Poll Finding

KFF Health Tracking Poll: Health Care Costs, Expiring ACA Tax Credits, and the 2026 Midterms

Published: Jan 29, 2026

Findings

Key Takeaways

  • The cost of health care, including paying for health insurance and out-of-pocket expenses, tops the list of the public’s economic anxieties, rising well above other necessities. Two-thirds of the public (66%) say they worry about being able to afford health care for them and their family, ranking higher than utilities, food and groceries, housing, and gas. In addition, most adults (55%) say their health care costs have gone up in the past year, including at least one in five who say they have increased at a faster rate than food or utilities. A majority (56%) of the public say they expect health care costs for them and their families to become even less affordable in the coming year.
  • With health care costs topping the list of economic worries across partisans and key groups, voters expect the issue to play a major role in their decisions to turnout in November’s midterm elections as well as which candidates they support. Majorities across partisans say health care costs will impact their vote in November, but the issue is resonating more with Democratic voters and independent voters. More than three-quarters of Democratic voters and independent voters say health care costs will impact both their decision to vote and which party’s candidate they will vote for in the election, compared to about half of Republican voters. In fact, two-thirds of Democratic voters and more than four in ten independent voters say health care costs will have a “major impact” on their 2026 voting decisions.
  • The Democratic Party has the advantage when it comes to which party voters trust to handle most health care issues, including health care costs, on which the Democrats have a 13-point advantage over Republicans. The one exception is prescription drug prices, an issue President Trump has focused on in his second term, and on which similar shares of voters say they trust the Democratic Party (35%) and the Republican Party (30%). Among independent voters, the Democratic Party has an edge over the Republican Party on health care issues, but many independent voters also say they don’t trust either party.
  • The public’s anxiety around health care costs comes at a time when the Senate and President Trump seem unlikely to revive the ACA enhanced premium tax credits, which expired on January 1st. Most (67%) of the public say Congress did the “wrong thing” by not extending the credits, including large majorities of Democrats (89%) and independents (72%). But majorities of Republicans (63%) including MAGA supporters (64%) say Congress did the “right thing” by not extending the ACA enhanced premium tax credits. While overall popularity of the ACA and the Marketplaces is still high, given the recent debate around the ACA enhanced tax credit debates, favorability has declined among Republicans.

Health Care Costs Top Public’s Concerns During Moment of Economic Anxiety

One year into the second term of President Trump and less than ten months before the 2026 midterm elections, the public remains concerned about the top issue of the 2025 election – the economy. Eight in ten (82%) adults say their cost of living has increased in the past year, including half who say it has increased “a lot.” Very few say their cost of living has “decreased” either “a little” (4%) or “a lot” (1%) while about one in ten say their living expenses have remained stable over the past year. Many adults, regardless of partisanship, say their cost of living has increased “a lot” in the past year, including a majority of (56%) Democrats, about half (53%) independents, and four in ten (41%) Republicans. About four in ten (38%) supporters of the Make America Great Again Movement (MAGA) also say their cost of living has increased “a lot” in the past year.

About Eight in Ten Adults Say Their Cost of Living Has Increased in the Past Year

Concerns about household spending coincide with a majority (71%) of the public saying President Trump is not focusing enough on domestic affairs, such as addressing the cost of living in the U.S. The share of the public who say President Trump is not paying enough attention to domestic concerns rises to about nine in ten (89%) Democrats and three-quarters of (76%) independents. On the other hand, a majority of the public (55%) also say the Trump administration is focusing “too much” on foreign affairs, such as actions in Venezuela, Ukraine, and Gaza. Republicans and MAGA supporters are more positive about President Trump’s priorities, with many saying he is spending the “right amount” on both domestic affairs (53% and 60%), and foreign affairs (66% and 76%).

Many Say Trump Is Not Focusing Enough on Domestic Affairs Such as Addressing the Cost of Living in The U.S., Too Focused on Foreign Affairs

The latest KFF Health Tracking Poll finds health care costs top the list of what the public worries about being able to afford for themselves and their family. Two-thirds (66%) of the public say they worry about paying for health care, including the cost of health insurance and out-of-pocket costs for things like office visits and prescription drugs, ranking higher as a financial worry than other household expenses like utilities, food, and rent or mortgage – all three items on which a majority of Americans are still worried about being able to afford.  About a third of adults (32%) say they are “very worried” about affording health care expenses, while about a quarter of adults say the same about being able to afford food and groceries (24%), their rent or mortgage (23%), or utilities (22%). About a fifth of adults say they are “very worried” about affording gas and transportation costs (17%). This comes as recent reports show that health care costs are on the rise for most Americans and the Affordable Care Act (ACA) enhanced tax credits, which benefitted most people who purchased insurance through the marketplace, have expired.

Health Care Costs Are the Top Household Expense the Public Worries About

Notably, health care costs are the biggest worry compared to other household expenses for all adults, regardless of partisanship. About one third of Democrats (36%) and Independents (34%) say they are “very” worried about affording health care, as are about one in four (24%) Republicans. This includes one in four MAGA Republicans (23%) and non-MAGA Republicans (24%).

Majorities Across Partisanship Worry About Affording Health Care Costs

One reason why health care expenses may be topping the list of household worries is that most adults say their health care costs have increased in the past year, including a substantial share who say these costs have increased at a faster rate than other household expenses.

Overall, more than half (55%) of adults say their health care costs have increased in the past year. This includes about two-thirds of people with employer-based health insurance (64%) and those who purchase their own coverage (66%), as well as about half (53%) of Medicare enrollees 65 and older. Perceptions about the increase of health care costs persist across partisanship, with about half or more across partisans saying their health care costs have increased in the past year, including 58% of Democrats, 56% of independents, and 51% of Republicans, including 47% of MAGA Republicans.

Many Say Their Health Care Costs Have Increased in the Past Year

Notably, about one in five of all adults say their health care costs have increased at a faster rate than other necessities like utilities (23%) and food and groceries (21%). This includes similar shares among partisans and MAGA supporters, as well as at least one in four with employer-sponsored insurance and about a third who purchase their own insurance. Smaller shares of adults who receive health insurance through Medicaid and Medicare say their health care costs have increased at a faster rate than utilities and food and groceries, suggesting those with government coverage are more insulated from the rising cost of health care.

One in Five Adults Say Their Health Care Costs Have Increased at a Faster Rate Than Utility and Food Costs

Looking ahead to the next year, a majority (56%) of adults expect their family’s health care costs to become less affordable, while about a third (35%) expect them to stay about the same, and one in ten (9%) expect them to be more affordable. Most Democrats (62%) and independents (58%) expect health care costs to become less affordable, while Republicans, including those who identify as MAGA Republicans are split, with similar shares saying they expect them to become less affordable or expect them to say about the same. Majorities across insurance types expect their health care costs to become less affordable. This includes two-thirds of those who self-purchase (64%) or have employer-sponsored insurance (60%) and majorities of those who are uninsured (57%) or who have coverage through Medicaid (55%).

Most Expect Their Health Care Costs To Become Less Affordable in the Next Year

Democrats Have an Advantage on Health Care Issues, But No Party Has an Advantage on the Cost of Living 

With health care costs on the rise and a significant source of worry for many, a majority of voters, regardless of partisanship, say the issue will play a role in their voting decisions. The cost of health care is a particularly strong motivator for Democratic voters, of whom more than eight in ten say it will impact their decision to vote and who they will vote for, including two-thirds who say it will have a “major impact.” The cost of health care is a similarly large motivator for independents, of whom about eight in ten say it will impact their vote, including more than four in ten who say it will have a “major impact.” While Democratic and independent voters are more likely to say health care costs are a strong motivator compared to Republican voters, substantial shares of Republican voters say it will impact their decisions in November as well. Six in ten (60%) Republican voters say it will impact their decision to vote and 56% say it will impact which party’s candidate they will vote for. This includes about a fifth of Republican voters who say the cost of health care will have a “major impact.” This suggests that rising health care costs resonate with voters across the board and will be a key voting issue to watch for in this November’s elections.

Majorities of Voters Across Partisanship Say the Cost of Health Care Will Impact Their Midterm Vote

Less than ten months before the 2026 midterm elections, the Democratic Party has a strong edge over the Republican Party when it comes to health care issues, including on the cost of health care. Democrats have a double-digit advantage over the Republicans when it comes to who voters trust on determining the future of Medicaid (43% vs. 25%), addressing the future of the ACA (42% vs. 26%), determining the future of Medicare (40% vs. 26%), and addressing the cost of health care (40% vs. 27%). Voters are more divided on which party they trust to address the cost of prescription drugs, an issue that President Trump has focused on during his second term. Notably, on every health care issue asked about, at least a quarter of voters say they trust neither party to do a better job.

Among Voters, Democrats Have an Edge Over Republicans on Most Health Issues

Unsurprisingly, on each health care issue polled, Democratic voters are more likely to say they trust the Democratic Party and Republican voters are more likely to say they trust the Republican Party. Among independent voters, the Democratic Party has a clear advantage over the Republican Party on each of the health care issues; however, sizeable shares of independent voters (between about one-third and four in ten) say they trust “neither” party. When it comes to addressing the cost of prescription drugs, a larger share of independent voters say they trust “neither party” than say they trust either the Democrats or the Republicans.

Among Independent Voters, Democrats Have an Edge Over Republicans On Health Care Issues, But Many Also Say They Trust Neither Party

While the Democrats have an advantage among voters overall on health care issues, voter confidence is low when it comes to both political parties and President Trump to address the cost of living. Most voters say they have “not too much” confidence or “none” in the Republicans in Congress (64%), the Democrats in Congress (63%), and President Trump (61%), to address the cost of living for people like them. Small and similar shares of voters overall say they have “a lot” or “some” confidence in President Trump (38%), Democrats in Congress (37%), or Republicans in Congress (36%) to address the cost of living.

Voters Have Equally Low Confidence in President Trump, Democrats and Republicans to Address the Cost of Living

Amid the ACA Tax Credits Debate, Favorability of the ACA and ACA Marketplace Remains High, but Has Declined Among Republicans  

While a majority of the public continues to express a favorable view of the ACA, Republicans’ views have soured recently in the wake of the debate over extending the enhanced tax credits and Republican lawmakers’ persistent attacks on the 2010 health care law. Overall favorability of the ACA has dropped in the most recent poll, with 58% now saying they have a favorable view of the law and 41% saying they have an unfavorable view (down from 64% favorable, 35% unfavorable in September 2025). The overall decline in favorability of the ACA is driven by Republicans, of whom one in five (22%) now say they have a “very” or “somewhat” favorable view, compared to one-third (36%) who said the same in September. Views of the ACA remain positive and stable among Democrats (91%) and independents (62%), as well as among individuals who buy their own health coverage (64%).

Following ACA Tax Credit Debate, Favorability of the ACA Declines Among Republicans and MAGA Supporters

Favorable views of the ACA marketplaces where people and small businesses owners can shop for health insurance have also declined from 70% in September 2025 to 62% in the latest KFF Health Tracking Poll. Similarly to views of the ACA overall, this shift is driven by Republicans (41% now vs. 59% in September 2025 who said they view the marketplace favorably). Views of the ACA marketplaces are stable and favorable among Democrats (81%), independents (64%), and among those who self-purchase their insurance (64%).

After ACA Tax Credit Debate, Favorability of the ACA Marketplaces Declined, Driven by Republicans and MAGA Supporters

Most Say Congress Did the “Wrong Thing” Not Extending the ACA Tax Credits

The public is largely critical of Congress not extending the ACA enhanced tax credits for people who buy their own health coverage. Two-thirds of the public say Congress did the “wrong thing” by not extending the ACA enhanced tax credits, compared to one-third who say Congress did the “right thing.” Majorities of Democrats (89%), independents (72%), non-MAGA Republicans (54%), and those who purchase their insurance themselves (67%) say Congress did the “wrong thing” by not extending the tax credits. While most (63%) Republicans say Congress did the “right thing” by not extending the tax credits, a sizeable share, about four in ten (37%), say Congress did the “wrong thing.” This marks a shift in views from when debates over to extend the tax credits or not were still ongoing in November, when half of Republicans said Congress should extend the tax credits, suggesting the debates have shifted opinion among the Republican base.

Most Democrats and Independents Say Congress Did the Wrong Thing Not Extending the ACA Tax Credits; Most Republicans Say It Was the Right Thing

Among those who think the enhanced tax credits should have been extended, a group that leans more Democratic, many say most of the blame either falls on President Trump (42%, 28% of total adults) or Republicans in Congress (38%, or 26% of total adults). About one in five (19%, or 13% of total adults) say Democrats in Congress deserve the most blame. Among the four in ten Republicans who say Congress did the “wrong thing” not extending the tax credits, two-thirds (64%) blame Democrats in Congress for their expiration, rising to seven in ten (72%) MAGA-supporters.

Many Blame President Trump or Republicans for Not Extending ACA Enhanced Tax Credits; One Third Say Congress Did the Right Thing Not Extending Them

There are some indications that the expiration of the enhanced tax credits will play a role in how voters make decisions in the coming November election. Among those who self-purchase their insurance, two-thirds say it will impact their decision to vote (66%) and which party’s candidate they will vote for (67%) in the upcoming election. And although the expiring enhanced premium tax credits directly affect only those who purchase their own coverage on the ACA marketplaces, among voters overall, six in ten (62%) say their expiration will have an impact on their decision to vote, including 30% who say it will have a “major impact” and 31% who say it will have a “minor impact.” An additional four in ten (38%) voters say it will have “no impact at all” on their decision to vote. The expiration of the tax credits is a stronger motivator for Democratic voters and independent voters than for Republican voters. About eight in ten Democratic and two-thirds of independent voters say it will impact their voting behavior, compared to about four in ten Republican voters.

Most Democrats, Independents Say Expiration of ACA Tax Credits Will Impact Their Midterm Vote, Majorities of Republicans Say It Will Not

Methodology

This KFF Health Tracking Poll/KFF Tracking Poll on Health Information and Trust was designed and analyzed by public opinion researchers at KFF. The survey was conducted January 13-20, 2026, online and by telephone among a nationally representative sample of 1,426 U.S. adults in English (n=1,355) and in Spanish (n=71). The sample includes 1,028 adults (n=60 in Spanish) reached through the SSRS Opinion Panel either online (n= 1,003) or over the phone (n=25). The SSRS Opinion Panel is a nationally representative probability-based panel where panel members are recruited randomly in one of two ways: (a) Through invitations mailed to respondents randomly sampled from an Address-Based Sample (ABS) provided by Marketing Systems Groups (MSG) through the U.S. Postal Service’s Computerized Delivery Sequence (CDS); (b) from a dual-frame random digit dial (RDD) sample provided by MSG. For the online panel component, invitations were sent to panel members by email followed by up to three reminder emails.

Another 398 (n=11 in Spanish) adults were reached through random digit dial telephone sample of prepaid cell phone numbers obtained through MSG. Phone numbers used for the prepaid cell phone component were randomly generated from a cell phone sampling frame with disproportionate stratification aimed at reaching Hispanic and non-Hispanic Black respondents. Stratification was based on incidence of the race/ethnicity groups within each frame. Among this prepaid cell phone component, 149 were interviewed by phone and 249 were invited to the web survey via short message service (SMS).

Respondents in the prepaid cell phone sample who were interviewed by phone received a $15 incentive via a check received by mail or an electronic gift card incentive. Respondents in the prepaid cell phone sample reached via SMS received a $10 electronic gift card incentive. SSRS Opinion Panel respondents received a $5 electronic gift card incentive (some harder-to-reach groups received a $10 electronic gift card). In order to ensure data quality, cases were removed if they failed two or more quality checks: (1) attention check questions in the online version of the questionnaire, (2) had over 30% item non-response, or (3) had a length less than one quarter of the mean length by mode. Based on this criterion, 2 cases was removed.

The combined cell phone and panel samples were weighted to match the sample’s demographics to the national U.S. adult population using data from the Census Bureau’s 2025 Current Population Survey (CPS), September 2023 Volunteering and Civic Life Supplement data from the CPS, and the 2025 KFF Benchmarking Survey with ABS and prepaid cell phone samples. The demographic variables included in weighting for the general population sample are gender, age, education, race/ethnicity, region, civic engagement, frequency of internet use and political party identification. The weights account for differences in the probability of selection for each sample type (prepaid cell phone and panel). This includes adjustment for the sample design and geographic stratification of the cell phone sample, within household probability of selection, and the design of the panel-recruitment procedure.

The margin of sampling error including the design effect for the full sample is plus or minus 3 percentage points. Numbers of respondents and margins of sampling error for key subgroups are shown in the table below. For results based on other subgroups, the margin of sampling error may be higher. Sample sizes and margins of sampling error for other subgroups are available on request. Sampling error is only one of many potential sources of error and there may be other unmeasured error in this or any other public opinion poll. KFF public opinion and survey research is a charter member of the Transparency Initiative of the American Association for Public Opinion Research.

