The Business of Health with Chip Kahn

What AI Can Do — And What It Can’t 

May 5, 2026

Video

Audio

About this Episode


Episode 2, AI Series: The data is good enough, the technology is getting better, the computing is becoming more available, and the use cases are getting clearer—but is AI truly a revolutionary technological advancement yet for health care? With a 30-year perspective on what digital technology has done and failed to do in health care, Dr. John Halamka, President of the Mayo Clinic Platform, joins Chip in discussing whether AI is actually disruptive or another wave of incremental change.

The Host


Headshot photo of Chip Kahn wearing a navy blue suit with a red tie, red pendant on lapel, and glasses.

Sr. Visiting Fellow

Charles N. Kahn III is a senior visiting fellow at KFF. He is also a visiting senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and a nonresident senior scholar at the University of Southern California’s Schaeffer Center for Health Policy & Economics. He serves as co-chair of the international Future of Health collaborative.

Guest


Dwight and Dian Diercks President, Mayo Clinic Platform 

Dr. Halamka is an emergency medicine physician, medical informatics expert and president of Mayo Clinic Platform, a digital initiative that brings together solution developers, data partners and healthcare service providers to transform healthcare. Dr. Halamka has been developing and implementing healthcare information strategy and policy for more than 40 years. Previously, he was executive director of the Health Technology Exploration Center for Beth Israel Lahey Health, chief information officer at Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center, and International Healthcare Innovation Professor at Harvard Medical School. He is a member of the National Academy of Medicine.

Transcript


AI Usage Disclosure: This transcript was created with assistance from AI tools. It was reviewed and edited by KFF Staff.

Chip Kahn: Last week Eric Larson gave us the strategic landscape, the case that AI is a general-purpose technology on the order of the steam engine and the Internet, and that American health care is uniquely exposed to its disruption and largely unprepared for it. This week we go from the roadmap to the road. Our guest is John Halamka. There may be no one in American medicine who has had a longer or closer view of what digital technology has done and failed to do in health care over the last 30 years. He ran IT at Beth Israel Medical center for more than two decades, advised the Bush and Obama administrations on national health IT, and lived through high tech, meaningful use and, and the rise of telehealth. He has watched every wave of digital innovation promise to transform American medicine and deliver something less. Today, he is president of Mayo Clinic Platform. So, when John says, as he did recently, that the data’s good enough, the technology’s getting good enough, the compute is getting available enough, and the use cases are getting clearer, that this time really may be different, it carries the weight of three decades of having heard this time is different before. The mission critical question for this conversation is whether AI is genuinely a disruptive revolution that has to be navigated or another wave of incremental change. And if it is a revolution, what makes it categorically different, and what does it take to navigate it? There is no better person to take us from the big picture to the operational reality. John Halamka, welcome to KFF’s Business of Health.

John Halamka: It is extraordinary to be with you because we’ve worked together for 25 years. This is going to be fun.

Chip Kahn: Great. John, one thing striking me, and at least for our YouTube viewers, you’ve got two grandfather clocks in the back of the room that I can see, and that’s an actual room, it’s not a virtual site. What’s that all about?

John Halamka: So, Eric Schmidt, who is on the board of Mayo, would tell you the following, that there are certain technological principles you should follow because the technology is going to change very fast, but the principles will not. And so, the two clocks behind me illustrate a bit of guidance as we start to talk about AI. So, in 1905 a guy in Armonk, New York had this idea. Could he take modular componentry knowing that technology would change? But you know, for the moment, take the technology you had, put it together in a novel way and create something of value. And so, the clock that you see over there was assembled to wind itself in 1905 using a singer sewing machine motor and Mercury switches. But of course, you could change it out as technology changed. The notion of modular replaceable technology was rolled into a company that the inventor called the International Time Recording Company. But then he said, “I wonder if I could work on other business machines.” So, he renamed the company IBM. So, the clock on the left is the pitch deck for the startup company of Thomas J. Watson, IBM. The clock on the right is exactly the opposite. And every component is hand-tooled, not replaceable, not maintainable, and locked in the technology of the mid-1700s. That’s Paul Revere’s clock. And the only way to maintain it is to be a silversmith in Boston. So, there you go. I think Thomas J. Watson had the right idea.

Chip Kahn: What a way to start. Let’s look at you for a moment. I mean you’ve spent decades on it. Whether it was your years at Beth Israel, whether it’s all the advice and guidance you’ve given to people here in Washington over that time, you’ve been there for it all. The advent of the EHR, the advent of high tech, meaningful use, the beginning of telehealth. Let’s look at it and just keep AI out of it for a moment. Why did all of that have an effect but then had so many unintended consequences and on the one hand got us somewhat advancing and we can call it a transformation, but we surely can’t call it a revolution in terms of health care.

John Halamka: Chip, you were there. I mean again, this is the great thing, isn’t it, a line from Hamilton, that we were there when these events happened in the room.

Chip Kahn: Yes.

John Halamka: And so, what happened in the room? Take us back to 2009. And as you remember, I was the chair of the Healthcare Information Technology Standards Panel. We had policy and we had standards and I was charged by Obama of figuring out all of these questions of how technology would revolutionize medicine. So, I said, well Mr. Obama, what should I do? He said well go talk to the FDA, see what they want. The FDA said oh, post market surveillance device and implantables. We need universal device identifiers. So just simply have every doctor at every visit type in every device in the patient’s body and be able to track it for quality and safety and recalls. Wow, who could argue with that? And then I said well, what should I do next? He said go talk to CMS. And CMS, we care about quality. In fact, 40 different quality measures. So what we just simply want is every doctor at every visit to record 40 numerators and denominators. So we can measure quality. Are we going to argue against quality? And then I talked to the CDC and they said, we want to look at epidemiology, and we want to look at emerging diseases or trends in violence. So all we have to do is ensure that every doctor at every visit and every nurse a complete understanding of every infectious agent that could be entering the community. By the time we were done,  every doctor and every nurse had to enter 140 data elements while seeing the patient, being empathetic, never committing malpractice, in 11 minutes. It’s impossible. So, as you suggest, all of the best people with all of the best intent created a set of burden for our clinicians that unfortunately has these unintended consequences of burnout and less working at the top of your lists.

Chip Kahn: John, I think last year you said, and I’ll quote you here, the data is good enough, the technology is getting good enough, the compute is getting available enough, and the use cases are getting clearer. Is it really different this time?

John Halamka: It really is. And so, I am just turning 64. And so, I know this sounds a bit odd, but I have been working on these issues for 50 years. And 50 years ago, what did I do? Oh, well, we didn’t have compute, so I actually did something called wire-wrapped something called an Altair 8080. I actually built a computer 50 years ago. I was the very first student at Stanford University to have a computer because I built it. Well, today you could go get teraflops for pennies in an instant. Mayo wanted to do an algorithm that required 20,000 GPUs running for two weeks. No problem. You could order it like you order a Happy Meal, right? I mean, it was very easy in 2025 and 2026 to get the compute, the storage that you need that wasn’t there 50 years ago. And I actually don’t have to write a lot of code to do these things. Many of the tools are low code or no code kinds of tools. And data. Think about it. I mean, we’ve both been on this journey for decades to reduce the friction for interoperability and data standards and aggregation of information to turn it into wisdom. And today at Mayo Clinic, as we’ll talk about, I work with eight countries on sovereign AI looking at hundreds of millions of birth-to-death multimodal records so that we can create the models for the patients of the future. So yes, 2026 is the perfect storm for innovation.

Chip Kahn: So, it’s categorically different.

John Halamka: It is categorically different. How about this, sometimes I’m asked, what is the best era that you would want to relive? Oh, did you like the 60s, the 70s, the 80s? I’ll tell you the answer to the question is today. Today is the best era to be alive.

Chip Kahn: So, let’s go to Mayo and walk us through the AI applications that are generally operational right now that you have strong feelings about and that are not piloting, that are actually affecting patients at the bedside.

John Halamka: Well, sure. So, Bob Wachter, who I’m sure you know very well and you’ll be chatting with, visited Mayo for a week. And I actually took him to the bedside and saidI’m going to show you how a patient, how a doctor uses this stuff day to day, and how it materially changes the way we are delivering a service.

John Halamka: So, for example, in cardiology. And again, I’m just going to give you some real examples. And you know, I have no privacy of any kind. And it’s all okay. So I have a supraventricular tachycardia. And that means my heart rate, which is about 50 or so at rest, sometimes goes to 170. It’s irritating. It is not life threatening. Mayo Clinic said, wow, John, maybe you have a cardiomyopathy, maybe you have pulmonary hypertension, maybe you have valvular disease. I mean, we’re not sure. So you have two choices. You know, you could come to Mayo. We could spend four days doing expensive invasive procedures, or we could just run 14 algorithms on the Lead 1 ECG you gather over a consumer device in your living room. Your choice. What did I do? Again, I’m not, of course, endorsing any product or service here, but I literally bought like a $50 device on Amazon that was able to gather either, a one-lead or a six-lead ECG. And then I sent it to Mayo that ran all the algorithms, and they came back and said, John, your heart is that of a 17-year-old. It is amazing. But you have a conduction defect. Take 25 cents of Diltiazem every day and your SVT will disappear forever. I did all that literally from my living room. And I am cured. And I didn’t have a single invasive procedure. And this is what Mayo does. Take every specialty. Radiology, radiation oncology, early detection of breast cancer, prostate cancer, all of these things in production today, augmenting the workflow of our clinicians, so that those clinicians can see more patients with greater quality and safety than ever before.

Chip Kahn: Boy, that’s really significant. You know, obviously Ambient AI in doing charting is one of the big areas of progress. And I know that you do a lot, both in Arizona and Florida, with the nurses. Actually, almost all their charting is done by voice. How does that all work? And how are the nurses working with that? And then, what are the efficiencies that come from that?

John Halamka: You may remember in Bob Wachter’s first book, the Digital Doctor, the first page is a crayon drawing done by a 7 year old called “A Visit to the Doctor,” where the doctor and the nurse are staring at a computer at one side of the room and the patient and the family are on the other side of the room. And that’s unfortunately, as we have moved from an analog to digital world, that’s unfortunately, we’ve lost the hearts and the minds of our doctors and nurses by turning them into administrative typists. And so, what ambient listening can do is several things. Well, first I mentioned those 140 data elements that need to be gathered. Those 140 data elements can actually be automagically—I know that’s not a word, right—

Chip Kahn: but it sounds good, though.

John Halamka: Yeah, yeah. from the doctor and the patient having a dialogue. So, you know, have you been sleeping okay? How’s your weight, how’s your mood? How’s your family? Right? You start to populate all of that and then the clinician just goes back and edits or signs off on the result. It is a substantial reduction burden with nurses especially, right? You’ve got nursing care plans and you’ve got progress notes, and the nurse and the patient have a dialogue. And that, in effect, inpatient record is created automatically so that the goal that our Chief Nursing Officer has is that a nurse will not touch a keyboard during a shift. And what a noble goal that is. I’m going to give you an analogy to ambient listening that you’re going to find kind of funny. Take you back to 2011. There was a product called Google Glass. And you remember, you put on the glasses, they had a camera, they had capacity to run software. Beth Israel at the time was the pilot site for that product. And what did we do? Well, we displayed the patient’s chart and their vital signs and their problem list on the glasses. So, we said, hey, patient, how did you like that experience? They said, the doctor was looking at me instead of a computer the whole time. Well, of course, the reality is the doctor was just reading the computer on the glasses in front of them. But the patient experience was better. And that’s the goal of ambient listening, compliance and accuracy with a patient focus.

Chip Kahn: I guess it also affects literally the nurse’s time because she or he is not stuck at a desk anymore…

John Halamka: I mean, you’ve talked to our clinicians. Approximately 50% of nursing days are spent at a keyboard. And so now, as you say, reduce that from 50% to 5%. It means that the reason they went into nursing was active listening, empathy, contact with patients, service. They can now work at the top of their lessons.

Chip Kahn: So, the issue of whether to go with an app or a technology that’s AI driven, you’ve said that they ought to be evaluated similarly to a pharmaceutical. What do you do at Mayo? What’s the process that you have and how much rigor do you want in evidence before you’ll pilot or experiment even with a new technology?

John Halamka: Sure. So you, of course know Micky Tripathi, and Micky served as ASTP ONC lead. When he retired from the Biden administration, he actually came to Mayo and is now the Chief AI Implementation Officer. You say, “Wow, that’s a weird title.” Well, so Micky obviously had spent a career in safety and quality and data, and is charged with making sure that we deploy AI, we do it rapidly. Right. We don’t want to constrain innovation, but we also understand its implications, you know, it’s safety and consequence. So here’s what we do for every algorithm, and I’m going to start with predictive AI because predictive, generative, and agentic AI, they all have slightly different characters. Predictive AI. What data set did you use to develop it? So suppose. And of course, Chip I’m making this up.

Chip Kahn: Sure.

John Halamka: I create an algorithm from the 10 million patients that Mayo has in Minnesota, lots of Scandinavian Lutherans, and then I run that algorithm in rural Georgia. Fewer Scandinavian Lutherans. Will it be good? Will it be bad? Do you know? So a data card tells you who phenotype, genotype, exposome was put into the training set for the algorithm. So every algorithm at Mayo has a data card. Then a model card tells you actually how does it run in practice? So here’s a fun one. I don’t know if you spent time with Eric Horvitz, chief scientist at Microsoft, but back in the day, Microsoft bought Amalga, I think it was, Craig Feied, Mark Smith and MedStar created this thing, I don’t know, 20 years ago, MedStar, Washington D.C., typically insured patients. The folks at Microsoft took the algorithms developed at MedStar and moved the algorithm six blocks away to a largely Medicaid population clinic. It didn’t work at all. Right, because your insured population in Georgetown has maybe a different diet or, or a different set of medication adherence than does a Medicaid clinic. So a model card tells you a bit about how the model actually works on each patient, given stratifications of race, ethnicity, zip code, age, gender, et cetera. So Mayo does that. But then here’s the biggest issue. I am going to develop an algorithm that is going to tell Chip whether you should eat more vegetables for dinner and whether you should walk 10,000 steps a day. Suppose that algorithm is wrong. Maybe you eat too many vegetables, and you walk too much. The likelihood of harm to you probably zero. Right? So, you have to do what we call qualification. If the algorithm is wrong, what is the consequence? Suppose I have an algorithm that is actually going to automatically go, back to device integration here, automatically inject insulin into your bloodstream. Aha. that algorithm’s wrong. You could be in hypoglycemic coma. So what you see is for every algorithm, not only data card and model card, but, but a stratification of six different ranks of risk if the algorithm goes bad. And once we do that, then in a—don’t worry, this is a relatively quick process, I mean, a week or two turnaround time—we then get the approval to put it in production.

Chip Kahn: This is causing big changes. And what this podcast is all about is how do we get to, good patient outcomes with the notion that at the end of the day, the business model is what’s going to be right to get there? And so how are the economics of running a health system affected by all the kinds of apps and adaptation of these new technologies that you’re bringing into place in your health system and recommending for other health systems?

