State Awards From Most of the Rural Health Fund Could Vary Only Modestly Despite Large Differences in Rural Needs

Published: Nov 6, 2025

Issue Brief

The July 2025 budget reconciliation law, known as the One Big Beautiful Bill, established the Rural Health Transformation Program (referred to here as the “rural health fund”), which will distribute $50 billion to states with approved applications. The rural health fund was created to help offset the impact on rural areas of the law—which includes an estimated $911 billion in federal Medicaid spending reductions over ten years, including an estimated $137 billion in rural areas based on KFF estimates. The fund was also motivated by ongoing concerns about the financial vulnerability of many rural hospitals. CMS has indicated that the funds are intended to be used for investments in “system transformation” rather than for “perpetual operating expenses.” Funds can be used to support rural areas in a variety of ways, including by promoting prevention and chronic disease management interventions, supporting collaboration among rural health facilities, and recruiting clinical workers to rural areas. However, payments to providers for care cannot exceed 15% of total funds, though providers could benefit in other ways, such as through investments in existing buildings and infrastructure (restricted to 20% of total funds).

The law states that half of the fund ($25 billion) will be distributed equally to states with approved applications (i.e., without regard to need) while granting the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid (CMS) broad discretion over how to distribute the remaining funds. In September 2025, CMS released a Notice of Funding Opportunity (NOFO) explaining that the remainder ($25 billion) would be distributed across approved states based on measures of state need ($12.5 billion), as well as the quality of proposed initiatives, state policy, and other factors. The state application deadline was on November 5, 2025. CMS is required to make award decisions by the end of the year and plans to distribute the first $10 billion in January 2026.

This brief provides estimates of how $37.5 of the $50 billion fund could be distributed across states if all states are approved for funding. This $37.5 billion includes the portions of the fund that can be calculated or estimated based on available data, i.e., the $25 billion that will be distributed equally across states and the $12.5 billion that will be distributed based on CMS’s evaluation of measures of state need (such as the size of a given state’s rural population). Estimates of the latter are based on data from the Sheps Center, which are based on criteria specified by CMS in the NOFO using information available to the public. DC and Puerto Rico and the other U.S. territories are ineligible for funding and so were excluded from the analysis. Estimated awards in text are rounded to the nearest $10 million or to the nearest $10 per rural resident, as applicable. See Methods for more details.

Awards from the $37.5 billion (of the $50 billion) could range from an estimated $550 million (in Rhode Island) to just over $1 billion (in Texas) over five years if all states were approved for funding. These differences are relatively modest compared to the wide variation across states in rural health needs.

Actual awards based on the first $37.5 billion would differ if CMS does not award funding to every state or if the agency decides to reduce awards for a given state over time. Actual awards to states may also differ if CMS uses different data to allocate funds or applies different criteria when distributing funds than what was indicated in the NOFO. For example, when evaluating the share of hospitals receiving Medicaid disproportionate share hospital (DSH) payments, CMS is expected to use more current data than are available to the public.

States could receive more than the estimates in this analysis, because totals will include their portion of the $12.5 billion that will be distributed based on CMS’s discretionary scoring of state policy, state initiatives, and other factors, and these scores are not yet known. State initiatives will be scored based on their quality by a merit review panel. This analysis will be updated after CMS announces the first year of funding.

Estimated Awards

Estimated Awards From $37.5 Billion of the $50 Billion Rural Health Fund Could Range From $550 Million to Just Over $1 Billion Over Five Years if All States Were Approved for Funding

If the $37.5 billion is distributed to all states, states will receive $750 million over five years, on average, with estimates ranging from $550 million in Rhode Island to just over $1 billion in Texas (Figure 1). Estimated awards for most states (32) are within 10% of the $750 million average (i.e., between $675 million and $825 million), despite wide variation in rural health needs.

Some states with relatively small rural populations could receive a disproportionate share of the $37.5 billion based on other factors. For example, Alaska has a small total population and the fifth smallest rural population in the country, but it could receive the fifth largest award from the $37.5 billion ($940 million). Most of the extra dollars that Alaska is estimated to receive from the $12.5 billion based on state need reflect the fact that a portion would go exclusively to the five states with the largest land area. Alaska is the largest state in the country and could receive $260 million from that pool.


Figure 1


As noted above, the $37.5 billion evaluated in this brief includes the $25 billion that will be distributed equally across states and the $12.5 billion that will be distributed based on measures of state need (Figure 2). Each state with an approved application would receive $500 million over five years from the $25 billion distributed equally across states if all states receive funding. If not all states are approved for funding, states with approved applications will receive more.

States will receive $250 million over five years, on average, from the $12.5 billion to be allocated based on state needs (again, assuming all states are approved for funding). Estimated awards from that $12.5 billion pool range from $50 million in Rhode Island to $530 million in Texas.

The remaining $12.5 billion of the $50 billion fund—which is based on state initiatives, state policy, and other factors—will result in additional funds for some or all states with approved applications, but cannot be estimated yet because of uncertainty about how CMS will score these factors (which, for example, will depend in part on whether states commit to certain policy changes in their applications and follow through over time).


Figure 2


Distribution Based on State Need

A Quarter of the $50 Billion Fund, $12.5 Billion, Will be Distributed Based Exclusively on Specific Measures of State Need

Of the $50 billion fund, a quarter ($12.5 billion) will be distributed based exclusively on specific measures of state need as defined by CMS (see below). In addition, $8 billion will be distributed based on the quality of state initiatives as determined by CMS (see below); that evaluation may take state needs into account to some degree, but the extent to which it will do so is unclear. State initiatives will be evaluated based on strategy, projected impact, sustainability beyond the funding period, and other factors, according to CMS.

Factors for Determining the Allocation of the $12.5 Billion of the Rural Health Fund Based on CMS Measures of State Need

Based on criteria published by CMS, the $12.5 billion based exclusively on measures of state need will be distributed as follows:

  • 40% of the $12.5 billion is based on the rural population and number of rural health care facilities in a state (20% each). CMS has published how it plans to define “rural” for purposes of distributing these dollars, though there are many potential ways of doing so. For example, CMS uses a broad definition of “rural hospitals” that includes all hospitals in areas classified as rural by the Health Resources & Services Administration (HRSA) (which itself is broader than some definitions) as well as any other hospital that receives certain Medicare rural payment designations or that is classified by Medicare as urban but reclassified as rural for certain payment purposes.
  • 20% of the $12.5 billion is based on uncompensated care as a percent of operating expenses among all hospitals (i.e., not just those in rural areas). Uncompensated care tends to be higher in states that have not expanded Medicaid under the Affordable Care Act, such as Texas and Georgia. Further, CMS is using data from 2021; uncompensated care may have dropped over time among states that have recently expanded Medicaid (like Oklahoma and Missouri in 2021 and North Carolina and South Dakota in 2023).
  • 24% of the $12.5 billion is based on the share of the population in rural areas and the share in frontier regions (12% each). These factors do not account for the total size of the population in each state or the size of rural health care systems (which is also the case for three other factors, like land area). As a result, states with a relatively large share of the population living in rural and frontier areas but relatively small rural populations and few rural hospitals may still receive a greater than average share of these dollars (e.g., as is the case for Alaska, North Dakota, and Wyoming) while the reverse may be true for states with large rural populations and many rural hospitals (e.g., as is the case for California, Florida, and Texas). Nonetheless, as noted above, 20% of the $12.5 billion is based directly on rural population and 20% on rural facilities.
  • 10% of the $12.5 billion will be based on land area and will only go to the five largest states. These five states could each receive large allocations from this pool (ranging from an estimated $240 to $260 million if all were approved for funding), while states just outside of the top five and all other states will not receive funds based on land mass.
  • 6% of the $12.5 billion is based on the share of all hospitals (not just those in rural areas) receiving Medicaid disproportionate share hospital (DSH) payments. Medicaid DSH status is based in part on the extent to which hospitals care for Medicaid and other low-income patients but also on specific criteria that vary across states.

Largest and Smallest Awards

Texas, California, New Mexico, Montana, and Alaska Are Expected to Receive the Largest Amounts From the $37.5 billion, Reflecting Differences Based on CMS Criteria of State Need

Estimated awards for these five states range from $940 to $1,030 million over five years from the $37.5 billion (Figure 1). As noted, $25 billion of the $37.5 billion will be distributed equally across states, meaning that any differences across states relate to the $12.5 billion distributed based on measures of state need ($12.5 billion). Most of the extra dollars that these five states are estimated to receive relative to others are attributable to the states’ relatively large land area, one of several factors used to allocate funds based on state need (Figure 3). Estimated awards based on this factor range from $240 million in New Mexico to $260 million in Alaska. Only the five largest states would receive funding from this pool based on their land area.


Figure 4


Missouri, Mississippi, North Carolina, Georgia, and Oklahoma could receive the next largest awards from the $37.5 billion, with estimates ranging from $820 to $840 million over five years. These states are estimated to receive more funds than average because they have relatively large rural populations and numbers of rural facilities and had relatively high levels of hospital uncompensated care in the year evaluated, among other factors. Despite these differences, their estimated awards are only roughly 10 percent more than the average award across all states ($750 million over five years) from the $37.5 billion.

Rhode Island, Massachusetts, Delaware, Connecticut, and New Jersey could have the lowest awards from the $37.5 billion, with estimates ranging from $550 to $610 million over five years. These are all relatively small states in or near the Northeast that rank relatively low on most factors, including rural population and the number of rural facilities.

Payments Per Rural Resident Could Vary Widely

Ten States Could Receive Less Than $375 Per Rural Resident Over Five Years While 11 States Could Receive More Than $1,500, Before Disbursements Based on State Policy, Initiatives, and Other Factors

Estimated awards from the $37.5 billion are partially, but not closely, tied to rural population, resulting in large differences in the amount each state could receive per rural resident. Assuming all states receive funds, the average award per rural resident across all states would be $590, but this amount per rural resident would vary widely across states. Texas could receive the least amount per rural resident ($240) while Rhode Island could receive the largest amount ($22,150, an outlier) (Figure 3). This in part reflects the fact that estimated state awards vary much less than differences in rural populations, principally due to the equal distribution of the first $25 billion across all states with approved applications but also reflecting the structure of the $12.5 billion distributed based on measures of need (only 20% of which is directly based on rural population).

Eleven States Will Receive Less Than $375 Per Rural Resident Over Five Years While 11 States Could Receive More Than $1,500

Additional Factors Affecting Awards

Most of the Remaining $12.5B Will be Distributed Based on State Policy and CMS’s Evaluation of States’ Proposed Initiatives

Of the remaining $12.5 billion, $8 billion (64%) is expected to be distributed across states based on the quality of their proposed initiatives, $3.75 billion (30%) based on state policies, and $0.75 billion (6%) based on other factors. It is not yet clear how, and how much, this portion of the award will differ across states, or the extent to which these funds will align with different measures of rural health needs.

According to CMS, the first bucket ($8 billion) will be distributed based on a qualitative review of a state’s proposed initiatives and, in later years, the state’s progress in implementing their plan. Proposed initiatives will be scored by a merit review panel selected by CMS. Panel members have not been announced to the public.

The second bucket ($3.75 billion) will be distributed based on whether a state has adopted, made progress towards adopting, or committed to adopting certain policies. Some of these policies aim to promote competition among health care providers, such as by expanding scope of practice for nurse practitioners and other non-physicians. Among other factors, three measure states’ progress in implementing certain Make America Health Again (MAHA) policies.

The remaining funds ($750 million) will be distributed based on other factors, such as the share of dual eligibles in integrated care plans and the quality of Medicaid and Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) data reporting to CMS.

Looking Ahead

CMS will decide which states to fund by the end of the year, and how to allocate the first year of funding across states. The agency will allocate $10 billion per year to states with approved applications over a five-year period (fiscal years 2026 through 2030), and it plans to distribute the first round of $10 billion in January 2026. CMS will use the same funding formula for each year, but the distribution of funds across states will likely change over time. This is in part because a quarter of the funds—i.e., the $12.5 of $50 billion excluded from analyses in this brief—is based on factors that are likely to change over time, including states’ progress in implementing policy changes and their proposed initiatives. The distribution could also change over time depending on whether CMS chooses to withhold, reduce, or recover funds from a given state for noncompliance or other reasons.

It is not clear what share of the $50 billion fund will go to rural hospitals and other rural health care providers or the extent to which any direct and indirect benefits of the fund will offset their losses under the reconciliation law. While some policymakers promoted the rural health fund as a way to support rural hospitals, the funds can also be used for much broader purposes. CMS has indicated that the funds are intended to be used for investments in “system transformation” rather than “perpetual operating expenses.” CMS has stipulated that payments to hospitals and other providers for patient care cannot exceed 15% of total funds, though providers could benefit in other ways, such as through investments in existing buildings and infrastructure (which are restricted to 20% of total funds). Evaluating the implications for rural hospitals will depend on how CMS allocates funds to states and how much of these funds states distribute to rural hospitals, other providers, and for other state initiatives.