GroupN (unweighted)M.O.S.E.
Total1,426± 3 percentage points
Party ID  
Democrats473± 6 percentage points
Independents483± 6 percentage points
Republicans367± 6 percentage points
   
MAGA Republicans/Rep leaners352± 6 percentage points
MAHA supporters618± 5 percentage points
Parents or guardians of children under 18 living in their household436± 6 percentage points
News Release

Health Care Costs Tops the Public’s Economic Worries as the Runup to the Midterms Begins; Independent Voters Are More Likely to Trust Democrats than Republicans on the Issue

Two Thirds of Public Say Congress "Did the Wrong Thing" by Not Extending ACA Enhanced Tax Credits, But Republicans Largely Say Congress “Did the Right Thing”

Published: Jan 29, 2026

Heading into this midterm election year, the cost of health care tops the public’s economic anxieties and more than 4 in 10 voters say the issue will have a major impact on their vote, a new KFF Health Tracking poll finds. Voters, including independents, currently trust Democrats more than Republicans to address the cost of health care and most other health care issues, though neither party has an advantage on addressing the overall cost of living, the poll finds.

The poll provides an early look at how the public and voters view health care issues, including costs, following a year of substantial debate and changes. Congress last year enacted major Medicaid changes expected to cut federal spending and increase the number of uninsured and allowed the Affordable Care Act’s enhanced tax credits to expire, sharply increasing the premium payments for most ACA Marketplace enrollees.

Across a range of measures, the poll finds significant concerns about health care costs:

  • The public was given a list of household expenses families worry about. A third (32%) say that they are “very worried” about their ability to afford health care for them and their families – more than say the same about affording food and groceries (24%), rent or mortgage (23%), monthly utility bills (22%), or gasoline and other transportation costs (17%).
  • Health care costs are the top economic worry for Democrats, independents, Republicans, and supporters of President Trump’s “Make America Great Again” movement.
  • A majority (56%) of the public expect health care costs for their family to become less affordable in the coming year. About 1 in 5 say that their health care costs have increased more quickly than other necessities such as monthly utilities (23%) and food and groceries (21%).
  • Among independent voters, more trust the Democratic Party (35%) than the Republican Party (15%) to address health care costs. Independent voters also give Democrats an advantage over Republicans on Medicaid, the ACA, Medicare, and the cost of prescription drugs, though sizeable shares say they trust neither party. Among all voters, trust in Republicans (30%) is within 5 percentage points of Democrats (35%) on drug prices, an issue President Trump has championed.

More than 4 in 10 voters say that health care costs will have a “major impact” both on their decision to vote in the midterm elections (44%) and on which party’s candidates they will support (43%). This includes two thirds of Democrats, more than 4 in 10 independents, and about a fifth of Republicans.

Health Care Costs Tops the Public’s Economic Worries as the Runup to the Midterms Begins; Independent Voters Are More Likely to Trust Democrats than Republicans on the Issue

Most Continue to View ACA Favorably, But Support Falls Among Republicans After Debate

The poll also gauges the public’s views on the ACA after Congress allowed the law’s enhanced tax credits to expire after extensive debate.

Two thirds (67%) of the public say that Congress did “the wrong thing” by allowing the tax credits to expire, twice the share (33%) that says Congress did “the right thing.”

Large majorities of Democrats (89%) and independents (72%) say that Congress did the wrong thing. While most Republicans (63%) and MAGA supporters (64%) say Congress did the right thing, about a third of each group says that Congress did the wrong thing.

Most (58%) of the public continues to hold favorable views of the ACA, though support this month is down 6 percentage points since September (64%).

The shift reflects a drop in favorability among Republicans (22% now vs. 36% in September) and among MAGA supporters (16% now vs. 31% in September).

Designed and analyzed by public opinion researchers at KFF, this survey was conducted January 13-20, 2026, online and by telephone among a nationally representative sample of 1,426 U.S. adults in English and in Spanish. The margin of sampling error is plus or minus 3 percentage points for the full sample. For results based on other subgroups, the margin of sampling error may be higher.

Finding on other topics including prior authorization will be reported separately. 

The Trump Administration’s Latest Expansion of the Mexico City Policy: A Funding Analysis

Published: Jan 28, 2026

Issue Brief

On January 27, 2026, the Trump administration released details of the latest expansion of the Mexico City Policy, a policy he reinstated in January of last year. The policy, which has been in effect, depending on the party of the President, since 1984, has required foreign non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to certify that they would not “perform or actively promote abortion as a method of family planning” using funds from any source (including non-U.S. funds) as a condition of receiving U.S. government global family planning funding. In 2017, President Trump reinstated the policy but also significantly expanded it to encompass the vast majority of U.S. bilateral global health assistance. The latest expansion, now part of a broader set of restrictions known as the “Promoting Human Flourishing in Foreign Assistance (PHFFA)” Policy, applies to significantly more funding, many more organizations, and new services and activities. Specifically, it now applies to most non-military foreign assistance and most recipients of foreign aid (not just foreign NGOs). And, in addition to abortion, it prohibits activities related to diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) and promoting or providing gender affirming care, legal protections based on gender identity, and other related services and activities. This analysis assesses the potential reach of the latest expansion of the policy by examining foreign assistance funding provided in FY 2024, the most recent year with complete information, to identify the amount of funding, number of organizations, and range of foreign assistance sectors that stand to be affected. The analysis looks at total funding that would be subject to restrictions, and although not all recipients are necessarily currently engaging in activities subject to the restrictions, all would have to decide whether they accept the policies’ terms. Among the key findings:

  • In FY 2024, $39.8 billion in U.S. foreign aid, spanning 160 countries, was obligated to prime recipients, funding that would be subject to the latest expansion (additional funding could be subject to the policy if it was ultimately provided, directly or indirectly, to recipients or sub-recipients).
  • Notably, this is tens of billions more than the amount of global health assistance subject to the policy under the Trump administration’s previously expanded policy ($7.3 billion in FY 2020), and significantly more than the amount of family planning assistance subject to the policy during earlier administrations (between $300-$600 million).
  • By recipient type, the largest share (41%) of the $39.8 billion was provided to multilateral organizations, recipients that are newly subject to the policy under the latest expansion. The second largest (29%) was provided to private sector organizations, including the newly-subject U.S. private sector.
  • By sector, humanitarian assistance accounted for the largest share of funding (29%), followed by health (26%) and economic development (22%); two of these sectors (humanitarian assistance and economic development) are among the several sectors newly subject to the policy under the latest expansion.
  • There were almost 2,600 prime recipients of U.S. foreign aid in FY 2024, a significantly higher number than for health alone (756 prime recipients). This number should be considered a floor, since prime recipients must “flow-down” the policy to any sub-recipients. The majority of prime recipients were foreign entities (62%); U.S.-based entities accounted for 34%, with multilateral recipients accounting for 4%.
  • Whether or not the full extent of the expansion will be instituted (there are likely to be legal challenges to some aspects of the policy, which could limit its reach, and some additional rule-making has yet to occur), it represents a significant expansion in terms of funding, number of organizations, and content and services restricted, well beyond the reach of what was in place during the first Trump administration.

Background

The Mexico City Policy (MCP) is a U.S. government (USG) policy that – when in effect – has required foreign NGOs1 to certify that they will not “perform or actively promote abortion as a method of family planning” using funds from any source (including non-U.S. funds) as a condition of receiving U.S. global family planning assistance and, in 2017 under the first Trump administration, most other U.S. global health assistance. First announced in 1984 by the Reagan administration, the policy has been rescinded and reinstated by subsequent administrations along party lines since and has been in effect for 23 of the past 42 years. It has also been steadily expanded over time (see Table 1). Under the first Trump administration, the policy was renamed “Protecting Life in Global Health Assistance” (PLGHA). Among opponents, it has also been known as the “Global Gag Rule,” because among other activities, it prohibited foreign NGOs from using any funds (including non-U.S. funds) to provide information about abortion as a method of family planning and to lobby a foreign government to legalize abortion.

Expansion of the Mexico City Policy Over Time

The second Trump administration reinstated the MCP through a Presidential Memorandum on January 24, 2025, noting that the policy would be expanded even further. On January 27, 2026, the policy details were released under three separate, but inter-related final rules (interim final rules were first posted on January 23), now called the “Promoting Human Flourishing in Foreign Assistance (PHFFA) Policy” (see Box 1).

Box 1: Promoting Human Flourishing in Foreign Assistance (PHFFA) Policy

The Trump administration released details of its new Promoting Human Flourishing in Foreign Assistance (PHFFA) Policy, which includes the latest expansion of the Mexico City Policy, via three separate, but related, final rules on January 27, 2026. Each rule applies to the same funding streams, types of organizations, and award mechanisms but restricts different activities and services:

This marks the most significant expansion of the policy to date. Specifically, it:

  • expands to all non-military U.S. foreign assistance (not just global health) administered by the State Department2 (with an intention for the State Department to work with other agencies that administer foreign assistance to also incorporate these provisions);
  • expands the types of recipients, and consequently the number of organizations, subject to the policy to also include multilateral organizations, foreign governments, and U.S.-based NGOs (not just foreign NGOs);3
  • expands to prohibit additional content areas and services newly subject to the policy: DEI-related activities as well as support for gender affirming care and services, information, and legal protections based on gender identity, among other related activities (referred to as promoting “gender ideology”); and
  • expresses an intent to expand to include funding provided through contracts (not just grants and cooperative agreements), although this will be the subject of future rule-making.

Findings

To assess the potential reach of the latest expansion, this analysis looks at U.S. government foreign assistance obligation data for FY 2024 (the most recent year for which complete obligation data by sector are available) to quantify the amount of funding and number and type of prime recipients that could be affected. While not all recipients are necessarily currently engaging in activities subject to the restrictions, all would have to decide whether they accept the policies’ terms. Obligations were analyzed because the policy applies to funding once newly obligated to a recipient (either through an existing or a new award). Data were obtained from ForeignAssistance.gov, the U.S. government’s centralized data portal for budgetary and financial data provided by more than 20 federal agencies that manage foreign assistance programs. The analysis is based on the funding identified in the PHFAA rules, which includes all non-military foreign assistance4 appropriated to the State Department or U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) under Title III and four other accounts under Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPs)/National Security, State Department, and Related Programs (NSRP) appropriations acts (specifically, “International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement,” “Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs,” “Peacekeeping Operations,” and “International Organizations and Programs”). The analysis also includes funding provided through contracts (not just grants and cooperative agreements) for two reasons: first, the rules indicate that further rule-making will be undertaken to add these policy restrictions to contracts; and second, it is not possible to disaggregate obligations by funding instrument in ForeignAssistance.gov (see Box 2 for key terms, Methodology for more detail, and Appendix for detailed data).

Box 2: Key Terms

  • Obligation: A binding agreement that will result in outlays of funds immediately or at a later date.
  • Prime Recipient: The main recipient, or those that receive funding directly from the U.S. government to carry out foreign assistance work.
  • Sub-Recipient: Those that receive funding indirectly from the U.S. government through an agreement with the prime recipient.
  • Non-Governmental Organization (NGO): a for-profit or not-for-profit organization that is not part of the U.S. government, a foreign government, or a multilateral organization; includes private sector organizations, non-profit organizations, and educational institutions.5
  • Multilateral Organization: an organization that is jointly supported by multiple governments and, often, other partners (versus bilateral efforts, which are carried out on a country-to-country basis); includes specialty agencies of the United Nations (U.N.) and international financing mechanisms that pool and direct resources from multiple public and private donors for specific causes.6
  • Foreign Government: any department, agency, independent establishment, or other entity of the government of a foreign country.
  • Parastatal: foreign-government-owned organization operated as a commercial company or other organization, including non-profits, or enterprises in which foreign governments or foreign government agencies have a controlling interest.
  • In FY 2024, $39.8 billion in U.S. foreign aid was obligated to prime recipients, funding that would be subject to the latest expansion. This includes funding provided to U.S. and foreign NGOs, international organizations, foreign governments, and parastatals (additional funding could be affected if it was ultimately provided, directly or indirectly, to recipients or sub-recipients subject to the policy).
  • Notably, this is tens of billions more than the amount of global health assistance subject to the policy under the first Trump administration’s previously expanded policy ($7.3 billion in FY 2020), and significantly more than the amount of family planning assistance subject to the policy during earlier administrations (between $300-$600 million). See Box 3.

Box 3: Funding Newly Subject under the Latest Expansion of the MCP

By Recipient Type:

  • Multilateral organizations: $16.3 billion
  • Foreign governments: $1.3 billion
  • U.S. NGOs: $16.5 billion^
  • Foreign NGOs: $3.5 billion in non-health sectors

By Sector:

  • Non-health sectors: $29.2 billion, including (for example):
    • Humanitarian assistance: $11.5 billion
    • Economic development: $8.7 billion
    • Democracy, human rights, and governance: $2.6 billion
    • Peace and security: $2.2 billion
    • Education and social services: $1.2 billion
  • Health sector: $8.3 billion in U.S. NGO,^ multilateral, and foreign government funding

Note: Amounts by recipient type and sector are not mutually exclusive categories. ^ Any foreign NGO that was a sub-recipient of U.S. global health assistance from a U.S. NGO would have been subject to the previously expanded MCP, PLGHA, when in place.

  • By recipient type, the largest share of funding was provided to multilateral organizations ($16.3 billion, or 41%), entities that are newly subject to the policy. The private sector received the next largest amount of funding ($11.4 billion, or 29%), followed by the non-profit sector ($9.7 billion, or 25%). Smaller amounts were provided to foreign governments ($1.3 billion, or 3.2%) and educational institutions ($1.1 billion, or 2.7%) (see Figure 1).
  • U.S.-based recipients received $16.5 billion (41%). These included U.S. NGOs, specifically U.S. non-profits, private sector organizations, and educational institutions (all newly subject to the policy). Foreign recipients, both governments and NGOs, received $6.9 billion (17%); foreign governments are also newly subject to the policy.
  • Collectively, the $39.8 billion in foreign assistance was provided to 160 countries, with more countries likely reached through “regional” and “worldwide” activities.7 This is significantly more countries than would be reached with global health assistance alone (87 countries).
  • By sector, humanitarian assistance accounted for the largest share of funding ($11.5 billion, or 29%) in FY 2024, followed by health ($10.5 billion, or 26%) and economic development ($8.7 billion, or 22%). Two of these sectors (humanitarian assistance and economic development) are newly subject to the policy (see Figure 2). The remaining sectors each accounted for approximately $3 billion (6%) or less.
  • There were 2,562 non-USG prime recipients of U.S. foreign assistance in FY 2024, most8 of which (2,111 or 82%) would be subject to the policy for the first time. This number should be considered a floor, since any sub-recipients of U.S. foreign aid would also be subject to the policy.
  • Whereas most funding was provided to multilateral organizations, most recipients (62%, or 1,587) were foreign-based organizations. About a third (34%, or 860) were U.S.-based organizations. Multilateral organizations accounted for the remaining 4% (115) (see Figure 3).
  • NGOs (foreign- and U.S.-based) accounted for the vast majority (93%, or 2,386) of recipients. NGOs include:
    • non-profits (more than half – 52% – of all 2,562 recipients, or 1,339),
    • private sector organizations (more than a third – 35% – of all recipients, or 905), and
    • educational institutions (6% of all recipients, or 142).
  • Among the 2,386 NGO recipients, almost two-thirds (64%, or 1,526) were foreign NGOs, and the other third (36%, or 860) were U.S.-based NGOs.
  • The sectors with the largest numbers of recipients in FY 2024 were program support9 (768), health (756), and economic development (516). The next largest sector was democracy, human rights, and governance (510), followed by humanitarian assistance (315) (see Figure 4).
U.S. Foreign Aid Funding Subject to the Latest Mexico City Policy Expansion, by Recipient Type, FY 2024
U.S. Foreign Aid Funding Subject to the Latest Mexico City Policy Expansion, Share by Sector, FY 2024
Number of Recipients Subject to the Latest Mexico City Policy Expansion, by Recipient Type, FY 2024
Number of Recipients Subject to the Latest Mexico City Policy Expansion, by Sector, FY 2024

Methodology

This analysis uses FY 2024 foreign assistance obligation data, downloaded from ForeignAssistance.gov on November 20, 2025. ForeignAssistance.gov is the U.S. government’s centralized data portal for budgetary and financial data provided by more than 20 federal agencies that manage foreign assistance programs. Obligations are binding agreements that will result in outlays of funding, immediately or sometime in the future. The policy, when in place, is applied to funding that is obligated to recipients either as part of an existing award or as part of a new award. Data on funding amounts and recipients were analyzed by agency, sector, location, and type of entity. To the extent possible, COVID-19 emergency funding was excluded from this analysis, as it represented one-time funding for a particular event.

Recipients were categorized into the following groups (see table below) based on classifications already present in the ForeignAssistance.gov data as well as background research, where such classifications were not provided. Each recipient was reviewed, and the review sought to correct any mis-categorization in the original data and remove duplicates. “Other/Unknown” recipients were those that could not be easily identified as belonging to a particular recipient type/sub-type. Where it was not possible to identify a recipient as a single, implementing entity, they were excluded from analysis looking at the number of unique recipients.