John Halamka: Well, and of course you ask the best question, but also a complicated question. And, sometimes I say with a bit of levity, the United States is actually five countries. You know, the East coast, the West coast, the Midwest, the South, and Texas, which is its own country. I say this because the reimbursement models and the incentives in each region of the United States are different. I mean, again, just knowing your career, would you say that in the Midwest in general, of course, heads in beds is a good idea, but let’s take the East coast to the West coast. Heads in beds. Oh my God, no. You don’t want that. You want wellness, you want home care, you want value-based purchasing, et cetera. So here’s the question for you, right? Depending on your reimbursement model, what is it that you’re going to do with AI that is going to ensure the best patient care? That’s of course what you want to do first. But also reimbursement, is going to cover some kinds of costs. Here’s why it’s hard. I think we probably all listened to Dr. Oz say, let’s move from sickness to wellness. Let’s move from hospital tertiary, quaternary referral to community and home, and let’s move from analog to digital. But ask yourself this question. What’s the reimbursement today for chemotherapy delivered in a hospital facility versus the home? Right. So, the incentives are slightly misaligned to do that end delivery in a non-traditional setting. So anyway, I say all this because your question is so complicated. I, mean, right, with AI, I can deliver right care, right patients, right time, right setting. But you know, hospital systems have to keep the lights on and so they will also have to reflect, “is there reimbursement for what activity that they use AI to automate?” Don Berwick, our mutual friend, said, if you automate a bad process, you just achieve a bad result faster. So, imagine you and I design a system that is great and unreimbursed. We’ll go bankrupt quicker. So again, this is not about letting revenue drive what it is we do. We have to be realistic when we deploy these things. We’re not building a CPT code for every use of AI. We’re trying to achieve efficiencies that are aligned with the reimbursement we get from delivering the service.

Chip Kahn: One of the issues, to me, I should say with pay-for-performance as an area, is that if it’s been successful at all in all the areas around the country you talked about up to this point, it’s given the payers an edge so that maybe they can get a cheaper price, maybe it’s used effectively, sometimes maybe inappropriately in terms of controlling volume, but it doesn’t really have any kind of outcomes measurement. It has all these measurement requirements that really don’t tell you much other than the hospital or the physician followed the right process or the right structure was in place. Can AI be a game changer here to begin to reform the structure you just described, which is sort of hostile to evolution that is appropriate because it’s so complicated?

John Halamka: Well, sure. So let me ask you an interesting question again. You’ve done this for decades how easy is it for you to order and get an echocardiogram on a patient? Well, here’s a problem. We don’t have a lot of echo techs and the supply and the demand has a mismatch. So, you’re going to wait six weeks to get an echo? I mean, unless you’re in some sort of life-threatening situation. Well, and again, I’m not endorsing any product or service here. I’m just telling you my experience. There are companies that are now creating AI driven devices so that a person who’s never done an echo in their lives with a minimal amount of training, as in a couple of hours, can produce an echo with the same quality as an echocardiographer with 30 years of experience. Wow. That means I’m actually be able to see more patients and deliver more services with more quality in more regions than ever before. Okay. Again, it’s going to always be in the interest of the patient and doing the right thing and it’s appropriate. But I will now be able to increase volume. But there’s another aspect of all this which is that a primary caregiver who’s utterly overwhelmed may say, ah, I am not really sure if I should refer this patient to a cardiologist or not. And how about this? I have doubt. So let me just refer them to cardiologists, which as you know, especially referrals and result in increased expense, obviously increased testing. What if the AI says actually the person in front of you right now has an ejection fraction of 70% based on their Apple Watch? (Not endorsing Apple). Oh, you don’t actually need to refer this person to a cardiologist. Well, and of course what I’m referring to is the Mayo Eagle and Beagle study, right, which actually took 125,000 EKGs from consumer devices and actually had primary care givers be able to now decide who to refer and not to refer based on AI interpretation of patient device data. And it had two interesting implications. First, those who needed cardiology referral got it 30% faster. And a whole lot of patients were actually not in need of a cardiology referral and fully managed by the PCP, resulting in the substantial increase in job satisfaction for the PCP. So again, you can hear this. We have in the United States a limited number of specialists. And if I can ensure that the right care is delivered by the right person in the right setting and AI helps us figure that out, everybody wins.

Chip Kahn: There has been a lot of discussion about AI hallucinations and other issues that are raised by the complexity and the mystery in some ways of the technology. How do you deal with that? One of my interviews the other day mentioned something, I think he used the word wobble or some word like that that said, that over time, even though their technology’s approved, it’s validated, it works over time, there’s an evolving of the way it works, so they’ve got to constantly recalibrate it. How do you make sure all of that is appropriately in place so that the AI results you’re talking about will be as assured a month from now as today?

John Halamka: Right. So what you’re talking about is data drift or data shift. And I’ll give you a real example. Think back. January 2020. Mayo was asking, how do we start delivering care in the home? How do we do telemedicine? In January of 2020, we are going to create an algorithm based on every person who is seeking remote care in January of 2020. And it will help us figure out who will benefit from remote care. And then we deployed it in March of 2020. So again, think back. How many of your patients were seeing their doctors through telemedicine in 2019 or January of 2020 versus say March or April of 2020, we literally went from 3% of the population to 93% of the population. And so, the algorithm developed back when it was 3% is completely useless when you get to the 93% because of this thing we call COVID. Right. And so, it requires, and this is what I would argue like a pharmaceutical post market surveillance on every use of the technology to say, did it work? Did it not work? Was there benefit? Was there harm? And then constant fine tuning. And so, here’s again a sort of interesting challenge. And again, I’m just going to be realistic because I get to live this every day. I went to medical school in the 1980s, and so I recently had the opportunity to speak with one of my colleagues who is the director of National Library of Medicine, Lister Hill. And I said, I’m curious, if you look back at the literature that I mastered in the 1980s, how much of it is wrong? And she did do an analysis. 60% of what I learned in medical school is wrong. I just don’t know which 60%. Right. So isn’t it interesting? Although AI, as you say, has hallucination, the AUCs aren’t perfect, but it’s probably a whole lot better than somebody who trained in medical school in the 1980s. So where does society draw the line? If my AUC is 0.6 and the algorithm AUC is 0.8, I’m betting you probably want the algorithm over me, even though it’s imperfect.

Chip Kahn: So, what you’re describing in some ways is the Waymo problem. When they hit a cat, it’s a big scandal. But if you compare them to all of us driving, they have a lot fewer accidents, if they have any at all. And we are a big risk. But the public doesn’t look at it that way. So, this is something that is an issue for technology generally.

John Halamka: So let me just give you another dark side to this. So, a few months ago, I was in Dublin and I met with all of the world’s radiology chairs. And they told me they hate AI. I said, well, why is that? And they say, well, let’s imagine that it has a positive predictive value of 95%. I mean, wow, that’s wildly better than any human. But here’s the problem. If I’m going to argue against the AI, right, there’s 5% false positives. The amount of time it takes me to document that I disagree with the AI, and I’m going to actually go a different direction from a medical legal perspective outweighs the benefit of the 95% of good advice that it offered me. And as you suggest, this is a cultural issue, that we are not allowing AI to have any margin of error, despite the fact that our human doctors and nurses have an amazing level of error.

Chip Kahn: If we look at, FDA, I think they’ve authorized roughly 950 AI enabled medical devices. How many of them actually clear your bar, for deployment at Mayo? And what does the ratio tell us about the gap between authorization and real clinical research readiness?

John Halamka: So isn’t it interesting, as you look at adoption of AI across health care systems, the radiologists and the cardiologists tend to adopt it first. And so as you look at the FDA approvals, the vast majority of these are in the field of radiology, cardiology devices, and that kind of thing. So then you start to ask the question, where is there a human nearby? Right? And that is, is it an autonomous decision where the AI looks at something and takes an action? Or is it that it’s that smart consultant that’s telling the human, hey, you know, I saw this fracture here. You may want to recheck that. So I would tell you where Mayo has been an early adopter of this stuff is, especially in the field of imaging, right? So radiology or digital pathology, radiation oncology, where it’s augmenting human behavior by helping them focus their attention. And at the moment I don’t think there’s a single case, I mean maybe we could find one in supply chain that orders Band Aids or something, but a single case where the AI itself is running autonomously without a human nearby.

Chip Kahn: I think that’s important. And if AI is generally disruptive, the question is whether health care’s decision making structures are designed for incremental change. And here I’m speaking generally not of Mayo specifically, can they actually navigate well, this revolution, I mean you’ve got a very contained shop, you know, you’ve got your implementer staff. Everyone’s not going to have the facility or the knowledge that you’re bringing. How is the average health care system, the individual or small group physician going to deal with the kinds of issues we’re talking about in terms of navigating this?

John Halamka: It’s a brilliant question, right? And there’s several ways you could look at it. I mean when you talk to Marty Makary, FDA has said it’s going to take a bit of a light touch for regulation. So you’re probably not going to see this rigorous premarket testing and such. So what that means it’s probably going to be up to the marketplace, the innovators and provider organizations, to figure out what to use and how to use it. So here’s what Mayo’s done. Although we have three destination medical centers, Minnesota, Florida, Arizona, we actually have around the world, about 50 affiliates that are typically community hospitals, some critical access hospitals. And they’ve said, hey Mayo, help us figure out what AI to deploy. So what Mayo will do is look at all these products and services built by Mayo, built by third parties, qualify them, and once we think they’re good enough, then we will go out to the community hospitals and say, oh, we’ve actually found this particular solution to be reasonable in terms of its positive, predictive value, its risk, its post market surveillance and that kind of thing. So maybe I would argue those who have the sophistication to develop and test these things have a societal responsibility to spread them to those who don’t. And certainly that’s the work that I do at Mayo Clinic Platform is I’ve been given an interesting KPI and that is Gianrico Farrugia said, John, I want you by 2030 to have touched the lives of 4 billion people by ensuring these algorithms that are qualified are disseminated globally to every Android phone, every HER, and every country on the planet.

Chip Kahn: Well, I guess along those lines, you’re also a chair of the Coalition for Health AI. What should AI governance look like inside a health system? And does that exist today? I mean, do the institutions even have the kind of structure to get the information from you and those who can provide guidance to make the kind of decisions they need to make?

John Halamka: And so, one of the challenges, and about four years ago we put this coalition together because there was not a community standard. As you and I know, malpractice isn’t a good or bad outcome. It’s, did you deviate from the community standard of care? So our thought was if we could put 4,000 organizations together across government, academia and industry and define what’s good enough, what are the best practices, what are the right safeguards, what is a standard data card or model card or qualification schema, then others would say, oh, I don’t have to define a data card myself. I can adopt the community standard of care for the evaluation of a given AI algorithm. And that’s really the purpose of the Coalition for Health AI. It’s a nonprofit organization bringing people together just to decide what will we, as a society ,accept and not. I mean, it was very funny. Eric Schmidt, who I mentioned, you know, he’s a board member of Mayo. When he created Waymo, he said, we actually did a cultural analysis and we found that the public wanted self-driving cars to be 10,000 times better than a human driver. Wow. Okay. The community standard of care is that a Waymo will have one accident in a million miles. Fascinating. I mean, somebody had to decide what’s good enough. So as you pointed out, if suddenly, I mean, there’s one tiny accident, it’s news, front page news. Despite the fact that we all agreed it’s wildly safer than any other transportation alternative. That’s why we need the standard for how you test, how you govern, and what is good enough.

Chip Kahn: One of the things that all of us face and see whenever we have any kind of interaction with the health care system is the health care workforce shortage. Sort of hits us in the face. You’ve said that AI is essential to closing that gap from a policy standpoint and then from a practical, real-world standpoint, how is AI going to do that and how fast can it do it?

John Halamka: So, let me give you a couple of statistics. I don’t know if you have, spent time in Davos at the World Economic Forum, but in 2025, the theme was AI and all the government leaders in Davos said, we have a problem. The birth rates in many industrialized countries are, are less than replacement. And in some places like Japan and South Korea, I mean looking at birth rates of 0.6, 0.7, but yet we have societies that are living into their 80s. So, lifespan may be in the 80s, but health span is probably in the 60s. So, what that means is we have a 20 year period where we’re going to need more care. Oh, but wait, our birth rates are so low there’s no one to deliver that care. And so, what I have heard from societal leader after societal leader and I just flew in from three days in Rochester where I hosted 28 international companies, including many government officials from Japan. What they said is we have decided that unless we deploy AI as part of extending the license of our mid-levels, helping our specialists see the right patient, delivering care in the home, an autonomous fashion, robotics, all these other things, we’re never going to meet the demand of an aging society with a birth rate that’s 0.6 or 0.7. So this becomes kind of a John Carter problem, right? That is there’s an urgency to change and it’s up to us to figure out how. And so I think the vision is this, that we assess as we’ve been talking about levels of risk and if we can build AI that will help a mid-level, a nurse practitioner, a PA deliver a higher quality of care to more patients with more serious disease, suddenly we are going to have a healthier society. And I’m seeing this sovereign AI notion that is country scale adoption of this stuff to meet the societal problems of supply, demand, mismatch. And I don’t see a lot of other arrows in our quiver because we’re not going to graduate enough nurses and doctors over the next 20 years to solve this problem for us without AI.

Chip Kahn: Well, I think your echo example is a good one in that respect. And I’m sure there are other areas with techs and other aspects of the workforce where literally, you know, having AI can change the whole aspect of that kind of care. And I assume that’s coming. And that gets to my sort of the overall question from a regulatory and policy framework, what do you think we need to assure the public that is risk averse, and I’ll use the word in a sense, and I think it comes from our discussion, not risk illiterate, but has a notion of risk that frankly reflects a nervousness that doesn’t reflect the reality of everyday life. I mean when you cross the street, you’re at risk. And people don’t compare that to other aspects of risk. What kind of structure do we need for AI deployment so that it can achieve, on the positive side, all the kinds of outcomes you’re describing?

John Halamka: Of course, you’ve asked the $64,000 question, so let me frame it in an unusual way. I was speaking with a prominent industry leader the other day about a paradox, and here’s the paradox is, say there are AI products, I’m sure you use several of them that go out and summarize the literature or summarize clinical data for you, and let’s say they’re 80% good. There are products that use different technologies and get actually higher levels of accuracy. And this leader told me the paradox is people trust the output of an LLM because it’s so compelling. Right? It makes you happy. And even if it’s telling you information that’s completely false, you feel good about it. So I asked the question, how many people do you know that are uploading their medical record or their wearable device information to ChatGPT or to Claude and then are asking questions of it and actually feel really good about the advice they are getting back, not only because it’s compelling and it’s well phrased, but because they’re instantaneously getting information that could take a couple of days for their PCP to synthesize and respond to. So, wow, there’s a cultural question that you ask. If people say, I am actually more interested in, immediacy and comfort than I am in complete accuracy and delay, we have to decide as a society if that’s okay or not. We’re replacing Dr. Google with Dr. Claude. And so, I guess here would be my dream. We’re not there yet. What if for every generative AI product, we could figure out an accuracy score? And remember, every time you give a prompt to a generative AI product, you get a different answer. So you actually need a score on every single answer that you get. Again, I’m going to hypothesize here. Let’s say that, the National Library of Medicine, working with industry innovators, creates a knowledge graph, and every generative AI response is checked, error checked against a knowledge graph of the world’s literature or clinical observations, then gets a score. You can say, wow, Claude just synthesized your medical record and gave you advice, and the confidence level is 0.9 as opposed to 0.1. Then you’ll decide as a human. Yes, it’s comforting and compelling. But you want to believe it. So here’s where I’m getting a little bit speculative. I have no question that people are going to use these products to guide their care journeys because they feel like it’s democratized access to knowledge and it’s reduced burden of navigation. But data cards, model cards, qualification, that all helps. But the individual patient, I’m betting is not going to go look at a data card or model card. They’re going to need something that says, oh, you, you know, this is believable or not believable. And we haven’t as a society built that yet, but we must to sort of close out.

Chip Kahn: Clearly, five years from now, ten years from now, the world is going to be different because of this technology. What keeps you up at night when you think about the prospects of that? Obviously, we’ve talked about the positive, but just in terms of how it could affect health care, is there an aspect that keeps you up at night when you think about how this is all going to work out?