This work was supported in part by Arnold Ventures. KFF maintains full editorial control over all of its policy analysis, polling, and journalism activities.

Methods

Of the $50 billion rural health fund, half ($25 billion) will be distributed equally among states with approved applications and half ($25 billion) will be distributed among approved states based on a set of 23 factors, weighted to varying degrees, as detailed by CMS in the Notice of Funding Opportunity (NOFO). CMS refers to the first half as “baseline funding” and the second half as “workload funding.” Weighted scores based on the workload funding factors will total to 100 points across all states. A state’s share of the $25 billion will depend on their total weighted score divided by 100, and its share of funds distributed based on a given factor will equal their weighted score for that factor divided by 100. The reconciliation law determined the overall allocation of baseline and workload funding, but gave CMS discretion to define more specifically how the workload funding would be distributed.

Of the $37.5 billion evaluated in this brief, $25 billion reflects the baseline funding that will be distributed equally across states with approved applications, as described in the law. If all states are approved for funding, each state would, by definition, receive $500 million over five years from this pool of funding. If not all states are approved for funding, the $25 billion of baseline funding will be distributed equally among states with approved applications only, meaning that each would receive more than $500 million.

The other $12.5 billion of the $37.5 billion evaluated will be based on CMS measures of state need. This corresponds to the half ($12.5 billion) of the workload funding that will be distributed based on seven factors that CMS refers to as “rural facility and population factors” (three of which are based on measures listed in the reconciliation law). Appendix Table 1 includes details about these factors based on the NOFO. We obtained estimated scores by state for each of these factors and their weighted total by state from the UNC Sheps Center Rural Facility and Population Score Estimates by State, as updated on October 24, 2025. The Sheps Center generated these estimates based on their interpretation of the NOFO and available data.

We converted estimated scores for a given factor into a dollar amount by: (1) calculating the share of workload funding distributed based on that factor (i.e., multiplying $25 billion by the weight for that factor) and (2) multiplying the result by the state share of the distribution based on that factor (i.e., the score divided by 100). Each state’s total distribution from the $12.5 billion based on state need is the sum of the factor allocations calculated in (2).

We calculated the total award from the $37.5 billion as $500 million per state plus the estimated award from the $12.5 billion. To calculate the award per rural resident, we divided by the state rural population as defined by CMS for the first factor, which was available from the Sheps Center estimates.

This analysis does not include the second half of the workload funding ($12.5 billion) that will be distributed based on state initiatives, state policy, and other factors, but cannot be estimated yet because of uncertainty about how CMS will score these factors. We do describe what share of the $12.5 will be distributed based on state initiatives, state policy, and other factors based on the weights assigned to each of the factors included in these three buckets. Some of these factors (health and lifestyle, individuals dually eligible for Medicare and Medicaid, remote care services, and data infrastructure)—representing 30% of the $12.5 billion—will be scored by evaluating how states rank based on a weighted average of measures from two buckets. For example, health and lifestyle factors will be evaluated based on the state rank of a weighted average of their score on certain state initiatives (75%) and the adoption of a certain policy (25%). The contribution of each bucket in those cases cannot be fully disentangled because of the structure of the calculation, which involves a ranking of a weighted average. In those cases, we apportioned the funding from these factors to each bucket based on the weights used to generate the weighted average (e.g., 75% or 25%).

Appendix

Factors for Determining the Allocation of the $12.5 Billion of the Rural Health Fund Based on CMS Measures of State Need
Poll Finding

KFF Health Tracking Poll: Public Weighs in on Health Care Debate and Government Shutdown 

Published: Nov 6, 2025

Findings

Key Takeaways

  • On October 1st the U.S. federal government shut down after Congress failed to pass a stopgap spending bill to keep it funded. Now in its sixth week, the shutdown marks the longest lapse in federal funding in U.S. history. Congress remains at a standstill over whether to extend the Affordable Care Act’s enhanced premium tax credits (ePTCs). About three quarters of the public continue to say Congress should extend the expiring tax credits, including more than nine in ten (94%) Democrats, three in four (76%) independents, and half of Republicans. As the debate continues, this poll shows that partisan loyalties among the public are deepening, with Republicans split over whether they want Congress to extend the tax credits for people who purchase their own coverage on the ACA marketplaces or allow them to expire.
  • Democrats largely support what congressional Democrats have been doing throughout this debate, while independents are split. A large majority of Democrats (81%) say Democrats in Congress should “refuse to approve a budget unless it includes extending these tax credits, even if it means the government remains shut down.” Independents are divided, while about eight in ten (84%) Republicans say Congressional Democrats should approve a budget to quickly end the shutdown.
  • If the enhanced tax credits are not extended, both political parties could face backlash from their bases. Among those who want to see Congress extend the tax credits, nearly four in ten say President Trump (28% of all adults) deserves most of the blame, and a similar share says they would blame Republicans in Congress (28% of all adults). Fewer, about one in four (17% of all adults), say Democrats in Congress deserve the most blame. Majorities of Democrats and independents say President Trump or Republicans in Congress would deserve the most blame, while a majority of MAGA Republicans say Democrats in Congress would deserve the most blame.
  • The Democratic Party maintains an edge over the Republican Party when it comes to voter trust of handling the future of the ACA, and a narrower edge when it comes to high cost of health insurance. At least one in five voters say they do not trust either party to address these issues. While majorities of Democratic and Republican voters say they trust their own party on these issues, independents are more likely to trust the Democratic Party over the Republican Party on the ACA (38% vs. 18%), though many say they don’t trust either party. Democratic and independent voters are also much more likely than Republican voters to say rising health costs would impact their willingness to vote and their candidate choice. Nearly six in ten Democratic voters and half of independent voters say an annual health cost increase of $1,000 – the average expected increase for marketplace enrollees if the ACA enhanced premium tax credits expire – would have a “major impact” on both their decision to turnout to vote and which candidate they would support, compared to about three in ten Republican voters.  

Majorities of the Public Continue to Support Extending ACA Tax Credits; Most Democrats Want Budget Deal to Include Extension

As part of the ongoing budget negotiations, Democratic leaders are pushing to extend the enhanced premium tax credits, which help some people afford their health insurance through marketplaces created by the Affordable Care Act (ACA). These tax credits are currently set to expire at the end of the year. Republican lawmakers, on the other hand, say they will take up the ACA tax credits after the government is reopened.

Conducted as people began reviewing ACA plan options for this year’s open enrollment, this poll shows that extending these tax credits beyond 2025 continues to be popular among the public. About three quarters (74%) of U.S. adults overall say Congress should extend the enhanced tax credits for people who purchase their own insurance through ACA marketplaces, about three times the share who say Congress should let these credits expire. Three quarters (76%) of adults who purchase their own health insurance, most of whom do so through ACA marketplaces, support the extension of these tax credits, while one in four (23%) say they should expire.

At least half of adults across partisans continue to support the extension of these tax credits. This includes more than nine in ten (94%) Democrats, three quarters (76%) of independents, and half of Republicans. However, Republican support for Congress extending the tax credits has dropped nine percentage points in the past month as the enhanced premium tax credits have become a talking point around the budget negotiations and a major sticking point for Democratic lawmakers. In addition, supporters of the “Make America Great Again” (MAGA) movement are now 13 percentage points less likely to say these tax credits should be extended, from about six in ten (57%) last month, to fewer than half (44%) now.  

A Majority of the Public Says Congress Should Extend ACA Tax Credits, Though Republican and MAGA Support Has Declined from Last Month

Now in its sixth week, the government shutdown has resulted in missed paychecks for some federal employees and delays in full SNAP benefits, adding pressure on Congress to reach an agreement. Overall, the public is split over what they think Congressional Democrats should do, with half (50%) saying they should “approve a budget that does not include extending these tax credits in order to quickly end the shutdown, even if it means the cost of health insurance will increase for some people,” while a similar share (48%) say Congressional Democrats should “refuse to approve a budget unless it includes extending these tax credits, even if it means the government remains shut down.”

A large majority of Democrats (81%) support Congressional Democrats holding out for a deal that includes extending the ACA’s enhanced premium tax credits, even if it prolongs a government shutdown. Independents are split, with about half (51%) saying Democratic leaders should refuse to approve a budget without the tax credit extensions and half (47%) saying they should approve a budget to quickly end the shutdown. More than eight in ten (84%) Republicans say Democratic lawmakers should approve a budget to end the shutdown.

More than half (55%) of those who purchase their own health insurance say Democrats should refuse to approve a budget that does not include an extension for ACA subsidies, while 45% say Democrats should approve the budget without the subsidies to quickly end the shutdown. Notably, past KFF polls have shown that nearly half of adults enrolled in ACA marketplace plans identify as Republican or lean Republican.

Most Democrats, and Half of Independents, Say Congressional Democrats Should Refuse to Approve a Budget Without ACA Tax Credit Extension

If Congress does not pass an extension for the enhanced tax credits, those who want to see the credits extended are most likely to blame Republican leaders, including President Trump. Nearly four in ten of those who support extending the tax credits say that if they are not extended Republicans in Congress deserve the most blame (38%, or 28% of all adults) and a similar share (37%, or 28% of all adults) say President Trump deserves most of the blame. About one in four (23% or 17% of total adults) say Democrats in Congress deserve the most blame. Notably, the group that supports extending the tax credits is made up of larger shares of Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents.

Among the half of Republicans who want to see the tax credits extended, seven in ten say they would blame Democrats in Congress if the tax credits are allowed to expire, rising to eight in ten MAGA-supporters.

Most Adults Who Support Extending ACA Tax Credits Blame Republican Lawmakers, Including President Trump, if Tax Credits Expire

Despite the ongoing legislative debate over the government shutdown, awareness of the lapsing enhanced premium tax credits remains limited, even among the group most directly impacted by the loss of tax credits. Overall, more than half of adults say they have heard or read “a little” (28%) or “nothing at all” (29%) about the issue, while 44% have heard or read “a lot” (13%) or “some” (30%). Among those who buy their own insurance, half say they have heard at least “some,” compared to four in ten last month.

Some Republican lawmakers have claimed that Democratic efforts to extend the ACA’s enhanced premium tax credits would allow undocumented immigrants to receive federally subsidized health insurance. This KFF poll gauged the public’s understanding of this claim over who is eligible for ACA coverage. About half (47%) of U.S. adults correctly say that undocumented immigrants are not eligible to buy health coverage on ACA marketplaces. There is some confusion, however, as about one in seven (14%) incorrectly say undocumented immigrants are eligible and nearly four in ten (39%) say they are not sure.

Although this claim has been made by some Republican lawmakers and conservative media outlets, there are no partisan differences in awareness of this aspect of ACA eligibility. At least half of Republicans (57%) and Democrats (52%) say undocumented immigrants are not eligible for this, while at least three in ten across partisans say they are not sure. A larger share of independents (44%) say they are not sure whether undocumented immigrants are eligible to buy coverage on the ACA marketplaces.

About Half of Adults Correctly Say Undocumented Immigrants Are Not Eligible for ACA Coverage, Including Similar Shares of Democrats and Republicans

Health Costs Could Influence Voters in 2026, and Democratic Party Holds Edge on Trust to Address ACA

There is some indication that these budget negotiations could influence how voters think about health care and their decisions at the ballot box in coming years. Consistent with previous polling, the Democratic Party continues to hold an advantage over the Republican Party among voters on which party they trust to do a better job addressing the future of the 2010 Affordable Care Act, or ACA. About four in ten voters (43%) say they trust the Democratic Party to do a better job addressing the future of the ACA compared to one-third (32%) of voters who say they trust the Republican Party. Democrats also have a small advantage on which party voters trust to address the high cost of health insurance (39% v. 33%), though a quarter of voters say they trust neither party on this issue.

On both health care issues, Democratic and Republican voters largely trust their own party. While the Democratic Party has a strong advantage over the Republican Party among independent voters on who they trust to do a better job handling the future of the ACA (38% v. 18%, respectively), independents are more split on which party they trust to address the high cost of health insurance.  More than one-third of independent voters say they do not trust either party to do a better job handling the ACA’s future (36%) or addressing the high cost of health coverage (41%).

The Democratic Party Holds Slight Edge in Trust on ACA and Health Coverage Costs Among Voters, Though Some Don’t Trust Either Party

As leaders in both political parties blame each other for the extended government shutdown, Democratic and Republican campaign groups have started running ads in competitive congressional districts, in hopes that the situation will boost their party’s standing with voters.