Funding included in the analysis was based on the specifications in the final rules and includes Title III funding appropriated to the State Department and USAID (now administered by the State Department) as well as funding appropriated to four other accounts under Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPs)/National Security, State Department, and Related Programs (NSRP) appropriations acts (specifically, “International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement,” “Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs,” “Peacekeeping Operations,” and “International Organizations and Programs”), whether or not these data were listed as “Economic” or “Military” funding. The analysis excluded the funding in these accounts that was directed to U.S. departments or agencies as prime recipients, which totaled $2.8 billion in FY 2024, as well as funding directed to “Other/Unknown” recipients, which totaled $1.5 billion in FY 2024 (although to the extent that this funding is ultimately provided to a non-USG sub-recipient, it too would be subject to the policy). The U.S. government has also indicated that its intention is to apply the latest MCP expansion to additional non-military foreign assistance at other U.S. agencies and departments, which would also increase the amount of funding and number of organizations subject to the latest expansion.

The analysis also includes funding provided through contracts (not just grants and cooperative agreements) for two reasons: first, the rules indicate that further rule-making will be undertaken to add these policy restrictions to contracts; and second, it is not possible to disaggregate obligations by funding instrument in ForeignAssistance.gov data.

Classification of U.S. Foreign Assistance Recipients

Appendix Tables

U.S. Foreign Aid Funding Potentially Subject to the Latest Mexico City Policy Expansion, FY 2024
U.S. Foreign Aid Funding and Number of Recipients Subject to the Latest Mexico City Policy Expansion, by Recipient Type, FY 2024
U.S. Foreign Aid Funding and Number of Recipients Subject to the Latest Mexico City Policy Expansion, by Recipient Type and Sub-Type, FY 2024
U.S. Foreign Aid Funding and Number of Recipients Subject to the Latest Mexico City Policy Expansion, by Sector, FY 2024
  1. Per the interim rules, a foreign non-governmental organization is defined as “any non-governmental organization or entity, whether non-profit or profit-making (including any commercial firm and educational institution), not organized or existing under the laws of the United States, any State of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or any other territory or possession of the United States.” ↩︎
  2. Specifically, funding appropriated to the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the State Department; this funding is “administered” by the State Department. USAID was dissolved by the Trump administration in 2025, with its remaining programs transferred to other agencies, including mainly but not solely the State Department. ↩︎
  3. The policies apply differently to U.S. NGOs and foreign governments/parastatals than to foreign NGOs and multilateral organizations. ↩︎
  4. The analysis excluded approximately $82 million in FY 2024 foreign aid funding that was identifiable as emergency COVID-19 assistance since it was one-time emergency funding. ↩︎
  5. Each rule of PHFFA defines a foreign NGO as “any non-governmental organization or entity, whether non-profit or profit-making (including any commercial firm and educational institution), not organized or existing under the laws of the United States, any State of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or any other territory or possession of the United States,” and it defines a U.S. NGO as “any non-governmental organization or entity, whether non-profit or profit-making (including any commercial firm and educational institution), organized or existing under the laws of the United States, any State of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or any other territory or possession of the United States.” ↩︎
  6. Each rule of PHFFA defines an international organization as “(A) Any organization designated as being entitled to enjoy the privileges, exemptions, and immunities under the International Organizations Immunities Act; (B) Any organization treated as a public international organization pursuant to the regulations or policies of the Department of State; (C) Any organization established by international agreement and whose governing body is composed principally of representatives of national governments; or (D) Any other multilateral entity in which sovereign nations participate.” ↩︎
  7. Number of countries represents countries that received funding directly from the U.S. government; additional countries may be reached through regional and worldwide programming. ↩︎
  8. Includes number of foreign governments, multilaterals, and U.S. NGOs that received foreign assistance as well as the number of foreign NGOs that received non-health assistance only. ↩︎
  9. Program support is “general management support required to ensure completion of U.S. foreign assistance objectives by facilitating program management, accounting and tracking for costs” according to the State Department, Standardized Program Structure and Definitions (SPSD) [Updated Foreign Assistance Standardized Program Structure and Definitions], June 2017, uploaded Feb. 2023, available at: https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/The-New-SPSD-June-2017-Accessible-2.16.2023.pdf. ↩︎

Medicare Advantage Insurers Made Nearly 53 Million Prior Authorization Determinations in 2024

Published: Jan 28, 2026

Introduction

Virtually all enrollees in Medicare Advantage (99%) are required to obtain prior authorization for some services – most commonly, higher cost services, such as inpatient hospital stays, skilled nursing facility stays, and chemotherapy. This contrasts with traditional Medicare, where only a limited set of services, including certain outpatient hospital services, non-emergency ambulance transport, and durable medical equipment, require prior authorization (see Box 1). Insurers often use prior authorization requirements to assess whether health care services are medically necessary before they are covered and to reduce unnecessary costs. At the same time, prior authorization processes and requirements, including the use of artificial intelligence to review requests, may result in administrative hassles for providers, delays for patients in receiving necessary care, and in some instances, denials of medically necessary services, such as post-acute care.

Prior authorization practices have gotten a fair amount of attention in recent years. KFF polling shows that most people view delays and denials of care by health insurance companies as a problem, with about two-thirds of Medicare beneficiaries reporting that they consider it to be a major problem. Last summer, the Trump Administration announced that private health insurers, including those that comprise a majority of Medicare Advantage enrollment, agreed to a voluntary initiative to improve the prior authorization process. Lawmakers in Congress have also been active on the issue, with bipartisan legislation introduced in both the House and Senate. Additionally, on January 1, 2026, the Administration launched the Wasteful and Inappropriate Spending Reduction (WISeR) model to test the use of enhanced technology to conduct prior authorization for an additional set of select services in traditional Medicare in six states.

This analysis uses data submitted by Medicare Advantage insurers to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) to examine the trends in the number of prior authorization requests, denials, and appeals for 2019 through 2024, as well as differences across Medicare Advantage insurers with the largest enrollment. It does not include requests or denials by type of service or type of plan because CMS does not collect or report this information, though such data could help inform consumers in choosing among plans. It also presents data from CMS about the use of prior authorization in traditional Medicare, including the number of requests and denials for fiscal years 2021 through 2024.

Key Takeaways

  • Nearly 53 million prior authorization requests were submitted to Medicare Advantage insurers on behalf of Medicare Advantage enrollees in 2024, an increase from 2023 (49.8 million) as the number of people enrolled in Medicare Advantage has grown. Substantially fewer prior authorization requests for traditional Medicare than Medicare Advantage beneficiaries were submitted to CMS – just over 625,000 in fiscal year 2024. 
  • In 2024, there were 1.7 prior authorization requests on average per Medicare Advantage enrollee, a slight decline from 1.8 in 2023. In contrast, in 2024, about 2 prior authorization requests were submitted per 100 traditional Medicare beneficiaries – a rate of about 0.02 per enrollee – which reflects the limited set of services subject to prior authorization in traditional Medicare.
  • In 2024, Medicare Advantage insurers fully or partially denied 4.1 million prior authorization requests, which is a somewhat larger share (7.7%) of all requests than in 2023 (6.4%) and similar to 2022 (7.4%). Though there were substantially fewer prior authorization requests for traditional Medicare beneficiaries, a larger share was denied – 22.9% (less than 150,000) in 2024.
  • A small share of denied prior authorization requests was appealed in Medicare Advantage –11.5% in 2024, similar to 2023 (11.7%).That represents an increase since 2019, when 7.5% of denied prior authorization requests in Medicare Advantage were appealed. The traditional Medicare data do not include information on appeals for 2023 and 2024, but in 2022 a relatively small share of denied prior authorization requests was appealed in traditional Medicare (6.4% in 2022).
  • Though a small share of prior authorization denials were appealed to Medicare Advantage insurers, most appeals (80.7%) were partially or fully overturned in 2024. Across all years examined, more than eight in ten appeals overturned the initial denial. These requests represent medical care that was ordered by a health care provider and ultimately deemed necessary but was potentially delayed because of the additional step of appealing the initial prior authorization decision. Such delays may have negative effects on a patient’s health.

Use of Prior Authorization in Medicare Advantage

CMS requires Medicare Advantage insurers to submit data for each Medicare Advantage contract (which usually includes multiple plans) as part of its oversight of Medicare Advantage plans. Insurers are required to submit the number of prior authorization determinations made during a year and whether the request was approved. Insurers are additionally required to report the number of initial decisions that were appealed (reconsiderations) and the outcome of that process, including whether the initial decision was affirmed, partially overturned, or fully overturned. These data are useful for assessing overall trends and variations across insurers, but do not contain the information necessary to understand how the use of prior authorization varies by type of service or type of plan because they are aggregated to the contract level. CMS is implementing a pilot program to collect more detailed data at the plan and service level this year, which would help assess whether some enrollees bear a higher burden of prior authorization requirements or are more frequently denied requested services. CMS states that it anticipates expanding the requirement to all plans in 2027.

In 2024, nearly 53 million prior authorization requests were submitted to Medicare Advantage insurers.

After dropping in 2020 amid the initial phase of the COVID-19 pandemic, prior authorization requests increased steadily between 2021 and 2024 (Figure 1). The decline in 2020 was likely due to both a decline in utilization, as well as the option for insurers to temporarily pause prior authorization requirements during the public health emergency.

Medicare Advantage Insurers Made Nearly 54 Million Prior Authorization Determinations in 2024

The increase in the total number of prior authorization requests since 2020 corresponds to an increase in Medicare Advantage enrollment. Between 2019 and 2024, the number of Medicare Advantage enrollees rose from 22 million people to 33 million people. Therefore, the number of prior authorization requests per enrollee has remained relatively constant in the past few years. In 2019, there were approximately 1.7 prior authorization requests per Medicare Advantage enrollee. That number dropped at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic to 1.4 in 2020 and 1.5 in 2021, before returning to the pre-pandemic level of 1.7 requests per enrollee in 2022 and rising slightly to 1.8 in 2023. In 2024, Medicare Advantage enrollment growth outpaced the increase in the number of prior authorization requests, leading to a slight drop in the number of requests per enrollee to 1.7 (Figure 2).

The modest decline in the number of prior authorization determinations per enrollee corresponds with increased regulatory attention to prior authorization in Medicare Advantage which clarified the criteria that may be used by Medicare Advantage plans to establish prior authorization policies. In addition, certain Medicare Advantage insurers also announced changes to prior authorization practices in 2023 and 2024, such as UnitedHealth Group’s decision to reduce the number of services subject to prior authorization and launch a national “gold card” program that exempts certain providers from prior authorization requirements.

Prior Authorization Determinations per Medicare Advantage Enrollee Declined Slightly Between 2023 and 2024

Medicare Advantage insurers denied 4.1 million (7.7%) prior authorization requests in 2024.

Of the 52.8 million prior authorization determinations in 2024, more than 90% (48.7 million) were fully favorable, meaning the requested item or service was approved in full. However, the remaining 4.1 million prior authorization requests (7.7%) were denied in full or in part by Medicare Advantage insurers. This is slightly higher than the 6.4% of requests that were denied in 2023 and similar to the share denied in 2022 (Figure 3). Across all years, most denials (73% in 2024, data not shown) were denied in full, while a minority of denials were determined to be partially favorable, meaning that only part of the request was approved. For example, the insurer may have approved 10 of 14 requested therapy sessions.

Medicare Advantage Insurers Denied Fewer than 10% of Prior Authorization Requests in Recent Years

Just 11.5% of denied prior authorization requests were appealed to Medicare Advantage insurers in 2024.

As in previous years, the majority of the 4.1 million denied prior authorization requests were not appealed. Though the share of denied requests that are appealed is small at just 11.5%, similar to the share in 2023 (11.7%), it has risen over time, from 7.5% in 2019 (Figure 4). These include appeals of claims that were both fully and partially denied.

The Share of Denied Prior Authorization Requests Appealed to Medicare Advantage Insurers in 2024 Was Similar to 2023

The vast majority of denied prior authorization requests that were appealed were subsequently overturned by Medicare Advantage insurers.

In each year from 2019 through 2024, more than eight in ten denied prior authorization requests that were appealed were overturned (Figure 5). This raises questions about whether the initial request should have been approved, although it could also indicate that the initial request was missing the required documentation to justify the service. In either case, patients potentially faced delays in obtaining services that were ultimately approved because of the prior authorization process.

More Than 80% of Denied Prior Authorization Requests That Were Appealed Were Overturned

Variation in Use of Prior Authorization Across Medicare Advantage Insurers in 2024

In 2024, the volume of prior authorization determinations varied across Medicare Advantage insurers, as did the share of requests that were denied, the share of denials that were appealed, and the share of decisions that were overturned upon appeal, meaning people may have different experiences depending on the Medicare Advantage plan in which they enroll.

Across most insurers, fewer prior authorization requests per enrollee were correlated with a higher share of requests being denied and vice versa. For example, prior authorization requests for UnitedHealth Group Inc. and Humana Inc., the two largest Medicare Advantage insurers, were among the lowest (UnitedHealth Group Inc., 1.0 requests per enrollee) and the highest (Humana Inc., 2.2 requests per enrollee) observed, and correspondingly, denial rates were above average (UnitedHealthcare, 12.8%) and below average (Humana, 5.8%) for these insurers. 

While all Medicare Advantage insurers require prior authorization for at least some services, there is variation across insurers and plans in the specific services that are subject to these requirements. In addition, some insurers waive prior authorization requirements for certain providers, for example, as part of risk-based contracts or through “gold carding” programs that exempt providers with a history of complying with the insurer’s prior authorization policies.

Prior authorization requests were most common among Elevance and Centene plans.

The number of prior authorization requests per enrollee ranged from a low of 0.6 requests per enrollee in plans sponsored by Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. to a high of 3.0 requests per enrollee in Elevance Health, Inc. and Centene Corporation plans (Figure 6). Kaiser is atypical among insurers in that it generally operates its own hospitals and contracts with an affiliated medical group. Looking across other insurers that are more similar, the low end of the range was 1.0 prior authorization requests per enrollee in UnitedHealth Group, Inc. plans. Differences across Medicare Advantage insurers in the number of prior authorization requests per enrollee likely reflect some combination of differences in the services subject to prior authorization requirements, the frequency with which contracted providers are exempted from those requirements (which may be related to the extent to which providers are affiliated with the insurer), how onerous the prior authorization process is for a particular insurer relative to others, and differences in enrollees’ health conditions and the health care services they use.

Prior Authorization Determinations Are More Common Among Certain Medicare Advantage Firms

UnitedHealth Group denied the highest share of prior authorization requests while Elevance denied the fewest.

The denial rate ranged from 4.2% of prior authorization requests for Elevance Health plans to 12.8% of prior authorization requests for UnitedHealth Group plans (Figure 7). The overall denial rate includes requests that were both fully and partially denied (adverse and partially favorable determinations, respectively).

Most insurers that had more prior authorization requests per enrollee than average denied a smaller share of those requests than average, such as Elevance Health, which had 3.0 prior authorization requests per enrollee and a denial rate of 4.2%. Conversely, insurers with fewer prior authorization requests per enrollee denied a higher share of those requests, such as UnitedHealth Group, which had 1.0 prior authorization requests per enrollee and a denial rate of 12.8%. Centene Corporation was an exception with both a relatively high number of prior authorization requests (2.9 per enrollee) and a relatively high denial rate (12.3%).

Firms Denied Between 4.2% and 12.8% of Prior Authorization Requests

Across all insurers, a small share of denials was appealed.

Most denied prior authorization requests are not appealed to the Medicare Advantage insurer. The shares ranged from 1.6% for Kaiser Foundation Health Plan to 19.9% for CVS Health Corporation, with the appeal of fewer than one in twelve denials across all insurers except CVS Health Corporation (Figure 8).

Across Most Firms, Fewer than One in Eight Denied Prior Authorization Requests Were Appealed

Across all firms, more than half of appeals were successful.

Even though most denials were not appealed, when they were, most of the initial decisions were partially or fully overturned. The share of appeals that resulted in favorable decisions overturning the initial denial was lowest for Kaiser Foundation Health Plan (51.0%) and highest for Centene Corporation (95.5%) (Figure 9), which also had the second highest share of requests initially denied.

Across all Firms, More than Half of Prior Authorization Request Denials that Were Appealed Were Overturned

The Use of Prior Authorization in Traditional Medicare

The use of prior authorization is relatively new to traditional Medicare and only used for a limited set of services, including certain outpatient hospital services, non-emergency ambulance transport, and durable medical equipment (see Box 1). The prior authorization process does not change any documentation requirements that are necessary for receiving Medicare payment – the confirmation that coverage requirements are met are required earlier in the review process. CMS has published reports presenting data on the use of prior authorization in traditional Medicare for fiscal years 2021, 2022, 2023, and 2024. These reports include information on the number of requests received, reviews completed, and the number and share of requests that were affirmed. For 2021 and 2022 only, the data also include information on appeals and the outcome of the appeal.

Just over 625,000 prior authorization reviews were completed by CMS for traditional Medicare in 2024.

Across the three categories of services that required prior authorization, there were 216,571 reviews completed in 2021, 260,986 reviews completed in 2022, 393,749 reviews completed in 2023, and 628,243 reviews completed in 2024 (Figure 10). This translates to about 2 prior authorization reviews per 100 traditional Medicare beneficiaries in 2024.

CMS Completed Just Over 625,000 Prior Authorization Reviews for Traditional Medicare in 2024

Less than one-quarter of prior authorization requests in traditional Medicare were denied.

