaccines’ safety. Among those who say it is “definitely true” or “probably true” that mRNA vaccines change your DNA, a large majority (77%) say they are not confident that the COVID-19 vaccines are safe, including half (51%) who say they are “not at all confident.” While the vast majority of those who say it is “definitely false” that mRNA vaccines alter DNA in turn express confidence in the safety of the COVID-19 vaccines (86%), confidence drops among those who lean toward thinking this is false, with just six in ten (63%) of those who say this myth is “probably false” expressing confidence in the COVID-19 vaccine’s safety.

Adults Who Believe or Lean Toward Believing the Myth That mRNA Vaccines Alter Your DNA Largely Lack Confidence in the COVID-19 Vaccine's Safety

Methodology

This KFF Health Tracking Poll/KFF Tracking Poll on Health Information and Trust was designed and analyzed by public opinion researchers at KFF. The survey was conducted April 8-15, 2025, online and by telephone among a nationally representative sample of 1,380 U.S. adults in English (1,322) and in Spanish (58). The sample includes 1,022 adults (n=48 in Spanish) reached through the SSRS Opinion Panel either online (n=997) or over the phone (n=25). The SSRS Opinion Panel is a nationally representative probability-based panel where panel members are recruited randomly in one of two ways: (a) Through invitations mailed to respondents randomly sampled from an Address-Based Sample (ABS) provided by Marketing Systems Groups (MSG) through the U.S. Postal Service’s Computerized Delivery Sequence (CDS); (b) from a dual-frame random digit dial (RDD) sample provided by MSG. For the online panel component, invitations were sent to panel members by email followed by up to three reminder emails.

Another 358 (n=17 in Spanish) adults were reached through random digit dial telephone sample of prepaid cell phone numbers obtained through MSG. Phone numbers used for the prepaid cell phone component were randomly generated from a cell phone sampling frame with disproportionate stratification aimed at reaching Hispanic and non-Hispanic Black respondents. Stratification was based on incidence of the race/ethnicity groups within each frame. Among this prepaid cell phone component, 194 were interviewed by phone and 164 were invited to the web survey via short message service (SMS).

Respondents in the prepaid cell phone sample who were interviewed by phone received a $15 incentive via a check received by mail. Respondents in the prepaid cell phone sample reached via SMS received a $10 electronic gift card incentive. SSRS Opinion Panel respondents received a $5 electronic gift card incentive (some harder-to-reach groups received a $10 electronic gift card). In order to ensure data quality, cases were removed if they failed two or more quality checks: (1) attention check questions in the online version of the questionnaire, (2) had over 30% item non-response, or (3) had a length less than one quarter of the mean length by mode. Based on this criterion, no cases were removed.

The combined cell phone and panel samples were weighted to match the sample’s demographics to the national U.S. adult population using data from the Census Bureau’s 2024 Current Population Survey (CPS), September 2023 Volunteering and Civic Life Supplement data from the CPS, and the 2024 KFF Benchmarking Survey with ABS and prepaid cell phone samples. The demographic variables included in weighting for the general population sample are sex, age, education, race/ethnicity, region, civic engagement, frequency of internet use, political party identification by race/ethnicity, and education. The weights account for differences in the probability of selection for each sample type (prepaid cell phone and panel). This includes adjustment for the sample design and geographic stratification of the cell phone sample, within household probability of selection, and the design of the panel-recruitment procedure.

The margin of sampling error including the design effect for the full sample is plus or minus 3 percentage points Numbers of respondents and margins of sampling error for key subgroups are shown in the table below. For results based on other subgroups, the margin of sampling error may be higher. Sample sizes and margins of sampling error for other subgroups are available on request. Sampling error is only one of many potential sources of error and there may be other unmeasured error in this or any other public opinion poll. KFF public opinion and survey research is a charter member of the Transparency Initiative of the American Association for Public Opinion Research.

GroupN (unweighted)M.O.S.E.
Total1,380± 3 percentage points
Parents of children under 18457± 6 percentage points
Party ID
Democrats469± 6 percentage points
Independents466± 5 percentage points
Republicans361± 6 percentage points

 

News Release

As COVID-19 Divisions, Attacks, and Misinformation Take Their Toll, Less Than Half of the Public Is Confident That the CDC and FDA Can Carry Out Core Functions 

Under the Trump Administration, Democrats’ Confidence in Federal Agencies’ Vaccine Information Falls Sharply, While Republicans’ Trust Increases

Published: May 6, 2025

Five years after the start of  COVID-19 pandemic and the communications challenges, divisions, and false claims that followed, less than half of the public say they have at least some confidence in the federal government’s health agencies like the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to carry out many of their core responsibilities, a new KFF Tracking Poll on Health Information and Trust finds.The low levels of confidence apply to federal agencies’ ability to ensure the safety and effectiveness of prescription drugs (46% express at least some confidence) and vaccines (45%), and to respond to outbreaks of infectious diseases (42%). Even fewer (32%) express at least “some” confidence in the agencies to act independently without interference from outside interests. 

When it comes to vaccines specifically, close to six in 10 adults have at least “a fair amount” of trust in either the FDA (57%) or CDC (59%) to provide reliable information. That leaves about four in 10 who say they trust the two institutions “not much” or “not at all” when it comes to vaccines (43% for the FDA, 41% for the CDC).The overall level of trust in each case is similar to where it stood in September 2023, though the poll reveals significant partisan shifts as the second Trump administration and Health and Human Services Secretary Robert F. Kennedy Jr. have started to change vaccine policies and messaging.The shares of Democrats who say they trust the FDA and CDC have fallen by nearly 20 percentage points since 2023, while the shares of Republicans who trust each of the agencies have increased by about 10 points. While those shifts have narrowed a partisan divide on trust, Democrats remain more likely than Republicans to say they trust each agency’s vaccine information.

“There are remarkably low levels of trust in the nation’s scientific agencies, shaped by partisan perspectives, and that presents a real danger for the country if and when another pandemic hits,” KFF President and CEO Drew Altman said. 

Amid the Trump administration’s ongoing changes to vaccine policy that could affect COVID-19 vaccines relying on mRNA technology, the poll finds that nearly half (45%) of the public say they’ve heard or read about the false claim that the mRNA vaccines such as those used for COVID-19 can change their DNA. 

Very few (3%) say the false claim is “definitely true,” while a quarter (24%) say it is “definitely false.” Most are unsure, saying the claim is “probably true” (26%) or “probably false” (45%).