Yet, the possibility of increasing health care costs resonates as a stronger motivator for Democratic voters and independent voters, rather than Republican voters. When asked how a $1,000 increase in their health care costs – the average expected increase for marketplace enrollees if the ACA’s enhanced premium tax credits expire – would affect their 2026 vote, nearly six in ten Democratic voters and more than half of independent voters say it would have a “major impact” on both their decision to vote (59% and 54%) and which candidate they support (56% and 52%). About three in ten Republican voters say such an increase would have a “major impact” on either their decision to turn out or who they support. Although the expiring enhanced premium tax credits directly affect only those who purchase their own coverage on the ACA marketplaces, this suggests that rising health care costs resonate more as a voting issue among Democrats and independents than Republicans.

Majority of Voters Say an Increase in Their Health Care Costs Would Influence Their 2026 Vote

Methodology

This KFF Health Tracking Poll was designed and analyzed by public opinion researchers at KFF. The survey was conducted October 27-November 2, 2025, online and by telephone among a nationally representative sample of 1,350 U.S. adults in English (n=1,274) and in Spanish (n=76). The sample includes 1,031 adults (n=63 in Spanish) reached through the SSRS Opinion Panel either online (n=1,007) or over the phone (n=24). The SSRS Opinion Panel is a nationally representative probability-based panel where panel members are recruited randomly in one of two ways: (a) Through invitations mailed to respondents randomly sampled from an Address-Based Sample (ABS) provided by Marketing Systems Groups (MSG) through the U.S. Postal Service’s Computerized Delivery Sequence (CDS); (b) from a dual-frame random digit dial (RDD) sample provided by MSG. For the online panel component, invitations were sent to panel members by email followed by up to three reminder emails. 

Another 319 (n=13 in Spanish) adults were reached through random digit dial telephone sample of prepaid cell phone numbers obtained through MSG. Phone numbers used for the prepaid cell phone component were randomly generated from a cell phone sampling frame with disproportionate stratification aimed at reaching Hispanic and non-Hispanic Black respondents. Stratification was based on incidence of the race/ethnicity groups within each frame. Among this prepaid cell phone component, 143 were interviewed by phone and 176 were invited to the web survey via short message service (SMS). 

Respondents in the prepaid cell phone sample who were interviewed by phone received a $15 incentive via a check received by mail. Respondents in the prepaid cell phone sample reached via SMS received a $10 electronic gift card incentive. SSRS Opinion Panel respondents received a $5 electronic gift card incentive (some harder-to-reach groups received a $10 electronic gift card). In order to ensure data quality, cases were removed if they failed two or more quality checks: (1) attention check questions in the online version of the questionnaire, (2) had over 30% item non-response, or (3) had a length less than one quarter of the mean length by mode. Based on this criterion, one case was removed.

The combined cell phone and panel samples were weighted to match the sample’s demographics to the national U.S. adult population using data from the Census Bureau’s 2024 Current Population Survey (CPS), September 2023 Volunteering and Civic Life Supplement data from the CPS, and the 2025 KFF Benchmarking Survey with ABS and prepaid cell phone samples. The demographic variables included in weighting for the general population sample are gender, age, education, race/ethnicity, region, civic engagement, frequency of internet use and political party identification. The weights account for differences in the probability of selection for each sample type (prepaid cell phone and panel). This includes adjustment for the sample design and geographic stratification of the cell phone sample, within household probability of selection, and the design of the panel-recruitment procedure.

The margin of sampling error including the design effect for the full sample is plus or minus 3 percentage points. Numbers of respondents and margins of sampling error for key subgroups are shown in the table below. For results based on other subgroups, the margin of sampling error may be higher. Sample sizes and margins of sampling error for other subgroups are available on request. Sampling error is only one of many potential sources of error and there may be other unmeasured error in this or any other public opinion poll. KFF public opinion and survey research is a charter member of the Transparency Initiative of the American Association for Public Opinion Research. 

GroupN (unweighted)M.O.S.E.
Total1,350± 3 percentage points
 
Party ID 
Democrats424± 6 percentage points
Independents422± 6 percentage points
Republicans412± 6 percentage points
MAGA Republicans377± 6 percentage points

 

 

News Release

Poll: Support for Extending the Expiring Enhanced ACA Tax Credits Remains High, But Dips Among Republicans and MAGA Supporters as Shutdown Continues and Partisanship Takes Hold

Democrats Overwhelmingly Back Congressional Democrats Holding Out for Budget Deal that Extends Tax Credits, Though Independents Are Split on the Approach

Published: Nov 6, 2025

As the government shutdown continues, public support remains high for extending the enhanced ACA tax credits set to expire at the end of the year, with three quarters (74%) of the public in favor of extending them, a new KFF Health Tracking Poll finds.

The expiring tax credits are a central issue in the ongoing Congressional budget standoff, as Democrats want the tax credits extended as part of a budget deal while Republicans want to reopen the government before negotiating over an extension. Without the enhanced tax credits, ACA Marketplace enrollees who benefit from them would on average have to pay more than twice as much out of pocket in premiums next year.  

The new poll finds little change in the public’s views on extending the tax credits since before the shutdown began, though support among Republicans dipped (from 59% in September to 50% now). Among those who identify as supporters of President Trump’s “Make America Great Again” movement, support fell from 57% in September to 44% now.

When asked about Congressional Democrats’ strategy of refusing to approve a budget unless it includes extending these tax credits, even if it means the government remains shut down, partisans firmly align with their party’s position.

Overall, about half (48%) are supportive of Congressional Democrats’ position, including 81% of Democrats. Similarly, half (50%) say they should approve a budget without an extension of the tax credits to quickly end the shutdown, even if it means the cost of health insurance will increase for some people, including 84% of Republicans. Independents are split (51% in favor of Congressional Democrats’ position; 47% favoring a quick end to the shutdown).

More than half (55%) of those who purchase their own health insurance, most of whom do so through ACA marketplaces, say Democrats should refuse to approve a budget that does not include an extension for ACA subsidies.

Looking ahead to next year’s midterm elections, the poll includes some early signs that voters give the Democratic Party an advantage on issues related to health care costs.

When asked which party they trust to do a better job on the future of the ACA, larger share of voters say that they trust the Democratic Party (43%) than the Republican Party (32%).

Similarly, when asked about addressing the high cost of health insurance, more voters also say they trust the Democratic Party (39%) than the Republican Party (33%) to do a better job. While independents are more likely to trust Democrats than Republicans on the future of the ACA, they are split when it comes to trust to address the cost of health coverage.

Other findings include:

  • Among those who want the tax credits extended, most say that either Congressional Republicans (38%) or President Trump (37%) would deserve most of the blame if they weren’t extended. Fewer say Congressional Democrats (23%) would deserve most of the blame.
  • About half (47%) of the public correctly says that undocumented immigrants are not eligible to buy ACA marketplace coverage. About one in seven (14%) incorrectly say that they are eligible to buy marketplace coverage, while the rest are not certain. Similar shares of Republicans and Democrats know the correct answer.

Designed and analyzed by public opinion researchers at KFF, this survey was conducted October 27-November 2, 2025, online and by telephone among a nationally representative sample of 1,350 U.S. adults in English and in Spanish. The margin of sampling error is plus or minus 3 percentage points for the full sample. For results based on other subgroups, the margin of sampling error may be higher.

How ACA Marketplace Costs Compare to Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance

Published: Nov 3, 2025

This analysis compares ACA Marketplace costs to employer-sponsored health insurance costs and finds that individual market premiums have become more similar to employer-sponsored premiums over time. In 2024, individual market insurance premiums averaged $540 per member per month, slightly below the average $587 per member per month premium for fully-insured employer coverage.

The analysis uses data from Mark Farrah Associates Health Coverage Portal to compare average premiums in the individual and group insurance markets. The data is based on insurer filings to NAIC in the Annual Exhibit of Premiums and Utilization, showing the average premiums and claims per member per month.

The full analysis and other data on health costs are available on the Peterson-KFF Health System Tracker, an online information hub dedicated to monitoring and assessing the performance of the U.S. health system.

Donor Government Funding for Family Planning in 2024

Authors: Adam Wexler, Jennifer Kates, and Eric Lief
Published: Nov 3, 2025

Key Findings

In 2025, the donor government funding landscape fundamentally changed. Under the new administration, the United States (U.S.), the largest donor to family planning in the world, has instituted significant changes to global health programs including freezing, and then cancelling, most global family planning projects, restricting allowable activities, rescinding family planning funding previously provided by U.S. Congress for 2025, and seeking to eliminate family planning funding in 2026. Collectively, these actions have significantly driven down disbursements. In addition, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) projects that total international assistance from donor governments will decline in 2025 as many, including several other large donors to family planning – the Netherlands, United Kingdom (U.K.), and Canada – have also signaled reductions in their development assistance budgets. As such, this report, which focuses on both bilateral and multilateral funding for family planning provided by donor governments in 2024, shows a decrease compared to 2023, and is likely a high point as funding will likely continue to decline moving forward. With the U.S. historically providing the largest share of funding for family planning annually, its abrupt reductions leave large gaps and could have a significant impact on global family planning efforts, as some studies have estimated.

Key Findings include the following:

  • Family planning funding from donor governments was US$1.36 billion in 2024, a decline of 8% compared to 2023 (US$1.47 billion) and a return to the 2022 level (US $1.37 billion). This is one of the lowest funding levels since the London Summit on Family Planning in 2012 and more than US $200 million below the peak level reached in 2019 (US $1.58 billion).1
  • Most funding is provided bilaterally (US$1.3 billion or 96%). The remainder – US$55.6 million (4%) – is for multilateral contributions to UNFPA’s core resources (adjusted for an estimated family planning share).
  • The overall decrease was largely due to decreased bilateral funding; multilateral funding (contributions to UNFPA’s core resources) also declined slightly.
  • No donor government increased funding in 2024, marking the first time there were no increases since tracking began in 2012. Five donors decreased funding (Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the U.K.) and four remained flat (Australia, Denmark, Norway, and the U.S.).2,3,4,5 These trends were the same after accounting for exchange rate fluctuations.6
  • As in the past, the U.S. was the largest donor government to family planning in 2024, accounting for 43% (US$579.6 million) of total funding, followed by the Netherlands (US$194.7 million, 14%), the U.K. (US$190.0 million, 14%), Sweden (US$116.1 million, 9%) and Canada (US$101.7 million, 7%). However, when family planning funding is standardized by the size of donor economies, Sweden ranked first, followed by the Netherlands, and Norway; the U.S. ranked 7th.

Looking ahead, donor government funding for family planning is expected to decline in 2025 and beyond. Due to the new administration’s actions targeting U.S. foreign assistance programs, including the rescission of family planning funding for 2025, U.S. funding will be significantly lower than prior year levels. In addition, the administration has proposed eliminating the entire family planning budget in 2026. If these cuts were to materialize, other donor governments would need to nearly double their funding in 2025 to maintain current levels, a scenario that seems unlikely due to previously announced plans to reduce international assistance budgets more broadly.

Report

Introduction

This report provides an analysis of donor government funding for family planning in low- and middle-income countries in 2024, the most recent year available, as well as trends over time. It includes both bilateral funding from donor governments and their contributions to the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA). It is part of an effort by KFF to track such funding that began after the London Summit on Family Planning in 2012. Overall, donor government funding for family planning decreased in 2024 and was one of the lowest levels of funding since the London Summit.

Findings

Total Funding

In 2024, donor government funding for family planning through bilateral and multilateral channels totaled US$1.36 billion, a decrease of US$112.8 million, or 8%, compared to 2023 (US$1.47 billion) and a return to the 2022 level (US $1.37 billion). This marks one of the lowest levels of funding since the London Summit in 2012 (see Figure 1 & Table 1). While bilateral and multilateral funding both decreased, the overall decline was largely due to decreased bilateral support (see “Bilateral Funding” and “Multilateral Funding” sections below).

Donor Government Funding for Family Planning, 2012-2024 (in billions)
Donor Government Funding for Family Planning, 2012-2024 (in current US$, millions)

No donor government increased family planning funding in 2024, marking the first time there were no increases since tracking began in 2012. Five donors decreased funding (Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the U.K.) and four remained flat (Australia, Denmark, Norway, and the U.S.) (see Figure 2).7,8,9,10 The Netherlands had the largest decrease, accounting for approximately half the overall decline, followed by Canada, the U.K., and Sweden. Canada’s decline was due to the timing of disbursements as it “front-loaded” multi-year bilateral projects that began in 2023 (even after the decline, Canada’s funding total in 2024 was its second largest since tracking began in 2012). These trends were the same after accounting for exchange rate fluctuations.11

Changes in Donor Government Funding for Family Planning (2023-2024)

The vast majority of donor government funding for family planning is provided bilaterally (96%). The remainder (4%) is for multilateral contributions to UNFPA’s core resources, adjusted based on the share used to support family planning activities. All donor governments provided a larger share of their family planning funding bilaterally (see Figure 3).