CMS approved (or affirmed) the majority of prior authorization requests it reviewed. CMS reported that 24.8% of requests were denied (or non-affirmed) in 2021, 27.6% of requests were denied in 2022, 28.8% of requests were denied in 2023, and 22.9% of requests were denied in 2024 (Figure 11). This reflects 53,680 denied requests in 2021, 72,029 denied requests in 2022, 113,448 denied requests in 2023, and 143,705 denied requests in 2024.

CMS Denied Less Than One-Quarter of Prior Authorization Requests for Traditional Medicare in 2024

In traditional Medicare, a small share of denied prior authorization requests was appealed to CMS and the share of prior authorization requests that were appealed and overturned upon appeal varied across service type.

In 2022, fewer than 5,000 denied prior authorization requests in traditional Medicare were appealed to the first level. As a share of all denied requests that translates to 6.4% appealed in 2022. Of the denied requests, 1,323 prior authorization denials were overturned upon appeal, which represents 28.7% of all first level appeals (Figure 12). Appeals data in traditional Medicare are presented differently across the CMS reports. Specifically, the 2023 and 2024 reports include a separate claims and appeals section for each category of service, which appears to include a broader universe of reviews by Medicare Administrative Contractors, including those for payment of services rendered, than what is presented in the report for 2021 and 2022. Given the differences in the data reported, we present appeals and whether the decision was overturned on appeal for 2022 only.

Prior Authorization Reviews, Denials, Appeals, and Outcome of Appeals in Traditional Medicare, by Category in FY2022

Denied requests for the ambulance transport services were most often appealed (19.6%); just 6.6% of denials for certain hospital outpatient services and 1.5% of certain durable medical equipment, prosthetics, orthotics and supplies requests were appealed.

The share of appeals that resulted in overturning the initial decision also varied widely. Nearly two-thirds (63.9%) of appeals for durable medical equipment, prosthetics, orthotics and other supplies were successful. That compares to 26.3% of appeals for the ambulance transport services and 22.2% of appeals for certain hospital outpatient services.

Box 1: Prior Authorization Requirements in Traditional Medicare

In 2015, CMS issued a final rule that established a prior authorization process for certain Durable Medical Equipment, Prosthetics, Orthotics, and Supplies (DMEPOS) items, with the goal of reducing the use of items that had been frequently subject to unnecessary utilization. Initial implementation began March 20, 2017, and items have been added and subtracted to the list over the following years through subsequent rulemaking. As of January 13, 2026, the DMEPOS items prior authorizations list includes over 70 items, including for pressure reducing support surfaces, power mobility devices, and lower limb prosthetics. Additionally, in December 2025, CMS issued a rule which establishes a prior authorization exemption process for certain DMEPOS items, allowing qualifying suppliers, such as those who show an affirmation rate of 90% or higher, to be exempt from prior authorization.

In a 2019 final rule (effective July 1, 2020), CMS established national prior authorization requirements for a set of hospital outpatient department services which had experienced significant increases in utilization and that are likely to be cosmetic procedures and not covered by Medicare, but may be combined with other therapeutic services, including blepharoplasty, botulinum toxin injections, panniculectomy, rhinoplasty, and vein ablation. In further rulemaking (effective July 1, 2021), CMS added implanted spinal neurostimulators and cervical fusion with disc removal to the list of services requiring prior authorization, and another rule (effective July 1, 2023) added facet joint interventions.

The CMS Repetitive, Scheduled Non-Emergent Ambulance Transport (RSNAT) Prior Authorization Model uses the authority provided through the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation (CMMI, or Innovation Center) to test whether prior authorization for non-emergent ambulances for certain medical appointments would save money for Medicare while maintaining access and quality of care. The model was first implemented in select states in December 2014 and was ultimately expanded nationwide in September 2020 as it met the model requirements, saving Medicare about $650 million over four years.

On January 1, 2026, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovations (CMMI) launched the Wasteful and Inappropriate Service Reduction (WISeR) Model that establishes new prior authorization requirements in traditional Medicare for select services in six states (New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, Texas, Arizona, and Washington). These services include skin substitutes (synthetic products used in the treatment of severe or chronic wounds), orthopedic pain management services, electrical nerve stimulator implants, incontinence control devices, and services related to the diagnosis and treatment of impotence. According to CMS, the model will test the use of enhanced technologies, such as artificial intelligence, to conduct prior authorization for services vulnerable to fraud or abuse.

Box 2: Recent Administrative Actions and Proposed Legislation on Prior Authorization

The Administration recently finalized three rules related to prior authorization.

The first rule (effective date: June 5, 2023) issued by the Biden Administration clarifies the criteria that may be used by Medicare Advantage plans in establishing prior authorization policies and the duration for which a prior authorization is valid. Specifically, the rule states that prior authorization may only be used to confirm a diagnosis and/or ensure that the requested service is medically necessary and that private insurers must follow the same criteria used by traditional Medicare. That is, Medicare Advantage prior authorization requirements cannot result in coverage that is more restrictive than traditional Medicare. The rule also describes how private insurers may consider additional information when traditional Medicare does not have fully established coverage criteria. The rules apply to coverage beginning with plan year 2024.

The second rule (effective date: April 8, 2024) issued by the Biden Administration is intended to improve the use of electronic prior authorization processes, as well as the timeliness and transparency of decisions, and applies to Medicare Advantage and certain other insurers. Specifically, it shortens the standard time frame for insurers to respond to prior authorization requests from 14 to 7 calendar days starting in January 2026 and standardizes the electronic exchange of information by specifying the prior authorization information that must be included in application programming interfaces starting in January 2027. It also requires that beginning in 2026, insurers post all items and services subject to prior authorization and the share of prior authorization requests that were approved, denied, and approved after appeal. A bipartisan bill has also been introduced to codify pieces of this rule.

The third rule (effective date: June 3, 2024) also issued by the Biden Administration would have required Medicare Advantage plans to evaluate the effect of prior authorization policies on people with certain social risk factors (“health equity analysis”) starting with plan year 2025, but the Trump Administration announced in June 2025 that it would not enforce these requirements.

Additionally, lawmakers in Congress have introduced several bills aimed improving the prior authorization process, including codifying changes made through recent rulemaking, and requiring written clinical criteria for prior authorization requirements, which were both introduced on a bipartisan basis. Other legislation would penalize insurers when initially denied requests are overturned upon appeal too often, require plans to include prior authorization information in plan advertisements, and one proposal would prohibit the use of prior authorization altogether.

Methods

The analysis of Medicare Advantage uses organization determinations and reconsiderations – Part C data from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) Part C and D reporting requirements public use file for contract years 2019 – 2021 and the limited data set for contract years 2022 through 2024. Medicare Advantage insurers submit the required data at the contract level to CMS and CMS performs a data validation check.

Data for Medicare Advantage contracts is aggregated to the parent company level. Insurers with less than 1 million enrollees into “other insurers”.

This analysis reflects data on service determinations and does not include claims determinations (for payment for services already provided). We also do not include withdrawn or dismissed determination requests in this analysis.

The enrollment data are from the CMS Medicare Advantage enrollment file for March of each year at the contract-plan-county level. We then sum up to the contract level to merge with the determination and reconsideration data. Contract-plan-county combinations are not included if there are fewer than 11 enrollees. The traditional Medicare analysis uses data included “Prior Authorization and Pre-Claim Review Program Stats,” published by CMS on September 15, 2023, which reflects prior authorization reviews completed in fiscal years 2021 and 2022, “Prior Authorization and Pre-Claim Review Program Stats for Fiscal Year 2023,” published on January 17, 2025, and “Prior Authorization and Pre-Claim Review Program Stats for Fiscal Year 2024,” published on September 16, 2025. The total number of traditional Medicare beneficiaries is from the Medicare Monthly Enrollment Dashboard for 2021 through 2024. While CMS published data on the use of prior authorization in traditional Medicare for FY2023 and FY2024, the information for appeals are not comparable to FY2021 and FY2022 data and are therefore not included in this analysis.

This work was supported in part by Arnold Ventures. KFF maintains full editorial control over all of its policy analysis, polling, and journalism activities.

Overview of President Trump’s Executive Actions on Global Health

Published: Jan 27, 2026

Note: Originally published on Jan. 28, 2025, this resource is updated as needed, most recently on October 24, 2025, to reflect additional developments. 

Starting on the first day of his second term, President Trump began to issue numerous executive actions, several of which directly address or affect U.S. global health efforts.* This guide provides an overview of these actions, in the order in which they were issued. The “date issued” is date the action was first taken; subsequent actions are listed under “What Happens/Implications.” See an accompanying timeline of events specific to the foreign aid review and USAID dissolution.

President Trump’s Executive Actions on Global Health

Initial Rescissions Of Harmful Executive Orders And Actions, January 20, 2025
PURPOSE: Initial rescissions of Executive Orders and Actions issued by President Biden.

Among these orders are several that addressed the COVID-19 pandemic and global health security, such as Executive Order 13987 (Organizing and Mobilizing the United States Government To Provide a Unified and Effective Response To Combat COVID-19 and To Provide United States Leadership on Global Health and Security),  which among other things established the National Security Council Directorate on Global Health Security and Biodefense and a Senior Director position to oversee it.

What Happens Next/Implications: Given that most of the provisions in the COVID-19 and Global Health Security actions issued by President Biden are no longer current or relevant, the rescissions of these actions are likely to have minimal effect on government policies. One exception may be the elimination of the Directorate of Global Health Security and Biodefense and its Senior Director at the National Security Council, which were responsible for interagency coordination on global health security matters during the Biden Administration. The elimination of this office echoes a similar move made during the first Trump Administration to eliminate an NSC Directorate for Global Health Security, and raises questions about who and which offices at NSC (and across the government) will fill this coordination role in the new Administration. More rescissions of other Biden administration Executive Actions may be issued at a later date.
Withdrawing The United States From The World Health Organization, January 20, 2025
PURPOSE: To withdraw from the World Health Organization (WHO).

“The United States noticed its withdrawal from the World Health Organization (WHO) in 2020 due to the organization’s mishandling of the COVID-19 pandemic that arose out of Wuhan, China, and other global health crises, its failure to adopt urgently needed reforms, and its inability to demonstrate independence from the inappropriate political influence of WHO member states.  In addition, the WHO continues to demand unfairly onerous payments from the United States, far out of proportion with other countries’ assessed payments.  China, with a population of 1.4 billion, has 300 percent of the population of the United States, yet contributes nearly 90 percent less to the WHO.”

ACTIONS: The United States intends to withdraw from the WHO. 
The Presidential Letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations signed on January 20, 2021, that retracted the United States’ July 6, 2020, notification of withdrawal is revoked.
Executive Order 13987 (Organizing and Mobilizing the United States Government to Provide a Unified and Effective Response to Combat COVID–19 and To Provide United States Leadership on Global Health and Security), which, among other things, called for “engaging with and strengthening the World Health Organization” is revoked.
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs shall establish directorates and coordinating mechanisms within the National Security Council apparatus as necessary and appropriate to safeguard public health and fortify biosecurity.
The Secretary of State and Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall take actions to pause future transfer of any U.S. funds, support, or resources to WHO; recall and reassign U.S. government personnel or contractors working in any capacity with WHO; and identify credible and transparent U.S. and international partners to assume necessary activities previously undertaken by WHO.
The Director of the White House Office of Pandemic Preparedness and Response Policy shall review, rescind, and replace the 2024 U.S. Global Health Security Strategy.
The Secretary of State shall immediately inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations, any other applicable depositary, and the leadership of the WHO of the withdrawal.
While the withdrawal is in progress, Secretary of State will cease negotiations on the WHO Pandemic Agreement and the amendments to the International Health Regulations, and states that “actions taken to effectuate such agreement and amendments will have no binding force on the United States.”
What Happens Next/Implications: President Trump initiated a process to withdraw from the WHO during his first term in office, a process that takes a year to finalize, and halted funding. This time period was not met when President Biden took office and he reversed this decision and restored funding. Now, after issuance of a formal letter of withdrawal United Nations and WHO, the process will be initiated once again. Such a letter has been issued, indicating that membership will end as of January 22, 2026.

Per the Executive Order, U.S. government representatives may not work with WHO. While U.S. representatives attended the Executive Board meeting in February (the U.S. previously held a seat on the Executive Board), no representatives attended the World Health Assembly in May, where world leaders adopted the Pandemic Agreement. On May 30, the White House released details on the President’s Budget Request for FY 2026, requesting eliminated funding for WHO. Further, on June 3, the administration asked Congress to rescind funds previously appropriated for fiscal years 2024 and 2025, including contributions to WHO. However, for both the FY 2026 appropriations and FY2024-25 rescissions, Congress will determine the final funding levels.

As the largest donor to WHO providing approximately 16%-18% of the organization’s revenue, the absence of U.S. funding will have an impact WHO’s operations, as will the loss of U.S. technical expertise. See: KFF Fact Sheet and Quick Take

Update: The formal withdrawal of the U.S. government from the WHO became effective on January 22, 2026.
Reevaluating And Realigning United States Foreign Aid, January 20, 2025
PURPOSE: To pause funding and review all U.S. foreign assistance to assess alignment with American values.

The U.S. “foreign aid industry and bureaucracy are not aligned with American interests and in many cases antithetical to American values. They serve to destabilize world peace by promoting ideas in foreign countries that are directly inverse to harmonious and stable relations internal to and among countries.”

“It is the policy of United States that no further United States foreign assistance shall be disbursed in a manner that is not fully aligned with the foreign policy of the President of the United States.”

Calls for:

90-day pause in U.S. foreign development assistance (new obligations or disbursements) to assess programmatic efficiencies and consistency with U.S. foreign policy.
Review of U.S. foreign assistance programs by the responsible department and agency heads under guidelines provided by the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Director of OMB.
Responsible department and agency heads, in consultation with the Director of OMB, will make determinations within 90 days of this order on whether to continue, modify, or cease each foreign assistance program based upon the review recommendations, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State.
New obligations and disbursements may resume for a program prior to the end of the 90-day period if a review is conducted, and the Secretary of State or his designeein consultation with the Director of OMB, decide to continue the program in the same or modified form.  Additionally, any other new foreign assistance programs and obligations must be approved by the Secretary of State or his designee, in consultation with the Director of OMB.
The Secretary of State may waive the pause for specific programs.
What Happens Next/Implications: Almost all global health programs are funded through foreign aid appropriations and are therefore subject to this order. The order temporarily freezes any new U.S. government spending (obligations or disbursements) through these programs, which could interrupt implementation of programs for which funds have not yet been obligated. It also calls for a 90-day review of all foreign aid programs. Key developments are as follows:
On January 24, 2025, A Notice on Implementation of the Executive Order was issued by USAID which, among other things, calls for stop-work orders to be issued for all existing foreign assistance awards (not just new obligations and disbursements). It notes that waivers have been granted for: foreign military financing for Israel and Egypt and emergency food assistance (and related expenses) and, on a temporary basis, salaries and related administrative expenses, including travel, for U.S. direct hire employees, personal services contractors, and locally employed staff. The stop-work order on existing awards halted U.S. global health (and other foreign assistance) programs that were already underway, placing key programs at risk of not being able to provide critical services, and affecting access for individuals on the ground, unless a waiver was received.
On January 28, the Secretary of State  issued a blanket waiver for life-saving humanitarian assistance programs, which also lays out a process for requesting additional waivers (more information is here). This guidance also states that the waiver does not apply to “activities that involve abortions, family planning, conferences, administrative costs [unless associated with waived activities], gender or DEI ideology programs, transgender surgeries, or other non-life saving assistance.”
On February 1, PEPFAR, the global HIV/AIDS program, was granted a limited waiver enabling it to resume or continue “urgent life-saving HIV treatment  services”, defined as a set of care and treatment services and prevention of mother-to-child transmission services.
On February 4, some additional services for other global health programs  – tuberculosis; malaria; acute risks of maternal and child mortality, including severe acute malnutrition; and other life-threatening diseases and health conditions – deemed to be “lifesaving” were also granted a limited waiver to allow them to resume or continue.
On February 6, a lawsuit was filed by Democracy Forward and Public Citizen Litigation Group, on behalf of the American Foreign Service Association and American Federation of Government Employees, challenging the foreign aid funding freeze, the plan to put most staff on leave, and the fact that staff had already been placed on leave; on February 7, they filed a temporary restraining order (TRO). That same day, a temporary restraining order was issued by the U.S. District Court in the District of Columbia preventing the government from placing additional staff on leave or evacuating staff back to the U.S., and requiring reinstatement of all staff already placed on leave, until February 14. The court did not grant a TRO on the funding freeze, on the grounds that the plaintiffs in this case did not demonstrate that the freeze caused them irreparable harm. On February 13, the court extended the TRO through February 21 (further actions are described below, as this case was combined with another for purposes of the court’s consideration).
On February 10, a lawsuit was filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia on behalf of two U.S. organizations seeking emergency relief from the freeze on funding for foreign assistance (AVAC v. United States Department of State).
On February 11, a lawsuit was filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia on behalf of several U.S. organizations challenging the executive order and subsequent actions freezing foreign aid and dissolving USAID, and asking the court to temporarily restrain and preliminarily and permanently enjoin Defendants from implementing these actions (Global Health Council v. Trump).
On February 13, the court, in a ruling pertaining to the February 10 and February 11 lawsuits brought by numerous U.S. organizations, issued a TRO preventing the Trump administration from “suspending, pausing, or otherwise preventing the obligation or disbursement of appropriated foreign-assistance funds in connection with any contracts, grants, cooperative agreements, loans, or other federal foreign assistance award that was in existence as of January 19, 2025; or issuing, implementing, enforcing”, or “otherwise giving effect to terminations, suspensions, or stop-work orders in connection with any contracts, grants, cooperative agreements, loans, or other federal foreign assistance award that was in existence as of January 19, 2025.”
On February 14, the parties filed a joint status report proposing an expedited preliminary injunction briefing schedule.
On February 18, the government filed a required status report stating that, despite the TRO, it had the authority to cancel contracts and suspend grant awards.
This was followed by a February 19 request by the February 10 plaintiffs (AVAC v. Department of State) for an emergency motion to enforce the TRO and to hold the defendants in civil contempt.
The defendants filed a required response on February 20, stating that they have not violated the TRO and should not be held in contempt, which was again opposed by the plaintiffs. Also on February 20, the February 11 plaintiffs (Global Health Council v. Trump) filed a response to the defendant’s status report with a motion to enforce the TRO.  The court reaffirmed the TRO on February 20 (but did not hold the defendants in contempt), stating it was prepared to hold a hearing on the preliminary injunction motions in both cases by March 4, 2025 and that the TRO would be in place through March 10, 2025, or the date the Court resolves the preliminary injunction motions, whichever is sooner.
The plaintiffs filed an emergency order to enforce the TRO on February 24, due to continued lack of payment, and the court issued a motion to enforce on February 25. The government appealed, (asking for a stay pending appeal) but this was denied by the court. The government then appealed to the Supreme Court and was granted a stay until February 28 while the case was considered.
On March 5, the Supreme Court denied the government’s request to vacate the federal district court’s TRO, sending the order back to the district court to clarify the government’s obligations for ensuring compliance with the TRO.
On March 6, the federal district court judge ordered the government to release all payments that were due to plaintiffs as of February 13, by Monday, March 10 at 6pm, and on March 10, the federal district court judge preliminarily enjoined the government from taking certain actions related to the foreign aid freeze.
On March 10, Secretary Rubio announced that a six-week review had been completed and that 83% of programs at USAID (5,200 contracts) had been cancelled. That same day, the court  preliminarily enjoined the government from enforcing actions taken to implement the foreign aid freeze (requiring it to reverse any terminations, suspensions, and stop-work orders and to pay for any work completed by February 13). The court stated that the government was “enjoined from unlawfully impounding congressionally appropriated foreign aid funds and shall make available for obligation the full amount of funds that Congress appropriated for foreign assistance programs in the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2024.”
On April 1, the government filed an appeal with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia challenging the preliminary injunction issued on March 10.
On April 17, the administration extended the foreign aid review for another 30 days from the original deadline of April 20, 2025.
On May 2 and May 30, the White House released information on its budget request for FY 2026, proposing significant decreases, and in some cases eliminations, of funding for global health activities. However, Congress will determine the final funding levels.
On June 3, the administration asked Congress to rescind previously appropriated funds for fiscal years 2024 and 2025, including $8.3 billion in foreign assistance, of which at least $1.2 billion was designated for global health. However, Congress will need to approve any potential rescissions.
• On August 13, the U.S. District Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit partially vacated the March 10 preliminary injunction in the cases GHC v. Trump and AVAC v. State Department which required the government to make congressionally appropriated foreign assistance funds available for obligation. The appeals court ruled that the plaintiffs did not have the authority to challenge the President’s impoundment of funds. Instead, the court ruled that challenges of impoundment should be brought forward by the Comptroller General.
• On August 28, the U.S. District Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit amended its opinion, clarifying that while plaintiffs did not have the authority to challenge impoundment of foreign assistance funds through the Impoundment Control Act, they could seek relief through the Administrative Procedures Act. Following this amended opinion, plaintiffs in GHC v. Trump and AVAC v. State Department cases motioned for a preliminary injunction in the U.S. district court on September 1. On September 3, the U.S. district court granted the preliminary injunction, ordering defendants to obligate expiring foreign assistance funds before the end of the fiscal year on September 30. On September 4, defendants appealed this preliminary injunction and requested a stay on the preliminary injunction pending the resolution of the appeals case, from both the district court and appeals court. These requests were both denied on September 5. On September 8, defendants requested a stay of the preliminary injunction as it pertained to funds included in the President’s proposed rescissions package from the U.S Supreme Court. On September 9, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court granted a partial administrative stay of the preliminary injunction, and on September 26, the court granted the partial stay.

The 90-day review of foreign assistance was initially supposed to go through April 19, 2025, however, has been granted a 30-day extension.
America First Policy Directive To The Secretary Of State, January 20, 2025
PURPOSE: To put core American interests first in foreign policy.

The foreign policy of the United States “shall champion core American interests and always put America and American citizens first.”

“As soon as practicable, the Secretary of State shall issue guidance bringing the Department of State’s policies, programs, personnel, and operations in line with an America First foreign policy, which puts America and its interests first.”
What Happens Next/Implications: The State Department is responsible for the supervision and overall strategic direction of foreign assistance programs administered by the State Department and USAID, which includes the vast majority of global health assistance. It also directly oversees PEPFAR, the global HIV/AIDS program, and many aspects of global health diplomacy for the U.S. Priorities and approaches for these and other global health programs are likely to be shaped by how the White House and State Department leadership define “America First” foreign policy and American interests, and how that definition is implemented in practice.

In the President’s Budget Request for FY 2026, the request proposes eliminated funding for several global health activities, including family planning and reproductive health (FPRH), neglected tropical diseases (NTDs), and nutrition, stating these are “programs that do not make Americans safer”. However, Congress will determine final funding levels and whether to include these eliminations in its appropriations bills.

On September 18, the State Department released the America First Global Health Strategy, its new vision for U.S. global health engagement. The strategy is built around three pillars — “making America safer, stronger, and more prosperous” — and prioritizes funding for direct service support, such as commodities and health workers, includes plans for country co-investment, and seeks to transition program management operations from U.S. leadership to country ownership. The State Department states that it aims to enter into multi-year bilateral agreements with those recipient countries who receive most U.S. foreign assistance by December 31, 2025 and to implement these new agreements by April 2026. 
Defending Women From Gender Ideology Extremism And Restoring Biological Truth To The Federal Government, January 20, 2025
PURPOSE: To define sex as an immutable binary biological classification and remove recognition of the concept of gender identity.

• The order states that “It is the policy of the United States to recognize two sexes, male and female” and directs the Executive Branch to “enforce all sex-protective laws to promote this reality”. Elements of the order that may affect global health programs are as follows:
Defines sex as “an individual’s immutable biological classification as either male or female”.  States that “sex” is not a synonym for and does not include the concept of “gender identity” and that gender identity “does not provide a meaningful basis for identification and cannot be recognized as a replacement for sex.”
Directs the Secretary of Health and Human Services to provide the U.S. Government, external partners, and the public clear guidance expanding on the sex-based definitions set forth in the order within 30 days.
Directs each agency and all Federal employees to “enforce laws governing sex-based rights, protections, opportunities, and accommodations to protect men and women as biologically distinct sexes, including when interpreting or applying statutes, regulations, or guidance and in all other official agency business, documents, and communications.
Directs each agency and all Federal employees, when administering or enforcing sex-based distinctions, to use the term “sex” and not “gender” in all applicable Federal policies and documents.
Directs agencies to remove all statements, policies, regulations, forms, communications, or other internal and external messages “that promote or otherwise inculcate gender ideology”, and shall cease issuing such statements, policies, regulations, forms, communications or other messages. Directs agencies to take all necessary steps, as permitted by law, to end the Federal funding of gender ideology.
Requires that Federal funds shall not be used to promote gender ideology and directs agencies to ensure grant funds do not promote gender ideology.
Rescinds multiple executive orders issued by President Biden, including: “Preventing and Combating Discrimination on the Basis of Gender Identity or Sexual Orientation” (13988) and “Advancing Equality for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer, and Intersex Individuals” (14075).
What Happens Next/Implications: This order is broad, directed to all federal agencies and programs. Because PEPFAR, and some other U.S. global health programs, serve people who are members of the LGBTQ community, guidance and implementation could affect the ability of these programs to reach individuals and organizations and provide them with services. In addition, the order will likely result in the removal of existing protections based on sexual orientation and gender identity, which had been provided in agency guidance for global health and development programs. Implementation guidance has been issued and all federal agencies must comply.
Memorandum For The Secretary Of State, The Secretary Of Defense, The Secretary Of Health And Human Services, The Administrator Of The United States Agency For International Development, January 24, 2025
PURPOSE: To reinstate Mexico City Policy and direct review of programs per the Kemp-Kasten Amendment.

• Revokes President Biden’s Presidential Memorandum of January 28, 2021 for the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, and the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development (Protecting Women’s Health at Home and Abroad).
Reinstates President Trump’s Presidential Memorandum of January 23, 2017 for the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, and the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development (The Mexico City Policy).
Directs the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Health and Human Services, to the extent allowable by law, to implement a plan to extend the requirements of the reinstated Memorandum to global health assistance furnished by all departments or agencies.
Directs the Secretary of State to take all necessary actions, to the extent permitted by law, to ensure that U.S. taxpayer dollars do not fund organizations or programs that support or participate in the management of a program of coercive abortion or involuntary sterilization.
What Happens Next/Implications: The Mexico City Policy is a U.S. government policy that – when in effect – has required foreign NGOs to certify that they will not “perform or actively promote abortion as a method of family planning” using funds from any source (including non-U.S. funds) as a condition of receiving U.S. global family planning assistance and, when in place under the Trump administration, most other U.S. global health assistance. First announced in 1984 by the Reagan administration, the policy has been rescinded and reinstated by subsequent administrations along party lines since; it was widely expected that the President Trump would reinstate it in his second term. The new memorandum calls for the implementation of a plan to extend the requirements to global health assistance furnished by all departments or agencies; until the plan is ready, the scope of the new memorandum is unknown.

The new memorandum also directs the Secretary of State to review programs under the Kemp-Kasten amendment, a provision of U.S. law that states that no U.S. funds may be made available to “any organization or program which, as determined by the [p]resident of the United States, supports or participates in the management of a program of coercive abortion or involuntary sterilization.” It has been used in the past to prevent funding from going to UNFPA.

See: KFF Mexico City Policy explainer and related resources and Kemp-Kasten explainer.

Update: Three interim final rules expanding and implementing the Mexico City Policy, now called the Promoting Human Flourishing in Foreign Assistance (PHFFA) Policy, were issued on January 27, 2026:
Protecting Life in Foreign Assistance
Combating Gender Ideology in Foreign Assistance
Combating Discriminatory Equity Ideology in Foreign Assistance Rules

Renewed Membership in the Geneva Consensus Declaration on Promoting Women’s Health and Strengthening the Family, January 24, 2025
PURPOSE: To rejoin the Geneva Consensus Declaration.

The United States informed signatories of the Geneva Consensus Declaration of its intent to rejoin immediately. Established in 2020, the declaration, led by the United States, has the following objectives: “to secure meaningful health and development gains for women; to protect life at all stages; to defend the family as the fundamental unit of society; and to work together across the UN system to realize these values.”

What Happens Next/Implications: The Geneva Consensus Declaration, initially crafted and signed by the U.S. – along with 31 other countries at the time – was meant to enshrine certain values and principles related to women’s health and family, including a rejection of the “international right to abortion.”  The Biden administration withdrew from the Consensus in 2021.
Review of and Changes to USAID, January 27, 2025
Reorganization of the Department of State, April 22, 2025
PURPOSE: To review and potentially reorganize USAID “to maximize efficiency and align operations with the national interest,” which may include the suspension or elimination of programs, projects, or activities; closing or suspending missions or posts; closing, reorganizing, downsizing, or renaming establishments, organizations, bureaus, centers, or offices; reducing the size of the workforce at such entities; and contracting out or privatizing functions or activities performed by federal employees.What Happens Next/Implications: Related to but separate from the Executive Order on reevaluating and realigning foreign aid and on the America first policy directive to the Secretary of State, the administration has made changes to and begun a review of USAID, the U.S. government’s international development agency which oversees and/or implements most U.S. global health programs (see, The U.S. Government and Global Health). Key developments are as follows:
On January 27, senior USAID career staff were placed on leave and hundreds of other staff were let go.
On February 2, the USAID website was taken down.
On February 3, the USAID building in DC was closed, which has prevented other staff from accessing it.
The President appointed Secretary of State Rubio as Acting USAID Administrator on February 3. Secretary Rubio has said that the agency has “conflicting, overlapping, and duplicative functions that it shares with the Department of State” and that its systems and processes are not “well synthesized, integrated, or coordinated, and often result in discord in the foreign policy and foreign relations of the United States.” President Trump and other administration officials have called for dissolving the agency altogether. Formal notification of the intent to review the agency was sent by Secretary Rubio to Congress on February 3.
On February 4, a notice was posted on the USAID website stating that on February 7, all USAID direct hire personnel would be placed on administrative leave globally, with the exception of “designated personnel responsible for mission­ critical functions, core leadership and specially designated programs.” The notice also said that staff posted outside the United States would need to return to the U.S. within 30 days.
On February 6, a lawsuit was filed by Democracy Forward and Public Citizen Litigation Group, on behalf of the American Foreign Service Association and American Federation of Government Employees, challenging the foreign aid funding freeze, the plan to put most staff on leave, and the fact that staff had already been placed on leave; on February 7, they filed for a temporary restraining order (TRO). That same day, a temporary restraining order was issued by the U.S. District Court in the District of Columbia preventing the government from placing additional staff on leave or evacuating staff back to the U.S., and requiring reinstatement of all staff already placed on leave, until February 14. The court did not grant a TRO on the funding freeze, on the grounds that the plaintiffs in this case did not demonstrate that the freeze caused them irreparable harm. On February 13, the court extended the TRO through February 21, at which time, the court determined that further preliminary injunctive relief was not warranted and the TRO was ended, allowing the government to dismiss USAID staff.
On February 11, a lawsuit was filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia on behalf of several U.S. organizations challenging the executive order pausing foreign aid, and subsequent actions freezing foreign aid and dissolving USAID, and asking the court to temporarily restrain and preliminarily and permanently enjoin Defendants from implementing these actions. In a February 13 ruling, a federal court issued a TRO preventing the Trump administration from freezing foreign aid assistance but stated that the proposed injunctions related to USAID were overbroad (in a separate case, the district court ended the TRO on dismissing USAID staff – see above).
On February 13, a lawsuit was filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland by 26 former and current employees of USAID, suing Elon Musk and DOGE for taking actions to control and dissolve the agency. On February 18, the plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction. The defendants responded on February 24 and the plaintiffs replied on February 26. On March 18, the court granted a preliminary injunction, requiring the defendants to reverse many of the actions taken to dissolve USAID, and on March 21, the defendants filed an appeal on the preliminary injunction. On March 25, the U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals granted the defendants’ motion for a temporary stay on the preliminary injunction, allowing DOGE to resume its efforts to dissolve USAID, until March 27. The following day on March 28, the court granted defendants’ motion for a stay, clearing the path for DOGE to continue its work dissolving USAID.
On February 18, a lawsuit was filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia on behalf of the Personal Services Contractor Association (representing USAID personal service contractors) challenging the suspension of foreign assistance and the actions related to USAID, including “steps to dismantle USAID, cripple its operations, or transfer its functions to the State Department without Congressional authorization”. On February 19, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order. On March 6, the court denied the TRO request.
On March 28, Secretary Rubio announced that the Department of State and USAID have notified Congress on their intent to “undertake a reorganization that would involve realigning certain USAID functions to the Department by July 1, 2025, and discontinuing the remaining USAID functions that do not align with Administration priorities.” Additionally, nearly all the remaining USAID staff received notice that they would be subject to a final reduction-in-force.
On April 22, Secretary Rubio announced the Department of State’s reorganization plan and new organization chart. The plan states that it would consolidate functions and remove non-statutory programs that are “misaligned with America’s core national interests.”
On April 28, a lawsuit was filed by a group of labor unions, non-profits, and local governments challenging the administration’s moves to drastically reshape several federal agencies without congressional approval (American Federation of Government Employees v. Trump). The district court issued a TRO on May 9 and preliminary injunction on May 22 ordering the administration to pause large-scale reductions in force, program eliminations, and other actions related to federal agency restructuring. An emergency motion by the government for a stay pending appeal of the district court’s preliminary injunction was denied on May 30.
On May 2 and May 30, the White House released information on its budget request for FY 2026, noting the reorganization of USAID into the Department of State.
On May 29, the Department of State notified Congress of its reorganization plans, including absorbing USAID’s continued functions.
On June 13, the district court in American Federation of Government Employees v. Trump ruled that the actions of the Department of State, including the reorganization announcement and notification to Congress, were in violation of the preliminary injunction.
On July 8, the U.S. Supreme Court granted the government’s request for a stay of the preliminary injunction pending resolution of the appeals case in American Federation of Government Employees v. Trump, allowing the government to move forward with large-scale reductions to federal agency operations and workforces, including at the State Department.