About a third (32%) of adults say vaccines that use mRNA technology are “generally safe” compared to about one in six (16%) who say they are “generally unsafe.” At the same time, about half of the public (52%) say they do not know enough about this technology to say. At least one in five Republicans (23%) and independents (18%) say they think mRNA vaccines are unsafe compared to far fewer Democrats (3%).

Other findings include:

  • Six in 10 adults (60%) say that under the Trump administration, federal health agencies are not paying enough attention to science. This includes most Democrats (73%) and independents (63%) but less than half of Republicans (45%).
  • Large majorities of the public are at least somewhat confident in the safety of most vaccines, including those for measles, mumps and rubella (83%), the flu (74%), and, among those ages 50 and older, pneumonia (82%) and shingles (79%). A narrower majority (56%) has confidence in the safety of COVID-19 vaccines, reflecting low confidence among Republicans (30%). 

The poll is part of KFF’s Health Information and Trust Initiative, which is aimed at tracking health misinformation in the U.S., analyzing its impact on the American people, and mobilizing media to address the problem. 

Designed and analyzed by public opinion researchers at KFF, this survey was conducted April 8-15, 2025, online and by telephone among a nationally representative sample of 1,380 U.S. adults in English and in Spanish. The margin of sampling error is plus or minus 3 percentage points for the full sample. For results based on other subgroups, the margin of sampling error may be higher.

Medicaid Covers at Least One in Five Hospital Inpatient Days in Nearly Every State

Published: May 5, 2025

The House and Senate are working on legislation to meet the requirements in the budget resolution, specifying cuts to Medicaid of up to $880 billion or more over 10 years. Large reductions in Medicaid spending are likely to have direct implications for the 83 million people covered by Medicaid, state budgets, and health care providers, including hospitals. Medicaid accounted for about one fifth (19%) of all spending on hospital care in 2023 and cuts to payments for care or loss of coverage could have implications for hospitals’ finances, the cost and quality of care, and people’s ability to access hospital services. There could be consequences for the broader economy too given that hospitals are the sixth largest employer in the country across industry subsectors.

To inform these discussions, this analysis describes the percent of inpatient hospital days that are covered by Medicaid (also referred to as the “Medicaid inpatient share”), nationally and by state. The analysis uses Medicare cost report data from 2023 (the most recent year available) and focuses on hospitals that are non-federal (see Methods for more details about the hospitals included and analysis).

Medicaid covered at least one in five inpatient hospital days in 48 states and the District of Columbia (hereafter referred to as a state) in 2023. Medicaid covered at least 25% of inpatient days in 30 states and at least 30% of days in 10 states (see Figure 1). The Medicaid share ranged from 11% in Wyoming to 37% in New Mexico. Medicaid covered about one in four (26% of) inpatient days nationally. Variation across states is driven by Medicaid eligibility levels—including whether a state has opted to expand under the Affordability Care Act—as well as demographics. Medicaid’s share of hospital use is likely higher than its share of hospital revenues in part because Medicaid payment rates are generally lower than what commercial insurers pay.

States with the highest Medicaid shares included a mixture of red and blue states. For example, among the 10 states with Medicaid shares of at least 30%, five were states that voted for President Trump in the 2024 election (Alaska, Kentucky, Louisiana, Nevada, and Oklahoma) and five were states that voted for Vice President Harris (California, Colorado, DC, New Mexico, and New York).

Medicaid covered about four in ten (41% of) births nationally in 2023, almost half (47%) of births in rural areas, and at least 40% of births in 26 states according to prior KFF analysis. The vast majority of births occur in hospitals.

Medicaid Covered 26% of Hospital Inpatient Days Nationally, and at Least 20% in Nearly All States

With hospital care accounting for about one third of Medicaid spending in 2023, large Medicaid cuts would be likely to affect hospitals. Some policy options under discussion would affect hospitals directly by reducing the payments made to hospitals through managed care organizations (by limiting what are known as state directed payments) or restricting states’ ability to fund Medicaid through provider taxes, which often support higher payments for hospitals. Also being considered are options to reduce federal spending on the Affordable Care Act (ACA) Medicaid expansion, which has helped improve hospital finances and may have especially benefited rural hospitals. The hospital industry has been lobbying Congress against proposed cuts, arguing that reductions in Medicaid spending would threaten access to hospital care for all patients—not just Medicaid beneficiaries—and the National Rural Health Association has argued that Medicaid spending reductions would lead rural hospitals to reduce or eliminate the services they offer or close altogether.

Also on the horizon is the expiration of the enhanced Affordable Care Act (ACA) subsidies in 2026; there would likely be implications for hospitals if the subsidies are allowed to expire, as the number of uninsured people would increase by 3.8 million per year on average according to Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projections.

This work was supported in part by Arnold Ventures. KFF maintains full editorial control over all of its policy analysis, polling, and journalism activities.

Methods

Data and Hospital Inclusion Criteria: This analysis relied on the RAND Hospital Data, a cleaned and processed version of the annual cost reports that Medicare-certified hospitals are required to submit to the federal government. The analysis included non-federal general short-term hospitals in the 50 states and the District of Columbia. The analysis excluded 47 hospitals that did not report total inpatient days, reported negative total Medicaid or inpatient days, or had a Medicaid share greater than 100%. These hospitals together represented 1% of non-federal general short-term hospitals in the 50 states and the District of Columbia (ranging from 0% in several states to 7% in Connecticut). The final sample included 4,400 hospitals.

We conducted a sensitivity analysis to assess how restricting to hospitals reimbursed under the inpatient prospective system (IPPS) would affect the results and found that it would have changed the results in each state by at most, one percentage point. Most IPPS hospitals directly report their Medicaid inpatient share, which is used for determining eligibility for Medicare disproportionate share hospital (DSH) status and the amount of DSH payments.

Calculation of Medicaid Shares: The analysis used the Medicaid inpatient share reported by hospitals to the federal government for the purposes of establishing Medicare DSH status and determining the amount of DSH payments for the 63% of hospitals in sample that reported that measure. For the 37% of hospitals that did not directly report their shares, the share was calculated from other lines in the cost reports. Medicaid days (the numerator) include Medicaid paid days and Medicaid eligible unpaid days. State shares reflect hospital shares weighted by the denominator (total inpatient days). When calculating shares or inpatient days, lines that were blank were treated as 0, including some instances where hospitals did not report any Medicaid days. Some hospitals had cost report periods that were less than or greater than 365 days, in which case days were scaled up or down to reflect a full year. Hospital data were sorted into fiscal year 2023 based on the mid-point of the reporting period.