John Halamka: Well, a couple of things keep me up at night. I’m sure you talk to many medical school deans. Generally for the last 30 years or so I’ve been able to lecture to conferences of the medical school deans of not only the U.S. but internationally. They are not preparing the next generation of students to be AI interpreters. Unfortunately, our medical schools tend to be fairly conservative and haven’t changed the curriculum to move away from memorization to data science or to tool assessment. And we need to. So, you know, I do not want the next generation of doctors to blindly accept the advice of an AI without having the training to decide if that AI is credible or not. That’s certainly one issue I do worry in agentic AI. We didn’t talk a lot about it, but I have recently had discussions with some of the chief information security officers of the largest hyperscalers in the world. They are really concerned that as we use agentic AI, in effect say AI can now take action on your own, that if a bad actor takes over that agentic AI, they could literally shut down your company in a few seconds. So we’re going to be really careful about cybersecurity and the potential for some of these tools that we create to actually have an effect that was never intended and, and one that could be extraordinarily harmful to our care delivery system. Again, I told you, I will never mention a product or service, but there is an open-source stack called OpenClaw which you may have looked at.

Chip Kahn: Yes, I’M familiar with it.

John Halamka: It’s a lovely open-source software system with no security of any kind. So if you say hey OpenClaw, you can now go answer all of Chip’s emails or order all of Chip’s groceries and operate the entire home ecosystem of locks and lights and heating. Just think about what happens when a bad actor has taken control of everything in your life. We just need to ensure that doesn’t happen.

Chip Kahn: John, this has been terrific and I just appreciate you spending the time with us and I think our audience will clearly have learned a lot today from our conversation.

John Halamka: Well, and I live this every day and as I said I’m approaching 64 but I’ve been a vegan for 25 years, so I got like 30 more years of working through this. So, you and I, 30 years from now we’ll say and here’s what we said in 2026 and here’s what came to pass.

Chip Kahn: John, I want to be with you 30 years from now. Thanks.


SERIES

This weekly podcast features insightful conversations between host Chip Kahn and his guests, who discuss the business of health care, connecting the dots between the health care business, policy, and patients.

The podcast’s first series on AI in health care illuminates how AI is changing health care, and features guests who are deploying this technology, managing its consequences, and designing policy around it.

Health Coverage by Race and Ethnicity, 2010-2024

Authors: Latoya Hill, Samantha Artiga, and Anthony Damico
Published: May 4, 2026

Summary

Health coverage plays a major role in enabling people to access health care and protecting families from high medical costs. There have been longstanding racial and ethnic disparities in health coverage that contribute to disparities in health. Due to Medicaid and Affordable Care Act (ACA) cuts in the 2025 reconciliation law and the expiration of the ACA’s enhanced premium tax credits, the number of uninsured is expected to increase by more than 14 million by 2034, potentially exacerbating racial disparities in coverage. This brief examines trends in health coverage by race and ethnicity from 2010 through 2024 and discusses the implications for health disparities. It is based on KFF analysis of American Community Survey (ACS) data for people under age 65. All noted differences between groups and years described in the text are statistically significant at the p<0.05 level. Key takeaways include:

Since 2010, there have been large gains in health coverage across racial and ethnic groups but racial and ethnic disparities in coverage persisted. The largest gains occurred after implementation of the ACA coverage expansions in 2014, with increases continuing until 2016. Hispanic people under age 65 had the largest percentage point increase in coverage, with their uninsured rate falling from 32.6% in 2014 to 19.1% as of 2016. Black, Asian, and American Indian or Alaska Native (AIAN) people also had larger percentage point increases in coverage compared to White people over that period. Despite these larger gains, Hispanic, Black, AIAN, and Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander (NHPI) people under age 65 remained more likely than their White counterparts to be uninsured as of 2016. Beginning in 2017, coverage gains began reversing, and the overall number of uninsured increased for three consecutive years, coinciding with the first Trump administration. Pandemic-era policies drove broad coverage gains and reduced uninsured rates across most racial and ethnic groups between 2019 and 2023.

In 2024, the overall uninsured rate increased for the first time since 2019 as pandemic-era continuous enrollment in Medicaid came to an end, with significant increases among Hispanic, Black, and White people under age 65. Asian, AIAN and NHPI people did not have statistically significant changes in coverage over this period. As of 2024,AIAN and Hispanic people under age 65 had the highest uninsured rates at 18.9% and 18.4%, respectively. Uninsured rates for NHPI (12.3%) and Black people (10.1%) under age 65 also were higher than the rate for their White counterparts (6.8%). Asian people had the lowest uninsured rate at 5.7%.

Coverage disparities have persisted over time and, in some cases, widened despite earlier gains under the ACA. For example, between 2010 and 2024, the uninsured rate for AIAN people grew from 2.4 to 2.8 times higher than the uninsured rate for White people, the Hispanic uninsured rate grew from 2.5 to 2.7 times higher than the rate for White people, and Black people remained 1.5 times more likely to be uninsured than White people.

Recent policy changes are projected to lead to increased coverage losses in coming years, which will likely widen racial and ethnic coverage disparities. The 2025 reconciliation law makes significant changes to Medicaid and the ACA Marketplaces, which are projected to lead to large coverage losses. It also further restricts access to health coverage for lawfully present immigrants across public health insurance programs. Additionally, the expiration of enhanced premium tax credits for ACA Marketplace enrollees has led to substantial out-of-pocket premium increases and further growth in the uninsured population. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that the combined impact of the reconciliation law with the expiration of the ACA’s enhanced premium tax credits will increase the number of uninsured by more than 14 million in 2034. Medicaid and ACA Marketplace coverage losses will likely widen racial disparities in coverage given that disproportionately large shares of Hispanic, Black, AIAN, and NHPI people are covered through these sources. Coverage losses, in turn, would likely contribute to widening disparities in health.

Trends in Uninsured Rates by Race and Ethnicity, 2010-2024

Prior to the enactment of the ACA in 2010, Hispanic, Black, Asian, AIAN, and NHPI people under age 65 were more likely to be uninsured compared to their White counterparts, with Hispanic and AIAN people at the highest risk of lacking coverage (Figure 1). Their higher uninsured rates reflected more limited access to affordable health coverage options. Although the majority of individuals have at least one full-time worker in the family across racial and ethnic groups, there are ongoing racial disparities in employment and income that result in some groups having more limited access to coverage offered by an employer or having greater difficulty affording private coverage when it is available. While Medicaid helps fill some of these gaps in private coverage, prior to the ACA, Medicaid eligibility for parents in most states was limited to those with very low incomes (often below 50% of the poverty level), and adults without dependent children—regardless of how poor—were ineligible under federal rules.

Uninsured Rate Among People Under Age 65 by Race and Ethnicity, 2010-2024 (Line chart)

Between 2010 and 2016, there were large gains in coverage across racial and ethnic groups under the ACA, but racial and ethnic disparities in coverage persisted. The ACA created new coverage options for low- and moderate-income individuals. These included provisions to extend dependent coverage in the private market up to age 26 and prevent insurers from denying people coverage or charging them more due to health status. Further, beginning in 2014, the ACA expanded Medicaid coverage to nearly all adults with incomes at or below 138% of poverty in states that adopted the expansion and made tax credits available to people with incomes up to 400% of poverty to purchase coverage through a health insurance Marketplace. Following the ACA’s enactment in 2010 through 2016, coverage increased across all racial and ethnic groups, with the largest increases occurring after implementation of the Medicaid and Marketplace coverage expansions in 2014. Hispanic people under age 65 had the largest percentage point increase in coverage, with their uninsured rate falling from 24.8% to 19.1% between 2014 and 2016. Black, Asian, and AIAN people also had larger percentage point increases in coverage compared to White people over that period. Despite these larger gains, Hispanic, Black, AIAN, and NHPI people under age 65 remained more likely than their White counterparts to be uninsured as of 2016.

Beginning in 2017, coverage gains began reversing, and the number of uninsured increased for three consecutive years. The uninsured rate for the total population under age 65 increased from 10.0% in 2016 to 10.9% in 2019. Hispanic people had the largest statistically significant increase in their uninsured rate over this period (from 19.1% to 20.0%) although the absolute change was small. There were also small but statistically significant increases in the uninsured rates among White and Black people under age 65, which rose from 7.1% to 7.8% and 10.7% to 11.4%, respectively, between 2016 and 2019. Rates for AIAN, NHPI, and Asian people under age 65 did not have a significant change. These coverage losses likely reflected policy changes made by the first Trump administration after taking office in 2017. These changes included decreased funds for outreach and enrollment assistance, guidance encouraging states to seek waivers to add new eligibility requirements for Medicaid coverage as well as to increase the frequency of eligibility verifications, and changes to public charge immigration policy that made some immigrant families more reluctant to participate in Medicaid and the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) (which were later reversed by the Biden administration).

Pandemic-era policies drove broad coverage gains and reduced uninsured rates across most racial and ethnic groups between 2019 and 2023. After rising in the years before the pandemic, uninsured rates declined between 2019 and 2023, with 3.6 million more people under age 65 gaining coverage as the uninsured rate fell from 10.9% to 9.5%. Declines occurred across most racial and ethnic groups, with the largest drop among AIAN people (21.7% to 18.7%), alongside smaller but significant declines among Hispanic (20.0% to 17.9%), Black (11.4% to 9.7%), Asian (7.2% to 5.8%), and White people (7.8% to 6.5%), while changes for NHPI people were not statistically significant. These gains were driven largely by increased Medicaid coverage, which offset declines in employer-sponsored insurance, and reflected pandemic-era policies that stabilized and expanded coverage. These policies included the Families First Coronavirus Response Act’s continuous enrollment provision for Medicaid, which required states to pause disenrollments from Medicaid during the COVID pandemic in exchange for increased federal funding to states, enhanced ACA Marketplace subsidies under the American Rescue Plan Act and Inflation Reduction Act, increased outreach and enrollment efforts, and low Marketplace attrition.

After years of decline, the overall uninsured rate among people under age 65 increased in 2024, with significant increases among Hispanic, Black, and White people. The total number of people under age 65 without health coverage increased by more than 1.3 million to 26.7 million in 2024, and the uninsured rate for the population under age 65 increased from 9.5% to 9.8%.Hispanic people experienced the largest increase in uninsured rates between 2023 and 2024 (17.9% to 18.4%), followed by Black (9.7% to 10.1%) and White people (6.5% to 6.8%).Asian, AIAN andNHPI people did not have statistically significant changes in coverage over this period.

Coverage disparities have persisted, and in some cases widened, over time even with recent gains and the large earlier gains in coverage under the ACA. For example, in 2010, the uninsured rate for AIAN people was 2.4 times higher than the uninsured rate for White people; however, in 2024, the gap had increased to 2.9 times higher than the rate for White people. Similarly, the Hispanic uninsured rate grew from 2.5 to 2.8 times higher than the rate for White people from 2010 to 2024, while Black people remained 1.5 times more likely to be uninsured than White people.

Coverage by Race and Ethnicity as of 2024

Hispanic, Black, AIAN, and NHPI people under age 65 were more likely than their White counterparts to be uninsured as of 2024(Figure 2). AIAN and Hispanic people had the highest uninsured rates at 18.9% and 18.4%, respectively, as of 2024. Uninsured rates for NHPI (12.3%) and Black people (10.1%) also were higher than the rate for their White counterparts (6.8%). Asian people had the lowest uninsured rate at 5.7%, although uninsured rates vary among subgroups of the Asian population. The higher uninsured rates among some groups are driven by lower rates of private coverage. Medicaid coverage helps to narrow these differences but does not fully offset them.

Medicaid and CHIP coverage help fill gaps in private coverage and reduce coverage disparities for children, but some disparities in children’s coverage remain (Figure 2). Medicaid and CHIP cover larger shares of children than adults, reflecting more expansive eligibility levels for children. This coverage helps fill gaps in private coverage, with over half of Hispanic, Black, AIAN, and NHPI children covered by Medicaid and CHIP. However, there remain some disparities in children’s coverage. For example, AIAN children are about three times as likely as their White counterparts to lack coverage (13.6% vs. 4.4%). Moreover, Hispanic children are more than twice as likely as White children to be uninsured (9.8% vs. 4.4%).

Health Coverage of People Under Age 65 by Race and Ethnicity, 2024 (Stacked column chart)

Among people under age 65, uninsured rates in states that have not expanded Medicaid are higher than rates in expansion states across most racial and ethnic groups as of 2024 (Figure 3). While uninsured rates for children are lower than for adults across groups, these differences between expansion and non-expansion states persist among children. For example, 16.0% of Hispanic children in non-expansion states are uninsured compared to 6.7% of Hispanic children in expansion states. The differences in coverage rates between Black and Hispanic people compared with White people are larger in non-expansion states compared with expansion states. However, the relative risk of being uninsured for Black, Hispanic, Asian and NHPI people compared with White people is similar in expansion and non-expansion states. For example, Hispanic people under the age of 65 years old are roughly 2.6 times as likely as their White counterparts to lack coverage in both expansion and non-expansion states. Uninsured rates for AIAN people are similar in expansion and non-expansion states.

Health Coverage of People Under Age 65 by Race and Ethnicity and Medicaid Expansion Status, 2024 (Stacked Bars)

Eligibility for Coverage Among The Uninsured as of 2024

Overall, about half of uninsured people are eligible for Medicaid or Marketplace coverage, but eligibility varies across racial and ethnic groups, with smaller shares of Hispanic and Asian uninsured people eligible for assistance due to these groups having larger shares of ineligible noncitizen immigrants. Overall, over half (52.2%) of people who were uninsured in 2024 were eligible for financial assistance either through Medicaid or through subsidized Marketplace coverage, while the remaining half (47.8%) were not eligible because they fell in the Medicaid coverage gap in states that have not expanded Medicaid, had income too high to qualify for Marketplace premium tax credits, , were eligible for employer coverage, or had an ineligible immigration status. However, the share of the remaining uninsured eligible for assistance varied by race and ethnicity. For example, uninsured Black people under age 65 were more likely than their uninsured White counterparts to fall in the Medicaid coverage gap, reflecting that most of the 10 states that have not expanded Medicaid, are in the South where a higher share of the Black population resides. Uninsured Hispanic and Asian people under age 65 were also less likely than White people to be eligible for coverage options, in part, due to higher shares of noncitizens who face immigrant eligibility restrictions including eligibility restrictions for lawfully present immigrants and ineligibility for undocumented immigrants. (Figure 4).

Eligibility for ACA Coverage Among Uninsured People Under Age 65 by Race and Ethnicity as of 2024 (Stacked column chart)

The U.S. Government and Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance

Published: May 4, 2026

Editorial Note: Originally published in June 2011, this resource is updated as needed to reflect the latest developments.

Key Facts

  • Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance (Gavi) is an independent public-private partnership and multilateral funding mechanism that aims to expand global access to and use of vaccines, particularly among vulnerable children.
  • Since its launch in 2000, Gavi has provided approximately $29 billion to support immunization efforts in low- and middle-income countries, not including funding for COVAX.
  • The U.S. government (U.S.) has supported Gavi since its creation through direct financial contributions, participation in Gavi’s governance as a member of the Board, and technical assistance; it had been its third largest contributor in recent years, providing 13% of its funding since its inception (not including funding for COVAX, the global COVID-19 pandemic vaccine response), reaching $300 million in FY 2024. In addition, the Biden administration had pledged that the U.S. would provide approximately $1.6 billion to Gavi over its 2026-2030 funding period.
  • While Congress again appropriated $300 million for Gavi in both FY 2025 and FY 2026, the Trump administration has not provided this funding to the organization, citing concerns about vaccine safety despite Gavi following globally recognized scientific standards and evidence.
  • Gavi’s latest replenishment summit secured pledges of more than $9 billion, towards a target of $11.9 billion, for the 2026-2030 period, as well as additional financing from development finance institutions and manufacturers to support country recipients. Still, the loss of U.S. funding in the context of a constrained financing environment globally presents new challenges for reaching children in low- and middle- income countries with life-saving vaccines.