Family Planning Funding from Donor Governments by Funding Channel, 2024

The U.S. continued to be the largest government donor to family planning in 2024, accounting for 43% (US$579.6 million) of total donor government funding (see Figure 4). The Netherlands was the second largest donor (US$194.7 million or 14%), followed by the U.K. (US$190.0 million or 14%), and Sweden (US$116.1 million or 9%).

Donor Government Funding as Share of Total Disbursements for Family Planning, 2024

Bilateral Funding

Bilateral disbursements for family planning from donor governments – that is, funding disbursed by a donor on behalf of a recipient country or region – totaled US$1.30 billion in 2024, a decrease of US$98.8 million, or 7%, compared to 2023 (US$1.40 billion) (see Appendix 1). Five donor governments (Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the U.K.) decreased bilateral funding and four remained flat (Australia, Denmark, Norway, and the U.S.). Canada’s decline was due to the timing of disbursements as it “front-loaded” multi-year bilateral projects that began in 2023 (even after the decline, Canada’s bilateral funding in 2024 was its second largest since tracking began in 2012). These trends were the same after accounting for exchange rate fluctuations.

The U.S. and U.K. have been the top two donors over the entire period since the London Summit (2012-2024). However, U.S. funding has been relatively flat while funding from the U.K., which fluctuated over the period, has declined in recent years. When these two donor governments are removed, bilateral funding from the other donor governments has generally increased over the period, with some fluctuations, particularly in recent years (see Figure 5).

Trends in Bilateral Family Planning Funding from Donor Governments, 2012-2024 (in millions)

Multilateral Funding

While the majority of donor government assistance for family planning is provided bilaterally, donors also provide support for family planning activities through core contributions to the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) (where donors direct or earmark funding for specific family planning activities, such as for UNFPA Supplies, these are included as part of bilateral funding). In 2024, UNFPA estimates that 15% of its core funding was directed to family planning activities.12

These totaled US$55.6 million in 2024, a decrease of US$13.9 million compared to 2023 (US$69.6 million) (see Appendix 2). The decrease was due to a decline in total contributions to UNFPA’s core resources as well as a lower share of core resources directed to family planning activities (15% in 2024 compared to 18% in 2023). Germany decreased funding, while Sweden increased funding and all other donor governments remained flat. Norway was the largest donor government to UNFPA’s core resources, followed by Germany, Sweden, and the Netherlands.

Fair Share

We looked at two different measures to assess the relative contributions of donor governments, or “fair share”, to family planning (see Table 2) as follows: rank by share of total donor government disbursements for family planning, and rank by funding for family planning per US$1 million in gross domestic product (GDP).

  • Rank by share of total donor government funding for family planning: By this measure, the U.S. ranked first in 2024, followed by the Netherlands, the U.K., Sweden, and Canada. The U.S. has consistently ranked #1 in absolute funding amounts over the entire period since the London Summit (2012-2024).
  • Rank by funding for family planning per US$1 million GDP: When funding for family planning is standardized by the size of donor economies (GDP per US$1 million), Sweden ranks at the top, followed by the Netherlands, Norway, and the U.K. (Figure 6); the U.S. ranks 7th.
Assessing Fair Share Across Donors, 2024
Donor Government Ranking by Funding for Family Planning per US$1 Million GDP, 2024

Methodology

Totals presented in this analysis include both bilateral funding for family planning in low- and middle-income countries as well as the estimated share of donor government contributions to UNFPA’s core resources that are used for family planning. Amounts are based on analysis of data from the 33 donor government members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in 2024 who had reported Official Development Assistance (ODA). Bilateral and multilateral data were collected from multiple sources.

Bilateral Funding:

Bilateral funding is defined as any earmarked (family planning designated) amount and includes family planning-specific contributions to multilateral organizations (e.g., non-core contributions to UNFPA Supplies). For purposes of this analysis, funding was counted as family planning if it met the OECD CRS purpose code definition: “Family planning services including counselling; information, education and communication (IEC) activities; delivery of contraceptives; capacity building and training.”

The research team collected the latest bilateral funding data directly from nine governments: Australia, Canada, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States during 2024. Direct data collection from these donors was desirable because they represent the preponderance of donor government assistance for family planning, and the latest official statistics – from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Creditor Reporting System (CRS) (see: http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/data) – do not include all forms of international assistance (e.g., funding to countries such as Russia and the Baltic States that are no longer included in the CRS database). In addition, the CRS data may not include certain funding streams, such as family planning components of mixed-purpose grants to non-governmental organizations, provided by donors. Data for all other OECD DAC member governments – Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, the European Union, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Lithuania, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, and Switzerland – which collectively accounted for approximately 3 percent of bilateral family planning disbursements, were obtained from the OECD CRS database and are from 2023 calendar year.

For some donor governments, it was difficult to disaggregate bilateral family planning funding from broader population, reproductive and maternal health totals, as the two are sometimes represented as integrated totals. In other cases, funding for family-planning-related activities provided in the context of other official development assistance sectors (e.g., humanitarian assistance, education, civil society) was included if identifiable (e.g., if donors indicate specific family planning percentages for mixed-purpose projects, or if it was possible to identify family planning specific funding based on project titles and/or descriptions).

With some exceptions, bilateral assistance data represent disbursements. A disbursement is the actual release of funds to, or the purchase of goods or services for, a recipient. Disbursements in any given year may include disbursements of funds committed in prior years and in some cases, not all funds committed during a government fiscal year are disbursed in that year. In addition, a disbursement by a government does not necessarily mean that the funds were provided to a country or other intended end-user. Enacted amounts represent budgetary decisions that funding will be provided, regardless of the time at which actual outlays, or disbursements, occur. In recent years, most governments have converted to cash accounting frameworks, and presented budgets for legislative approval accordingly; in such cases, disbursements were used as a proxy for enacted amounts.

Amounts presented are for the fiscal year period, which vary by country. The U.S. fiscal year runs from October 1-September 30. The Australian fiscal year runs from July 1-June 30. The fiscal years for Canada and the U.K. are April 1-March 31. Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden use the calendar year. The OECD uses the calendar year, so data collected from the CRS for other donor governments reflect January 1-December 31. Most UN agencies use the calendar year, and their budgets are biennial.

All data are expressed in US dollars (USD). Where data were provided by governments in their currencies, they were adjusted by average daily exchange rates to obtain a USD equivalent, based on foreign exchange rate historical data available from the U.S. Federal Reserve (see: http://www.federalreserve.gov/) or in some cases from the OECD. Funding totals presented in this analysis should be considered preliminary estimates based on data provided and validated by representatives of the donor governments who were contacted directly.

Specific notes pertaining to the donor governments where direct data collection was conducted are as follows:

  • Project-level data were reviewed for Canada, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden to determine whether all or a portion of the funding could be counted as family planning.
  • Project-level data were also reviewed for France for 2012-2020, but comparable data were not available for 2021-2024, so totals for these years are based on the OECD DAC CRS database. Totals for 2021-2024 will be updated once comparable data become available. Starting with the report presenting 2022 funding amounts, totals for France were included under the amounts presented for all other DAC members; prior reports presented totals for France separately.
  • Funding attributed to Australia and the United Kingdom is based on a revised Muskoka methodology as agreed upon by donors at the London Summit on Family Planning in 2012.
  • For the U.S., funding represents final, Congressional appropriations (firm commitments that will be spent) to the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), rather than disbursements, which can fluctuate from year-to-year due to the unique nature of the U.S. budget process (unlike most other donors, U.S. foreign assistance funding may be disbursed over a multi-year period). U.S. totals for 2017-2020 also include some funding originally appropriated by Congress for UNFPA that was transferred to the USAID family planning & reproductive health (FP/RH) account due to specific provisions in U.S. law including the Kemp-Kasten amendment (see KFF “UNFPA Funding & Kemp-Kasten: An Explainer”).
Multilateral Funding:

UNFPA core contributions were obtained from United Nations Executive Board documents and correspond to amounts received during the 2024 calendar year, regardless of which contributor’s fiscal year such disbursements pertain to. Data were already adjusted by UNFPA to represent a USD equivalent based on date of receipts. UNFPA estimates of total family planning funding provided from core resources were obtained through direct communications with UNFPA representatives for 2012-2021; family planning funding estimates from UNFPA’s core resources for 2022-2024 are based on amounts reported on UNFPA’s Transparency Portal and designated as for “Ending the Unmet Need for Family Planning”.

UNFPA’s core resources are meant to be used for both programmatic activities (family planning, population and development, HIV/AIDS, gender, and sexual and reproductive health and rights) as well as operational support. Donor government contributions to UNFPA’s core resources were adjusted to reflect the share of core resources supporting family planning activities in a given year based on information from UNFPA. For instance, in 2024, UNFPA reported expenditures totaling US$522 million from core resources including US$79 million for family planning activities, which results in an estimated 15% of a donor government’s core contribution in 2024 being included in its total funding for family planning.13,14

Other than core contributions provided by governments to UNFPA, un-earmarked core contributions to United Nations entities, most of which are membership contributions set by treaty or other formal agreement (e.g., United Nations country membership assessments), are not identified as part of a donor government’s family planning assistance even if the multilateral organization in turn directs some of these funds to family planning. Rather, these would be considered as family planning funding provided by the multilateral organization and are not included in this report.

This work was supported in part by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. KFF maintains full editorial control over all of its policy analysis, polling, and journalism activities.

Adam Wexler and Jen Kates are with KFF. Eric Lief is an independent consultant.

Endnotes

Endnotes

  1. Family planning totals may be different from those reported in previous years due to updated data received after the publication of prior reports. Donor amounts may not sum to total amounts due to rounding. ↩︎
  2. Since contributions to UNFPA’s core resources were flat for all donor governments except Germany and Sweden (and the adjustments for an FP share reflect UNFPA decisions, not those of donors), year-to-year assessments of the changes in overall funding were largely based on bilateral totals. Bilateral declines less than $2 million were categorized as “flat”; declines greater than $2 million were categorized as “decreases”. Germany’s bilateral funding and core contributions to UNFPA both decreased. While Sweden’s core contribution increased, it was not large enough to offset bilateral declines. ↩︎
  3. In 2023, the U.K. Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) undertook an update of its family planning funding data including a move from reporting disbursements by fiscal year to calendar year. Updated data for the entire period were not available at the time of publication. As such, U.K. totals for 2021-2024 are based on the calendar year; totals for 2012-2020 are still based on the U.K. fiscal year. All U.K. totals are based on the revised-Muskoka methodology. ↩︎
  4. The assessment that total U.S. family planning funding was flat in 2024 compared to 2023 is based on the amounts specified by the U.S. Congress in annual appropriations bills. The family planning amounts specified by Congress were the same in 2023 and 2024. ↩︎
  5. Canada’s decline was due to the timing of disbursements as it “front-loaded” multi-year bilateral projects that began in 2023 (even after the decline, Canada’s funding in 2024 was its second largest since tracking began in 2012). ↩︎
  6. In most cases, donor governments provide funding data in their currency of origin, which are converted to U.S. dollars for this report (see Methodology). ↩︎
  7. Since contributions to UNFPA’s core resources were flat for all donor governments except Germany and Sweden (and the adjustments for an FP share reflect UNFPA decisions, not those of donors), year-to-year assessments of the changes in overall funding were largely based on bilateral totals. Bilateral declines less than $2 million were categorized as “flat”; declines greater than $2 million were categorized as “decreases”. Germany’s bilateral funding and core contributions to UNFPA both decreased. While Sweden’s core contribution increased, it was not large enough to offset bilateral declines. ↩︎
  8. In 2023, the U.K. Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) undertook an update of its family planning funding data including a move from reporting disbursements by fiscal year to calendar year. Updated data for the entire period were not available at the time of publication. As such, U.K. totals for 2021-2024 are based on the calendar year; totals for 2012-2020 are still based on the U.K. fiscal year. All U.K. totals are based on the revised-Muskoka methodology. ↩︎
  9. The assessment that total U.S. family planning funding was flat in 2024 compared to 2023 is based on the amounts specified by the U.S. Congress in annual appropriations bills. The family planning amounts specified by Congress were the same in 2023 and 2024. ↩︎
  10. “Other DAC Countries”, which includes: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Estonia, European Union, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, and Switzerland, is not listed under any assessment of increasing, decreasing, or remaining flat because there may be differences among the donor governments included. ↩︎
  11. In most cases, donor governments provide funding data in their currency of origin, which are converted to U.S. dollars for this report (see Methodology). ↩︎
  12. The family planning share of UNFPA’s core resources is based on several sources including: expenditure totals as reported in UNFPA’s annual report; family planning expenditure totals as presented on the UNFPA Programme Expenses portal (see here), and direct communication with UNFPA (see Methodology). The 15% share for 2024 is a preliminary estimate. ↩︎
  13. UNFPA, “World at a Crossroads: 2024 Annual Report”; June, 2025. ↩︎
  14. UNFPA, UNFPA Programme Expenses portal (see here); accessed October 2025. ↩︎

Appendices

Donor Government Bilateral Funding for Family Planning, 2012-2024 (in millions)
Donor Government Core Contributions to UNFPA, Total & FP-Share (in millions)

Challenges with Implementing Work Requirements: Findings from a Survey of State Medicaid Programs

Published: Oct 31, 2025

On July 4, President Trump signed into law a budget and tax bill that includes significant changes to the Medicaid program including new requirements for states to implement work requirements for individuals enrolled through the Affordable Care Act (ACA) Medicaid expansion pathway or certain state waivers. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that this requirement will have the largest effect on spending and coverage compared to other provisions, reducing federal Medicaid spending by $326 billion over ten years and resulting in 5.3 million more people who are uninsured.