Limitations: Cost report data are reported by hospitals and likely have some degree of inaccuracy. For example, it is possible that hospitals that are not part of the Medicare DSH program—which account for 41% of the hospitals in the sample and 7% of inpatient days—may have less incentive to fully account for Medicaid days, given that they do not receive Medicare DSH payments. In that case, the estimates in this analysis would be conservative. It is also possible that the data are inaccurate in other ways that could lead to this analysis overreporting shares, and reporting issues could vary by state.

 

White House Releases FY26 Budget Request

Published: May 2, 2025

On May 2, 2025, the White House released preliminary details of its FY26 budget request, including funding for global health activities at the State Department, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and the Fogarty International Center (FIC) at National Institutes of Health (NIH). While funding amounts for most areas (e.g., HIV, tuberculosis, maternal and child health, etc.) were not specified (more detailed budget information is expected later this month or in June), the proposed budget includes significant reductions in global health funding overall. It also includes proposed rescissions to prior year funding amounts. As specified in the request:

State/USAID:

  • Global Health Programs (GHP) account: Totals $3.8 billion, $6.2 billion below the FY25 amount ($10.0 billion).
  • States that the budget focuses on “lifesaving assistance and preventing infectious diseases from reaching the United States.”
  • President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR): States that funding is preserved for any current beneficiaries.
  • Family Planning & Reproductive Health (FP/RH): Suggests that the administration is proposing to eliminate funding for FP/RH programs in line with previous actions (see here and here).
  • World Health Organization (WHO): In line with the Trump Administration’s executive order Withdrawing The United States From The World Health Organization, “pauses” assessed and voluntary contributions to WHO.

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC): Eliminates the CDC’s Global Health Center, which was funded at $693 million in FY25.

Fogarty International Center (FIC): Eliminates FIC, which is at NIH and was funded at $95 million in FY25.

Table: KFF Analysis of Global Health Funding in the FY 2026 Budget Request
Department / Agency / ProgramFY25 CR (based on FY24 Final, millions)FY26 Request (millions) 1Difference (FY26 Request – FY25 CR, millions)Notes: 1
State Department & USAID
Global Health Programs (GHP)

 

$10,030.5

 

$3,797.5

 

-$6,232.5

 

The United States is the largest global contributor to programs that provide so-called family planning services through liberal NGOs, and have funded abortions. This stands in direct conflict with the President’s action reinstating the “Mexico City Policy.” The Budget protects life and prevents a proabortion agenda from being promoted abroad with taxpayer dollars. The Budget focuses on lifesaving assistance and preventing infectious diseases from reaching the United States. The U.S. President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief funding is preserved for any current beneficiaries.
Family Planning & Reproductive Health (FP/RH) 2$607.5$0-$607.5
World Health Organization (WHO)3$118.9$0-$118.9The Budget pauses most assessed and all voluntary contributions to UN and other international organizations, including for the UN Regular Budget, UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, and the World Health Organization. This is consistent with Executive Order 14199, “Withdrawing the United States From and Ending Funding to Certain United Nations Organizations and Reviewing United States Support to All International Organizations.” To preserve maximum negotiating leverage, the President can choose to fund these international organizations out of the A1OF if he chooses.
Health & Human Services (HHS)
CDC Global Health Programs$692.8$0-$692.8The Budget refocuses CDC’s mission on core activities such as emerging and infectious disease surveillance, outbreak investigations, and maintaining the Nation’s public health infrastructure, while streamlining programs and eliminating waste. The Budget proposes merging multiple programs into one grant program and giving States more flexibility to address local needs. Specifically, the Budget proposes consolidating funding for Infectious Disease and Opioids, Viral Hepatitis, Sexually Transmitted Infections, and Tuberculosis programs into one grant program funded at $300 million.The Budget eliminates duplicative, DEI, or simply unnecessary programs, including: the National Center for Chronic Diseases Prevention and Health Promotion; National Center for Environmental Health; National Center for Injury Prevention and Control; the Global Health Center; Public Health Preparedness and Response, which can be conducted more effectively by States; and the Preventive Health and Human Services Block Grant, the purposes for which can be best funded by States. The Budget refocuses CDC on emerging and infectious disease surveillance, outbreak investigations, preparedness and response, and maintaining the Nation’s public health infrastructure. The Budget maintains more than $4 billion for CDC.
NIH Fogarty International Center (FIC)$95.16$0-$95.16The Administration is committed to restoring accountability, public trust, and transparency at the NIH. NIH has broken the trust of the American people with wasteful spending, misleading information, risky research, and the promotion of dangerous ideologies that undermine public health. While evidence of the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic leaking from a laboratory is now confirmed by several intelligence agencies, the NIH’s inability to prove that its grants to the Wuhan Institute of Virology were not complicit in such a possible leak, or get data and hold recipients of Federal funding accountable is evidence that NIH has grown too big and unfocused. Further, the NIH has been involved in dangerous gain-of-function research and failed to adequately address it, which further undermines public confidence in NIH. The NIH has also promoted radical gender ideology to the detriment of America’s youth. For example, the NIH funded a study titled “Psychosocial Functioning in Transgender Youth after 2 Years of Hormones,” in which two participants tragically committed suicide. The Budget proposes to reform NIH and focus NIH research activities in line with the President’s commitment to MAHA, including consolidating multiple overlapping and ill-focused programs into five new focus areas with associated spending reforms: the National Institute on Body Systems Research; National Institute on Neuroscience and Brain Research; National Institute of General Medical Sciences; National Institute of Disability Related Research; and National Institute on Behavioral Health. The Budget also eliminates funding for the National Institute on Minority and Health Disparities (-$534 million), which is replete with DEI expenditures, the Fogarty International Center (-$95 million), the National Center for Complementary and Integrative Health (-$170 million), and the National Institute of Nursing Research (-$198 million). NIH research would align with the President’s priorities to address chronic disease and other epidemics, implementing all executive orders, and eliminating research on climate change, radical gender ideology, and divisive racialism. This new structure retains the Advanced Research Projects Agency for Health. The Budget maintains $27 billion for NIH research.

1 – Based on information provided in the “Fiscal Year 2026 Discretionary Budget Request – Major Discretionary Funding Changes” released by OMB on May 2, 2025.

2 – The family planning & reproductive health total includes bilateral funding and U.S. contributions to the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA).

3 – In addition to the assessed amounts, the U.S. provides voluntary contributions to WHO for specific projects/activities determined on an annual basis. These voluntary contributions are not represented here. The Trump Administration has indicated it is cancelling all contributions (assessed and voluntary) to WHO. The FY25 amounts are based on the FY24 levels, which are based on estimates listed in the FY25 Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Congressional Budget Justification.