Gavi Overview

Created in 1999 and formally launched in January 2000, Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance (Gavi) is an independent public-private partnership and multilateral funding mechanism that “aims to save lives and protect people’s health by increasing coverage and equitable and sustainable use of vaccines.” Gavi’s main activities include supporting low- and middle-income countries’ access to new and underused vaccines for vulnerable children through financial support, technical expertise, and market-shaping efforts, such as negotiating with manufacturers, to help lower the cost of procuring vaccines. Gavi operates in five-year funding cycles, with a revised strategy and goals for each cycle. Each five-year strategy is accompanied by a vaccine investment strategy, which determines which vaccines will be made available to countries.

Gavi’s current five-year strategy, for the 2026-2030 period, which is its sixth strategy, includes four core goals:

  1. introduce and scale-up vaccines,
  2. strengthen health systems to increase equity in immunization,
  3. improve sustainability of immunization programs, and
  4. ensure healthy markets for vaccines and related products.

The current strategy emphasizes reducing the number of ‘zero-dose’ children with the goal of reaching no zero-dose children by 2030, in alignment with Immunization Agenda 2030; prioritizing programmatic and financial sustainability of country immunization programs; supporting targeted countries that have phased out of Gavi support or have never been eligible for Gavi support to maintain immunization progress; and providing more tailored approaches for Gavi countries to reach under-vaccinated populations, such as those living in remote or conflict settings, by encouraging countries to adopt strategies that reduce potential barriers to vaccination.

In addition to Gavi’s role in routine childhood immunizations, Gavi was one of the organizations leading COVAX, a multilateral effort that supported the equitable development, procurement, and delivery of COVID-19 vaccines globally that began in 2020 and ended in 2023. Gavi’s role in COVAX was to facilitate the procurement and delivery of COVID-19 vaccines, with particular emphasis on low- and middle-income countries. Provision of COVID-19 vaccines and funding support to countries was integrated into Gavi’s regular programming from 2024-2025 (COVID-19 vaccine support has been discontinued).

Organization

Gavi’s Secretariat, with its main headquarters in Geneva and an office in Washington, D.C., carries out the day-to-day operations of the partnership. Gavi does not have program offices or staff based in recipient countries but rather relies on country health ministries and World Health Organization (WHO) regional offices to implement programs. Gavi is led by a Chief Executive Officer (CEO), currently Sania Nishtar.

The 28-member Gavi Board sets Gavi’s funding policies and strategic direction, and monitors program implementation. It includes 18 “representative” seats, nine seats for independent individuals, and one ex-officio non-voting seat for Gavi’s CEO. The 18 representative seats, as specified in Gavi’s statutes, are as follows: donor country governments (5), implementing country governments (5), the WHO, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the World Bank, and the Gates Foundation, and one seat each for civil society groups, the vaccine industry in industrialized countries, the vaccine industry in developing countries, and technical health/research institutes. Additionally, several Board committees guide and advise the Board and the CEO on Gavi activities under their purview. The U.S. government was represented on Gavi’s Board as the Board member for the donor country government constituency until the end of 2025. With the suspension of U.S. support, the U.S. lost eligibility to hold a seat on the Gavi Board.

Funding

Since its 2000 launch, Gavi has received approximately $30 billion in financing, not including funding for COVAX (see Table 1).1 Approximately four-fifths (80%) of Gavi’s funding came from contributions provided by donor governments and private organizations and individuals. The top three government donors were the United Kingdom, the U.S. and Norway, while the largest private donor was the Gates Foundation.

Donors support Gavi through direct contributions as well as funding commitments to innovative financing mechanisms, the proceeds of which help support Gavi’s overall financing. These innovative financing mechanisms include the International Finance Facility-Immunisation (IFFIm) and the Pneumococcal Conjugate Vaccine (PCV) Advance Market Commitment (AMC). The IFFIm was created in 2006 and uses donor funding commitments to back the issuance of special bonds in capital markets, essentially providing “up-front” financing to Gavi. The PCV AMC began in 2010, and though it ended in 2020, it supported accelerated access to pneumococcal vaccines through up-front funding commitments from donors and continues to do so through contracts with manufacturers that extend until 2029. The U.S. does not provide support to either of these mechanisms.2 

In addition to financing Gavi’s regular activities, donors pledged additional resources to support the Gavi COVAX Advance Market Commitment (COVAX AMC), a financial mechanism within COVAX that supported low- and middle-income countries through procurement and distribution of COVID-19 vaccines; through 2024, Gavi received $12.6 billion from donor governments, private philanthropy, and innovative financing mechanisms for the COVAX AMC for vaccine procurement, delivery, and logistics.3

Funding to Gavi, 2000-2025 (Table)

Country Eligibility and Support

Eligibility

Only low- and middle-income countries with a Gross National Income (GNI) per capita below or equal to $1,8204 are eligible for Gavi support. In 2025, 54 countries were eligible for Gavi support.

Recipient countries’ governments are expected to share responsibility for funding their national immunization efforts through Gavi’s co-financing requirements (introduced in 2008), determined according to country income level and transition status. As countries develop economically, they are expected to contribute a greater share of the funding required for immunization programs. Countries classified as low-income by the World Bank are initial self-financing countries, while countries between the low-income threshold and Gavi eligibility threshold ($1,820 GNI per capita) are in preparatory transition. Initial self-financing countries are responsible for co-financing the equivalent of $0.20 per dose each year. Countries in preparatory transition gradually increase their co-financing contribution each year.5 When a country’s income rises above the GNI per capita threshold, it moves into an eight-year “accelerated transition” period of increasing domestic financing share, after which the country is expected to fully fund its own immunization programs.6 As of 2025, 19 countries have transitioned out of Gavi financial support.

Additionally, Gavi offers limited support for countries that have transitioned out of Gavi eligibility and for middle-income countries that have never been eligible for Gavi support.7 Recognizing that many formerly and never Gavi-eligible countries experience low coverage rates and have yet to make key vaccine introductions, eligible countries can apply for “catalytic” funding to support the introduction of key missing vaccines (HPV, PCV, or rotavirus) or mitigation of backsliding.8

Country Support

Gavi provides grant financing to country programs in the following two support types:

Country allocation formulas for HSIS support are based on the following metrics: number of zero-dose children, coverage of essential vaccines,10 GNI per capita, and if a country is considered fragile or conflict-affected.11 For vaccines, all countries are required to pay a share of the cost of their Gavi-supported vaccines.

Additionally, Gavi has provided country support through emergency response funding, including for Ebola vaccination during Ebola outbreaks12 and for COVID-19, allowing for up to $200 million in reprogrammed Gavi support for the COVID-19 response in Gavi-eligible countries, and other support  for the COVID-19 response including through the creation of COVAX (which helped expand access to COVID-19 vaccines in lower-income countries) and the COVID-19 Vaccine Delivery Partnership (CoVDP, which aimed to improve COVID-19 vaccine coverage in certain COVAX countries, with a particular emphasis on countries that were below 10% coverage in January 2022).13 In 2022, Gavi supported 50 outbreak response vaccination campaigns. Gavi currently funds several emergency vaccine stockpiles, allowing for rapid deployment of vaccines during outbreaks, including for cholera, Ebola, meningitis, mpox,14 and yellow fever. In 2024, Gavi deployed vaccines from these emergency stockpiles to 20 countries.15

Since its launch in 2000, Gavi has provided approximately $29 billion to support country immunization programs (not including funding for COVAX).16 Over the past three years, 2023-2026, more than $8.1 billion has been disbursed, most of which has been for vaccine support (62%), followed by health systems strengthening (23%) (see Table 2).

Gavi Country Support (Disbursements), by Type, 2023-2026 (Table)

Results

Gavi reports it has helped to immunize more than 1.2 billion children in supported countries, including more than 72 million in 2024 alone, and supported 58 different vaccine introductions and preventive campaigns and 50 outbreak response campaigns in 2024. Additionally, Gavi support has helped avert more than 20.6 million deaths and contributed to more than $280 billion in economic benefits, since its launch in 2000. Additionally, according to Gavi, its support has led to improved child health and immunization indicators across its supported countries. For example, the average vaccine coverage across multiple key Gavi-supported vaccines –  including the human papillomavirus (HPV) vaccine, inactivated polio vaccine, and pentavalent vaccine (the vaccine providing protection against diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis, hepatitis B, and Hib),17 among others –  was 63% in Gavi-supported countries in 2024, up from 48% in 2019.18 Lastly, Gavi’s work has contributed to vaccine market-shaping; for example, Gavi reports that its influence has helped lower the cost of the HPV vaccine from a price per dose of $4.50 in 2015 to $2.90 in 2022.19

U.S. Engagement with Gavi

The U.S. government has supported Gavi since its creation. President Clinton made the initial U.S. pledge to the newly formed partnership in 2000, and the U.S. provided its first contribution in 2001. Prior to the second Trump administration, the U.S. supported Gavi through financial contributions, participation in Gavi’s governance, and by providing technical assistance, but the current administration has not provided funding to the organization (see below).

Additionally, the U.S. had supported other global immunization activities that complemented Gavi’s  efforts, providing bilateral (country-to-country) support for immunization through USAID (before its dissolution), CDC, and other agencies, focusing on strengthening routine immunization systems to deliver vaccines. However, the U.S. government is currently reorganizing how it supports global health programs, including immunization activities, under its “America First Global Health Strategy” which includes the development of bilateral agreements with countries. Given that Gavi was the mechanism through which the U.S. supported vaccine procurement, it is not yet clear how these agreements will support procurement going forward. See also the KFF fact sheet on the Trump administration’s foreign aid review and the proposed reorganization of U.S. global health programs.

Financial Support 

The U.S. supported Gavi with direct contributions starting in 2001, with funding reaching $300 million in FY 2024, its highest level. Additionally, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the U.S. provided $4 billion in FY 2021 emergency funding to Gavi for COVID-19 vaccine procurement and delivery support under COVAX, making the U.S. the largest donor to COVAX (32% of $12.6 billion received overall).20In addition to its financial support for COVAX, the U.S. donated the largest number of COVID-19 vaccines to other countries. While Congress appropriated $300 million for U.S. contributions to Gavi in FY 2025 and FY 2026 (see Figure 1), the current administration has not provided funding to Gavi after citing concerns about vaccine safety despite Gavi following globally recognized scientific standards and evidence.21 See the KFF budget tracker and the KFF fact sheet on the U.S. Global Health Budget: Maternal & Child Health (MCH) for details on historical appropriations for Gavi, and also the KFF fact sheet on the Trump administration’s foreign aid review and the status of U.S. support for Gavi.

U.S. Appropriations to Gavi, FY 2017 - FY 2026 (Stacked column chart)

Governance Activities

The U.S. had historically played a role in Gavi’s governance, including as a Board and committee member, but with the suspension of U.S. funding by the Trump administration, the U.S. is no longer eligible to hold a Board seat.  

Technical Support

The U.S. had historically provided Gavi with technical support and expertise in the design, implementation, and evaluation of its programs in the field through partnerships with several U.S. agencies. For example, Gavi’s accelerated vaccine introduction programs had been conducted with technical support from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the now-dissolved U.S Agency for International Development (USAID), along with other partners.

Endnotes

  1. This amount includes proceeds for 2000-2024 and pledges for 2025. ↩︎
  2. For further information about restrictions on U.S. support for these innovative financing mechanisms, see KFF, Innovative Financing Mechanisms for Global Health: Overview and Considerations for U.S. Government Participation, Sept. 2011. ↩︎
  3. KFF analysis of Gavi cash receipts data. Gavi, “Cash Receipts 31 December 2024,” https://www.gavi.org/news-resources/document-library/cash-receipts. ↩︎
  4. For countries to be eligible for Gavi support, their most recent GNI per capita must be at or below $1,820, or the country’s average GNI per capita over the last three years must be at or below $1,820. ↩︎
  5. Countries in the first year of the preparatory transition phase co-finance the equivalent of $0.20 per dose, the same as initial self-financing countries. For each subsequent year, countries in preparatory transition co-finance a 15% increase of the total fraction paid in the prior year. Gavi, “Co-financing policy,” https://www.gavi.org/sites/default/files/programmes-impact/our-impact/01_Gavi-Alliance-Co-financing-Policy-60.pdf. ↩︎
  6. Countries in the first year of the accelerated transition phase co-finance the equivalent of the prior year’s total fraction plus 15%, the same as countries in preparatory transition. For each year after, the amount per dose increases linearly until the country is fully financing each vaccine after the eighth year and end of Gavi support. Gavi, “Co-financing policy,” https://www.gavi.org/sites/default/files/programmes-impact/our-impact/01_Gavi-Alliance-Co-financing-Policy-60.pdf. ↩︎
  7. Countries eligible for this limited funding include those above the Gavi eligibility threshold ($1,820 GNI per capita) but below the World Bank lower-middle income threshold ($4,495 GNI per capita) or those that are eligible to borrow from the International Development Association. Gavi, “Annex D: Report to the Board, July 24-25 2025,” https://www.gavi.org/sites/default/files/%20/board/minutes/2025/24-25-july06%20-%20Annex%20D%20-%20Framework%20for%20Gavi%20Funding%20to%20Countries.pdf. ↩︎
  8. Support for backsliding mitigation is only available to former Gavi-eligible countries. Gavi, “Annex D: Report to the Board, July 24-25 2025,” https://www.gavi.org/sites/default/files/%20/board/minutes/2025/24-25-july06%20-%20Annex%20D%20-%20Framework%20for%20Gavi%20Funding%20to%20Countries.pdf. ↩︎
  9. HSIS support only available for Gavi-eligible countries. Gavi, “Annex D: Report to the Board, July 24-25 2025,” https://www.gavi.org/sites/default/files/%20/board/minutes/2025/24-25-july06%20-%20Annex%20D%20-%20Framework%20for%20Gavi%20Funding%20to%20Countries.pdf. ↩︎
  10. Includes coverage of first-dose diphtheria, tetanus, and pertussis containing vaccine (DPT1), coverage of DTP3, and coverage of second-dose measles containing vaccine (MCV2). Gavi, “Annex D: Report to the Board, July 24-25 2025,” https://www.gavi.org/sites/default/files/%20/board/minutes/2025/24-25-july06%20-%20Annex%20D%20-%20Framework%20for%20Gavi%20Funding%20to%20Countries.pdf.    ↩︎
  11. Gavi, “Annex D: Report to the Board, July 24-25 2025,” https://www.gavi.org/sites/default/files/%20/board/minutes/2025/24-25-july06%20-%20Annex%20D%20-%20Framework%20for%20Gavi%20Funding%20to%20Countries.pdf.    ↩︎
  12. Gavi, “500,000 doses of Ebola vaccine to be made available to countries for outbreak response,” webpage, https://www.gavi.org/news/media-room/500000-doses-ebola-vaccine-be-made-available-countries-outbreak-response. ↩︎
  13. CoVDP phased out its operations in June 2023 as the partnership was not set up to be a permanent structure. WHO, “COVID-19 Vaccine Delivery Partnership,” webpage, https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/covid-19-vaccines/covid-19-vaccine-delivery-partnership; Devex, “Exclusive: A COVID-19 initiative for vaccine delivery is winding down,” 11 January 2023, https://www.devex.com/news/exclusive-a-covid-19-initiative-for-vaccine-delivery-is-winding-down-104724. ↩︎
  14. Gavi, “Gavi 6.0 Funding Guidelines,” https://www.gavi.org/sites/default/files/support/guidelines-2026/gavi-60-funding-guidelines-annexes.pdf#page=43 ↩︎
  15. Gavi, “Vaccine stockpiles,” https://www.gavi.org/vaccineswork/vaccine-stockpiles-guide. ↩︎
  16. KFF analysis of data provided by Gavi on disbursements by program area and year. KFF personal communications with Gavi, March 19, 2026. ↩︎
  17. The vaccines included in Gavi’s breadth of protection measure include: the third dose of the pentavalent vaccine, third dose of the pneumococcal conjugate vaccine, first dose of the rubella-containing vaccine, last dose of the rotavirus vaccine, second dose of the measles-containing vaccine, yellow fever, meningococcal A, Japanese encephalitis, and last dose of the HPV vaccine. Gavi, “Gavi 2024 Annual Progress Report,” https://www.gavi.org/sites/default/files/programmes-impact/our-impact/apr/Gavi-2024-Annual-Progress-Report.pdf#page=17.    ↩︎
  18. Gavi, “Gavi 2024 Annual Progress Report,” https://www.gavi.org/sites/default/files/programmes-impact/our-impact/apr/Gavi-2024-Annual-Progress-Report.pdf#page=17. ↩︎
  19. As another example of Gavi’s market-shaping influence, Gavi and UNICEF recently announced an agreement to make R21/Matrix-M malaria vaccines more affordable for Gavi countries through the IFFIm mechanism. UNICEF, “Gavi and UNICEF announce equitable pricing deal for malaria vaccine to protect 7 million more children by end of decade,” https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/gavi-and-unicef-announce-equitable-pricing-deal-malaria-vaccine-protect-7-million. ↩︎
  20. The U.S. announced it would donate 500 million Pfizer doses to COVAX at the G7 Summit in June 2021. However, a portion of these doses were purchased using funds appropriated to Gavi ($2 billion for 300 million Pfizer doses), while the remaining 200 million doses were purchased using $1.5 billion in other emergency funds from the American Rescue Plan Act. To avoid double-counting, Gavi counts the U.S. funding that was contributed to Gavi under its COVAX funding contributions, with only 200 million of the doses – those purchased directly by the U.S. – counted as COVAX vaccine dose donations. KFF personal communication with Gavi, Nov. 12, 2021; White House, “FACT SHEET: President Biden Announces Historic Vaccine Donation: Half a Billion Pfizer Vaccines to the World’s Lowest-Income Nations,” June 10, 2021; Gavi, “COVAX AMC Donors Table,” Apr. 7, 2022, https://www.gavi.org/sites/default/files/covid/covax/COVAX-AMC-Donors-Table.pdf; Gavi, “Cash Receipts 31 December 2024,” https://www.gavi.org/news-resources/document-library/cash-receipts. ↩︎
  21. Secretary Robert F. Kennedy Jr. (@SecKennedy), https://x.com/SecKennedy/status/1937986463510982869 [X post], June 25, 2025; Gavi, “Statement,” https://www.gavi.org/news/media-room/statement-response-25-june-2025; Reuters, “Exclusive: US conditions funding to global vaccine group on dropping mercury-based preservative from shots,” https://www.reuters.com/business/healthcare-pharmaceuticals/us-conditions-funding-global-vaccine-group-dropping-mercury-based-preservative-2026-01-28/. ↩︎