In the summer of 2025 while the new law was under debate in Congress and shortly after enactment, the 25th annual budget survey of Medicaid officials in all 50 states and the District of Columbia conducted by KFF and Health Management Associates (HMA), in collaboration with the National Association of Medicaid Directors (NAMD) was in the field. To better understand how states are preparing for Medicaid work requirements, the survey asked states to discuss anticipated challenges to implementing work requirements by the end of 2026, including related system changes and data matching. KFF anticipates that work requirements will apply to 43 states (41 expansion states including the District of Columbia plus Georgia and Wisconsin, which have expanded Medicaid through waivers). We received responses to this question from 42 of these states.

Because the survey question asked specifically about challenges pertaining to systems, nearly all states described system changes they expect to make; however, they identified other challenges as well. These challenges include how quickly the requirements must be implemented, staff capacity concerns, cost concerns, and issues for applicants and enrollees (Figure 1). In many cases, states described multiple, interrelated challenges. For example, the compressed implementation timeframe and need for federal guidance often factored into state responses detailing other challenges. Some states expressed more challenges than others. A few states that had already been pursuing 1115 waivers to implement work requirements reported fewer anticipated implementation challenges. Understanding state challenges can help inform the content and timing of forthcoming federal guidance. 

Figure 1: States Report a Variety of Challenges With Implementing New Medicaid Work Requirements

States cited the need to make major changes to eligibility systems in a short timeframe and the need for enhanced data sharing infrastructure as major challenges. States will need to make significant changes to eligibility systems to be able to verify compliance with work, school, and other qualifying activities as well as to identify individuals who qualify for mandatory exemptions and optional exceptions. States expressed concern over having to make such major system changes in a very short timeframe, noting the long lead times typically needed to design, procure, and build new systems. Adding to the challenge will be the need to make key system design and workflow decisions before CMS releases guidance. Another priority many states mentioned is enhancing capabilities to collect and match data from multiple agencies and external sources (e.g., SNAP, Medicaid claims data, state education enrollment data) to reduce the burden on applicants and enrollees for documenting their work or exemption status (Figure 2). However, some states acknowledged that data sharing infrastructure is limited and establishing interfaces to accurately share data will take time to put in place. 

According to several states, other policy changes in the law, including restrictions on eligibility for lawfully present immigrants, 6-month eligibility redeterminations for expansion enrollees, and limits to retroactive Medicaid coverage, also require significant systems changes. Increasing this complexity, some states also mentioned the challenge of aligning different work requirements across Medicaid, SNAP, and TANF, as well as having to make complex systems and eligibility policy changes for SNAP as required by the new law. These changes may be particularly complicated for states with integrated Medicaid and SNAP eligibility systems. In addition, a few states noted that they are currently involved in multiyear IT systems projects and that it will be challenging to complete those projects successfully while also simultaneously adding new systems redesigns.  All of these systems challenges are further exacerbated by limited state staff capacity and financial resources.

According to many states, the short implementation timeline means they will need to move quickly with key systems changes and policy decisions before clear federal guidance is available. States have just over a year to prepare to implement work requirements on January 1, 2027, and have less than a year before they will need to begin outreach to notify individuals of the new requirements in September 2026 (Figure 3). The law directs the Secretary of HHS to issue an interim final rule on implementing work requirements by June 1, 2026, leaving little time between when the guidance is released and when outreach begins. For many states, this short timeline intensifies the pressure to move quickly with system upgrades, particularly given the often lengthy vendor procurement process, and other key decisions. However, several states emphasized the risks of moving forward in the absence of clear guidance, noting that if state decisions are not aligned with the federal expectations, the resulting rework would increase costs and potentially delay meeting important deadlines. Some states described the implementation deadline as unrealistic, noting that it increases the risk of errors that could lead to unnecessary coverage losses. In light of these risks, some states said early and clear guidance from CMS would be helpful, especially on issues such as the definition of medical frailty and other exemptions or the permissibility of self-attestation that could affect systems decisions.

A small number of states explicitly mentioned interest in the option for states to pursue good faith waivers to delay implementation of work requirements, noting that additional guidance would be needed to understand the criteria to obtain a “good faith waiver” and the state application process.

Figure 3

Several states reported workforce challenges, including the need to hire or reallocate staff in anticipation of increased workloads and the need for additional staff training. Many states reported that they will need to hire additional staff or reallocate existing staff to handle increased workloads from verifications, appeals, and enrollee outreach. States also anticipate the need for additional staff training, including training staff across departments and agencies (e.g., SNAP), to ensure eligibility workers understand the new rules and requirements, exemption criteria, and documentation requirements. A few states called out the additional workforce resources that will be necessary to conduct comprehensive and multi-modal outreach efforts and respond to the expected increase in enrollee inquiries.

A few states noted that staff are already managing major multiyear projects that are underway, such as eligibility system modernization projects, forcing staff and leadership to juggle competing demands. Similarly, limited staff capacity could cause spillover effects and result in less timely eligibility determinations for enrollees not subject to work requirements.

Even with implementation funds and federal matching payments for administrative costs, some states cited the increased costs of implementing work requirements as a concern. A number of states explicitly mentioned the fiscal implications tied to systems changes, hiring additional staff, and conducting outreach to enrollees. One state noted that, given the tight timeframe coupled with the enormity and complexity of the new requirements tied to system changes, interagency agreements, state rulemaking, and enrollee outreach, states may need to move forward on multiple parallel tracks, which could increase implementation costs and the risk for errors. Contracts for systems changes or new components are costly, and states noted that accelerated timelines often increase those costs. Some states also reported that the increased costs will further strain already constrained state budgets. In addition, some states discussed that new financial penalties for error rates in SNAP and Medicaid may potentially affect how they move forward with system changes. The new law provides $200 million in funding to states for systems development, with states able to access federal matching funds. The federal government generally provides 50 percent of the funds for administrative activities but pays for up to 90 percent of certain administrative costs, including for certain IT system changes.

While not asked directly about enrollee issues, several states cited concerns for applicants and enrollees, including anticipated confusion over the new requirements and possible coverage losses. States anticipate confusion among enrollees and applicants about the new work requirements and listed educating individuals among the challenges they will face. While states noted the importance of outreach to consumers, a few reported that efforts to move forward with communication and outreach without federal guidance could result in more enrollee confusion if CMS guidance does not align with state assumptions related to documentation requirements, exemption definitions, or data matching. Some states also expressed concern over possible coverage loss stemming from the accelerated implementation timeline and indicated that they plan to investigate ways they can minimize any coverage losses. One state noted particular concerns for enrollees in rural areas with limited internet access and those with jobs with fluctuating work hours.

Sex Education Programs: Definitions, Funding, and Impact on Teen Sexual Health

Published: Oct 30, 2025

Adolescents face unique challenges accessing reliable health information and education. This has become even more difficult in a post-Roe landscape where publicly available health information on government webpages continue to be suppressed, federal and state level reproductive policy changes and legal challenges persist, and mis- and dis- information about health—particularly, reproductive health issues like abortion and contraception—are widespread. Over the last several years, teen pregnancy and birth rates have fallen; however, rates of sexually transmitted infections (STIs) remain high among teens and young adults. Many schools and community groups have adopted a broad spectrum of programming that ranges from curricula aimed at reducing teen pregnancy and STI rates—which can include topics like contraception as well as broader aspects of adolescents’ reproductive health such as forming healthy relationships—to curricula that emphasize abstinence and avoidance of all sexual risks. The content of these programs varies considerably and is shaped by policies at the school, district, state, and federal level.

Over the years, Congressional, legislative, and executive agency actions have both hindered and expanded access to federal funding for comprehensive sex education depending on the administration and partisanship. Most recently, the Trump administration’s executive order officially recognizing only two sexes—male and female—has far-reaching implications for the LGBTQ+ community and education. The proclamation has affected how federal agencies run health programs, collect data, share health information, and will also shape whether state and local sex education programs supported by federal grants like the Teen Pregnancy Prevention program, will continue to qualify for support. 

This issue brief reviews the major sex education models and funding streams that are most commonly used, highlights state policies on sex education, and summarizes what is known about the impact of these programs and policies on teen sexual behavior and health outcomes.

Sources of Sex Education

Adolescents receive sex education information from a wide array of sources including informal channels such as parents, friends, online or social media, or through formal settings such as school or health care professionals. For example, while most teens learn about condoms—the most commonly used contraceptive among teens—in formal educational settings and through their parents—a 2024 study on youth health access found, not surprisingly, that many teens also get their contraceptive information from friends and online through websites and social media.

Most youth use social media and nearly half are online almost constantly on platforms like YouTube, TikTok, and Instagram. While social media can be an effective tool to spread reliable and trustworthy health-related information to young people, it can and has been used to spread mis- and dis-information. Anecdotally, a growing number of young women have reportedly stopped using hormonal oral contraceptive pills after viewing TikTok content describing negative experiences with the pill.

Parents can be another source of information for adolescents. Most female adolescents say they discussed “how to say no to sex,” birth control methods, and STIs/STDs with their parents. Most male adolescents discussed STIs/STDs with their parents (55%), but fewer than half say they discussed any other sex education topics. While most adolescents aged 15 to 19 say they received some sex education from their parents, one in five adolescents say they did not (Figure 1).

Parental involvement also plays a role how or whether students receive sex education from schools. Most states (45 states and D.C.) have “opt-in” and/or “opt-out” policies for sex education, meaning that parents can choose to remove their student from classes that include sexual content or must approve their participation in classroom education on the topic. Nonetheless, many teens say they received sex education in formal settings such as schools and churches. Most reported getting information about STIs/STDs and HIV/AIDS prevention and “how to say no” to sex in a formal setting (Figure 1). Far fewer adolescents, however, say they learned about birth control methods or waiting until marriage in classroom settings. Fewer than half of adolescents say they received education on where to get birth control.

One in Five Adolescents Say They Did Not Receive Any Sexual Education From Their Parents

State Policies and Sex Education Models:
Impact on Youth Reproductive Health

Most states and D.C. require some aspect of sex education be taught in public schools (Figure 2). However, the decision-making process over implementation of sex education varies on both the state and local level, resulting in different interpretations of program models and content, as well as the timing and overall quality of the sex education provided to children and adolescents. 

In most states (43), local school districts and sometimes individual schools develop their own curricula, but state-level officials play a role in curriculum development in seven states (North Carolina, Rhode Island, Iowa, Minnesota, South Carolina, Texas, and Washington). State-level education officials—such as state boards, state departments, state commissioners, and superintendents—develop educational content standards that, depending on state statutes, are either required or recommended in curriculum development. Funding availability may also determine if and how schools implement sex education.

While Most States Require Sex and/or HIV Education to be Taught in Schools, the Standards and Content Vary Greatly

There are two main approaches towards formal sex education: sexual risk avoidance and comprehensive sex education. These categories are broad, and the content, methods, and targeted populations can vary widely between programs.

Sexual Risk Avoidance Education: The foundation of these programs is to emphasize the benefits of abstaining from non-marital sexual activity as a means of reducing risky behaviors, STIs, and teen pregnancy.

  • Abstinence-only: In general, abstinence-only programs teach adolescents how to voluntarily refrain from non-marital sexual activity, and stress that abstinence is the only safe and effective way to prevent unintended pregnancy and STIs. They generally do not discuss contraceptive methods or condoms other than to emphasize their failure rates.
  • Abstinence-plus: Some programs stress abstinence as the best way to prevent pregnancy and STIs and include information on contraception. Other abstinence-plus programs emphasize safer-sex practices and often include information about healthy relationships and lifestyles.

Comprehensive sex education: These programs include medically accurate, evidence-based information about both sex and abstinence, contraception, and the use of condoms to prevent STI transmission. Comprehensive programs also usually include information about healthy relationships, sexual consent, sexual orientation, and gender identity.