Responding to Federal Medicaid Reductions: Which States Are Most at Risk?

Published: May 2, 2025

Issue Brief

Medicaid Watch

The House and the Senate have now passed a budget resolution that implies big, but unspecified, cuts to Medicaid. The House Energy and Commerce Committee is instructed to reduce the federal deficit by at least $880 billion over 10 years, with nearly all those cuts expected to come from Medicaid. The targets in the Senate are less clear, but Senate Majority Leader John Thune has suggested the Senate will seek at least $1.5 trillion in overall spending cuts, which again would have to include substantial cuts to Medicaid.

Medicaid is the primary program providing comprehensive health and long-term care to one in five people living in the U.S and accounts for nearly $1 out of every $5 spent on health care. There are not yet detailed proposals under consideration by Congress to achieve federal Medicaid spending reductions. Because Medicaid financing is shared between the states and the federal government, any reduction in federal Medicaid spending would leave states with tough choices about how to offset reductions through tax increases or cuts to other programs, like education, corrections, and economic development. If states are not able to offset the loss of federal funds, they would have to make cuts to their Medicaid programs by reducing coverage, restricting benefits, or lowering provider reimbursement rates.

Because states have some flexibility to determine which populations and services to cover, how to deliver care, and how much to reimburse providers, there is significant variation in Medicaid per enrollee spending across states. Some notable differences in policy choices include whether states have implemented the Medicaid expansion under the Affordable Care Act (ACA) as well as decisions about optional coverage for children, pregnancy, people with disabilities and people who need long-term care. State flexibility to cover benefits deemed optional by the federal government leads to significant variation in covered services, particularly the adoption of optional home care benefits. Because of this variation in state policy choices, some states may be disproportionately impacted by federal cuts depending on the specific federal policy changes pursued. For example, the effects of federal policy changes to reduce federal spending for the ACA expansion group would be limited to expansion states while a cap on per enrollee spending for all eligibility groups would impact all states.

States’ ability to respond to federal spending reductions and how they will be affected by any cuts is complicated and depends on an array of factors. The cuts will be made in the context of states’ existing Medicaid programs, but other factors, including population demographic characteristics, health status of Medicaid enrollees, available revenue and state budget choices, and measures of health care costs and access to care, that drive demand for Medicaid as well as states ability to raise revenue or reduce spending will also play a role. This analysis examines a range of measures within these four broad categories to identify states that may have greater difficulty responding to federal Medicaid spending reductions (Figure 1).

The measures used in the analysis were selected from many possible data points because of the availability of state-level data and because they highlight both the capacity of states to respond to federal reductions and the possible implications of federal reductions and state responses on specific populations. Choosing different measures would likely lead to different state rankings. To identify states most at risk, states were ranked separately for each measure, with ties receiving the same rank. Rankings were then summed across each measure within a category to produce a cumulative score, which was used to determine each state’s aggregate ranking for the category. For the full state aggregate ranking for each category, see the Appendix tables. State specific data for these measures as well as other key Medicaid program characteristics can be found in a data collection on State Health Facts.

Measures to Identify States at Greater Risk if Federal Medicaid Spending Is Reduced

All states will likely face challenges responding to federal Medicaid cuts and caps to varying degrees, but states with certain characteristics are more at risk. Six states (Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri, New Mexico, South Carolina, and West Virginia) rank in the top five for multiple risk categories and another nine states (Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, District of Columbia, Louisiana, New York, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Washington) rank in the top five for at least one category of risk factors.

Fifteen States Rank in the Top Five for One or More Categories of Risk Factors for Responding to Federal Medicaid Reductions

Demographics

Higher rates of poverty and unemployment among state residents as well as a growing share of individuals over age 85, increase demand for Medicaid, making it more difficult for states to respond to federal Medicaid reductions. Because Medicaid serves low-income populations, states with higher shares of residents in poverty or higher unemployment rates would likely experience continued enrollment in Medicaid even as they make cuts in response to federal funding reductions. Similarly, Medicaid is the largest provider of long-term care services, and an aging population could contribute to increased need for these services. Medicaid also disproportionately covers people with disabilities and finances 41% of births overall so states with higher shares of people ages 18 to 64 who have a disability and higher shares of the female population of reproductive age who have low incomes could face more challenges making program cuts. New Mexico, Kentucky, Louisiana, South Carolina, Arkansas, and Mississippi rank in the top 5 for states with population demographics that could make it difficult to respond to federal Medicaid reductions.

The measures used to rank states on population demographics include:

  • Higher Share of Population Below 100% FPL
  • Higher Unemployment Rate, March 2025
  • Higher Projected 5-Year Change in Population Ages 85+
  • Higher Share of Female Population Ages 18-49 Who Have Income Below 200% FPL
  • Higher Disability Rate for Working-Age Adults (18-64)
Demographics

Health Status

Medicaid cuts in states with Medicaid enrollees who have higher health care needs could undermine efforts to improve overall health status. Because Medicaid is a key source of coverage for individuals with significant health care needs, states with higher shares of Medicaid enrollees who are children with special health care needs, who have a disability, serious mental illness, or multiple chronic conditions, or who need long-term care may face greater challenges in restricting program coverage or benefits. Additionally, any cuts to Medicaid programs in states with sicker Medicaid enrollees could have more negative effects on individuals’ health and potentially the health status of the overall population. Missouri, West Virginia, Kentucky, Pennsylvania, and Mississippi rank in the top 5 for states with poor Medicaid enrollee health status that could worsen in the face of Medicaid program cuts made in response to federal funding reductions.

The measures used to rank states based on the health status of Medicaid enrollees include:

  • Higher Share of Children with Special Health Care Needs Covered by Medicaid/CHIP
  • Higher Share of Medicaid Enrollees Who Reported a Disability
  • Higher Share of Medicaid Enrollees with Serious Mental Illness (SMI)
  • Higher Share of Medicaid Enrollees Using Long-Term Care
  • Higher Share of Medicaid Enrollees Who Have Three or More Chronic Conditions
Health Status

State Revenue and Budgets

States that are more reliant on federal Medicaid and other federal funding and those that have more limited ability to raise revenue may have a harder time responding to federal funding reductions. Medicaid financing is shared by states and the federal government. For states that have a higher federal medical match rate (FMAP) replacing lost federal funding will require more state dollars than for states with the minimum FMAP. With broader federal funding reductions at play, states that rely more heavily on federal funding beyond Medicaid could face even deeper reductions in federal funding. States that currently spend less per capita may have a harder time reallocating spending across programs to offset federal reductions. While it is difficult for all states to increase revenue by raising taxes, states with lower taxable resources or lower tax collections per capita could experience greater challenges offsetting cuts. Mississippi, Alabama, South Carolina, Missouri, and Oklahoma rank in the top 5 for states with high reliance on federal funding and limited ability to raise revenue or reduce spending that could make it difficult to offset federal Medicaid funding reductions.