Recent Changes to Temporary Protected Status Designations: Potential Impacts on Health and Health Care

Published: May 1, 2026

Introduction

The Temporary Protected Status (TPS) program was established in 1990 and allows the Secretary of Homeland Security to designate a country for TPS if there is an ongoing armed conflict, environmental disaster,  epidemic, or other conditions that may “temporarily prevent the country’s nationals from returning safely.” Eligible individuals from TPS designated countries can receive TPS, which protects them from deportation and allows them to work in the U.S. for temporary, extendable periods.

The Trump administration has carried out numerous immigration policy changes focused on increasing immigration enforcement and reducing immigration into the country, including seeking to end TPS designations for many countries. Further, under the 2025 reconciliation law, TPS holders will lose access to subsidized ACA Marketplace coverage starting January 1, 2027, and Medicare starting no later than January 4, 2027, while they already are ineligible for Medicaid and the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP). This brief provides an overview of the TPS program, recent changes to TPS designations announced by the Trump administration, and potential implications of loss of TPS for individuals on health and health care. It includes KFF analysis of Congressional Research Service reports to assess changes in the number of individuals and countries with TPS designations over time and of 2024 American Community Survey (ACS) data to estimate the number of noncitizen immigrant workers likely to have TPS, who could be impacted by the elimination of TPS designations.

According to federal data, as of March 2025 (the latest data available), nearly 1.3 million individuals from 17 countries had TPS.  As of March 2026, the Trump administration has ended or attempted to end TPS designations for 13 of 17 countries with active TPS designations at the time he took office, which could impact over one million TPS holders. However, implementation of some of these changes is subject to ongoing litigation. Individuals who lose TPS lose their work authorization and become at risk for deportation, which may negatively impact their health and access to health coverage and care. Moreover, termination of TPS designations could negatively impact the U.S. economy and workforce by putting hundreds of thousands of immigrant workers at risk of deportation. Immigrants likely to have TPS from 16 of the 17 countries for which data are available made up about 740,000 workers ages 18 and older in the U.S. as of 2024, including about 53,000 workers in the health care industry.

Overview of the TPS Program

The TPS program was established under the Immigration Act of 1990 to allow eligible immigrants from designated countries to live and work in the U.S. The program is administered by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). DHS has the authority to designate a country for TPS for periods of 6 to 18 months and can extend these periods if conditions in the country continue to prevent its nationals from returning safely, such as due to armed conflict or environmental disasters. TPS provides immigrants with employment authorization and protection from deportation but it does not provide a pathway to citizenship. A TPS holder can only obtain permanent status by separately qualifying for another immigration status, such as lawful permanent residence through a family-based or employment-based visa petition.

As of March 2025, close to 1.3 million noncitizen immigrants from 17 countries had TPS with five countries, Venezuela, Haiti, El Salvador, Ukraine, and Honduras, accounting for approximately 97% of all recipients. The remaining 12 countries include over 39,000 individuals with TPS. The number of people with TPS has grown in recent years, from under 500,000 in 2017 to about 1.3 million in 2025, driven by new country designations, particularly for Venezuela and Ukraine, as well as redesignations for countries like Haiti that continue to face ongoing humanitarian crises (Figure 1).

Temporary Protected Status Recipients by Nationality Over Time, 2017-25 (Stacked column chart)

Recent Changes to TPS Designations

The Trump administration has ended or attempted to end TPS designations for 13 of 17 countries that had designations when he took office, which could impact about one million TPS holders, but implementation is subject to ongoing litigation (Appendix Table 1). As of March 31, 2026, termination of TPS designations for Afghanistan, Cameroon, Honduras, Nepal, Nicaragua, and certain Venezuelan TPS holders had already taken effect, impacting close to 320,000 TPS holders from these countries. Termination of TPS designation for Yemen is expected to take effect in May 2026, and termination of TPS designation as well as work authorization for remaining Venezuelan TPS holders is expected to take effect in October 2026, which could impact over 350,000 immigrants from these countries. Further, the Trump administration has taken steps to end TPS designations for Burma (Myanmar), Ethiopia, Haiti, Somalia, South Sudan, and Syria, but these terminations were on hold as of March 31, 2026, due to court challenges. If allowed to proceed, these terminations could lead to an additional 330,000 immigrants losing TPS status.

Potential Implications of Loss of TPS

Individuals who lose TPS lose their work authorization and become at risk of deportation, which may negatively impact their access to health coverage and care. The Trump administration’s attempts to end TPS designations for 13 of 17 countries put a vast majority of TPS holders at risk of losing their status and becoming subject to deportation as well as losing access to health coverage. As of 2026, TPS holders are eligible for subsidized ACA and Medicare coverage if they meet other program eligibility requirements. They are not eligible for Medicaid and CHIP. TPS holders who lose their status would become undocumented and lose access to any federally funded coverage. Under longstanding policy, undocumented immigrants are ineligible for all forms of federally funded health coverage including Medicaid, CHIP, Medicare, and coverage through the ACA Marketplace. Further, loss of TPS would result in immigrants losing their work authorization, leading to employment loss and, consequently, potential loss of access to employer-sponsored health coverage. At the same time, lost income due to job loss may make it difficult for impacted immigrants to afford health care. Based on KFF analysis of ACS data, as of 2024, over four in ten (44%) of likely TPS workers 18 and older from 16 of 17 countries with active TPS designations at the time had employer-sponsored health coverage compared to 45% of other noncitizen workers and 70% of U.S. citizen workers 18 and older.

Loss of TPS may also negatively affect people’s health by increasing their immigration-related worries and making them more reluctant to access health care. People losing TPS status become undocumented, putting them at risk for deportation and likely increasing their immigration-related worries. Data from the 2025 KFF Survey of Immigrants show that over three in four (77%) of likely undocumented immigrants say they have experienced negative health impacts due to immigration-related worries since January 2025, and about half (48%) say that they have avoided seeking medical care since January 2025 due to immigration-related concerns.

Termination of TPS designations may also have negative impacts on the U.S. workforce, which included about 740,000 likely TPS workers overall as of 2024. KFF analysis of ACS data show that, as of 2024, noncitizen immigrants likely to have TPS from 16 of the 17 countries with active designations at the time made up about 740,000 workers in the U.S., including about 53,000 health care workers. These include noncitizen immigrants ages 18 and older who were born in a country with an active TPS designation as of December 2024 and whose year of entry in the U.S. is on or before the most recent continuous residence requirement for their country as specified by USCIS (see methods for more details). Data for immigrants from South Sudan were not available separately in ACS. Among noncitizen immigrants ages 18 and older likely to have TPS from the 16 countries with data available, about three in four (74%) report being employed compared to about two-thirds (67%) of other noncitizen immigrants and about six in ten (62%) U.S. citizens ages 18 and older.

Methods

This analysis is based on KFF analysis of the 2024 American Community Survey (ACS) 1-year Public Use Microdata Sample. Individuals likely to have TPS were identified in ACS as those who report being noncitizen immigrants, were born in a country with an active TPS designation as of December 2024 for which data are available namely, Afghanistan, Burma (Myanmar), Cameroon, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Haiti, Honduras, Lebanon, Nepal, Nicaragua, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Ukraine, Venezuela, or Yemen (country of birth data for South Sudan is not available separately in ACS); arrived in the U.S. on or before the year of the most recent continuous residence requirement for their country as specified by USCIS; do not receive Medicaid, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), or Social Security; and do not work for the U.S. government or military since TPS holders are excluded from these benefits and are generally excluded from government and military service. Workers were further identified as those ages 18 and older who report being employed and currently at work in the U.S. civilian labor force and health care workers were identified as a subset of all workers who worked in the health care industry (industry codes 7970 through 8290).

Appendix

Table 1
CountryInitial DesignationLatest DesignationStatus as of March 2026Number of TPS Holders as of March 2025
Afghanistan5/20/202211/21/2023Terminated effective 7/14/20258,105
Burma (Myanmar)5/25/20215/26/2024Terminated effective 1/26/2026, but restored subject to court order3,670
Cameroon6/7/202212/8/2023Terminated effective 8/4/20254,920
El Salvador3/9/2001 Active170,125
Ethiopia12/12/20227/13/2024Terminated effective 2/13/2026, but restored subject to court order4,540
Haiti1/21/20108/4/2024Terminated effective 2/3/2026, but restored subject to court order330,735
Honduras1/5/1999 Terminated effective 9/8/202551,225
Lebanon11/27/2024 Active140
Nepal6/24/2015 Terminated effective 8/20/20257,160
Nicaragua1/5/1999 Terminated effective 9/8/20252,910
Somalia9/16/19919/18/2024Terminated effective 3/17/2026, but restored subject to court order705
South Sudan11/3/201111/4/2023Terminated effective 1/5/2026, but restored subject to court order210
Sudan11/4/199710/20/2023Active1,790
Syria3/29/20124/1/2024Terminated effective 11/21/2025, but restored subject to court order3,860
Ukraine4/19/202210/20/2023Active101,150
Venezuela (2021 desig.)3/9/2021
 
 Terminated effective 11/7/2025, small number of individual cases on hold pending court activity252,825
Venezuela (2023 desig.)9/20/2023 Terminated effective 10/3/2025, with work authorization for some beneficiaries valid until 10/2/2026 subject to court order352,190
Yemen9/3/20159/4/2024Terminated effective 5/4/20261,380
Note: Updates are current as of March 2026. 
Sources: U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, “Temporary Protected Status Designated Country” (last reviewed March 31, 2026). Number of TPS holders obtained from Congressional Research Service, “Temporary Protected Status and Deferred Enforced Departure” (August 28, 2025). 

Changes to the Medicare Advantage Program Enhance Some Consumer Protections But Roll Back Others

Published: May 1, 2026

CMS recently finalized policies as part of the 2027 Medicare Advantage final rule that both enhance consumer protections and roll back changes to the Medicare Advantage program that were intended to protect consumers. These changes have gotten less attention than payment issues and changes to the star ratings system, which also affect plan payments, but could have implications for Medicare beneficiaries (See Table 1):

  • CMS will enhance some consumer protections by requiring Medicare Advantage plans to post eligibility criteria for Special Supplemental Benefits for the Chronically Ill (SSBCI), making it easier for prospective enrollees to assess their eligibility for these benefits, which include food and produce, pest control, and transportation for non-medical needs, among others. CMS also added guardrails for debit cards issued by plans to administer supplemental benefits, so enrollees can better understand how to use these cards to obtain their benefits and also to prevent the purchase of non-covered items.
  • CMS rolled back some changes to the Medicare Advantage program that were intended to protect consumers, including rescinding a requirement that plans notify enrollees of unused supplemental benefits mid-year, as well as eliminating a number of marketing requirements, such as provisions aimed at increasing the separation between marketing activities from educational events and a prohibition on the use of superlatives in marketing materials, and removes the State Health Insurance Assistance Programs (SHIPs) from the list of resources that brokers must offer to beneficiaries for further information during sales calls.
  • In addition, CMS did not finalize a proposal that would have modified a special enrollment period to make it easier for enrollees to switch coverage if one of their providers is no longer part of their Medicare Advantage’s plan network.
Medicare Advantage Consumer Protections Enhanced, Rolled Back, or Not Finalized in the Medicare Advantage Final Rule for 2027 (Table)

CMS Finalized a Few Changes to the Medicare Advantage Program That Enhance Some Consumer Protections

Improving SSBCI Eligibility Transparency. Medicare Advantage plans offer supplemental benefits to Medicare Advantage plan enrollees, such as dental, vision, and hearing, which are considered primarily health related (e.g., preventing or treating an illness). Beginning in 2020, Medicare Advantage plans have also been able to offer supplemental benefits that are not primarily health related for chronically ill beneficiaries, known as Special Supplemental Benefits for the Chronically Ill (SSBCI). These benefits include food and produce, general supports for living (i.e. assistance with housing and utilities), pest control, and transportation for non-medical needs, among others. To receive these benefits, Medicare Advantage enrollees must have one or more comorbid and medically complex chronic conditions that meet all of the following criteria:

  • is life threatening or significantly limits the overall health or function of the enrollee;
  • has a high risk of hospitalization or other adverse health outcomes; and
  • requires intensive care coordination.