Proponents of sexual risk avoidance education (SRAE) argue that teaching abstinence to youth will delay teens’ first sexual encounter and will reduce the number of partners they have, leading to a reduction in rates of teen pregnancy and STIs. However, there is a limited body of evidence to support that SRAE programs have these effects on the sexual behavior of youth, and some studies have documented no impacts on pregnancy and birth rates.

There is, however, considerable evidence that comprehensive sex education programs can be effective in delaying sexual initiation among teens and increase the use of contraceptives, including condoms, among sexually active youth. Studies repeatedly show that comprehensive sex education is associated with lower pregnancy rates, more consistent condom use, and lower rates of unprotected sex. Despite this growing evidence, 34 states require schools to stress abstinence, or emphasize that abstinence is preferable to sexual activity, if sex education is taught.

Research also shows that comprehensive sex education programs improve students’ health outcomes and understanding, knowledge, and attitudes of a wide range of health topics, including gender and sexual diversity, violence, and healthy relationships.

Gender and Sexual Diversity

For years, research has found that comprehensive sex education with LGBTQ-inclusive curricula is associated with reduced victimization among sexual minority youth as well as reduced adverse mental health outcomes among all youth. Despite the demonstrated effectiveness in improved outcomes, instruction on sexual orientation and/or gender identity (SOGI) is required in only nine states and D.C. and optional in 13 states—if sex education is taught (Figure 3). Among these states, eight require instruction to portray non-heterosexual and non-cisgender identities as unacceptable. In other states, there is either no explicit policy or instruction on SOGI is banned altogether.

Nine States and D.C. Require Some Instruction on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in Sexual Education

Historically, heterosexual and cisgender identities have been the central focus of sex education, but in recent years, advocates have increasingly called for more representation of sexual and gender diversity in curricula. In 2021, approximately 3 in 10 (29.6%) LGBTQ+ students who received any kind of sex education reported that LGBTQ+ representation was positive, while over half (57%) reported receiving sex education without “LGB or transgender/non-binary” topics.

Although sex education content is typically determined by states and school districts, recent actions by the Trump administration may further impede access to SOGI instructional material. In January 2025, the administration issued an executive order officially recognizing only 2 sexes: male and female, which does not account for the complexity of sex and human beings and excludes recognition of gender expansive identities including transgender and non-binary people. In July 2025, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) issued a policy notice restricting the use of federal funding from the Teen Pregnancy Prevention (TPP) program, meaning grantees of this program would no longer receive funding if their educational materials reflected “radical gender ideology” and encouraged “discriminatory equity ideology.” These actions have raised concerns about how gender and sexual diversity may be included in sex education, if at all.

Concern over educational content, particularly sex education, has long been a point of contention for parents. Parents may choose to opt their children out of sex education classes due to personal or religious beliefs. In recent years, parental involvement has evolved into a national debate over how much influence parents should be allowed to have when it comes to their student’s education and personal health decisions, with some calling for a “Parental Bill of Rights.” This movement has gained traction in several politically conservative states and is increasingly reshaping educational curricula in school districts across the nation.

Healthy Relationships and Violence

It is not uncommon for adolescents to experience dating violence (DV). An estimated 1 in 12 teens in 2021 report experiencing physical DV, which can include being hit, injured with an object or weapon, or slammed into something. An estimated 1 in 10 teens report experiencing sexual DV, which includes unwanted physical advances such as kissing, touching, or forced intercourse. Some adolescents, such as female teens and those who identify as LGBTQ, report higher rates of physical and sexual dating violence.

Studies have long shown that comprehensive sex education is associated with lower rates of DV among adolescents and increased knowledge, attitudes, and skills to form healthy relationships. School-based programs that teach DV and intimate partner violence (IPV) prevention have been proven to reduce both DV and IPV among students, with some programs yielding long-term outcomes. Research also shows that comprehensive school-based programs improve students’ knowledge and attitudes towards forming healthy relationships and improve communication skills and intention/consent. 

Schools are required to have curricula on healthy relationships in 34 states and D.C., but fewer states (17 and D.C.) are mandated to teach students on sexual consent (Figure 4).

While Most States Require Schools to Educate on Healthy Relationships, Fewer Than Half Require Schools to Teach Sexual Consent

Abortion Knowledge

Abortion is a safe and common medical service that an estimated one in four women will obtain at some point in their life. In 2022, 9% of abortion patients were younger than 20-years-old.

Since the Dobbs decision, 12 states have banned abortion, and another 6 states have implemented early gestational limits between 6 and 12 weeks. The confluence of mis- and dis- information, litigation on abortion access, and policy changes at the state and federal level has made accessing reliable and accurate information on abortion difficult for many. Small shares of 15- to 17-year-olds say they received information about abortion in the past year, primarily through sources like social media, websites, and friends. Fewer than four in ten say they are confident in their ability to get information about abortion services or methods.

Abortion is largely absent from school curricula, including in sex education class. Only California, Colorado, and D.C. require sex education programs to teach about abortion. Six other states—Arkansas, Connecticut, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, and South Carolina—restrict what can be taught regarding abortion. One third of states discourage abortion curricula in sex education programs, and five of these states—Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, North Dakota, and Tennessee—require schools to show students a medically inaccurate depiction of fetal development beginning at fertilization, known as the Meet Baby Olivia video. These “Baby Olivia” laws have been introduced in several other states, including Ohio, West Virginia, and Missouri.

Federal Funding Streams for Sex Education

Although decisions regarding if and how sex education is taught are ultimately left to individual states and school districts, Congress and the executive branch also play a role by providing financial support to programs that focus on preventing adolescent pregnancy. Federal dollars go toward programs that focus on sexual risk avoidance education/abstinence education, comprehensive sex education, or a combination of the two approaches.

Four major programs provide the majority of federal dollars towards education on teen pregnancy prevention: the Teen Pregnancy Prevention (TPP) program, the Personal Responsibility Education Program (PREP), the Title V Sexual Risk Avoidance Education Program (SRAE), and the General Departmental (GD) Sexual Risk Avoidance Education (SRAE) program. These programs primarily fund school programs but can also fund churches, juvenile justice programs, and other entities. Other federal programs, including the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC) Division of Adolescent School Health (DASH), also provide varying amounts of funding toward sex education initiatives each year.

The four major programs differ in several ways, including by scope and educational approach (Table 1). Notably, the TPP program and PREP use evidence-based, comprehensive sex education models proven to be effective at preventing teen pregnancy, whereas the two SRAE programs stress refraining from nonmarital sexual activity and have historically focused on abstinence-only approaches. While grant announcements and notices from the two SRAE programs required grantees to adopt “evidence-based” interventions and “medically accurate” curricula during the Biden administration, Project 2025’s agenda—which the Trump administration has been closely mirroring in their recent policy proposals—specifically notes that “any [sex education program] lists with ‘approved curriculum’ or so-called evidence-based lists should be abolished.”

Federal Teen Pregnancy Prevention Programs

The TPP program, established in 2010, is a national grant program that funds organizations to educate adolescents in making healthy decisions to improve their sexual and reproductive health outcomes. The large majority of TPP program participants were served in school settings, and some participants were served in community-based settings, or other places such as juvenile justice centers and clinics. Compared to the pre-pandemic era, larger shares of participants in recent years were served in technology-based and virtual settings.

Also established in 2010, PREP awards grants to state agencies to educate adolescents on both abstinence and contraception, focusing on those who experience homelessness, are in foster care, live in areas with high teen birth rates, or are from minority groups. Like the TPP program, most of the implemented programming took place in school settings during school hours, with a smaller share taking place after school.

Formerly known as the Title V Abstinence Education Grant program established in 1996, the Title V SRAE awards funds to grantees focused on sexual risk avoidance or abstinence until marriage. The GD SRAE program similarly funds programs that exclusively teach abstinence, with a focus on teens experiencing homelessness, teen pregnancy, and domestic violence. An evaluation of the two SRAE programs show that most SRAE programming took place in middle and high schools (74%), while others took place in settings such as community-based organizations, faith-based institutions, and detention centers.

The four programs are appropriated different amounts of federal funding per fiscal year (FY). The TPP program is a discretionary grant program and received $101 million in FY2024. PREP and the Title V SRAE programs, both mandatory spending programs, received $75 million each. The GD SRAE program, a discretionary grant program, received $35 million in funding in FY2024. Of the $286 million of federal dollars dedicated to teen pregnancy prevention programs from these four programs, 38% goes towards programs that focus exclusively on sexual risk avoidance/abstinence education, which has been demonstrated to be less effective at preventing pregnancy in adolescents compared to comprehensive sex education (Figure 5).

In FY2024, $110 Million in Federal Funding for Teen Sexual Health Education Programs Went Towards Sexual Risk Avoidance (Abstinence-Only) Education

Funding for the SRAE programs had only small fluctuations between FY2019 and FY2024 ($100-$110 million), but this has more than doubled since FY2014 when the programs were funded at $51.4 million in total (Figure 6). Federal funding towards comprehensive sex education, on the other hand, has remained steady in the last 10 years, ranging between $170.6 and $176 million.

For the Past Six Years, Federal Funding Towards Abstinence-only Education Exceeded $100 Million, More Than Double the Funding a Decade Ago

While federal funding for sex education and other reproductive health services for adolescents has been appropriated by Congress for decades, there have been recent efforts from the Trump administration to cancel or withhold these federal dollars from grantees. The Trump administration recently announced the cancellation of a $12.3 million PREP grant to California after state officials refused to revise curricula in compliance with the president’s 2025 executive order on gender. This executive order refuted the concept of “gender ideology,” and—without scientific evidence—argued that only two sexes exist. Shortly after, the administration sent letters to 46 additional states and territories demanding that all references to “gender ideology” (generally taken to mean reference to transgender people) be removed from PREP sex educational materials. States that fail to comply may also risk losing federal funding like California’s program. As of September 2025, 16 states and D.C. have sued HHS, alleging that these current grant conditions are unlawful, unconstitutional, and harmful to gender diverse youth.

Similar policy changes were also made to the TPP program earlier this summer, but the Trump administration’s actions were blocked by a judge in October 2025. Previous iterations of the House Republican’s 2026 funding bill would have likewise eliminated funding for the TPP program altogether and increased funding for abstinence-only education by $5 million. These actions mirror previous efforts to dismantle comprehensive sex education in the classroom from the first Trump administration, which unsuccessfully tried to cut over $200 million in federal funding for TPP program grantees. The first Trump administration also shifted the TPP focus and funding away from comprehensive sex education and towards abstinence-only education.

The recent policy proposals from the second Trump administration closely align with Project 2025’s agenda, which claims comprehensive sex education promotes sex, prostitution, and abortion. Project 2025’s agenda prioritizes curricula that emphasizes sexual risk avoidance, arguing that any other program should not be eligible for federal funding. President Trump’s proposed 2026 discretionary budget, which is both a funding request to Congress and documentation of administrative priorities, would eliminate support for the TPP program as well as the GD SRAE program, claiming that both are “duplicative” of PREP and Title V SRAE, respectively.

Global Disease Outbreaks: A 2025 Snapshot and Implications for the U.S.

Published: Oct 29, 2025

Each year, there are multiple infectious disease outbreaks (defined as the occurrence of cases of disease in excess of what is expected) throughout the world. Some of these become severe and have global and domestic implications, including, most notably, the COVID-19 pandemic, but also the 2002-2004 SARS outbreak in China and eventually 28 other countries and the 2014 Ebola outbreak in West Africa. Since outbreaks are an ongoing reality and threat to human health, understanding the current status and scope of global disease outbreaks is important for stemming further spread to other geographic areas and populations, providing advice to travelers, and identifying the types of medical countermeasures that might be needed. While historically the U.S. government has played a key and often lead role in responding to outbreaks throughout the world, particularly in low- and middle-income countries, understanding the extent of outbreaks takes on added importance now, given changes made by the Trump administration. These changes include reduced funding, reductions in the number of U.S. staff supporting international outbreak response efforts, and elimination of some offices and functions, actions which collectively have diminished current U.S. government capacity to respond to outbreaks at home and abroad, even as experts believe another costly pandemic may strike the world within 25 years. There may a renewed opportunity, however, to mitigate some of these risks with the release of the State Department’s new U.S. global health strategy, which includes global health security as one of its three pillars.

To better understand the current outbreak landscape around the world, and because there is no single database of all global outbreaks, we analyzed data from multiple official sources to develop a snapshot of the number, type, and location of disease outbreaks, with human transmission, that have occurred thus far in 2025. Based on this analysis, we identified more than 100 outbreaks, including some that have affected multiple countries and impacted large populations. This finding is broadly similar to an estimate from a prior study of the 1996-2023 period that identified an average of 108 outbreaks that occurred each year. However, given that 2025 is not yet over, there could be more outbreaks in the weeks and months ahead. Our finding is also likely an underestimate due to delays in reporting and other factors (see methods for more information).