The measures used to rank states on their ability to raise revenue or reduce spending include:

  • Higher Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP) for Medicaid and Multiplier
  • Higher Share of State Spending from Federal Funds
  • Lower Total State Expenditures per Capita
  • Lower Total Taxable Resources per Capita
  • Lower State Government Tax Collections per Capita
State Revenue and Budgets

Health Care Costs and Access

States that face higher health care costs and related access issues could have a harder time cutting Medicaid spending without exacerbating existing access to care and provider shortage issues. Medicaid operates within the broader health care system. In higher cost markets, states have to spend more to pay for health care services needed by Medicaid enrollees and can make it harder to reduce spending. High health care costs can also be a barrier to accessing needed care for people who are un- or underinsured. In states with higher shares of residents reporting access to care issues and larger numbers of people living in primary care shortage areas, cutting provider reimbursement rates or scaling back on coverage or benefits in response to federal Medicaid spending reductions could worsen these issues. Alaska, West Virginia, District of Columbia, New York, New Mexico, and Washington rank in the top 5 for states with high health care costs and access barriers that could make it difficult to respond to Medicaid reductions.

The measures used to rank states on overall health costs and access to care include:

  • Higher Health Care Expenditures per Capita by State of Residence
  • Higher Average Annual Family Premium per Enrolled Employee for Employer-Based Health Insurance
  • Higher Share of Children (Ages 3-17) Who Faced Difficulties Obtaining Mental Health Care
  • Higher Share of Adults Who Report Not Seeing a Doctor in the Past 12 Months Because of Cost
  • Higher Share of the Population in a Primary Care Health Professional Shortage Areas (HPSAs)
Health Care Costs and Access

Appendix Tables

Demographics

Health Status

State Revenue and Budgets

Health Care Costs and Access

Section 1115 Waiver Watch: Early Signs Point to New Directions Under Trump Administration

Published: May 2, 2025

1115 waivers generally reflect priorities identified by states as well as changing priorities from one presidential administration to another. The Biden administration encouraged states to propose waivers that expand coverage, address health-related social needs (or “HRSN”), and assist individuals with reentry from incarceration. In contrast, the first Trump administration focused on work requirements and eligibility restrictions with a limited focus on enrollee social determinants of health; however, the administration approved a first-of-its kind waiver in North Carolina that allowed the state to provide limited housing and nutrition supports to targeted Medicaid enrollees. In addition, the Biden administration expanded waiver financing tools that had been limited under the first Trump administration.

While the future direction of demonstration waivers is uncertain, recent actions from the Trump administration could signal efforts to curtail waivers related to social determinants of health and to limit waiver financing tools and flexibility. Two major changes demonstrate this shift: (1)  rescinding Biden-era guidance on covering health-related social needs (HRSN) services, and (2) phasing out federal funding for “Designated State Health Programs” (DSHP) in waivers. This waiver watch examines these recent actions in the context of the recent history of Medicaid waivers aimed at addressing enrollee social determinants of health and DSHP.

Use of 1115 Waivers to Address Social Determinants of Health Under Biden and Trump Administrations

The first Trump administration generally had a limited focus on enrollee social determinants of health. Historically states have had limited ability to use Medicaid to help address social determinants of health. Social determinants of health (SDOH) are the conditions in which people are born, grow, live, work and age. SDOH include but are not limited to housing, food, education, employment, healthy behaviors, transportation, and personal safety. Despite a limited focus in general on SDOH, in 2018 the first Trump administration approved North Carolina’s “Healthy Opportunities Pilots,” allowing the state to cover certain non-medical services that target social needs, including housing, nutrition, transportation, and interpersonal relationship supports to specific and limited enrollees. The Pilots operated in three regions of the state and did not go as far as to provide coverage of rent/temporary housing or meal supports equivalent to three meals a day. The Trump administration later released guidance in 2021 highlighting existing federal authorities and opportunities for states to use Medicaid to address enrollee social determinants of health, including under Section 1115 authority.

The Biden administration moved to a more expansive 1115 “health-related social needs” framework and approved 18 waivers authorizing evidence-based housing and nutrition services for specific high-need populations under this framework. (Figure 1). Under the Biden administration, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) released a series of guidance documents (which were updated in 2024) on a new waiver opportunity to expand the tools available to states to address enrollee health-related social needs (or “HRSN”). The guidance included federal guardrails and requirements related to expenditure limits, service delivery requirements, and monitoring and evaluation requirements. The HRSN framework allowed for coverage of rent/temporary housing and utilities for up to six months and meal support up to three meals per day, departing from longstanding prohibitions on payment of “room and board” in Medicaid. CMS indicated broadening the availability of HRSN services was “expected to promote coverage and access to care, improve health outcomes, reduce health disparities, and create long-term, more cost-effective alternatives or supplements to traditional medical services.” CMS stressed new HRSN initiatives were not intended to replace other federal, state, and local social service programs but rather to complement and coordinate with these efforts. One of the final Biden administration HRSN approvals was an extension of North Carolina’s waiver under the new HRSN-framework. Reflecting findings from the evaluations of the initial waiver (discussed below in Box 1), the renewal expands the Healthy Opportunities program statewide, introduces new HRSN-framework services (e.g., short-term rental assistance, nutrition supports that were equivalent to three meals a day), and includes new DSHP funding authority.

Box 1. Evidence from North Carolina

Evaluations of the North Carolina “Healthy Opportunity Pilots” waiver approved by the first Trump administration show lower costs over time and largely positive outcomes. At the time of the waiver evaluation study period (March 2022 – November 2023), over 13,000 individuals had been enrolled in the three pilot regions within the state (most recent state data shows enrollment has since increased to about 42,000 as of March 2025). Services are targeted; enrollees must have at least one qualifying behavioral or physical health condition and one qualifying “social risk factor” (e.g., housing insecurity, food insecurity) to qualify for covered housing, nutrition, transportation, or interpersonal violence services.