While initially created through Executive Order in 1961 as part of the State Department, the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 established it as an independent agency within the executive branch. As such, the Executive branch does not have authority to dissolve it without Congress, and Congress also requires notification first as well as consultation on any proposed changes.

Update: On July 1, 2025, USAID was dissolved (with most employees being separated from the agency; any remaining personnel were separated by September 2, 2025). Remaining functions/activities were transferred to the State Department.
Withdrawing the United States From and Ending Funding to Certain United Nations Organizations and Reviewing United States Support to All International Organizations, February 4, 2025
PURPOSE: To review United States participation in all international intergovernmental organizations, conventions, and treaties and to withdraw from and end funding to certain United Nations (U.N.) organizations.

The U.S. “helped found” the U.N. “after World War II to prevent future global conflicts and promote international peace and security.  But some of [its] agencies and bodies have drifted from this mission and instead act contrary to the interests of the United States while attacking our allies and propagating anti-Semitism.”
States that the U.S. “will reevaluate our commitment to these institutions,” including three organizations that “deserve renewed scrutiny”:
a) the U.N. Human Rights Council (UNHRC; the U.S. will not participate in and withhold its contribution to the budget of the body),
b) the U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO; the U.S. will conduct a review of its membership in the body within 90 days), and
c) the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA; reiterates that the U.S. will not contribute to the body).
Requires that within 180 days:
a) the Secretary of State, with the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., conduct a review of all international intergovernmental organizations of which the U.S. is a member and provides any type of funding or other support, and all conventions and treaties to which the United States is a party, to determine which organizations, conventions, and treaties are contrary to the interests of the United States and whether such organizations, conventions, or treaties can be reformed; and
b) the Secretary of State to report the findings of the review to the President, through the National Security Advisor, and provide recommendations as to whether the U.S. should withdraw from any such organizations, conventions, or treaties.
What Happens Next/Implications: With a long history of multilateral global health engagement, the U.S. is often the largest or one of the largest donors to multilateral health efforts (i.e., multi-country, pooled support often directed through an international organization). It provided $2.4 billion in assessed or core contributions in FY 2024 – 19% of overall U.S. global health funding – as well as more funding in voluntary or non-core contributions.

The U.S. is also a signatory or party to numerous global health-related international conventions, treaties, and agreements; these include those that played a role in the global COVID-19 response (such as the International Health Regulations). It often has participated in negotiations for new international instruments, although the Trump administration indicated in a Jan. 20, 2025, Executive Order, listed above, that the U.S. would no longer engage in the Pandemic Agreement (sometimes called the “Pandemic Treaty”) negotiations.

This Executive Order will have immediate impacts via the ordered actions related to the three U.N. organizations specified, much as the impacts of the Jan. 20, 2025, Executive Order on the World Health Organization (WHO, which initiated U.S. withdrawal from membership and halted U.S. funding) are already being seen. Beyond these, additional impacts of this Executive Order will be determined by the findings and recommendations of the international organizations and conventions review, particularly if U.S. support for or membership in some international organizations is recommended to be reduced or eliminated and if it recommends the U.S. withdraw from any international agreements.

Congressional notification and oversight of any proposed changes will also be important to watch, including debates about whether advice or consent or congressional notification periods are or may be required prior to withdrawing the U.S. from international instruments such as treaties.

The administration has already signaled plans to discontinue support for several international organizations in its budget request for FY 2026 by proposing eliminated funding for Gavi, the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), and the World Health Organization (WHO). However, Congress will determine final funding levels and whether to include these eliminations in its appropriations bills.

The 180 day review of all international intergovernmental organizations goes through August 3, 2025.
Memorandum For The Heads Of Executive Departments And Agencies, February 6, 2025
PURPOSE: The memorandum seeks to “stop funding Nongovernmental Organizations that undermine the national interest and administration priorities”.

The memorandum:

States: it is Administration policy “to stop funding NGOs [Nongovernmental Organizations] that undermine the national interest.”
Directs heads of executive departments and agencies to review all funding that agencies provide to NGOs and “to align future funding decisions with the interests of the United States and with the goals and priorities of my Administration, as expressed in executive action; as otherwise determined in the judgment of the heads of agencies; and on the basis of applicable authorizing statues, regulations, and terms.”
What Happens Next/Implications: This memo aligns with other Executive actions that target federal funding for global health and foreign assistance programs. Implementation of this memo could result in the Administration halting funding to global health NGOs they determine “do not align with administration priorities.” No criteria for how this determination will be made has been provided.

The majority of U.S. global health assistance is channeled through NGOs. In FY22, for example, 62% of U.S. global health funding was provided to NGOs as prime partners (45% to U.S.-based NGOs and 17% to foreign-based NGOs) and others are likely sub-recipients of U.S. assistance.* As such, this Order could have a significant impact on NGOs if it is determined that they do not align with administration policies.

*Source: KFF analysis of data from www.foreignassistance.gov.
Addressing Egregious Actions of The Republic of South Africa, February 7, 2025
PURPOSE: To stop U.S. support for South Africa due to its “commission of rights violations in its country or its ‘undermining United States foreign policy, which poses national security threats to our Nation, our allies, our African partners, and our interests.”

“It is the policy of the United States that, as long as South Africa continues these unjust and immoral practices that harm our Nation:
(a)  the United States shall not provide aid or assistance to South Africa; and
(b)  the United States shall promote the resettlement of Afrikaner refugees escaping government-sponsored race-based discrimination, including racially discriminatory property confiscation.”

ACTIONS:

All executive departments and agencies, including USAID, shall, to the maximum extent allowed by law, halt foreign aid or assistance delivered or provided to South Africa, and shall promptly exercise all available authorities and discretion to halt such aid or assistance.
The head of each agency may permit the provision of any such foreign aid or assistance that, in the discretion of the relevant agency head, is necessary or appropriate.
The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall take appropriate steps, consistent with law, to prioritize humanitarian relief, including admission and resettlement through the United States Refugee Admissions Program, for Afrikaners in South Africa. A plan shall be submitted to the President through the Assistant to the President and Homeland Security Advisor.
What Happens Next/Implications: South Africa receives a significant amount of global health assistance, particularly for HIV/AIDS, from the United States government. The executive order allows the heads of U.S. agencies to permit the provision of foreign aid or assistance under this order at their discretion. On February 10, the U.S. Embassy and Consulates in South Africa announced that PEPFAR would not be impacted by this Executive Order and could continue under the limited waiver already granted to the foreign aid funding freeze. No other exceptions have yet been announced.

The Government of South Africa has issued a statement in response to the Executive Order that, among other things, expresses concern “by what seems to be a campaign of misinformation and propaganda aimed at misrepresenting our great nation.”

Notes and Sources:

*There are several other Executive Actions issued by the President that instruct all government agencies on a variety of topics and as such broadly affect global health program operations but are not specific to global health. These include, for example, Executive Actions withdrawing from the Paris Agreement under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and ending DEI programs. These are not included in this resource.

Sources: White House, https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/; State Department, www.state.gov.

Medicaid and Upcoming State Budget Debates

Published: Jan 23, 2026

As states begin budget debates for state fiscal year (FY) 2027, many states are facing a more tenuous fiscal climate. Slowing revenue growth and heightened spending demands coupled with anticipated federal Medicaid cuts under the 2025 reconciliation law, changes to the Affordable Care Act (ACA) enhanced Marketplace subsidies, and economic changes are contributing to tighter budget conditions and fiscal uncertainty for states. Medicaid is often central to state fiscal decisions as it is simultaneously a significant spending item as well as the largest source of federal revenues for states.

States projected Medicaid enrollment to remain flat for FY 2026 in KFF’s 2025 budget survey of Medicaid officials and total Medicaid spending was expected to increase 7.9%, though there was substantial variation across states. States reported a variety of cost pressures including provider and managed care rate increases, greater enrollee health care needs, and increasing costs for long-term care, pharmacy benefits, and behavioral health services. Some states have already implemented Medicaid spending cuts to address recent budget challenges, and others may follow as they contend with budget gaps and prepare for the implementation of the Medicaid changes in the 2025 reconciliation law.

Now in January 2026, halfway through FY 2026, governors are beginning to release proposed budgets for state legislatures to consider for FY 2027. Most states will be adopting FY 2027 budgets this year and another 16 states enacted biennial budgets last year, though some of these states may adopt a supplemental budget for FY 2027. The state budget cycle in most states runs from July to June, and governors typically release their budget proposals early in the calendar year followed by a convening of the legislature to finalize and enact a budget. While most states have not yet released budget proposals, implementation of the 2025 reconciliation law will put pressure on state Medicaid programs and states such as Colorado and Idaho have already announced Medicaid cuts. Medicaid issues are also likely to intersect with broader health care coverage and affordability debates leading up to the mid-term elections in November 2026. There will be 39 gubernatorial elections (18 incumbent governors running for reelection and 21 incumbent governors who are either term-limited or not seeking reelection) and control of state legislative bodies could also be affected. This brief describes current state fiscal conditions as states begin FY 2027 budget debates and highlights key areas to watch for Medicaid policy changes as states respond to fiscal challenges and the 2025 reconciliation law. 

State Fiscal Pressures

States are facing a more tenuous fiscal climate as they prepare for FY 2027 budget debates. In recent years, tax cuts combined with changes in inflation and consumer consumption patterns has led to slowing state revenue growth following a period of record-breaking revenue and expenditure growth for states after the initial pandemic-induced economic downturn (Figure 1). General fund spending has also slowed, and data show state rainy day fund capacity is also beginning to decline following all-time highs (though funds remain stronger than before the pandemic). States are also contending with increasing spending demands from Medicaid, employee health care, education, housing, and disaster response, though state fiscal conditions vary widely across states. Due to tightening budget conditions, some states have begun implementing more budget management strategies, like spending cuts or other cost containment measures.

General Fund Revenues and Spending Have Slowed Following Pandemic-Era Highs

Recent federal actions, including the passage of the 2025 reconciliation law, may intensify state budget pressures for FY 2027. States are preparing for significant policy changes and federal funding cuts in the 2025 reconciliation law, including tax code changes as well as Medicaid and SNAP cuts. The new law is expected to reduce federal Medicaid spending by $911 billion (or 14%) over the next decade, though the impact varies by state. States may offset some of the reductions with state funds, though the challenging fiscal climate and the magnitude of federal funding cuts in the new law may make it difficult. For example, states may consider filling in funding gaps created by losses in federal funding for Planned Parenthood or providing state funded coverage for lawfully present immigrants who lose health coverage due to new eligibility restrictions. Some states are also moving to subsidize ACA Marketplace premiums with state funds following the expiration of the enhanced subsidies. The expiration of the enhanced subsidies as well as federal workforce cuts, tariff changes, and shifts in economic conditions contribute to heightened fiscal uncertainty for states. While not expected to offset rural hospitals’ losses under the reconciliation law and funding amounts will vary, states will be receiving additional federal funding through a new rural health fund. Given state budget challenges and fiscal uncertainty, at least 14 states, including Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, Maryland, New Mexico, and Rhode Island, have already forecasted budget gaps for FY 2027.

State Medicaid Changes

In response to mounting state budget pressures and the passage of the 2025 reconciliation law, FY 2027 state budget debates may include efforts to reduce Medicaid spending. Even though many provisions of the reconciliation law do not take effect immediately, a few states have already implemented Medicaid spending cuts for FY 2026 and, heading into the FY 2027 budget cycle, states may continue to propose Medicaid policy changes in key areas (Figure 2). This brief includes Medicaid changes from recently announced governors’ budget proposals, though most states have not yet released detailed budget proposals yet. The state budget landscape will likely continue to evolve as revenue forecasts and spending demands become clearer and as more states release their budgets. Given the timing and disparate impact of the reconciliation law across states as well as variation in state fiscal conditions, FY 2027 Medicaid policy changes will vary by state and some Medicaid cuts may not begin until FY 2028 or later.

Figure 2

Medicaid State Budgets: Key Policy Areas to Watch

Provider Rates

States have substantial flexibility to establish Medicaid provider reimbursement methodologies and amounts, especially within a fee-for-service (FFS) delivery system where a state Medicaid agency pays providers or groups of providers directly. Historically, during times of weak state revenue collections, states have typically turned to provider rate restrictions to contain costs. KFF’s 2025 Medicaid budget survey found that adopted FY 2026 budgets included more rate increases than cuts, but there was a notable uptick in states reporting provider rate restrictions compared to previous years. Some notable restrictions in FY 2026 included 4% across the board reductions for all provider types and services in Idaho, and a reversal of 1.6% across the board provider rate increases to address budget shortfalls in Colorado.

State budget pressures and the 2025 reconciliation law may result in additional rate cuts in FY 2027 budgets. While the 2025 reconciliation law did not directly make changes to how states set provider rates, the law imposes new limits on managed care state-directed payments for inpatient hospital and nursing facility services and new restrictions on states’ ability to generate Medicaid provider tax revenue. Some provider tax provisions in the new law have already been implemented, and some states may be anticipating the effect of future provider tax limits that will be phased on over time, which could exacerbate state budget challenges and result in reimbursement rate cuts. Some early FY 2027 governors’ budget proposals include provider rate restrictions: Colorado proposed reducing Medicaid provider rates to 85% of Medicare rates, along with rate reductions for certain home health, dental, behavioral health, and other services, and Idaho proposed extending their 4% provider rate reductions. Texas has also proposed reimbursement rate reductions for FY 2027 for substance use treatment facilities and durable medical equipment. North Carolina has not yet passed their biennial budget for FY 2026 and FY 2027; while this stalemate resulted in rate cuts that were eventually restored in FY 2026, the legislature may consider additional cuts as they finalize their budget.  

Benefits

State Medicaid programs must cover a comprehensive set of “mandatory” benefits, including items and services typically excluded from traditional insurance, but may also cover a broad range of optional benefits. For example, all states cover prescription drugs as an optional benefit, and most states cover other optional services such as physical therapy, eyeglasses, and adult dental care. KFF’s 2025 Medicaid budget survey found that benefit expansions continued to far outweighed benefit restrictions and limitations in FY 2026 (consistent with prior survey years), particularly for behavioral health. However, some states had plans to restrict coverage of GLP-1s for obesity treatment, including CaliforniaNew Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina, which all eliminated coverage of GLP-1s for obesity treatment in January 2026, likely reflecting recent state budget challenges and fiscal uncertainty.

As states enter FY 2027 budget debates, it may be challenging to sustain recent benefit expansions and states may face increased pressure to cut or limit optional benefits. While the 2025 reconciliation law does not directly change Medicaid benefits, states may have to cut or limit optional benefits to offset federal funding cuts in the new law or respond to existing budget challenges. Colorado’s recently released governor’s budget proposal for FY 2027 includes capping dental benefits, and Rhode Island’s Medicaid program FY 2027 budget proposal considers ending GLP-1 coverage. Idaho governor’s budget proposal includes suggested cuts to dental, pharmacy, and various medical service benefits.

Home Care             

Medicaid pays for almost 70% of all home care spending in the U.S., and most Medicaid home care is provided through optional services, giving states flexibility to manage costs. Most states use various mechanisms to limit home care spending under waiver programs, including caps on enrollment, total spending, and per-participant costs, as well as restrictions on specific services like personal care. Nearly a third of states reported planning to adopt new strategies in FY 2026 to contain home care costs, according to data from KFF’s 2025 survey of officials administering Medicaid home care programs.

State budget challenges and federal funding cuts in the 2025 reconciliation law could result in additional pressure to reduce optional home care services in FY 2027 budgets. The 2025 reconciliation law does not directly change home care benefits, but significant Medicaid spending on home care and the availability of mechanisms for limiting such spending could spur states to make home care cuts. When faced with fiscal pressures in the past, all states reduced spending on home care by either serving fewer people (40 states) and/or by cutting benefits or payment rates for long-term care providers (47 states). Recently released governors’ budget proposals from Colorado and Idaho include suggested cuts to home care services, although specifics of these proposals are not available and may evolve during the legislative process.

Eligibility and Work Requirements

Since the pandemic, many states have expanded Medicaid eligibility or taken steps to remove administrative barriers to enrollment for certain groups. States have also built on post-pandemic unwinding strategies to automate eligibility and renewal processes, improve communication with members, and reduce administrative barriers. However, in FY 2026, some states reduced Medicaid spending through eligibility restrictions, reflecting tighter budget conditions. As of January 2026, California reinstated asset limits for Medi-Cal eligibility for long-term care benefits for adults 65 and older or with a disability, and D.C. reduced Medicaid income limits to 138% of the federal poverty limit for certain enrollees. Some states have also rolled back state-funded health coverage programs that expand coverage to immigrants regardless of status. In addition, KFF’s 2025 Medicaid budget survey found that a few states planned to cancel or postpone one or more projects or initiatives due to uncertainty at the federal level, including federal waiver policy changes such as pre-release coverage for individuals who are incarcerated or continuous enrollment for children.

Upcoming FY 2027 budget debates may consider Medicaid eligibility restrictions to address state budget challenges. States will also begin the implementation of the 2025 reconciliation law’s Medicaid eligibility policy changes, including pausing implementation of some provisions in the Biden-era Eligibility and Enrollment Final Rule (that aimed to streamline complex processes), restricting Medicaid eligibility for certain immigrants, conducting more frequent eligibility redeterminations for ACA expansion adults, and imposing Medicaid work requirements for ACA expansion adults. Operationalizing these new policies will require significant changes to state eligibility systems and processes, which may displace staff, funding, and resources from implementing other Medicaid priorities. Increased costs associated with implementing the changes in addition to state budget pressures and federal funding cuts could mean more states consider restricting coverage of optional eligibility groups. For example, Idaho’s legislature has signaled that it may consider repealing the Medicaid expansion to address budget shortfalls.