Additionally, Medicare Advantage plan must determine that the benefit has a reasonable expectation of improving or maintaining the health or overall function of the chronically ill enrollee.

The final rule requires Medicare Advantage plans to post on their websites the eligibility criteria they use to determine whether an enrollee qualifies for SSBCI to increase transparency for potential enrollees, including both the criteria for meeting the “chronically ill” definition as well as the specific criteria for each benefit. Previously, plans were not required to post eligibility criteria publicly. CMS noted that in response to a prior rule, they had received many comments requesting that plans post their specific SSBCI criteria on a public-facing website. CMS expects this change will provide greater transparency for Medicare Advantage enrollees and improve their ability to assess whether they are eligible for these benefits and make an informed decision when they are deciding whether to enroll in a plan.

Moreover, CMS added regulatory language to ensure plans apply the eligibility criteria to Medicare Advantage enrollees in an objective and consistent manner. The rule clarifies that Medicare Advantage plans must verify all statutory criteria for "chronically ill" status through an objective process such as a health risk assessment or a claims review, rather than allowing self-attestation alone.

Enhancing Guardrails for Debit Cards that Administer Supplemental Benefits. Medicare Advantage plans are permitted to use debit cards to administer supplemental benefits, such as helping cover the cost of dental or vision services, the purchase of over-the-counter products, or the purchase of food and produce at participating retailers. CMS requires that Medicare Advantage plans administer these benefits in a way that ensures the debit card only be used towards plan-covered items and services. CMS noted, however, that enrollees frequently express confusion about what can be purchased with their plan debit card, and that stakeholders have raised concerns that these cards could be used to purchase items that are not covered by Medicare Advantage plans, particularly at large retailers. CMS also indicated that debit cards may be subject to fraud in the absence of stronger guardrails applied to non-covered items.

The final rule codifies existing regulations and adds requirements regarding the use of debit cards for supplemental benefits. Beginning in 2027, Medicare Advantage plans that choose to use debit cards to administer supplemental benefits must provide cards that are electronically linked to plan-covered benefits through a real-time identification mechanism that verifies eligibility at the point of sale. CMS states that real-time verification will ensure ease of access to benefits, increase transparency, and help eliminate fraud by preventing unauthorized purchases of non-covered items. Plans are also required to provide instructions to enrollees on how to use the debit card, provide customer support service to enrollees who have questions about how to use the debit card, and maintain an alternative reimbursement process for circumstances where enrollees are not able to use their debit card. CMS explained that it expects these changes will make Medicare Advantage enrollees more aware of their debit card benefits and how to use them.

The rule does not finalize a proposed change that would have prohibited marketing materials from listing the dollar value of supplemental benefits or the method by which these benefits are administered (e.g., debit cards or “Medicare flex cards”). In the proposal, CMS raised concerns with marketing tactics related to debit cards, including that some Medicare Advantage plans had been marketing the debit cards in inaccurate and misleading ways, using terms like "flex card" with an enticing dollar value attached to them, which might imply enrollees will automatically receive unrestricted spending money just by enrolling in the plan. However, CMS declined to finalize this proposal, citing concerns that this change would reduce informed decision-making before beneficiaries enroll in a plan.

CMS Also Rolled Back Changes to the Medicare Advantage Program That Were Intended to Protect Consumers

Mid-Year Supplemental Benefits Notice Rescinded. Medicare Advantage plans offer an array of supplemental benefits, but there is little data yet available to examine how frequently enrollees are using the benefits available to them. Medicare beneficiaries often highlight the availability of extra benefits as a reason they choose to enroll in Medicare Advantage plans, and CMS has also observed beneficiaries make enrollment decisions on these benefits, but that enrollees are often unaware of the benefits available to them and are not using them. The April 2024 final rule required Medicare Advantage plans to send enrollees a mid-year notice, between June 30 and July 31 of each plan year, listing any supplemental benefits the enrollee had not yet used during the first six months of the year, which was set to take effect January 1, 2026.

CMS rescinded this requirement before it took effect, citing several reasons: more recent survey data showing that 70 percent of Medicare Advantage enrollees reported using at least one supplemental benefit in the past year, which CMS suggests means beneficiaries are aware of these benefits, (though CMS notes there are still data gaps on utilization of these benefits); the administrative and financial burden on plans, particularly on smaller Medicare Advantage plans; and that this information is duplicative of information in the Annual Evidence of Coverage document that is already sent to enrollees. They also note this recission is consistent with the administration’s priorities to reduce unnecessary regulatory burdens, laid out in its Executive Order, Unleashing Prosperity Through Deregulation.

Marketing Requirements Rolled Back. CMS regulates how Medicare Advantage insurers, as well as agents, brokers, and other third parties who sell Medicare Advantage plans may communicate with beneficiaries. In recent years, CMS has documented patterns of aggressive and misleading marketing behavior, based on reports from state insurance commissioners, State Health Insurance Assistance Programs (SHIPs), and beneficiary advocacy groups, and has made a number of changes in prior rules to provide additional oversight of Medicare Advantage plan marketing. The recent final rule eliminates many of these provisions, with the stated goal of streamlining regulatory requirements for agents and brokers, and making the services offered by these groups more accessible to beneficiaries.

  • Limitations on Marketing at Educational Events Rolled Back: CMS requires that Medicare Advantage insurers, agents, and brokers clearly distinguish between educational and marketing events, and prohibits the discussion of specific plan costs or benefits at events promoted as educational. The April 2023 final rule reinforced this separation by prohibiting the collection of scope of appointment forms at educational events, requiring a 48-hour waiting period between the collection of scope of appointment forms and personal marketing appointments, and requiring a 12-hour waiting period between educational and marketing events at the same location. These provisions were intended to prevent beneficiaries from feeling pressured into attending marketing events or making coverage decisions on the spot when seeking out educational information.

    The current final rule rolls back these provisions, citing stakeholder feedback that waiting periods create unnecessary delays and may be burdensome to beneficiaries who must travel for multiple events and appointments that could otherwise take place in a single session. Agents and brokers may now collect scope of appointment forms at educational events, and may conduct a personal marketing appointment at any point afterwards, with no waiting period. Further, educational and marketing events may now be held back-to-back in the same location, provided that beneficiaries are notified of the transition and offered the opportunity to leave if they prefer. CMS noted that some commenters opposed these changes due to concern that they may leave beneficiaries more vulnerable to aggressive sales tactics and may blur the line between educational and marketing information.
  • Prohibition on Use of Superlatives in Marketing Materials Eliminated: The final rule eliminates certain requirements around the language used in marketing materials, such as a prohibition on the use of superlatives (e.g., “best” or “most”) without supporting documentation. CMS first introduced this requirement in the April 2023 final rule, citing concern that these claims may be misleading when taken out of context, and may encourage beneficiaries to enroll in a plan based on information that is misrepresented or misunderstood. The current rule revises this stance, stating that existing CMS requirements already prohibit the use of misleading or inaccurate claims in marketing materials, while the prohibition on superlatives represents an undue burden for insurers, agents, and brokers that does not meaningfully expand on these other protections.
  • Mandatory Disclaimer Requirements Modified: CMS requires that brokers and other third parties who represent multiple Medicare Advantage insurers begin all sales calls with a mandatory disclaimer stating that they do not represent every plan available in the area and providing beneficiaries with a list of resources they may reach out to for further information. CMS introduced this requirement in the May 2022 final rule to ensure that beneficiaries had access to complete, unbiased information about their coverage options, as many brokers only represent a subset of available plans and may have a financial incentive to steer beneficiaries towards some plans over others. The current final rule preserves this requirement, but allows the disclaimer to be provided later in the call as long as it is stated before any discussion of specific plan benefits, rather than in the first minute of the call as previously required.

    Notably, the rule also removes the State Health Insurance Assistance Programs (SHIPs) from the list of resources that must be included in the disclaimer, now limited to official CMS resources such as 1-800-MEDICARE and Medicare.gov. SHIPs are federally-funded, state-based programs that offer free, unbiased counseling and education to Medicare beneficiaries. This change prompted criticism from some commentors, who noted that 1-800-MEDICARE is not generally equipped to provide the same level of in-depth counseling or local information that SHIP counselors are trained to provide. However, CMS states that SHIP volunteers may not always have the expertise to help beneficiaries navigate increasingly complex Medicare Advantage options and that the standardized training and 24/7 availability of customer service representatives at 1-800-MEDICARE make it a more appropriate resource in this context, while also noting that 1-800-MEDICARE may still refer callers to their local SHIP on a case-by-case basis.

CMS Declined to Finalize a Proposal to Streamline the Medicare Advantage Special Enrollment Period for Provider Terminations

Medicare Advantage plans have networks of providers, and beneficiaries must see providers in their plan’s network or potentially pay higher cost sharing. KFF analysis has shown that Medicare Advantage enrollees have access to about half of the physicians available to traditional Medicare beneficiaries in their area, on average. Medicare beneficiaries say having access to their preferred providers is an important factor when selecting their Medicare coverage. With this in mind, the Trump administration recently launched a new provider search tool on the Medicare plan finder to help beneficiaries identify if their doctors are in a plan’s network, though it experienced issues during its initial rollout.

While Medicare beneficiaries may select plans based on access to their preferred doctors and hospitals, providers can leave Medicare Advantage networks at any time during the year, potentially disrupting coverage for plan enrollees. Currently, a special enrollment period (SEP) for Significant Change in Provider Network allows Medicare Advantage enrollees to switch plans or return to traditional Medicare when CMS determines there were "significant" changes to their plan's provider network – for example, the termination of a contract with a large hospital system. When CMS makes that determination, Medicare Advantage plans must send a separate notice to affected enrollees explaining their SEP eligibility to select different coverage, including guaranteed issue rights to purchase a Medigap policy regardless of pre-existing conditions.

CMS proposed to eliminate the significance determination, making the SEP available to any "affected enrollee" of a provider termination, defined as someone assigned to, currently receiving care from, or having received care within the past three months from a terminated provider. Rather than waiting for CMS to review and approve a significance finding, plans would include SEP eligibility information in the standard provider termination notice already sent to enrollees. Enrollees could then attest directly to the plan that they meet the affected enrollee definition and are eligible for a special enrollment period to change their Medicare coverage.

This proposal would have put the decision in the hands of Medicare beneficiaries – allowing them to decide whether a provider termination was significant enough to warrant switching coverage, rather than waiting for that determination from CMS. However, CMS declined to finalize this proposal and did not explain its rationale for its decision. CMS does note that this topic generated broad interest and may be addressed in further rulemaking.

Americans’ Challenges with Health Care Costs

Authors: Grace Sparks, Lunna Lopes, Alex Montero, Marley Presiado, and Liz Hamel
Published: Apr 30, 2026

Editorial Note: This brief was updated on April 30, 2026, to include the latest KFF polling data. It was originally published on December 14, 2021.

For many years, KFF polling has found that the high cost of health care is a burden on U.S. families, and that health care costs factor into decisions about insurance coverage and care seeking. These costs also rank as the top financial worry for adults and their families. This data note summarizes recent KFF polling on the public’s experiences with health care costs. Main takeaways include:

  • Just under half of U.S. adults say it is difficult to afford health care costs, and about three in ten say they or a family member in their household had problems paying for health care in the past 12 months. Hispanic adults, young adults, and the uninsured are particularly likely to report problems affording health care in the past year.
  • The cost of health care can lead some to put off needed care. About one-third (36%) of adults say that in the past 12 months they have skipped or postponed getting health care they needed because of the cost. Notably three in four (75%) uninsured adults under age 65 say they went without needed care because of the cost.
  • The cost of prescription drugs prevents some people from filling prescriptions. About four in ten (43%) U.S. adults say they have not taken their medication as prescribed in the past year due to costs. This includes three in ten who say they have taken an over-the-counter drug instead of getting a prescription filled (31%), a quarter (27%) who have not filled a prescription, and one in five (19%) who have cut pills in half or skipped doses of medicine because of the cost. Larger shares of lower-income, uninsured, women, Black, and Hispanic adults report taking these measures.
  • Health care debt is a burden for a large share of Americans. In 2022, about four in ten adults (41%) reported having debt due to medical or dental bills including debts owed to credit cards, collections agencies, family and friends, banks, and other lenders to pay for their health care costs, with disproportionate shares of Black and Hispanic adults, women, parents, those with low incomes, and uninsured adults saying they have health care debt.
  • Those who are covered by health insurance are not immune to the burden of health care costs. Almost four in ten insured adults under the age of 65 (38%) worry about affording their monthly health insurance premium and large shares of adults with employer-sponsored insurance (ESI) and those with Marketplace coverage rate their insurance as “fair” or “poor” when it comes to their monthly premium and to out-of-pocket costs to see a doctor.
  • Notable shares of adults say they are worried about affording medical costs such as the cost of health care services (including the cost of health insurance and out-of-pocket costs for things like office visits and prescription drugs). About two-thirds of adults say they are either “very worried” (30%) or “somewhat worried” (34%) about being able to afford the cost of health care for themselves and their families.

Difficulty Affording Medical Costs

Many U.S. adults have trouble affording health care costs. While lower income and uninsured adults are the most likely to report this, those with health insurance and those with higher incomes are not immune to the high cost of medical care. Just under half of U.S. adults say that it is very or somewhat difficult for them to afford their health care costs (44%). Uninsured adults under age 65 are much more likely to say affording health care costs is difficult (82%) compared to those with health insurance coverage (42%). Additionally, a slight majority of Hispanic adults (55%) and half of Black adults (49%) report difficulty affording health care costs compared to about four in ten White adults (39%). Adults in households with annual incomes under $40,000 are more likely than adults in households with higher incomes to say it is difficult to afford their health care costs. (Source: KFF Health Tracking Poll: May 2025)

Mirrored bar chart showing shares who say it is easy or difficult to afford their health care costs by total, insurance status, race/ethnicity, and household income.

When asked specifically about problems paying for health care in the past year, about three in ten (28%) adults say they or a family member in their household had problems paying for care, rising to four in ten among Hispanic adults (41%) and young adults ages 18 to 29 (40%). Among those under age 65, six in ten (59%) uninsured adults report problems paying for health care in the past year, about twice the share of insured adults who say the same (30%). (Source: KFF Health Tracking Poll: November 2025)

Single bar showing the percent who say, in the past 12 months, they or a family member living with them had problems paying for health care by total, age, gender, race/ethnicity, household income, and insurance status.

The cost of care can also lead some adults to skip or delay seeking services, with one-third (36%) of adults saying that they have skipped or postponed getting needed health care in the past 12 months because of the cost. Women are more likely than men to say they have skipped or postponed getting health care they needed because of the cost (38% vs. 32%). Adults ages 65 and older, most of whom are eligible for health care coverage through Medicare, are much less likely than younger age groups to say they have not gotten health care they needed because of cost.

Three-quarters of uninsured adults say they have skipped or postponed getting the health care they needed due to cost. Having health insurance, however, does not offer ironclad protection as about four in ten adults with insurance (37%) still report not getting health care they needed due to cost. (Source: KFF Health Tracking Poll: May 2025)

Single bar chart showing percent who say they have skipped or postponed getting needed health care in the past 12 months because of the cost by total, age, gender, race/ethnicity, household income, and insurance status.

Skipping care due to costs can have notable health impacts. Nearly two in ten adults (18%) report that their health got worse because they skipped or delayed getting care. Among adults under age 65, those who are uninsured are twice as likely as those with health coverage to say that their health worsened due to skipped or postponed care (42% vs. 20%). About four times as many adults under age 65 (23%) say their health got worse after skipping or postponing care as adults ages 65 and older (6%), most of whom have Medicare coverage. (Source: KFF Health Tracking Poll: May 2025)

Single bar chart showing the share who say their health got worse because they didn't get care or postponed their care by total, age, and insurance status.