Nearly 200,000 services had been delivered at the time of the evaluation, with food services representing more than 85% of all services delivered. While housing services were a lower share of services delivered, the average amount billed per housing service was higher at $532, compared to $131 per food service, $199 per transportation service, and $105 per IPV/toxic stress service. Examples of covered services include home remediation services, one-time payment of first month’s rent, medically tailored home-delivered meals, and violence intervention services. Comparing those who received Pilot services to Medicaid enrollees who screened positive for social risks but lived in regions not covered by the Pilots, the interim evaluation found:

  • Spending (including both Pilot service spending and spending for medical care) was, on average, $85 less per Pilot participant per month. Even with an increase in spending at enrollment, HOP participation resulted in lower overall spending over time.
  • Emergency department visits decreased following Pilot enrollment (an estimated reduction of 6 emergency department visits per 1,000 beneficiary months). Inpatient hospitalizations also decreased for non-pregnant adults (an estimated reduction of two admissions per 1,000 beneficiary months).
  • Participation in the Pilots reduced the number of unmet housing, nutrition, and transportation needs reported by enrollees.
  • No significant change was found on the impact of Pilot enrollment on inpatient admissions for children and pregnant adults, outpatient visits, and prenatal and postpartum care use. Due to a lack of data on clinical outcomes, the interim evaluation was unable to investigate whether Pilot participation affected clinical outcomes (e.g., diabetes, hypertension); subsequent evaluations may provide more information.

Use of DSHP Under Biden and Trump Administrations

Spending on certain Designated State Health Programs (DSHP) have been used to draw down federal matching dollars, but support for this policy has varied across the Trump and Biden administrations. HHS has authorized states to access federal Medicaid matching funds for certain types of state-funded health programs in waivers pre-dating the first Trump administration. Generally, this policy may expand available resources by freeing up state funds to finance new Section 1115 waiver initiatives. These state health programs (called DSHPs) do not otherwise qualify for federal funding, must have existed prior to 1115 waiver implementation, and often provide safety-net health care services for low-income or uninsured individuals (such as addiction recovery treatment or support for individuals with intellectual and developmental disabilities). With DSHP authority, states can claim federal match (up to set limits) for state programs approved by CMS.

The first Trump administration announced in 2017 it would no longer accept state proposals for new or renewing 1115 demonstrations that rely on federal matching funds for DSHP. In the guidance, the administration noted oversight concerns and stated there was no “compelling case that federal DSHP funding is a prudent federal investment.” At the time, authority for DSHP in active / current demonstrations was not affected but they could not be extended or renewed. Prior to the Trump administration, DSHP was often used to help finance Delivery System Reform Incentive Payment (DSRIP) waivers, which provided states with significant federal funding to support hospitals and other providers in changing how they provide care to Medicaid beneficiaries. Along with phasing out DSHP funding, the first Trump administration reduced funding for DSRIP renewals and did not approve new DSRIP demonstrations.

The Biden administration rescinded the 2017 DSHP guidance and approved 1115 demonstrations in eight states (nine total demonstrations) that provide federal funding for DSHPs (Figure 1). CMS only approved DSHP expenditure authority in a subset of states with HRSN 1115 approval (in waivers including CalAIM, New York’s Medicaid Redesign, and MassHealth). CMS approved the use of “freed up” state funds for HRSN initiatives (in all states with DSHP expenditure authority) and approved limited other uses (e.g., reentry and workforce initiatives) that varied across state approvals. In waiver approvals, CMS notes that only new waiver initiatives that were determined to promote the objectives of the Medicaid program (such as by “improving access to high-quality covered services”) could be financed with freed up state funds; new DSHP-funded initiatives were expected to not supplant existing services or programs. DSHP authority was described as time-limited and states were expected to submit sustainability plans that describe the state’s strategy to fund and maintain these initiatives beyond the current demonstration approval period. With these DSHP approvals, the Biden administration also introduced new guardrails, including that federal funding for DSHPs could not exceed 1.5 percent of the state’s total Medicaid spending and that states must use non-federal funding sources for at least 15 percent of the state’s share of the cost of new waiver initiatives. Similar to its guidance for HRSN programs, as a condition of DSHP approval CMS required states to meet provider payment rate requirements for core Medicaid services.

Health-Related Social Needs (HRSN) Waivers Approved as of January 20, 2025

In recent months, the Trump administration rescinded HRSN guidance issued by the Biden administration and announced it would be phasing out DSHP funding authority. Neither action affects currently approved / existing waivers but both may limit new HRSN / SDOH state waiver requests or waiver extension requests. CMS indicates in its March 2025 letter that rescinding HRSN guidance does not nullify existing HRSN approvals but going forward they will consider HRSN / SDOH requests on a “case-by-case” basis. The Trump administration also announced in April 2025 that it does not intend to approve new or extend existing requests for federal matching funds for state expenditures for DSHP. The guidance also says it does not intend to renew a funding mechanism for state health programs specific to Tennessee’s waiver called “designated state investment programs” or DSIP, approved by the Trump administration in 2021 and renegotiated by the Biden administration in 2023. Similar to the 2017 letter, the 2025 letter notes that federal DSIP and DSHP funding have “appeared to serve primarily as a financing mechanism for states” rather than as an integral part of demonstrations. The CMS press release said that “DSHPs and DSIPs have grown from approximately $886 million in 2019 to nearly $2.7 billion in eligible expenditures in 2025, representing increasing costs to the federal government without a sustainable state contribution.” Phasing out DSHP authority may limit states’ ability to finance new 1115 initiatives.

Future waiver approvals and CMS guidance will provide additional insight into the waiver priorities and financing approach of the new Trump administration.  With regard to waiver financing, in addition to phasing out DSHP the first Trump administration made other changes to 1115 waiver budget neutrality policy in 2018 designed to limit the amount of federal funds that could be used for waiver spending. Limits included changing the amount of savings states can carry over between demonstrations and establishing new rules on spending trend rates used in budget neutrality calculations. The Biden administration made changes to Section 1115 budget neutrality policies that provided greater flexibility for states to design and implement 1115 demonstration programs, including HRSN initiatives (such as not requiring offsetting savings for HRSN services). More broadly, the first Trump administration’s Section 1115 waiver policy emphasized work requirements – which were challenged in court – and other eligibility restrictions and capped financing. Since the Trump administration has taken office, some states are again pursuing Medicaid work requirements through Medicaid demonstration waivers. Work requirements in Medicaid are also being considered as part of a broader federal legislative package of potential changes to Medicaid designed to significantly reduce federal Medicaid spending. The future of work requirement waivers may depend on the outcome of these legislative debates, as legislation may mandate work requirements.