The implementation of Medicaid work requirements may have a significant impact on state Medicaid program budgets and systems capacity in FY 2027. The 2025 reconciliation law requires states to implement work requirements for individuals enrolled through the ACA Medicaid expansion pathway or certain state waivers beginning January 1, 2027 (with the option for states to implement requirements earlier). The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that this requirement will have the largest effect on spending and coverage compared to other provisions, reducing federal Medicaid spending by $326 billion over ten years and resulting in 5.3 million more people who are uninsured. In KFF’s 2025 Medicaid budget survey, states reported a number of implementation challenges including the significant eligibility systems changes needed, the short timeframe, staff capacity concerns, and issues for applicants and enrollees. States also reported fiscal challenges tied to systems changes, hiring additional staff, and conducting outreach to enrollees. Even with implementation funds and federal matching payments for administrative costs, some states cited the increased costs of implementing work requirements on a short timeline as a concern, which may factor into FY 2027 budget debates. For example, among recently released FY 2027 governors’ proposed budgets, Utah includes $16.5 million, Colorado includes over $50 million, Kentucky includes $35.6 million, and Wyoming includes $7.4 million in funding for the new law’s Medicaid eligibility redetermination changes. In addition, some states are planning to move forward with work requirements before the federal deadline, which could have additional implications for state budgets. To date, Nebraska is the first state to announce it will implement early, starting May 1, 2026.

Medicaid: What to Watch in 2026

Published: Jan 23, 2026

At the start of 2026, many issues are at play that could affect Medicaid coverage, financing, and access to care. Medicaid, which is administered by states within broad federal rules, provides comprehensive health and long-term care coverage to one in five low-income Americans. A more tenuous fiscal climate in 2026 coupled with implementation of the 2025 reconciliation law will put pressure on state Medicaid programs. While major legislative changes to Medicaid at the federal level are unlikely in 2026, key areas to watch include federal policy actions such as new regulations or guidance related to work requirements, implementation guidance for other components of the 2025 reconciliation law, and states’ policy actions in response to federal policy changes and state budget pressures.

Medicaid issues are likely to intersect with broader health care coverage and affordability debates, including the expiration of the enhanced premium tax credits for Affordable Care Act (ACA) coverage and efforts by the administration to control drug prices and hold insurance companies accountable, leading up to the mid-term elections in November 2026. At the federal level, these elections could affect the make-up of Congress and at the state level, they could affect control of state legislatures and governors’ offices. There will be 39 gubernatorial elections (18 incumbent governors running for reelection and 21 incumbent governors who are either term-limited or not seeking reelection).

Medicaid Coverage

In 2026, states will begin implementing Medicaid policy changes that are estimated to increase the number of people without health insurance by 7.5 million in 2034. Over half (5.3 million) of people newly uninsured from Medicaid changes would come from new work requirements for Medicaid enrollees in the ACA Medicaid expansion group or enrollees in partial expansion waiver programs (Georgia and Wisconsin) starting January 1, 2027. Beyond work requirements, the 2025 reconciliation law made other Medicaid eligibility changes, including pausing implementation of some provisions in two Biden-era eligibility and enrollment rules (that aimed to streamline complex processes), restricting Medicaid eligibility for certain lawfully-present immigrants, and requiring states to conduct more frequent eligibility redeterminations for ACA expansion adults.

States will need to make major policy decisions and systems upgrades, likely in advance of formal federal guidance, to be ready to implement work requirements in January 2027. Operationalizing new Medicaid work requirements will require changes to state eligibility systems and processes, enhanced data sharing infrastructure, and targeted enrollee outreach and education, all of which will demand staff resources and funding that will limit attention to other Medicaid priorities. The short timeline for making these changes means states will need to move forward with key decisions before formal guidance from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) may be available, increasing the risk that they will have to make adjustments to align with federal policy, which could increase costs. Despite these challenges, some states have indicated a desire to implement work requirements before the January 2027 deadline. To date, Nebraska is the first to announce it will begin enforcing federal work requirements early, starting May 1, 2026.

Federal immigration policies and state policy choices could have implications for Medicaid coverage in 2026. In addition to federal legislative changes, broader immigration policies, such as changes to the public charge rules, new agreements for CMS to share Medicaid data with Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and continued public immigration enforcement activity could result in fewer legal immigrants obtaining or maintaining Medicaid coverage. In the face of increasing fiscal pressure, several states have announced they are rolling back state-funded coverage for immigrants who are not eligible for federally-funded Medicaid, which will further limit coverage options for immigrants. States may also adopt other eligibility restrictions in an effort to reduce state costs. 

Medicaid Financing

Cuts to federal Medicaid spending will exacerbate the fiscal challenges states are experiencing because of slowing revenue growth and increasing spending demands. The 2025 reconciliation law made historic cuts to federal Medicaid financing, which are estimated to reduce federal Medicaid spending by $911 billion over 10 years. Although the most significant changes to federal Medicaid financing don’t take effect until October 2027 or later, some states will experience more immediate effects resulting from changes to federal requirements governing provider taxes. One of the most immediate effects is that states are prohibited from establishing any new provider taxes or increasing existing taxes. Historically, states have used provider taxes as a means of sustaining Medicaid funding in times of slowing revenue growth or increasing spending demands, but that tool is no longer available because of the new prohibition.

Some states may also face reductions to states’ budgeted revenues for 2026 because of more immediate changes to federal provider tax rules. This would occur in two types of cases:

  • States that had adopted new provider taxes for state fiscal year (FY) 2026 may not be able to implement those taxes if they had not done so by July 4, 2025, and
  • States that have implemented provider taxes with a special waiver from CMS known as a “uniformity waiver,” may need to revise their taxes as early as April 1, 2026 because of new limits on the use of such waivers (estimated to affect at least seven states including California, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, Ohio, New York, and West Virginia).

To address slowing revenue growth and increasing spending demands, states may seek to restrict Medicaid provider reimbursement rates, benefits, or eligibility to reduce state Medicaid spending. For example, four states eliminated GLP-1 coverage for obesity treatment in late 2025 likely reflecting recent state budget challenges and fiscal uncertainty. While state Medicaid programs must cover nearly all drugs, a long-standing statutory exception allows states to choose whether to cover weight-loss drugs under Medicaid, resulting in limited state coverage of GLP-1s for obesity treatment. Recent governors’ budgets have included restrictions for other Medicaid benefits including dental and home care. States’ fiscal challenges in 2026 stem from factors other than the 2025 reconciliation law, but the law may exacerbate such challenges. Beyond limiting revenues in states affected by the provider tax provisions, states will need to spend more to implement the law’s requirements, most notably the new work requirements that start January 1, 2027. While the 2025 reconciliation law included some resources to implement policy changes, states may need to make additional investments in systems or workforce to comply with multiple and complex policy changes. Because states pay less than 50% of total Medicaid costs, reductions in state funding will have even larger effects on total Medicaid spending. For example, on average, states accounted for 35% of total Medicaid spending in federal fiscal year 2024. At that rate, a decrease of $100 million in state Medicaid spending would decrease total Medicaid spending by $286 million.

Recent Trump administration prescription drug initiatives could result in savings for state Medicaid programs, though questions remain about the implementation and impact of the deals. In fall 2025, the Trump administration announced reaching agreements with some drug manufacturers, including Pfizer and AstraZeneca, to provide most-favored nation (MFN) prescription drug pricing in Medicaid. MFN prices will be available to state Medicaid programs through the GENEROUS (GENErating cost Reductions fOr U.S. Medicaid) Model, a voluntary drug payment model through which CMS will negotiate supplemental drug rebates based on prices paid in other countries. The Trump administration also recently announced the BALANCE (Better Approaches to Lifestyle and Nutrition for Comprehensive hEalth) Model, another voluntary model that intends to expand access to obesity drugs in Medicaid and Medicare by negotiating lower GLP-1 prices with manufacturers. While lower prices for state Medicaid programs through the recently announced models could result in reduced Medicaid prescription drug spending and potentially expanded coverage of obesity drugs, how the new lower costs under the models compare to the net prices state Medicaid programs currently pay and how states or manufacturers will respond remain unclear. Due to the design of the Medicaid Drug Rebate Program (MDRP), Medicaid programs already typically pay lower prices, net of rebates, than other payers. Further, the recent announcements will not impact costs for Medicaid enrollees as they already pay little or no copays for prescription drugs.

Medicaid Access to Care

State decisions to restrict provider reimbursement rates or benefits in response to federal Medicaid spending cuts could limit access to care for some Medicaid enrollees in 2026. Changes to Medicaid financing will make it difficult for states to increase payment rates to providers and may create pressure for states to restrict payment rates. Reduced or stagnant payment rates to providers coupled with rising costs and increases in the number of people who are uninsured (from Medicaid and Marketplace coverage changes) could pressure providers to reduce staff, services or potentially close. Some providers already struggling financially, such as rural hospitals or hospitals serving a high share of Medicaid enrollees, could face more challenges. An influx of funding from the Rural Health Transformation Program may help to mitigate some challenges in the near term, but those funds are temporary and not expected offset the full magnitude of Medicaid funding cuts over the next ten years. Restricting Medicaid coverage of “optional” services (like behavioral health or home care) could result in less access to care for people with complex health conditions. This may be particularly likely for home care services, where existing tools for managing spending such as caps on total spending or enrollment make it easier for states to limit spending in the future.

The administration may shape Medicaid access through actions to curtail or approve new Section 1115 Medicaid demonstration waivers. Such waivers allow states an avenue to test new approaches in Medicaid if the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Secretary determines the waiver is likely to “promote the objectives of the Medicaid program.” Waiver priorities may shift from one presidential administration to another. For example, the Trump administration has rescinded Biden-era 1115 waiver guidance on covering health-related social needs (HRSN) services, indicated plans to phase out certain waiver financing tools (related to use of “Designated State Health Programs” (DSHP), notified states that it does not anticipate approving or extending waivers with continuous eligibility provisions for children and adults or workforce initiatives. While the Trump administration has indicated the phase out or rescission of certain Biden-era waiver policies, the administration has not provided details about its priorities for the use of 1115 waivers. The 2025 reconciliation law included a new provision that requires the Chief Actuary at CMS to certify that 1115 waivers are not expected to result in an increase in federal expenditures compared to federal expenditures without the waiver. While “budget-neutrality” for waivers has been required under long-standing policy and practice, typically the calculations are determined on a per enrollee basis over the course of the waiver and are negotiated between states and the administration.

Workforce challenges tied to reimbursement rate policies and changes in immigration policy could also exacerbate access challenges. KFF survey data finds that 13% of immigrants have avoided going to work since January 2025 because of concerns about drawing attention to someone’s immigration status, a number which rises to 40% among people who are likely to be undocumented immigrants. Such concerns are most significant for the long-term care workforce because Medicaid is the dominant payer for care and more than one in four long-term care workers are immigrants. Beyond long-term care, immigrants constitute a large share of workers in other health care fields, including over one in four physicians in US hospitals.

What to Watch

The issues identified in this policy watch could have major implications for Medicaid coverage, financing, and access to care. Key questions for each of these areas will be important to monitor as debates evolve leading up to the mid-term elections, which will have significant implications for Medicaid and health policy in general in the years ahead.

Medicaid coverage changes:

  • How will federal guidance shape implementation of work requirements and other eligibility changes in the reconciliation law?
  • How will states implement Medicaid work requirements? How many states will implement work requirements ahead of the January 2027 deadline? Will any states be granted good faith waivers to delay implementation?
  • Will states adopt additional eligibility restrictions in budgets for FY 2027?
  • How will aggregate and state enrollment trends evolve during 2026?

Medicaid financing changes:

  • How will federal Medicaid financing changes affect state budgets and provider rates in 2026?
  • How will state financing challenges affect the development of their FY 2027 budgets?
  • Will states be able to offset reduced federal funding with state funding or will states adopt policies to restrict Medicaid? What policies will states adopt to reduce state Medicaid spending?
  • Will states be able to sustain recent increases in provider rates or expansions in services, particularly for long-term care and behavioral health?

Medicaid access changes:

  • How will broader changes in Medicaid coverage affect access to care?
  • How will changes in Medicaid 1115 waiver policy affect access to care?
  • Will changes in financing result in hospital or other provider closures and what will that mean for access to care? Will funding for providers from the rural health transformation fund offset restrictions from other federal and state policies?
  • How will broader immigration policies affect the long-term care workforce and access to services that are predominantly funded by Medicaid?

How Has U.S. Spending on Health Care Changed Over Time?

Published: Jan 22, 2026

This chart collection explores National Health Expenditure (NHE) data from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), including the latest data from 2024. These data offer insights into changes in health spending over time in the U.S., as well as the driving forces behind spending growth. A related interactive tool contains more of the latest NHE data.

The slideshow is part of the Peterson-KFF Health System Tracker, an online information hub dedicated to monitoring and assessing the performance of the U.S. health system.

State Recommendations for Routine Childhood Vaccines: Increasing Departure from Federal Guidelines

Authors: Jennifer Kates and Clea Bell
Published: Jan 22, 2026

In anticipation of federal changes to vaccine policy by the Trump administration, last year, some states began to de-couple their own vaccine recommendations from the federal government. This marked a departure from prior practice where, historically, states typically relied on Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and its Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) for such recommendations.  Starting in May of last year, HHS Secretary Kennedy and the CDC/ACIP began to make changes to the federal vaccine schedule for children, culminating in an announcement on January 5 of this year with the most wide-ranging changes to date (see Table 1). Collectively, these changes have resulted in reducing the number of diseases targeted from 17 to 11 and the number of routine vaccines from 13 to 7. As part of these changes, six vaccines are no longer recommended for routine use by all children in the United States.

This policy brief tracks the number of states that have announced they are no longer following federal government recommendations for childhood vaccines as of January 20, 2026, updating an analysis from September of last year (while the current analysis focuses on state sources for childhood vaccine recommendations, our earlier analysis also looked at state actions regarding insurance coverage requirements and pharmacist administration).  Overall, the number of states that have taken such an action has increased significantly since last September, with a majority of states (28) now departing from federal guidelines for some or all childhood vaccines compared to 22 states in September of last year (see Table 2). Moreover, the number of states decoupling their vaccine recommendations for all childhood vaccines has risen from just nine in September to 25. The red-blue divide across the country continues to grow, with all blue states1 (those with Democratic governors) having announced that they will no longer follow federal guidelines, though four states with Republican governors have also done so.

Findings

As of January 20, 2026, the majority of states (28 states, including DC) have announced that they will not follow the new CDC childhood vaccine recommendations for at least some childhood vaccines, instead relying on prior recommendations, state recommendations, and/or those of external entities. Most of these states have indicated that they will follow the recommendations of the independent medical association, the American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP). Among these are two inter-state public health alliances which previously formed to develop shared recommendations and have reaffirmed their intent to follow AAP guidelines: the West Coast Health Alliance, which includes California, Hawaii, Oregon, and Washington, and the Northeast Public Health Collaborative, which includes ten states and New York City.

Almost all of these states (25 of 28) have announced that they will do so for all childhood vaccines. Most of these states are choosing to follow non-federal guidelines for all childhood vaccines. The three states that are more limited are Alaska and Mississippi, which announced that they would continue to recommend the Hepatitis B vaccine at birth for all infants, even those whose mothers test negative (no longer recommended as routine by the CDC), and Arizona, which has announced that it will continue to recommend Hepatitis B at birth and COVID-19 vaccines consistent with guidelines from external entities.

This marks a significant increase since September when only nine states had announced that they would not follow CDC/ACIP vaccine recommendations for all childhood vaccines (some also did so for adults). In September, most states that had announced changes did so for COVID-19 only (13), which at that time, was the only vaccine for which changes had been made by the federal government (removing the routine vaccination recommendation generally, including for children). With the changing recommendation regarding Hepatitis B vaccine in December of 2025 and additional vaccines in early January 2026, many more states have expanded this scope to include all childhood vaccines.

The red-blue divide in vaccine policy continues with all blue states (those with Democratic governors) departing from federal guidelines. As in September, there is a significant political divide in vaccine policies across the country, which is even sharper today. While all blue states have departed from federal recommendations (one exception is Virginia which just swore in a new Democratic Governor this week and may choose to change their position regarding vaccine recommendations soon), four states with Republican governors have also done so for at least some childhood vaccines (Alaska, Mississippi, New Hampshire, and Vermont). This divide in state policy mirrors a growing divide in public opinion).

Looking ahead, it is possible other states will join this group and de-couple their own childhood vaccine recommendations from the federal government. Regardless of future state decisions, the current landscape – with diverging recommendations from the federal government, many states, and physician organizations — represents a challenging one for parents and providers to navigate, which could dampen already falling vaccination rates.  Moreover, much of this divide is likely to play out in the next school season, when states have to decide whether and how to translate their vaccine recommendations into school attendance requirements or revise existing exemption allowances.  