A 2022 KFF report found that people who already have debt due to medical or dental care are disproportionately likely to put off or skip medical care. Half (51%) of adults currently experiencing debt due to medical or dental bills say in the past year, cost has been a probititor to getting the medical test or treatment that was recommended by a doctor. (Source: KFF Health Care Debt Survey: Feb.-Mar. 2022)

Prescription Drug Costs

The high cost of prescription drugs also leads some people to cut back on their medications in various ways. About three in ten adults (31%) say in the past 12 months they have taken an over-the-counter drug instead of getting a prescription filled because of cost concerns, while about a quarter (27%) say they have not filled a prescription and about one in five (19%) say they have cut pills in half or skipped doses of medicine due to cost. Overall, four in ten (43%) adults report taking at least one of these measures in the past year, continuing an upward trend from a third (33%) in 2025 and about three in ten (31%) in July 2023.

Larger shares of adults in households with lower and middle incomes report resorting to these cost-saving prescription medication solutions compared to those with higher incomes. About half of adults in households with annual incomes under $40,000 (52%) or between $40,000 and $90,000 (47%) say they have not taken their medication as prescribed due to the cost in the last year, compared to three in ten adults in households with incomes of $90,000 or more. Uninsured adults under the age of 65 are more likely than their counterparts to also report not taking their medicine as prescribed due to costs (58% compared to 43% of insured adults under age 65). Additionally, half of women (49%) say they have taken any of these prescription medication measures compared to about a third (36%) of men. Over half (55%) of Black adults say the same, compared to half (47%) of Hispanic adults and four in ten White adults. (Source: KFF Health Tracking Poll: March 2026)

Multiple split bars showing the percent who have taken steps to reduce the cost of care including taking an over-the-counter drug instead of getting a prescription filled, not filled a prescription for medicine, or cut pills in half or skipped doses of medicine.

Health Insurance Cost Ratings

Health insurance provides some financial protection, but premiums and out-of-pocket costs can still present a financial burden for many individuals. Overall, most insured adults rate their health insurance as “excellent” or “good” when it comes to the amount they have to pay out-of-pocket for their prescriptions (61%), the amount they have to pay out-of-pocket to see a doctor (53%), and the amount they pay monthly for insurance (54%). However, at least three in ten rate their insurance as “fair” or “poor” on each of these metrics, and affordability ratings vary depending on the type of coverage people have.

Adults who have private insurance through employer-sponsored insurance or Marketplace coverage are more likely than those with Medicare or Medicaid to rate their insurance negatively when it comes to their monthly premium, the amount they have to pay out of pocket to see a doctor, and their prescription co-pays. About one in four adults with Medicare give negative ratings to the amount they have to pay each month for insurance and to their out-of-pocket prescription costs, while about one in five give their insurance a negative rating when it comes to their out-of-pocket costs to see a doctor.

Medicaid enrollees are less likely than those with other coverage types to give their insurance negative ratings on these affordability measures (Medicaid does not charge monthly premiums in most states, and copays for covered services, where applied, are required to be nominal). (Source: KFF Survey of Consumer Experiences with Health Insurance)

Split bar chart showing shares of adults by main insurance coverage who rate specific aspects of their current health insurance as either fair or poor.

Health Care Debt

In June 2022, KFF released an analysis of the KFF Health Care Debt Survey, a companion report to the investigative journalism project on health care debt conducted by KFF Health News and NPR, Diagnosis Debt. This project found that health care debt is a wide-reaching problem in the United States and that 41% of U.S. adults currently have some type of debt due to medical or dental bills from their own or someone else’s care, including about a quarter of adults (24%) who say they have medical or dental bills that are past due or that they are unable to pay, and one in five (21%) who have bills they are paying off over time directly to a provider. One in six (17%) report debt owed to a bank, collection agency, or other lender from loans taken out to pay for medical or dental bills, while similar shares say they have health care debt from bills they put on a credit card and are paying off over time (17%). One in ten report debt owed to a family member or friend from money they borrowed to pay off medical or dental bills.

While four in ten U.S. adults have some type of health care debt, disproportionate shares of lower income adults, the uninsured, Black and Hispanic adults, women, and parents report current debt due to medical or dental bills.

Single bar chart showing the percent who say they have different types of debt due to medical or dental bills for themselves or someone else in their care.

Vulnerabilities and Worries About Health Care and Long-Term Care Costs

Health care costs remain at the top of the list of people’s financial worries, with nearly two-thirds (64%) saying they are at least somewhat worried about affording the cost of health care, including the cost of health insurance and out-of-pocket costs for things like office visits and prescription drugs for themselves and their families. This includes three in ten who say they are “very worried” about affording health care. A similar share of adults is “very worried” about affording gas and transportation costs (29%), up from about one in six (17%) in January. This follows a nationwide increase in gasoline prices since the U.S. conflict with Iran began in February. About one in five adults say they are “very worried” about affording food and groceries (23%), rent or mortgage (21%) or monthly utilities (21%).

Notably, just under nine in ten (85%) uninsured adults under age 65 say they are worried about affording the cost of health care, though a large share of insured adults is also worried (64%). Health care costs are a top household worry across insurance types and across partisans. (Source: KFF Health Tracking Poll: April 2026)

Stacked bar chart showing the public's levels of worry when it comes to affording living necessities. Shown among total adults.

Many U.S. adults may be one unexpected medical bill from falling into debt. About half of U.S. adults say they would not be able to pay an unexpected medical bill that came to $500 out of pocket. This includes one in five (19%) who would not be able to pay it at all, 5% who would borrow the money from a bank, payday lender, friends or family to cover the cost, and one in five (21%) who would incur credit card debt in order to pay the bill. Women, those with lower household incomes, Black and Hispanic adults are more likely than their counterparts to say they would be unable to afford this type of bill. (Source: KFF Health Care Debt Survey: Feb.-Mar. 2022)

Split bar chart showing how adults would handle an unexpected medical bill of 0, if they'd be able to pay the bill without going into debt, go into debt to pay the bill, or would not be able to pay the bill.

Among older adults, the costs of long-term care and support services are also a concern. Almost six in ten (57%) adults 65 and older say they are at least “somewhat anxious” about affording the cost of a nursing home or assisted living facility if they needed it, and half say they feel anxious about being able to afford support services such as paid nurses or aides. These concerns also loom large among those between the ages of 50 and 64, with more than seven in ten saying they feel anxious about affording residential care (73%) and care from paid nurses or aides (72%) if they were to need these services. See The Affordability of Long-Term Care and Support Services: Findings from a KFF Survey for a deeper dive into concerns about the affordability of nursing homes and support services.

The Growing Use of Artificial Intelligence in Health Care and Implications for Disparities

Published: Apr 30, 2026

Introduction

Artificial intelligence (AI) is increasingly being integrated into health care, including but not limited to diagnosis and treatment plans, drug development, prediction of health risks and outcomes, health monitoring, and medical imaging. AI can also automate aspects of health care including data processing and administrative tasks, reimbursement decisions, patient interactions, and clinical decision-making. Additionally, individuals are increasingly using AI for health information and advice.

While there has been an increase in funding for and use of AI in health care in recent years, public opinion on AI’s role in providing accurate health information remains mixed. Further, there are concerns that AI may lead to job losses and reduce personalized human-based interactions. Moreover, AI can exacerbate health disparities if the underlying data on which models are built are biased and/or not inclusive. Alternatively, some suggest that AI may help mitigate disparities if it is carefully designed. This brief examines the implications of the growing use of AI for disparities in health and health care and discusses factors that can help reduce AI-related bias in health care.

Growing Use of AI in Health Care

AI tools are becoming increasingly integrated into various aspects of the health care system. For example, hospitals report using AI or predictive models as both administrative tools to perform tasks such as patient scheduling, billing, and medical coding, and as clinician-facing tools to predict health risks and outcomes among patients. A 2025 survey conducted across 16 states found that eight in ten (84%) health insurers report using AI or machine learning for fraud detection, utilization management, and prior authorization, among other uses. Health systems also report using AI to “limit claim denials and streamline prior authorization processes.”

The public also is increasingly using AI for health information and advice although many have limited trust in the reliability of AI tools. According to OpenAI data from 2026, more than 40 million people globally turn to ChatGPT daily for health information. The data also show that AI chatbots are becoming an important source of information for health insurance and billing advice, with users asking between 1.6 and 1.9 million questions per week regarding plan comparisons, claims, billing, and coverage. Further, a 2026 KFF survey finds that about a third (32%) of adults say they use AI chatbots for health information or advice (Figure 1). However, two-thirds (67%) of adults overall say they trust AI tools or chatbots “not too much” or “not at all” to provide reliable health information, and about three in four (77%) say the same regarding information about mental health and emotional well-being. While rates of use for and trust in AI for physical health advice are similar across racial and ethnic groups, Black and Hispanic adults are more likely than their White counterparts to report using AI for mental health advice and Black adults (29%) are somewhat more likely than White adults (20%) to say they trust AI tools or chatbots to provide reliable information about mental health and emotional well-being “a great deal” or “a fair amount.”

About One in Three Adults Report Using AI for Health Advice, With Black and Hispanic Adults Being More Likely to Use AI for Mental Health Advice (Split Bars)

Impact of AI on Disparities in Health and Health Care

As the use of AI in health care grows, research suggests that AI models can exacerbate racial and ethnic health disparities. A 2024 systematic review of 30 studies over a ten-year time period (from 2013 to 2023) that assessed instances of racial bias perpetuated by AI and machine learning algorithms in health care found a significant association between AI utilization and an exacerbation of racial disparities in health and health care outcomes. These disparities included longer waiting times for appointments, lower rates of success in predicting mental health outcomes, and underdiagnosis of health conditions, particularly for Black and Hispanic people compared to other groups. For example:

  • One study found that a machine learning algorithm used for creating patient appointment schedules led to Black patients experiencing 33% longer wait times than other patients. This was due to the model using socioeconomic indicators such as employment status, zip code, insurance type, and past no-show rates, which are correlated with race, to create appointment schedules.
  • Another study found that a widely used algorithm to guide health care decisions assigned Black patients the same level of risk as White patients even though Black patients were sicker. The algorithm used health care costs as an imperfect proxy for illness, since less money is spent on Black patients who have an equivalent level of need due to inequities in access to care. The authors suggest that addressing this disparity would significantly increase the share of Black patients receiving additional care.
  • In diagnostics, AI models may underperform on patients with darker skin because training datasets are more likely to collect data from lighter skinned patients.

In the systematic review, the authors identified four primary and interrelated causes for AI-perpetuated disparities including: biased underlying datasets, historical and systemic biases that can be encoded into AI when it is trained on these data, algorithmic design bias, and biased application and/or deployment of AI.

These AI-related racial and ethnic disparities also extend into mental health diagnosis and treatment recommendations. For example, language-based AI models underperformed on predicting depression severity for Black patients as compared to White patients since the two groups use different types of language to express depression symptoms and AI is often primarily trained on language used by White patients given that there is more data available on White patients since they make up a larger share of the population. However, researchers found that even models trained exclusively on the depression-related social media language used by Black individuals performed poorly at predicting depression severity in the group while models trained with the same social media data on White individuals performed well at predicting that group’s depression severity. The authors suggest that this could be due to other factors beyond language, such as paralinguistic features like speech rate or tone, serving as better predictors for depression severity among Black individuals. A separate study found that several AI models made inferior treatment recommendations for Black mental health patients when the patient’s race was explicitly or implicitly mentioned, likely due to biases embedded in the data on which these models are trained. An AI model used for suicide prediction also performed worse for Black patients, with researchers finding that it successfully detected 62% of suicides among White patients but only 10% among Black patients.

Research has found that the use of race in clinical algorithms may also impact the reliability of AI tools for certain groups since they are often trained on these algorithms. AI models are often trained on clinical algorithms used to predict diagnoses and treatments, which in some cases have historically used race as a factor and resulted in worse outcomes for some groups. One of the most well-known examples of this practice is the use of separate measures of kidney function (i.e., estimated glomerular filtration rates, eGFRs) for Black patients compared to non-Black patients, which resulted in many Black patients not receiving a kidney transplant. Another study found that removing the use of race from spirometry, a test used to measure lung function, would increase the number of Black people who would qualify for lung disease diagnosis and disability payments. Further, a 2019 study found that an algorithm used to predict the likelihood of safely having a Vaginal Birth after Cesarean Delivery (VBAC) incorrectly predicted a lower likelihood of success for VBAC for Black and Hispanic women than White women, which led to doctors performing more cesarian deliveries on Black and Hispanic women than White women. A growing number of organizations and health care institutions have recently moved to remove race from these algorithms. However, to the extent AI is trained on algorithms or results from algorithms that use race as a factor, AI could perpetuate these racial biases.

Research also shows that AI models may promote racial and ethnic health misinformation, leading to misdiagnosis or delayed care. A study of multiple AI chatbots found instances of the tools promoting "race-based medicine" and false claims about race such as difference in skin thickness between Black and White patients. Further, all AI chatbots included in the study incorrectly stated that Black men’s and women’s normal lung function tends to be lower than their White counterparts’, reflecting its training on the underlying race-biased algorithm to calculate lung function.

If carefully designed, AI has the potential to help address disparities. For example, AI-driven decision support tools can be used to identify and correct real-time clinician bias, particularly during high-stress periods when "cognitive load" often leads to disparities in documentation and diagnosis. By automating administrative tasks such as scheduling and billing, AI could help reduce staff burnout at safety-net hospitals, which disproportionately treat underserved groups. AI can also be used to identify the social determinants that drive health inequities through the analysis of large amounts of population data, which can then help guide interventions to address disparities. AI can also help identify disparities in health outcomes that might otherwise go unrecognized. For example, in a recent study, researchers used machine learning to identify excess deaths due to COVID-19 that were unrecognized in official mortality reports and found that these unrecognized deaths occurred disproportionately among people of color, those with lower educational attainment, and those with lower household incomes, among other factors.

Careful design and inclusive data collection; a diverse workforce; and a focus on ethical considerations, transparency, and a collaborative approach are factors that may help mitigate AI biases in health care. Identification and mitigation of biases during AI models’ development, as well as continuous monitoring and inclusion of more representative data over time, can help to address AI-related bias in health care. Further, having a diverse and representative data science workforce and training AI developers to recognize biases in algorithm development also play an important role in developing equitable AI models. Developing and enforcing ethical standards for AI in health care that inform how AI models and algorithms will be designed to help reduce bias and discrimination and establishing accountability in the creation and use of those algorithms may also help to reduce algorithmic bias. Further, collaborating with a wide range of stakeholders, such as health care workers, policymakers, community members, and ethicists when developing AI tools can offer a broader and more nuanced understanding of the impact of AI on health disparities.

Researchers and other experts have increased their focus on the creation of frameworks and coalitions to help guide equitable use of AI in health care. In 2023, the Coalition for Health AI released guidance for the implementation of AI tools that centers equity, fairness, and ethics. The guidance includes recommendations on developing a common set of principles to guide the development and use of AI tools and a coalition or advisory board to help ensure equity and facilitate trustworthiness in health-related AI. In early 2024, experts in health, medicine, technology, and policy issued a call for “ongoing dialogue and ethical commitment from all stakeholders” to ensure that AI in health care is inclusive following a series of discussions at the 2023 Responsible AI for Social and Ethical Healthcare (RAISE) international symposium. In 2024, the Council of Medical Specialty Societies and the Doris Duke Foundation created the Encoding Equity alliance, whose aims are to identify the incorrect use of race in clinical algorithms and guidelines, design “accurate and equitable decision tools”, and collect and disseminate evidence on the use of AI in health care to promote health equity.