Breaking Down the U.S. Global Health Budget by Program Area

Published: May 1, 2025
Note: Starting on the first day of his second term, President Trump issued several executive actions that have fundamentally changed foreign assistance. These included: an executive order which called for a 90-day review of foreign aid; a subsequent “stop-work order” that froze all payments and services for work already underway; the dissolution of USAID; and the cancellation of most foreign assistance awards. The Trump administration has also been working to restructure several government departments and agencies, many of which carry out U.S. global health activities. As a result, U.S. global health programs have been disrupted and, in some cases, ended. While Congress has provided FY 2025 funding to these global health programs through a continuing resolution (CR), which maintains funding at the FY 2024 level, it is important to note that the impacts of the Trump administration changes to foreign assistance are not fully clear. As such, the data presented below are based on Congressional appropriations.

This fact sheet provides a historical overview of U.S. funding for global health by program area over the past decade. Funding totals are based on amounts specified by Congress in annual appropriations bills, as well as some amounts that are determined at the agency level. See our Budget Tracker for more detail on historical funding and our Budget Summaries for the latest on ongoing appropriations discussions.

U.S. Global Health Budget: Overview

The U.S. Government is the largest donor to global health in the world and includes support for both disease (HIV, tuberculosis, malaria, and neglected tropical diseases) and population (maternal and child health, nutrition, and family planning and reproductive health) specific activities as well as global health security. Most U.S. funding for global health is provided bilaterally (approximately 80%). Of the multilateral share, the majority is provided to The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (Global Fund). The U.S. investment in global health grew significantly in the early 2000s, largely due to the creation of new initiatives including the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and the President’s Malaria Initiative (PMI). However, over the last decade, U.S. funding for global health has remained relatively flat, with spikes in some years due to emergency supplemental funding for disease outbreaks, including Ebola, Zika, and COVID-19. In FY 2025, global health funding was provided through a continuing resolution (CR) which maintained the prior year (FY 2024) amount of $12.4 billion.

Figure 1

U.S. Global Health Funding, FY 2016 - FY 2025

Figure 2

U.S. Global Health Funding (in millions), By Program Area, FY 2025

Table 1

Historical Funding by Agency for Global Health, in millions

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U.S. Global Health Budget: Global HIV Funding, Including PEPFAR

The U.S. first provided funding to address the global HIV epidemic in 1986. U.S. efforts and funding increased slowly over time until the launch of the U.S. President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) in 2003, which initiated a period of significant increases and is the largest effort devoted to a single disease in the world. The majority of U.S. global HIV funding is for PEPFAR bilateral efforts (89%) with additional funding for UNAIDS and international HIV research activities. As part of its global HIV response, the U.S. also provides funding to the Global Fund (see below for details). PEPFAR funding is specified by Congress in annual appropriations bills and is largely provided to the Department of State, which is responsible, through the Bureau for Global Health Security and Diplomacy (GHSD), for coordinating all U.S. programs, activities, and funding for global HIV efforts. Other agencies that receive HIV funding under PEPFAR include the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and Department of Defense (DoD). In addition, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) supports international HIV research activities, (funding which is not counted as part of PEPFAR). Global HIV funding through regular appropriations1  has historically accounted for the largest share of the U.S. global health budget (ranging from 42% to 50% between FY 2016 and FY 2025). In FY 2025, global HIV funding was provided through a continuing resolution, which maintained the prior year (FY 2024) amount and totaled $5.4 billion, of which $4.9 billion is for PEPFAR2  ($4.8 billion for bilateral HIV and $50 million for UNAIDS), and approximately $575 million is for international HIV research activities at NIH.

Figure 3

U.S. Funding for Global HIV, FY 2016 - FY 2025

Table 2

Historical Funding by Agency and Account for Global HIV, in millions

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U.S. Global Health Budget: Tuberculosis (TB)

Since 1998, when the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) began a global tuberculosis (TB) control program, U.S. involvement in global TB efforts has grown and it is now one of the largest donors to global TB control in the world. U.S. bilateral TB funding is provided through USAID and includes U.S. contributions to the TB Drug Facility (additional U.S. support for TB activities is provided through its contribution to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria). U.S. funding for TB has grown over the past decade, with much of the increase occurring in more recent years. U.S. funding for TB rose from $240 million in FY 2016 to $406 million in FY 2025 and currently accounts for approximately 3% of the U.S. global health budget. FY 2025 funding was provided through a continuing resolution, which maintained the prior year (FY 2024) amount.

Figure 4

U.S. Funding for Global Tuberculosis (TB), FY 2016 - FY 2025

Table 3

Historical Funding by Agency and Account for Global Tuberculosis (TB), in millions

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U.S. Global Health Budget: Malaria/PMI

The U.S. government has been involved in global malaria activities since the 1950s and, today, is the second largest donor to global malaria efforts in the world (the largest is the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria). The U.S. response to malaria is driven by the President’s Malaria Initiative (PMI), an interagency initiative to address global malaria that was led by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and co-implemented together with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), with additional activities provided by the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and Department of Defense (DoD). In addition to its bilateral programs, the U.S. also supports malaria programs through its contribution to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. U.S. bilateral funding for malaria increased over the past decade from $873 million in FY 2016 to approximately $1 billion in FY 2025; while funding increased over the period, it has been relatively flat in recent years. In FY 2025, malaria accounted for 9% of the U.S. global health budget. FY 2025 funding was provided through a continuing resolution, which maintained the prior year (FY 2024) amount.

Figure 5

U.S. Funding for Global Malaria, FY 2016 - FY 2025

Table 4

Historical Funding by Agency and Account for Global Malaria, in millions

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U.S. Global Health Budget: The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria

The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (Global Fund) is an independent, public-private, multilateral institution which finances HIV, TB, and malaria programs in low- and middle-income countries. The Global Fund receives contributions from public and private donors and in turn provides funding to countries based on country-defined proposals. The U.S. provided the Global Fund with its founding contribution in 2001 and has since been its largest single donor (U.S. contributions to the Global Fund are counted as part of PEPFAR). However, Congress places a number of restrictions on U.S. contributions, including a funding match requirement that limits the amount the U.S. can contribute. The U.S. contribution to the Global Fund through regular appropriations has fluctuated over the past decade but reached its highest level to date ($2.0 billion) in FY 2023. In FY 2025, funding for the Global Fund was $1.7 billion, flat compared to the FY 2024 level, as funding was carried over due to the continuing resolution, and $375 million less than the FY 2023 level, though Congress stated the decline was due to the funding match requirement that limits the amount the U.S. can contribute. In addition to regular appropriations, Congress provided $3.5 billion in emergency supplemental funding to the Global Fund to address the impacts of COVID-19 on HIV programs in FY 2021.