Findings

Our analysis finds that thus far in 2025 (see Table 1):

  • We identified 102 reported disease outbreaks with human transmission in 66 countries as of October 10, 2025; this is likely an undercount due to delays in reporting, the multiplicity of outbreaks that may be captured in this analysis as a single outbreak (e.g., the United States has identified 44 distinct outbreaks of measles as of Oct. 7 this year), and other factors.
  • These outbreaks are due to 20 different infectious diseases spanning a wide variety of disease types (including respiratory, vector-borne, food or waterborne, and direct contact infections) and including avian influenza (H5N1), Chikungunya, cholera, Ebola, Marburg, measles, mpox, Nipah, Rift Valley fever, yellow fever, and Zika, among others.
  • There is significant geographic variation in the occurrence of outbreaks by region. The greatest number of reported outbreaks have been in sub-Saharan Africa (33 countries), followed by the Western Hemisphere (15), East Asia and the Pacific (7), South and Central Asia (6), and the Near East (Middle East and North Africa, 5).
  • A third of these countries (23) countries have experienced more than one outbreak this year, often of varying scales. For example, the Democratic Republic of the Congo has reported outbreaks of anthrax, cholera, cVDPV1, Ebola virus disease, mpox, and one outbreak due to an unexplained cause but described now as “acute febrile illness,” and the United States has reported outbreaks of dengue – which is not endemic in the continental U.S. but has caused localized transmission from travel-related imported cases – and measles, which had long been considered eliminated in the U.S., a status that is now at risk due to increasing cases.
  • Outbreaks have ranged in size, as measured by number of cases as well as the number of affected countries. For example, a single case of Chapare hemorrhagic fever constituted an outbreak in Bolivia, while the largest this year has been the cholera outbreak across 34 countries, which has approached a half million cases and been declared a health emergency by the World Health Organization.
  • Similarly, the number of deaths resulting from these outbreaks has also varied widely, as some virulent infectious diseases have led to high mortality, such as deaths among all suspected cases of Marburg virus disease (10 of 10) and deaths among two-thirds of suspected cases of Ebola virus disease (43 of 64). Others have resulted in few deaths but spread rapidly and can have important health impacts, such as chikungunya and mpox.

Table 1

Disease Outbreaks, 2025

DiseaseCountryRegion*Primary Category for Disease/TransmissionNumber of Cases/Deaths (as of date)
Acute febrile illnessDemocratic Republic of the CongoSub-Saharan AfricaNot applicable1,318 suspected cases, inc. 53 deaths (as of Feb. 25)
AnthraxDemocratic Republic of the CongoSub-Saharan AfricaDirect contact infection17 suspected cases, inc. 1 death (as of April 30)
ThailandEast Asia and the Pacific5 confirmed cases, inc. 1 death (as of May 28)
UgandaSub-Saharan Africa15 confirmed cases, inc. 2 deaths (as of March 30)
Avian InfluenzaCambodiaEast Asia and the PacificRespiratory infectionCambodia: 11 confirmed cases, inc. 6 deaths (as of July 1)
Mexico: 1 confirmed case, inc. 1 death (as of April 2)
MexicoWestern Hemisphere
Chapare hemorrhagic feverBoliviaWestern HemisphereDirect contact infection1 confirmed case, inc. 1 death (as of Jan. 13)
ChikungunyaKey countries:
Bangladesh
South and Central AsiaVector-borne infectionGlobal overview: 445,271 (263,592 suspected and 181,679 confirmed) cases, inc. 155 deaths (as of Sept. 30)
Indian Ocean countries: data not provided (as of Sept. 5)
Bolivia: data not provided (as of June 26)
Cuba: data not provided (as of Sept. 26)
La Réunion and Mayotte (France): in La Réunion, over 47,500 confirmed cases, but more than 170,000 consultations for suspected chikungunya, and at least 12 deaths, with more suspected; in Mayotte, 116 cases (as of May 4)
BoliviaWestern Hemisphere
ChinaEast Asia and the Pacific
CubaWestern Hemisphere
KenyaSub-Saharan Africa
La Réunion and Mayotte (France)Sub-Saharan Africa
MadagascarSub-Saharan Africa
SomaliaSub-Saharan Africa
Sri LankaSouth and Central Asia
CholeraAfghanistanSouth and Central AsiaFood-/waterborne infectionGlobal overview: 489,452 cholera/Acute Watery Diarrhea cases; 6,155 deaths (as of Sept. 26; earlier alert)
AngolaSub-Saharan Africa
BangladeshSouth and Central Asia
BurundiSub-Saharan Africa
ChadSub-Saharan Africa
Cote d’IvoireSub-Saharan Africa
Democratic Republic of the CongoSub-Saharan Africa
EthiopiaSub-Saharan Africa
GhanaSub-Saharan Africa
HaitiWestern Hemisphere
IndiaSouth and Central Asia
IraqNear East
KenyaSub-Saharan Africa
MalawiSub-Saharan Africa
MozambiqueSub-Saharan Africa
MyanmarEast Asia and the Pacific
NamibiaSub-Saharan Africa
NepalSouth and Central Asia
NigerSub-Saharan Africa
NigeriaSub-Saharan Africa
PakistanSouth and Central Asia
PhilippinesEast Asia and the Pacific
Republic of the CongoSub-Saharan Africa
RwandaSub-Saharan Africa
SomaliaSub-Saharan Africa
South SudanSub-Saharan Africa
SudanSub-Saharan Africa
TanzaniaSub-Saharan Africa
ThailandEast Asia and the Pacific
TogoSub-Saharan Africa
UgandaSub-Saharan Africa
YemenNear East
ZambiaSub-Saharan Africa
ZimbabweSub-Saharan Africa
DengueUnited States of AmericaWestern HemisphereVector-borne infectionOutbreaks in various areas (as of July 29); 2,560 locally acquired cases (as of Sept. 25)
Ebola virus disease (EVD) (inc. Sudan virus disease, SVD)Democratic Republic of the Congo

Uganda
Sub-Saharan AfricaDirect contact infectionEVD: 64 suspected (53 confirmed and 11 probable) cases, inc. 43 deaths (as of Oct. 5; earlier alert)

SVD: 14 cases – 12 confirmed, 2 probable – inc. 4 deaths – 2 confirmed, 2 probable (as of April 26)
Invasive meningococcal diseaseSaudi ArabiaNear EastDirect contact infection17 cases (as of April 11)
Marburg virus disease TanzaniaSub-Saharan AfricaDirect contact infection10 suspected (2 confirmed, 8 probable) cases, inc. 10 deaths (as of March 12)
MeaslesArgentinaWestern HemisphereRespiratory infectionRegion of the Americas (inc. United States of America): 10,139 confirmed cases, inc. 18 deaths (as of Aug. 8; earlier alert)
Morocco: more than 25,000 suspected cases, inc. 13,706 confirmed cases and 184 deaths, from Oct. 2023 through April 13, 2025 (as of May 13)
United States of America: 1,544 cases, inc. 3 deaths (as of Sept. 30)
BelizeWestern Hemisphere
BoliviaWestern Hemisphere
BrazilWestern Hemisphere
CanadaWestern Hemisphere
Costa RicaWestern Hemisphere
MexicoWestern Hemisphere
MoroccoNear East
ParaguayWestern Hemisphere
PeruWestern Hemisphere
United States of AmericaWestern Hemisphere
Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS) coronavirusSaudi ArabiaNear EastRespiratory infection9 confirmed cases, inc. 2 deaths (as of April 21)
MpoxKey countries:
Burundi
Democratic Republic of the Congo
Kenya
Rwanda
Sierra Leone
Uganda
Sub-Saharan AfricaDirect contact infectionGlobal overview: 38,671 confirmed cases, inc. 163 deaths (as of Aug. 31; earlier alert)
Nipah virusBangladesh
India
South and Central AsiaDirect contact infectionBangladesh: 4 confirmed cases, inc. 4 deaths (as of Aug. 29)
India: 4 confirmed cases, inc. 2 deaths (as of July 12)
Oropouche virus diseaseKey countries:
Brazil
Panama
Western HemisphereVector-borne infectionData not provided (as of July 14); Americas Region overview: 12,786 confirmed cases (as of July 27)
RabiesTimor-LesteEast Asia and the PacificDirect contact infection4 confirmed cases, inc. 4 deaths (as of June 17)
Rift Valley FeverSenegalSub-Saharan AfricaVector-borne infectionData not provided (as of Oct. 10)
Variant Poliovirus (i.e., circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus of three types: cVDPV1, cVDPV2, cVDPV3)cVDPV1:
Algeria
Near EastFood-/waterborne infectioncVDPV1 global overview: 2 cases of acute flaccid paralysis (as of Oct. 6)
 
cVDPV2 global overview: 146 cases of acute flaccid paralysis (as of Oct. 6)
 
cVDPV3 global overview: 5 cases of acute flaccid paralysis (as of Oct. 6)
Democratic Republic of the CongoSub-Saharan Africa
cVDPV2:
Angola
Sub-Saharan Africa
BeninSub-Saharan Africa
Burkina FasoSub-Saharan Africa
Central African RepublicSub-Saharan Africa
ChadSub-Saharan Africa
DjiboutiSub-Saharan Africa
EthiopiaSub-Saharan Africa
NigerSub-Saharan Africa
NigeriaSub-Saharan Africa
Papua New GuineaEast Asia and the Pacific
SomaliaSub-Saharan Africa
SudanSub-Saharan Africa
YemenNear East
cVDPV3:
Cameroon
Sub-Saharan Africa
ChadSub-Saharan Africa
GuineaSub-Saharan Africa
Yellow fever Bolivia
Brazil
Colombia
Ecuador
Peru
Western HemisphereVector-borne infection235 confirmed cases, inc. 96 deaths (as of May 25; earlier alert)
Zika virus diseaseIndiaSouth and Central AsiaVector-borne infection151 cases in 2024 (as of Jan. 29)
Note: * Regions reflect those used by the U.S. State Department; Near East includes the Middle East and North Africa. Disease outbreaks as identified and defined by the following authoritative sources: WHO, CDC, and GPEI; not an exhaustive list of outbreaks globally. As of Oct. 10, 2025. Does not include diseases such as COVID-19, wild poliovirus, and seasonal influenza where there have not been unexpected levels of cases and deaths this year.

Sources: WHO, Disease Outbreak News, Situation Reports, and Rapid Risk Assessment Reports; CDC, Outbreak webpage; CDC, Travel Notices webpage; GPEI, Polio This Week.

Methods

This analysis is based on data from the World Health Organization (WHO: Disease Outbreak News, Situation Reports, and Rapid Risk Assessment Reports); U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC: Outbreak webpage and Travel Notices webpage), and the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI: Polio This Week), with some supplementary data obtained from the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO). Case reports and data from these sources were used to identify outbreaks with human transmission (including transmission from animal to human) by country and type as of October 10, 2025. This estimate should be considered a floor. First, one or more outbreaks of a single disease reported in a particular country are counted as a single outbreak – for example, the United States has identified 44 distinct outbreaks of measles as of Oct. 7 this year, but it is included as a single outbreak in this analysis. Second, due to delays in reporting and non-reporting (due to capacity or other issues), not all outbreaks that have occurred have necessarily been reported to these sources. Third, not included in this analysis are diseases that may be significant and with ongoing transmission, including this year, but not reported to be occurring at unexpected levels, such as COVID-19, seasonal influenza, and wild poliovirus; also not included are diseases that are spreading among animals without transmission to humans. Finally, while the sources used are the main international sources available for tracking outbreaks, there may be other sources that capture additional data (such as ProMED from the International Society for Infectious Diseases, BEACON based at Boston University, and The Tracking Report based at Brown University).

How Schools Have Responded to the Youth Fentanyl Crisis

Author: Nirmita Panchal
Published: Oct 28, 2025

With the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, deaths due to drug overdose among adolescents more than doubled, primarily driven by the synthetic opioidfentanyl. National survey data show that while the percent of adolescents (ages 12-17) with a past year substance use disorder decreased from 2021 to 2024, the share of adolescents with a past year opioid use disorder remained stable over the same period. Additionally, less than one-third of adolescents with a past year opioid use disorder reported receiving any treatment. In recent years, many schools have incorporated measures to address the fentanyl crisis. Further, nearly 7 in 10 adolescents reported receiving substance use disorder and prevention education at school and over 480,000 adolescents received substance use treatment at school in 2023, underscoring how schools can serve as an access point for these services among youth.

This analysis examines trends in drug overdose deaths among adolescents from the latest data from the Centers for Disease Control and explores the steps public schools took in the 2024-2025 school year to combat drug overdose due to fentanyl by drawing upon survey data from the School Pulse Panel.1 The School Pulse Panel is a study by the National Center for Education Statistics and the U.S. Census Bureau that surveys schools monthly on a variety of topics, including drug overdose prevention services.