Table 1: Trump Administration Changes to Childhood Vaccine Recommendations
Disease(s)/VaccineChange Date
COVID-19No  longer routine5/27/25; September 2025
Hepatitis B (HepB)No  longer routine12/16/25
Human papillomavirus (HPV)Reduced from 2 or 3 doses to 1 dose1/5/26
Rotavirus (RV)No  longer routine1/5/26
InfluenzaNo  longer routine1/5/26
Hepatitis A (HepA)No  longer routine1/5/26
Meningococcal ACWY (MenACWY)No  longer routine1/5/26
Note: In addition to these changes, the federal government is no longer recommending the combined MMRV product or the multi-dose influenza vaccine with Thimerosal.
Sources: https://www.hhs.gov/press-room/cdc-adopts-individual-based-decision-making-for-hepatitis-b-immunization-for-infants-born-to-women-who-test-negative-for-the-hepatitis-b-virus.html; https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/decision-memo-adopting-revised-childhood-adolescent-immunization-schedule.pdf; https://x.com/seckennedy/status/1927368440811008138; https://www.hhs.gov/press-room/cdc-immunization-schedule-individual-decision-covid19-standalone-chickenpox-toddlers.html.
Table 2: State Childhood Vaccine Recommendations: Reliance on Non-Federal Sources
StateParty of
Governor
Relies on non-Federal Source for Routine
Childhood Vaccine Recommendations
 

 

As of September 22, 2025
All Vaccines: 9 States
COVID-19 only: 13 States
As of January 20, 2026
All Vaccines: 25 States
COVID-19/Hepatitis B: 1 State
Hepatitis B only: 2 States
AlabamaR  
AlaskaR Hepatitis B
ArizonaDCOVID-19 OnlyCOVID-19/Hepatitis B
ArkansasR  
CaliforniaDAll VaccinesAll Vaccines
ColoradoD All Vaccines
ConnecticutDCOVID-19 OnlyAll Vaccines
DelawareDCOVID-19 OnlyAll Vaccines
District of ColumbiaDAll VaccinesAll Vaccines
FloridaR  
GeorgiaR  
HawaiiDAll VaccinesAll Vaccines
IdahoR  
IllinoisDAll VaccinesAll Vaccines
IndianaR  
IowaR  
KansasD All Vaccines
KentuckyD All Vaccines
LouisianaR  
MaineDCOVID-19 OnlyAll Vaccines
MarylandDAll VaccinesAll Vaccines
MassachusettsDAll VaccinesAll Vaccines
MichiganDCOVID-19 OnlyAll Vaccines
MinnesotaDCOVID-19 OnlyAll Vaccines
MississippiR Hepatitis B
Missouri*R  
MontanaR  
NebraskaR  
Nevada*R  
New HampshireR All Vaccines
New JerseyDCOVID-19 OnlyAll Vaccines
New MexicoDCOVID-19 OnlyAll Vaccines
New YorkDCOVID-19 OnlyAll Vaccines
North CarolinaDCOVID-19 OnlyAll Vaccines
North DakotaR  
OhioR  
OklahomaR  
OregonDAll VaccinesAll Vaccines
PennsylvaniaDAll VaccinesAll Vaccines
Rhode IslandDCOVID-19 OnlyAll Vaccines
South CarolinaR  
South DakotaR  
TennesseeR  
TexasR  
UtahR  
VermontRCOVID-19 OnlyAll Vaccines
Virginia**D  
WashingtonDAll VaccinesAll Vaccines
West VirginiaR  
WisconsinDCOVID-19 OnlyAll Vaccines
WyomingR  
Notes: *While news reports for Missouri and Nevada indicate that these states do not anticipate making changes to their vaccine recommendations, despite CDC changes, these were not attributed to specific officials or other documentation and were therefore not included here.  **As of January 17, 2026, Virginia’s governor is now a Democrat, the state may choose to change its position regarding vaccine recommendations soon.

Sources:

Alaska: https://alaskapublic.org/news/health/2025-12-30/alaska-sticks-with-universal-hepatitis-b-vaccine-despite-federal-update; Bill introduced: https://www.akleg.gov/basis/Bill/Detail/34?Root=HB%20238

Arizona: https://directorsblog.health.azdhs.gov/newborns-receive-hepatitis-b-vaccine-at-birth-for-good-reason/

California: https://www.cdph.ca.gov/Programs/OPA/Pages/NR26-001.aspx

Colorado: https://cdphe.colorado.gov/press-release/colorado-reaffirms-evidence-based-vaccine-guidance-and-continued-access-for-families

Connecticut: https://www.health.ny.gov/press/releases/2026/2026-01-12_pediatrics_vaccine_schedule.htm

Delaware: https://www.health.ny.gov/press/releases/2026/2026-01-12_pediatrics_vaccine_schedule.htm

District of Columbia: https://dchealth.dc.gov/release/dc-health-responds-cdc%E2%80%99s-decision-reduce-childhood-vaccines

Hawaii: https://www.cdph.ca.gov/Programs/OPA/Pages/NR26-001.aspx

Illinois: https://x.com/IDPH/status/2008590092475252895?s=20

Kansas: https://www.kdhe.ks.gov/m/newsflash/home/detail/1839

Kentucky: https://kyperf.sharepoint.com/sites/KPhA/Shared%20Documents/Forms/AllItems.aspx?id=%2Fsites%2FKPhA%2FShared%20Documents%2FMarketing%2FKPhA%20Website%20and%20Blog%2FKDPH%20Letters%2FKDPH%5FVaccine%20Recommendation%20Letter%5F1%2E7%2E25%2Epdf&parent=%2Fsites%2FKPhA%2FShared%20Documents%2FMarketing%2FKPhA%20Website%20and%20Blog%2FKDPH%20Letters&p=true&ga=1

Maine: https://www.maine.gov/dhhs/mecdc/health-professionals/health-advisory-notices/maine-childhood-immunization-recommendations-wed

Maryland: https://health.maryland.gov/newsroom/Pages/Statement-from-Secretary-Seshamani-on-childhood-vaccine-schedule-.aspx

Massachusetts: https://www.mass.gov/news/governor-healey-condemns-cdc-rollback-of-childhood-vaccine-recommendations

Michigan: https://www.michigan.gov/mdhhs/inside-mdhhs/newsroom/2026/01/06/vaccines-state

Minnesota: https://www.health.state.mn.us/news/pressrel/2026/immuniz010826.html

Mississippi: https://msdh.ms.gov/msdhsite/_static/resources/21461.pdf

New Hampshire: https://www.dhhs.nh.gov/sites/g/files/ehbemt476/files/documents2/han-child-immunization-schedule.pdf

New Jersey: https://www.nj.gov/health/news/2026/approved/20260112a.shtml

New Mexico: https://www.nmhealth.org/news/awareness/2026/1/?view=2309

New York: https://www.health.ny.gov/press/releases/2026/2026-01-12_pediatrics_vaccine_schedule.htm

North Carolina: https://www.ncdhhs.gov/blog/2026/01/08/ncdhhs-hosts-media-availability-discuss-importance-vaccines-and-address-recent-public-health

Oregon: https://www.cdph.ca.gov/Programs/OPA/Pages/NR26-001.aspx

Pennsylvania: https://www.pa.gov/agencies/health/newsroom/federal-changes-do-not-impact-vaccine-access–recommendations

Rhode Island: https://www.ri.gov/press/view/50302

Vermont: https://www.healthvermont.gov/disease-control/immunizations/recommended-vaccines-children-and-teens; https://www.health.ny.gov/press/releases/2026/2026-01-12_pediatrics_vaccine_schedule.htm

Washington: https://www.cdph.ca.gov/Programs/OPA/Pages/NR26-001.aspx

Wisconsin: https://www.dhs.wisconsin.gov/dph/memos/communicable-diseases/bcd-2026-01.pdf


  1. One exception is Virginia, which just swore in a new Democratic Governor on January 17th and may choose to change their position regarding vaccine recommendations soon. ↩︎

VOLUME 38

AI Health Tools Raise Safety Concerns. Plus, Flu Vaccine Myths Spread During Record Season


Highlights

New features from AI companies, like ChatGPT Health and Claude for Healthcare, aim to provide personalized health guidance as OpenAI reports more than 40 million daily users seek health information from its chatbot, but concerns remain about AI providing wrong or dangerous health advice, particularly around mental health.

And as the U.S. experiences its highest flu levels in 25 years, a vaccine-strain mismatch may be contributing to claims that flu vaccines are ineffective, despite evidence that vaccines still reduce severe illness and death and protect against other circulating strains.


AI & Emerging Technology

AI Companies Launch Health Products as Millions Seek Medical Advice From AI

A laptop screen screen displaying a list is viewed over the shoulders of two people comparing it to a paper bill held in hand.
KFF/ Getty Images

What’s happening?

  • Two artificial intelligence (AI) companies announced new health-related features this month, with “ChatGPT Health” and “Claude for Healthcare” both allowing users to connect their medical records and wellness apps to the chatbots for personalized health guidance. The companies say the features are not intended to be used for diagnosis or treatment, but rather aim to help users navigate everyday health questions by grounding responses in users’ own health data.
  • The new tools come as OpenAI reports that more than 40 million people globally turn to ChatGPT daily for health information, with users asking 1.6 to 1.9 million health insurance questions per week about comparing plans, handling claims, billing, and coverage. According to a report from OpenAI which draws from anonymized conversations and a survey of ChatGPT users, Americans are using ChatGPT to decode medical bills, appeal insurance denials, and at times self-diagnose or manage their care. More than 5% of all ChatGPT messages globally are about health care, according to OpenAI’s report. KFF will continue to monitor how the public reports using AI tools for health information.

Why this matters

  • ChatGPT and other generative AI models can give wrong and potentially dangerous advice, particularly in conversations about mental health. OpenAI faces multiple lawsuits from people who say loved ones harmed or killed themselves after interacting with the tool, and several states have passed laws banning chatbots from providing mental health and therapeutic decision making.
  • KFF polling has shown that only about one in three adults (32%) say they would trust an online health tool that uses AI to access their medical records to provide personalized health information. Despite this low level of trust, the use of AI chatbots for health questions and the expansion into more personalized health features by leading AI companies suggests that the convenience offered by these tools may outweigh concerns about accuracy and safety, or that some users may not be aware of gaps in these areas. Health communicators and providers should be aware of how patients are using these tools and provide guidance on their appropriate use.

Social Media and AI Policy Roundup

Study Shows Team-Based Content Moderation Improves Consensus

A common challenge in content moderation of incorrect or harmful information is people do not agree on what is true. A December study from the Annenberg School for Communication found that content moderators working in teams reached higher levels of agreement on controversial content moderation decisions compared to working alone. The experiment involved over 600 politically diverse moderators and found that “structured social interaction” strengthened accuracy and agreement in content moderation decisions. The findings come as some major platforms have scaled back content moderation efforts to prioritize free speech and diverse thinking, with Meta ending its third-party fact-checking program in 2025 and X reducing its trust and safety teams. Even before these changes, a 2023 KFF poll found that most adults (69%) said social media companies were not doing enough to limit the spread of false and inaccurate health information.

Visa Restrictions Target Content Moderators and Fact-Checkers

A December directive from the State Department instructed immigration officers to deny H-1B visas to individuals who worked in fact-checking, content moderation, trust and safety, or other activities the administration considers censorship of Americans’ speech. In response, the International Fact-Checking Network issued a statement calling the policy a misunderstanding of fact-checking, arguing that the practice strengthens public debate rather than censoring it. Imran Ahmed, the CEO of the Center for Countering Digital Hate, was among European figures barred from receiving a visa and has sued the Trump administration, claiming the denial is “punishment” for his organization’s work combatting misinformation.

Reports indicate that X’s Grok chatbot is being used to create AI-generated nonconsensual intimate imagery (NCII) of women and children, which can harm victims’ mental health through depression, anxiety, PTSD, and suicidal ideation. X has since announced that it would restrict Grok from generating explicit images of real people in jurisdictions where such content is illegal, but these reports have raised questions about who is liable when AI causes documented psychological harm. International regulators have warned of investigations and other actions, and lawmakers in the U.S. have expressed concern. Legal observers have characterized the AI-generated images as a testing ground for whether Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, which provides legal immunity to online platforms for user-generated content, extends to harmful or illegal AI-generated content. Legal efforts to regulate AI have largely stalled in the U.S., but a bill signed into law last year criminalizes sharing NCII, including AI-generated images, and requires platforms to remove them.


Recent Developments

Flu Vaccine Misconceptions Spread During One of the Worst Flu Seasons in Decades

A woman wearing a cloth mask receives a bandage on her shoulder from a health care professional.
Lauren Bishop / CDC

What’s happening?

Misleading claims that flu vaccines are ineffective or weaken the immune system have circulated during the ongoing respiratory virus season, which has seen the highest flu levels in 25 years. The surge in cases is largely driven by a new mutation of the virus, called subclade K, that emerged after the season’s vaccine formulation was finalized in March. Each year, scientists predict what strains to include in the coming season’s flu vaccine, but subclade K only became the dominant strain after those decisions were made, creating a mismatch between the vaccine and the circulating virus.

Where confusion about flu vaccines is emerging

  • The vaccine-strain mismatch may be contributing to claims that the vaccine is ineffective. Senator Rand Paul, for example, questioned the vaccine’s effectiveness on a podcast in mid-January, specifically citing the strain mismatch and suggesting that claims about crossover protection are “inflated.” While this season’s vaccine was not specifically designed to target subclade K, evidence from prior influenza seasons shows that flu vaccines can still provide some protection from infection when they are mismatched to the dominant circulating strain. Vaccination also helps to protect against severe outcomes, including hospitalization and death.
  • Statements by health officials may also contribute to concern over the safety of the flu vaccine. For example, a video clip of Health and Human Services (HHS) Secretary Robert F. Kennedy Jr. appearing on a podcast in 2020 has been shared widely online recently. In the clip, Kennedy says he would not take a flu shot “in a million years” and claims that the vaccine can make people susceptible to other infections. Other HHS officials have claimed that randomized controlled trials do not show that the flu vaccine protects against influenza, but fact-checkers note that flu vaccines are designed primarily to reduce the risk of hospitalization and death. Although clinical trials are typically too small to reliably measure these relatively rare outcomes, meta-analyses have demonstrated that flu vaccines reduce these risks.
  • Others have claimed that the flu vaccine increases the risk of being infected with flu. While flu vaccines can cause some side effects that may resemble flu-like illness, they contain inactivated or attenuated versions of the virus that cannot cause flu infection, and vaccination is not associated with higher rates of other, non-influenza infections. Because flu vaccines do not fully protect against infection and multiple strains can circulate in the same season, vaccinated individuals can still become infected with influenza, but this does not mean the vaccine caused the infection.

Conflicting guidance may contribute to further confusion

  • Guidelines published by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in August 2025 recommended that everyone aged six months or older receive routine annual influenza immunization. However, as part of broader changes to federal vaccine policy, HHS issued a memo in January reducing the number of vaccines recommended for all children and moving six vaccines, including influenza, from routine recommendations to “shared clinical decision making,” a process where health care providers and parents decide individually whether vaccination is appropriate.
  • Physician organizations, including the American Medical Association (AMA) and American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP), have criticized the changes and reaffirmed their support for routine childhood vaccinations, including flu vaccines. KFF polling has shown that larger shares of the public trust their own health care providers and physician associations like the AMA and AAP than the CDC for reliable vaccine information.

Why this matters

  • The misleading narratives about flu vaccines and the shifting federal guidance come as flu vaccination rates have already declined from pre-pandemic levels to around 43% for both adults and children. Older adults, pregnant people, and people with underlying health conditions face the highest risk of severe illness, hospitalization, or death from influenza. While these groups typically have higher flu vaccination rates than the general public, the ongoing severe season and the vaccine-strain mismatch may create an environment that allows misleading claims about the flu vaccine to spread, potentially impacting vaccine uptake and hesitancy among these vulnerable groups.
  • For children, the federal government’s decision to move pediatric flu vaccines to the shared clinical decision making category could introduce additional barriers to vaccine access and potentially result in lower vaccination rates. The move comes as smaller shares of parents view flu vaccination as important. The KFF/Washington Post Survey of Parents found that while about nine in ten parents view routine immunizations for measles, mumps, and rubella (MMR) and polio as important for children in their community to get, a much smaller share (56%) said the same for the flu vaccine. Similarly, while at least eight in ten parents express confidence in the safety of MMR and polio vaccines for children, smaller shares (65%) say they are confident the flu vaccines are safe for children. HHS framed the decision as part of an effort to restore trust, but it remains unclear what effect the changes will have. KFF will continue to monitor how changing federal guidance impacts trust in vaccines and public health efforts.

About The Health Information and Trust Initiative: the Health Information and Trust Initiative is a KFF program aimed at tracking health misinformation in the U.S., analyzing its impact on the American people, and mobilizing media to address the problem. Our goal is to be of service to everyone working on health misinformation, strengthen efforts to counter misinformation, and build trust. 


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Support for the Health Information and Trust initiative is provided by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation (RWJF). The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of RWJF and KFF maintains full editorial control over all of its policy analysis, polling, and journalism activities. The data shared in the Monitor is sourced through media monitoring research conducted by KFF.