Figure 6

U.S. Funding for The Global Fund, FY 2016 - FY 2025

Table 5

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U.S. Global Health Budget: Maternal & Child Health (MCH)

The U.S. has been involved in Maternal & Child Health (MCH) efforts since the 1960s (and is the largest donor government to MCH activities in the world). MCH funding, which includes funding for polio and U.S. contributions to Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance (GAVI) and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), is provided through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and the State Department. U.S. funding for MCH increased slightly from $1.14 billion in FY 2016 to $1.30 billion in FY 2025. This was primarily driven by increased funding to GAVI and polio during the period. In fact, when these are removed, bilateral MCH funding has remained relatively level for several years over the period. In FY 2025, MCH accounted for the third largest share of U.S. funding for global health (10%). FY 2025 funding was provided through a continuing resolution, which maintained the prior year (FY 2024) amount.

Figure 7

U.S. Funding for Global Maternal & Child Health (MCH), FY 2016 - FY 2025

Table 6

Historical Funding by Agency and Account for Global Maternal and Child Health (MCH), in millions

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U.S. Global Health Budget: Nutrition

The U.S. has a long history of supporting global efforts to improve nutrition and is the largest donor to nutrition efforts in the world. Historically, support for U.S. global nutrition activities was included as part of broader maternal and child health (MCH) funding; starting in 2010, Congress began to designate funding for nutrition activities, all of which is provided through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).3  U.S. funding for nutrition increased from $144 million in FY 2016 to $165 million in FY 2025 and has accounted for approximately 1% of the total U.S. global health budget over the period. FY 2025 funding was provided through a continuing resolution, which maintained the prior year (FY 2024) amount.

Figure 8

U.S. Funding for Global Nutrition, FY 2016 - FY 2025

Table 7

Historical Funding by Agency and Account for Global Nutrition, in millions

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U.S. Global Health Budget: Family Planning & Reproductive Health (FP/RH)

The U.S. has been involved in Family Planning & Reproductive Health (FP/RH) efforts since the 1960s and is currently the largest donor to global FP/RH in the world. The majority of U.S. FP/RH funding is provided through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) for bilateral activities, with additional funding provided through the State Department for the U.S. contribution to the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA).4  U.S. funding for FP/RH rose steadily in its first two decades5  and more recently, has remained relatively flat at just about $600 million, accounting for approximately 5-6% of the U.S. global health budget each year from FY 2016-FY 2025. FY 2025 funding was provided through a continuing resolution, which maintained the prior year (FY 2024) amount.

Figure 9

U.S. Funding for International Family Planning/Reproductive Health (FP/RH), FY 2016 - FY 2025

Table 8

Historical Funding by Agency and Account for International Family Planning and Reproductive Health (FP/RH), in millions

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U.S. Global Health Budget: Global Health Security

Since the 1990s, there has been growing concern about new infectious diseases that threaten human health including, in more recent years, the emergence and spread of threats such as Ebola, Zika, H1N1 influenza, COVID-19, and antibiotic resistance. U.S. global health security efforts aim to reduce the threat of emerging infectious diseases by supporting preparedness, detection, and response capabilities worldwide. Funding designated by Congress for global health security through both emergency and regular appropriations has fluctuated over time, rising largely in response to outbreaks, including Ebola, Zika, and COVID-19.6  The share of global health funding that global health security represents has increased over time, rising from 4% in FY 2016 to 10% in FY 2025. In FY 2025, funding for global health security was $1.3 billion. FY 2025 funding was provided through a continuing resolution, which maintained the prior year (FY 2024) amount.

Figure 10

U.S. Funding for Global Health Security, FY 2016 - FY 2025

Table 9

Historical Funding by Agency and Account for Global Health Security, in millions

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U.S. Global Health Budget: Neglected Tropical Diseases (NTDs)

NTDs are a group of parasitic, bacterial, and viral infectious diseases that primarily affect the most impoverished and vulnerable populations in the world. The U.S. Congress first designated funding to address NTDs in 2006, through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).7  Funding was flat at around $100 million for several years before rising to a peak of $115 million in FY 2023 and remained flat in FY 2024 and FY 2025. Funding for NTDs accounts for a relatively small share of the U.S. global health budget (1% in FY 2025). FY 2025 funding was provided through a continuing resolution, which maintained the prior year (FY 2024) amount.

Figure 11

U.S. Funding for Global Neglected Tropical Diseases (NTDs), FY 2016 - FY 2025

Table 10

Historical Funding by Agency and Account for Neglected Tropical Diseases (NTDs), in millions

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  1. In addition to regular appropriations, Congress provided $250 million in emergency supplemental funding to address the impacts of COVID-19 on U.S. bilateral HIV programs in FY 2021. ↩︎
  2. Total PEPFAR funding in FY 2025 is $6.5 billion ($4.8 billion for bilateral HIV, $50 million for UNAIDS, and $1.7 billion for the Global Fund). ↩︎
  3. Totals do not include funding provided through Food for Peace (FFP) due to the unique nature of the program. ↩︎
  4. Under current law, any U.S. funding withheld from UNFPA is to be made available to other family planning, maternal health, and reproductive health activities (see the KFF fact sheet on U.S. government international family planning and reproductive health statutory requirements and policies). ↩︎
  5. PAI. Cents and Sensibility: U.S. International Family Planning Assistance from 1965 to the Present. Accessed September 2022 at https://pai.org/cents-and-sensibility. ↩︎
  6. In FY15, Congress provided $5.4 billion in emergency funding to address the Ebola outbreak, of which $909.0 million was specifically designated for global health security. In FY16, Congress provided $1.1 billion in emergency funding to address the Zika outbreak, of which $145.5 million was specifically designated for global health security. In FY18, Congress provided $100 million in unspent Emergency Ebola funding for “programs to accelerate the capabilities of targeted countries to prevent, detect, and respond to infectious disease outbreaks.” In FY19, Congress provided $38 million in unspent Emergency Ebola funding for “programs to accelerate the capacities of targeted countries to prevent, detect, and respond to infectious disease outbreaks.” In FY20, Congress provided $1.235 billion in emergency COVID-19 funding to “prevent, prepare for, and respond to coronavirus” globally, and in FY21, Congress provided $9.4 billion in emergency COVID-19 funding “to prevent, prepare for, and respond to coronavirus, including for vaccine procurement and delivery.” While none of the FY20 funding was designated for global health security, all of the FY21 funding provided through CDC ($750 million) was designated by CDC as global health security. ↩︎
  7. Additional NTD funding is used for NTD research at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and National Institutes of Health (NIH), although this funding is not specified by Congress. ↩︎