Total drug overdose death rates among adolescents sharply increased alongside the COVID-19 pandemic, before slowing in 2023; with the fastest increases in these deaths seen among children of color (Figure 1). In 2019, 1.1 per 100,000 adolescents (or 282 adolescents total) died by drug overdose, before increasing to 2.8 in 2022 (or 721 adolescents total). Although there has been a recent decline, drug overdose death rates remain higher than pre-pandemic rates (1.7 in 2024 or 441 adolescents total). White adolescents continue to account for the largest share of adolescent drug overdose deaths (50% in 2024); however, Black and Hispanic adolescents have experienced the fastest increase in these deaths in recent years.

Drug Overdose Death Rates Among Adolescents, 2019-2024

Among public schools in the 2024-2025 school year, nearly 3 out of 4 public school administrators reported that some or all of their staff are trained to recognize a drug overdose. Specifically, 30% of administrators reported that all of their teachers and staff are trained and 44% of administrators reported that some of their teachers and staff are trained (Figure 2). However, 16% of administrators reported that none of their staff are trained.

3 in 10 Public Schools Report That All Teachers and Staff Are Trained To Recognize A Potential Drug Overdose

Fifty-two percent of public schools reported offering fentanyl education to students in the 2024-2025 school year using several methods (Figure 3). The most common type of fentanyl education is provided through classroom instruction (30%), followed by school assemblies (22%) and events held for school families (22%).

3 in 10 Public Schools Incorporate Education on the Dangers of Fentanyl into Classroom Instruction

Seventy-seven percent of public schools reported storing naloxone – a nasal spray to reverse opioid overdose – on campus (Figure 4). In light of the fentanyl crisis, measures were taken to improve access to naloxone. An analysis of large school districts across the U.S. found that by 2023, there was an increase in the percent of districts stocking naloxone; however, some districts did not have plans to do so. Currently, several states, including Illinois, Rhode Island, Washington, and Arkansas, have mandates for schools to stock naloxone. California’s Department of Health Care Services provides naloxone for free to schools through an application process. Many other states recommend or at least allow schools to stock naloxone on campus and administer if needed.

Share of Public Schools That Store Naloxone as of the 2024-2025 School Year

Some schools are more likely than others to store naloxone – for example, schools with fewer students of color were more likely to store naloxone than schools with a higher population of students of color (Figure 4). Specifically, schools in which less than 25% of students were students of color were more likely to store naloxone than schools in which more than 75% of students were students of color (79% vs. 71%). This is consistent with research that suggests that compared to White people, Black people may have limited access to naloxone. Similar trends in schools storing naloxone were seen with schools in lower poverty neighborhoods compared to higher poverty neighborhoods (78% vs. 72%), middle and high schools compared to elementary schools (82% and 89%, vs. 69%), and schools with 1,000 or more students compared to smaller-sized schools.   

Among school staff, nurses, security personnel, and administrative staff are most likely to be trained to administer naloxone in the case of an emergency (Figure 5). In the 2024-2025 school year, 1% of public schools reported that naloxone was administered at school or during a school event.

Among School Staff, Nurses and Security Personnel are Most Likely to be Trained to Administer Naloxone
  1. The School Pulse Panel utilizes a random stratified sample of the Common Core of Data, a universe of public schools. This stratified sample includes public and public charter schools, schools with magnet programs, alternative schools, special education schools, and vocational schools. Approximately 4,000 schools were included in the sample for the 2024-2025 school year. Approximately 1,600 schools responded to the March survey – findings from this survey are included in this brief. There has been some variation in the number of schools that respond each month. While school principals are the initial point of contact to complete the survey, they may invite other school and district staff to assist with completion. Published data is weighted and adjusted to account for non-response. ↩︎

8 Things to Watch for the 2026 ACA Open Enrollment Period

Published: Oct 28, 2025

The Affordable Care Act (ACA) Marketplace Open Enrollment season starts November 1, 2025 in most states. The premiums insurers charge are increasing. And, with enhanced premium tax credits set to expire at the end of the year, out-of-pocket premiums are expected to increase drastically. Additionally, changes to Marketplace enrollment and eligibility rules in this year’s budget reconciliation law and in the Trump Administration’s “Marketplace Integrity and Affordability” regulation (program integrity regulation) include other changes to open enrollment.

Here are the eight things to know for the 2026 Open Enrollment period.

1. Enhanced premium tax credits are set to expire.

Currently, enhanced premium tax credits provide extra financial assistance to ACA Marketplace enrollees who are eligible for subsidies, and make middle-income enrollees (those with incomes above four times the poverty level) eligible for financial help, unlike in the original ACA. These enhanced tax credits will expire at the end of the year unless Congress acts to change the law.

Looking ahead to 2026, the future of the enhanced premium tax credits remains uncertain. Without enhanced tax credits, KFF estimates that subsidized Marketplace enrollees’ out-of-pocket premium payments will be 114% higher, on average.

These increases in enrollees’ monthly premium payments will vary from person to person. If enhanced tax credits expire, people with incomes below four times poverty ($62,600 for an individual, $128,600 for a family of four) will continue to receive a tax credit, but the amount of financial help they receive could be significantly less. People with incomes above four times poverty will no longer be eligible for financial help and will be hit by a double whammy of lost tax credits and rising costs from insurers if enhanced tax credits expire. A KFF calculator allows users to input a zip code, income, and age to see 2026 premium payments with or without an extension of the enhanced tax credits.

While these tax credits do not expire until the end of 2025, if Congress does not extend the subsidies at least a few days before the enrollment window opens, Marketplace enrollees will log on and see these higher premiums as soon as open enrollment starts on November 1. The Congressional Budget Office projects significant coverage losses, and insurers expect younger, healthier enrollees to be more likely to drop their Marketplace plans, which will in turn push premium increases even higher than they otherwise would be. 

2. Marketplace enrollees could have to repay more at tax time.

Currently, an enrollee who makes less than 400% of the federal poverty level and whose income ends up being higher than they had estimated at the time they signed up must repay some of the excess premium tax credit on their taxes the following year, up to a repayment limit.

Starting in the 2026 plan year, due to changes made in the 2025 budget reconciliation law, tax credit repayment limits will be eliminated, and Marketplace enrollees will be expected to repay the full amount of any excess tax credits when they file their 2026 taxes.

Additionally, if enhanced premium tax credits expire, and the “subsidy cliff” returns for people with incomes over four times the federal poverty level, enrollees who start out with expected incomes below four times poverty but end up with actual incomes above four times poverty will have to pay back the entire tax credit, which could be thousands or even tens of thousands of dollars.

Marketplace enrollees, who are often self-employed, shift, or gig-workers, tend to have high income volatility, potentially leaving them subject to significant repayments. If an enrollee experiences a mid-year change in their expected earnings, they can notify the Marketplace to adjust their coming months’ tax credit to minimize repayments at tax time.

3. Program changes might result in more Marketplace enrollees selecting higher deductible plans.

With the expiration of enhanced premium tax credits, many ACA Marketplace enrollees facing higher monthly premium payments next year may decide to switch from a silver or gold plan to a bronze or catastrophic plan to keep a lower premium payment, but the tradeoff would be a much higher deductible.

The Trump administration announced plans to expand access to catastrophic health plans on the Federally Facilitated Marketplaces and some State-Based Marketplaces. Citing a “significant rise in health insurance premiums,” CMS will streamline the process for individuals to receive a “hardship exemption” if they are not eligible for premium tax credits or cost sharing help because their projected income is below the federal poverty level or above 250% of the federal poverty level. These individuals will be allowed to enroll in a catastrophic plan where they are available on or off the Marketplace. These plans have lower premiums than bronze plans but have an annual deductible of $10,600 for an individual or $21,200 for a family in 2026.

Additionally, the budget reconciliation law included changes to health savings account (HSA) rules that will automatically treat all Marketplace bronze and catastrophic plans as high-deductible health plans (HDHP), making them eligible to be paired with an HSA. In the past, not all bronze or catastrophic plans with high deductibles available on the Marketplace could be used with an HSA. This change could increase use of HSAs in the Marketplace. The budget reconciliation law also now allows all HDHPs with an HSA to cover telehealth and other remote services before the enrollee meets the deductible.

4. Premium tax credit eligibility will be eliminated for certain lawfully present immigrants.

Currently, lawfully present immigrants with incomes below 100% FPL who are ineligible for Medicaid because they have been in the U.S. less than five years are eligible for subsidized ACA Marketplace coverage.

Starting in 2026, lawfully present immigrants who are not eligible for Medicaid due to their immigration status and who have incomes below 100% FPL will no longer be eligible for subsidized Marketplace coverage.

Additionally, starting in 2027, the budget reconciliation law further restricts eligibility for subsidized Marketplace coverage only to certain lawfully present immigrants. These individuals include:

  • Lawful permanent residents
  • Cuban and Haitian entrants, as defined in section 501(e) of the Refugee Education Assistance Act of 1980
  • Any lawful residents living in the U.S. under the Compact of Free Association

This means other lawfully present immigrants such as refugees, asylees, and survivors of human trafficking will no longer be eligible for premium tax credits starting in 2027.

5. Consumers with lower incomes can no longer sign up year-round.

In recent years, consumers with estimated incomes less than or equal to 150% of the federal poverty level (FPL) ($23,475 for an individual, and $48,225 for a household of 4 in 2026) could enroll in Marketplace coverage at any point throughout the year, not just during Open Enrollment, in what was called the “low-income special enrollment period” (low-income SEP). Insurers had expressed concern that this year-round opportunity to enroll in and switch plans was leading to adverse selection as lower-income people could wait until they were sick to sign up or switch to a more generous plan.

Starting August 25, 2025, a consumer can no longer qualify for an SEP just because they have a low income. This change, included in the program integrity regulation, will expire at the end of plan year 2026; however, a provision of the budget reconciliation law that takes effect in 2026 will effectively end the low-income SEP permanently. This change will prohibit most consumers from receiving a premium tax credit if they enroll in Marketplace coverage through an income-based SEP, such as the low-income SEP.

6. Loss of federal Navigator funding could make it harder for some consumers to find help during open enrollment.

In February 2025, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) announced a 90% reduction in federal Navigator funding, reducing funding from $100 million last year to $10 million for the 2026 plan year. This cut will significantly reduce the resources available to nonprofit and community organizations that help consumers with navigating coverage changes, selecting plans, and applying for premium tax credits, among other services. For example, Navigators in the state of Louisiana were awarded $2,467,867 last year. This year they were awarded $250,000. In North Carolina, funding was reduced from $7,434,368 in 2025 to $750,000 in 2026.

While agents and brokers have facilitated an increasing number of enrollments for HealthCare.gov, unlike Navigators, agents and brokers are financially compensated by private insurers for enrolling people in plans. Recent Department of Justice indictments have involved allegations that some brokers have fraudulently enrolled consumers or switched their Marketplace coverage to obtain commission payments from insurance companies.

7. Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) recipients will be unable to sign up for Marketplace coverage.

A Biden administration regulation from 2024 allowed DACA recipients to enroll in Marketplace or Basic Health Program (BHP) coverage and access premium tax credits and cost-sharing reductions.

As of August 25, 2025, due to the Trump Administration program integrity rule, DACA recipients are no longer eligible for Marketplace coverage, premium tax credits, cost-sharing reductions, or BHP coverage in states that operate one. No DACA recipients can enroll after that date, and, in most states, those already enrolled in Marketplace coverage lost this coverage effective September 30, 2025.

8. Several planned regulatory changes to ACA Marketplace coverage have been temporarily blocked by a federal court.

The Trump Administration issued a program integrity rule that makes substantial changes to Marketplace enrollment processes and eligibility for premium tax credits, aimed in part at reducing fraudulent enrollment. These changes were scheduled to go into effect for the 2026 plan year. However, many of these changes have been temporarily halted by a federal court in Maryland.

In a case called City of Columbus et. al v. Kennedy, plaintiffs question the authority of the Trump Administration to make many of these changes, alleging that the Administration either exceeded their authority under the ACA or failed to make the case that these new eligibility and enrollment restrictions were warranted. The court granted a preliminary injunction in August blocking the implementation of several parts of the program integrity rule, including additional paperwork requirements for certain consumers to verify their income to be eligible for premium tax credits. Also, the court temporarily blocked a requirement that returning Marketplace enrollees who would otherwise be automatically reenrolled into a zero-premium plan pay a new five-dollar monthly premium until they actively reenroll. A list of the stayed provisions is available here.

It is expected that this case (and a related one) will take several months to be resolved, so consumers may not see these stayed provisions in effect soon, if at all.