While there has been increasing activity at the state-level to regulate AI in health care, the Trump administration has prioritized deregulation of AI, reduced or eliminated equity requirements for AI in health care, and is challenging state regulations that impose strict anti-bias requirements.  President Trump issued Executive Order (EO) 4148 in January 2025 that rescinded a number of Biden administration EOs, including those related to equitable use of AI in health care. He replaced those EOs with EO 14179, which shifts focus away from “equity” mandates and “algorithmic fairness” and towards “minimally burdensome” requirements to encourage innovation. While numerous states have recently introduced or enacted legislation related to AI in health care, the Trump administration is challenging state laws that impose strict bias audits or transparency requirements for AI via EO 14365 issued in December 2025. Under the EO, the Department of Justice created an AI Litigation Task Force in January 2026 to challenge states with AI laws found to be inconsistent with federal policy. The EO also directs the Secretary of Commerce to restrict federal grant money, specifically the Broadband Equity Access and Deployment (BEAD) Program funds, in states with “onerous” AI laws. For example, Colorado passed the “Consumer Protections for Artificial Intelligence” law in 2024, which among other things, requires health care providers and health insurers to take steps to prevent algorithmic discrimination. However, implementation of the law has been postponed due to legal challenges.

 

Estimating Effectiveness of Influenza and COVID-19 Vaccines: The “Test-Negative” Design

Published: Apr 30, 2026

Recent news reports indicate HHS decided to initially delay publication of, and then not publish, a CDC-led study that estimates the effectiveness of the COVID-19 vaccine over the past winter season. The study had already passed internal reviews by CDC scientific and editorial teams, and its methodology, as indicated by a reportedly leaked copy of the manuscript, is one that is widely used by researchers around the world for studying respiratory virus vaccine effectiveness. Only a few weeks prior, CDC had published a study on influenza vaccine effectiveness using the same methodological approach, and the approach has also been used by CDC in similar studies of COVID-19 vaccine effectiveness in prior years. National Institutes of Health Director and acting Director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) Jay Bhattacharya wrote in an op-ed that the decision not to publish the study was due to concerns about its methodology, and that CDC was “upholding its responsibility to ensure that every piece of information it shares is rigorously validated, accurate and worthy of public trust” through additional review of the study prior to publication. To provide context for public discussion of the unpublished study, this policy brief provides an overview of the methodological approach in question – the test-negative case control design – and discusses some of its strengths and limitations in assessing vaccine effectiveness for respiratory diseases like influenza and COVID-19.

What is vaccine effectiveness and how do scientists estimate it?

CDC defines vaccine effectiveness (VE) as “how well vaccination works under real-world conditions to protect people against health outcomes such as symptomatic illness, hospitalization, and death.” This contrasts with “vaccine efficacy,” which refers to how well a vaccine works in ideal, controlled conditions such as a clinical trial. At a basic level, a VE study compares health outcomes (like illness or hospitalization) and vaccination status in different groups of people, in order to generate an estimate of the level of protection that a vaccine provides against those health outcomes. Researchers typically calculate the magnitude of the difference – the level of protection – between groups as a percentage (e.g., a vaccine can have a VE of 50% against illness if that illness was 50% less common in the vaccinated group compared to the unvaccinated group). There are several epidemiological approaches for conducting these types of studies, including “observational” approaches such as cohort studies that follow groups of vaccinated and unvaccinated people over time and measure how frequently health outcomes occur in each group, and case-control studies that identify groups of people with a particular health outcome (cases) and those without that outcome (controls) and determine the frequency of vaccination in each group. A common observational approach used to study VE for respiratory illnesses is a type of case-control study called the “test-negative” design. An “experimental” design such as a randomized controlled trial (where participants are randomized into vaccinated and unvaccinated groups and the vaccine is compared to a placebo) of an existing, FDA approved vaccine is generally considered unethical, meaning observational approaches such as the test-negative design are preferable when assessing VE for vaccines already widely used and shown to be safe and effective.   

Box 1. Defining vaccine effectiveness and test-negative design

Vaccine Effectiveness (VE): “How well vaccination works under real-world conditions to protect people against health outcomes such as symptomatic illness, hospitalization, and death.” (CDC)

“Test-negative” study design: A type of case-control study where subjects are patients who visit medical institutions, with those who test positive for a disease (e.g. influenza or COVID-19) classified as “cases” and those who test negative as “controls”. Vaccination status can then be compared between cases and controls to generate an estimate of VE. (adapted from Fukushima & Hirota 2017)

What is the test-negative study design?

In recent years the “test-negative” design has become the most prevalent approach for studying and monitoring VE of COVID-19 and influenza vaccines in “real world” situations. The test-negative design is a version of the case-control approach where researchers define a clinical outcome of interest (such as influenza-like-illness or respiratory disease symptoms), identify people seeking health care who present with these same symptoms, then test individuals for the pathogen of interest (such as influenza virus or COVID-19). Those that test positive for the pathogen are cases and those that test negative are controls, and researchers can then compare how many in each group were vaccinated. With this information at hand, researchers can determine VE, which is calculated as 1 minus the odds ratio (the odds of vaccination in cases over the odds of vaccination in controls).  For example, in a hypothetical study with 200 participants, 100 were test positive for infection (cases) and 100 were test-negative (controls). When vaccination status is checked, it is distributed across groups as shown in Table 1.

Table 1
Hypothetical Test-Negative Study Results
VaccinatedNot VaccinatedTotal
Cases (test positive)3070100
Controls (test negative)6040100
Note: These results are “unadjusted.”  In VE studies, statistical techniques are used to calculate “adjusted” odds, controlling for factors such as age, comorbidities, prior vaccination status, etc.

In this case, the odds of vaccination among cases is 30/70 = 0.43, and in controls it is 60/40 = 1.5.  The odds ratio would be 0.43/1.5 = 0.29. Therefore VE in this hypothetical study would be (1 – 0.29) x 100% = 71%, indicating that the vaccine was about 71% effective at preventing the outcome among the vaccinated compared to the unvaccinated.   

Researchers will also typically use statistical techniques to control for differences between groups in other characteristics, such as age, comorbidities, and prior infection history.  The as-yet unpublished CDC study of COVID-19 VE and the recently published study of influenza VE use the test-negative approach. It is also the approach often used to estimate VE in respiratory disease research networks for influenza and COVID-19 in the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and across Europe.

What are the strengths and weaknesses of this approach?

The test-negative approach, which relies on people seeking care and health facilities for identifying cases and controls, has become the dominant study design for several reasons. It is often easier to conduct a test-negative design compared to other approaches because both cases and controls are identified in the same location presenting with similar symptoms, whereas other approaches might require seeking controls from the community to match with cases. It’s oftenefficient because it uses existing surveillance and diagnostic testing infrastructure at health care facilities. The test-negative approach also reduces the likelihood of a common bias in case-control designs, which is the potential for differences in health care-seeking behavior between cases and controls. That is, vaccinated people may systematically differ from unvaccinated people in ways that affect healthcare-seeking behavior, which creates the potential for biased VE estimates when community controls are used.

However, there are also methodological issues and potential biases that can occur with test-negative designs. Care must be taken in defining and correctly identifying persons with the illness or health outcome of interest, so that consistency is maintained over time and potentially across multiple locations. It is important to identify study participants systematically according to pre-defined criteria. The quality and consistency of the tests used is very important, as some types of tests (such as rapid diagnostic tests) are less sensitive/specific compared to others (such as RT-PCR or viral culture); lower quality tests can lead to misclassification of cases vs. controls. In addition, in situations where widespread or mandatory testing is in place (for example, when all incoming patients in a facility are tested for COVID-19, as was common for a period during the pandemic), then asymptomatic individuals could be classified as cases even though they may differ in important ways from other cases that are symptomatic or have more severe disease. There are also potential concerns about how to handle prior infections and prior vaccinations because if the groups differ in a systematic way in these areas it can introduce a bias to the study. For COVID-19 studies, in particular, VE estimates unadjusted for infection history can underestimate VE. There are other potential biases that exist in test negative designs as well. Table 2 presents a summary of key strengths and weaknesses of the test-negative design for studying COVID-19 and influenza.

As with all epidemiological studies, poor study design, inconsistent implementation, and failure to take into consideration important biases and confounders can lead to misleading results. However, when well-designed and implemented with consistency and attention to detail, test-negative study designs can produce accurate estimates of vaccine effectiveness. In fact, studies have shown that effective test-negative designs can produce results highly consistent with randomized trials (the “gold-standard” of epidemiological study designs) when compared directly. The reportedly leaked manuscript of the disputed COVID-19 vaccine study indicates methods that are in line with previously published VE studies of influenza and COVID-19 vaccines, suggesting that the current controversy could be a result of increased scrutiny of COVID-19 vaccine effectiveness studies at this particular moment.

Table 2
Test-negative design for studying COVID-19 and influenza vaccine effectiveness: strengths and limitations
StrengthsPotential Limitations
Reduces biases from health-seeking behavior differences
Cases and controls are both drawn from those seeking health care and the same facilities, which reduces the risk of introducing systematic differences in characteristics/behaviors related to health care seeking behaviors.
Care must be taken to apply consistent case definitions
It is important to identify study participants systematically according to pre-defined criteria applied consistently over time and across locations.  Inconsistencies can introduce bias into the study results.
Efficiency, administrative ease, and flexibility
Typically, it is easier to implement and manage test-negative studies compared to randomized trials or case-control studies relying on community controls because they take place in existing facilities and can be merged with ongoing clinical operations. Test-negative studies can often use existing lab testing and surveillance infrastructure at health facilities to identify cases and controls, meaning researchers do not have to build this infrastructure from scratch.
Poor test quality can bias results
The quality of tests used to identify cases and controls is very important. Some types of tests (such as rapid diagnostic tests) are less sensitive/specific compared to others (such as RT-PCR or viral culture). Poorer quality tests and which can lead to misclassification of cases vs. controls.
Results validated against randomized trials
Well designed and managed test-negative VE studies have produced results consistent with randomized trial VE estimates when compared.
Prior infection status can bias results when not accounted for
Test-negative studies that do not collect information on and/or account for prior infection may produce biased results because prior infection may be associated with vaccinated vs. non-vaccinated status and also affect severity of disease/health outcomes. 
Ethical to use for already approved vaccines
Observational approaches such as the test-negative design are preferable when assessing VE for vaccines already FDA-approved and widely used, as a randomized controlled trial of an existing, approved vaccine is unethical.
Doesn’t work well in universal testing environmentsIn situations with mandatory testing (e.g., when all incoming patients in a facility are tested for COVID-19, as was common for a period during the pandemic), then asymptomatic individuals could be classified as cases though they may differ symptomatic cases.
Sources: Jackson ML, Nelson JC (2013) https://doi.org/10.1016/j.vaccine.2013.02.053, Lipsitch M, Jha A, Simonesen L (2016) https://doi.org/10.1093/ije/dyw124, Tchetgen EJT, Cowling BJ (2016) https://doi.org/10.1093/aje/kww064, Fukushima W, Hirota Y (2017) https://doi.org/10.1016/j.vaccine.2017.07.003, Sullivan SG, Chua HC et.al (2020) 10.1097/EDE.0000000000001116, Dean NE, Hogan JW, Schnitzer NE (2020) https://www.nejm.org/doi/10.1056/NEJMe2113151.

Abortion Coverage Limitations in Medicaid and Private Insurance Plans

Published: Apr 30, 2026

Editorial Note: This brief was originally published on April 30, 2026 and was updated on May 21, 2026 to reflect changes in Pennsylvania

Key Findings

  • The Dobbs decision had a major impact on abortion access across the U.S., resulting in state laws that restrict or prohibit the provision of abortion in a large swath of the nation. In addition to state laws affecting the provision of abortion, some states have addressed abortion coverage options under Medicaid or private insurance by implementing new state laws or in response to court decisions on cases that challenged funding restrictions. Since Dobbs, six states (of a total of 13 states) have implemented policies that require abortion coverage in private plans, and five states have eliminated Medicaid coverage restrictions. 
  • Among the 37 states that do not have laws prohibiting abortion, 17 states and D.C. follow the Hyde Amendment restrictions, which restrict the use of federal funds for all abortions with the exceptions of pregnancies resulting from rape or incest or endanger the life of the pregnant person. However, twenty states use state funds to pay for abortions for Medicaid enrollees beyond the Hyde Amendment restrictions, up from 16 states in 2019. Despite the expansion of abortion funding for Medicaid enrollees, over half of women of reproductive age (15-49) with Medicaid coverage live in a state that follows the Hyde Amendment restrictions (33%) or has a law banning the provision of abortion (19%).
  • Federal and states policies also shape access to coverage for abortion in private insurance plans. States are responsible for regulating fully insured individual, small, and large group plans, including Affordable Care Act (ACA) marketplace plans. Among the states that do not ban the provision of abortion, four impose Hyde-like restrictions on the circumstances under which state regulated private plans may cover abortion.
  • The ACA allows states to enact laws barring all plans participating in the state marketplace from covering abortion. As of January 2026, 25 states prohibit abortion coverage in their ACA Marketplace plans. In contrast, 13 states require all state regulated plans, including Marketplace plans, to include abortion coverage regardless of the circumstances, and the remaining 12 states and D.C. are silent on the issue.
  • A review of the 2026 Marketplace plans in the 12 states and D.C. that have no specific laws requiring or prohibiting abortion coverage finds six states have no Marketplace plans that include abortion coverage. The remaining six states and D.C. have at least one plan in the 2026 Marketplace that includes abortion coverage on the exchange.
  • Abortion coverage remains a focal point of debate in Congress and a target for investigation by the Trump administration. During the failed 2025 negotiations to extend enhanced premium tax credits, there were proposals to ban the use of federal ACA tax credits for Marketplace plans that include abortion benefits. Since then, the administration has issued guidance on the management of non-federal premium funds that ACA plans are required to collect and segregate if they offer abortion coverage and launched investigations aimed at further restricting abortion coverage within these plans.

Introduction

While the 2022 Dobbs decision overturning Roe v. Wade eliminated federal abortion protections and allowed states to ban the provision of abortion, federal and state restrictions on abortion coverage persist even in states without laws that prohibit abortion. State and federal efforts to address insurance and Medicaid coverage of abortion services began soon after the 1973 Supreme Court’s Roe v. Wade decision legalizing abortion and have continued to the present day. Since 1977, the Hyde Amendment, which bans the use of any federal funds for abortion, allowing only exceptions for pregnancies that endanger the life of the pregnant person, or that result from rape or incest, has been a major barrier to coverage of abortion services for low-income women.

Decades later, the issue of abortion coverage was at the heart of many debates in the run up to the passage of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) and subsequently led to renewed legislative efforts at the state level to limit coverage of abortions, this time in private insurance plans. Further federal restrictions on abortion coverage are still being debated in current day policy discussions. Most recently, there have been proposals to ban the use of federal ACA tax credits for Marketplace plans that include abortion as a covered benefit. This policy was recently discussed as part of the failed negotiations to extend the federal tax credits in the fall of 2025. In March 2026, the Trump Administration launched investigations to ascertain whether states that require health insurance plans to cover abortion are violating the Weldon Amendment, a federal law that that prohibits federal funds from going to state or local governments that “discriminate” against health care entities which refuse to provide, pay for, cover, or refer for abortions.

This brief reviews current federal and state policies on Medicaid and insurance coverage of abortion services in the U.S. and presents national and state estimates on the availability of abortion coverage for people enrolled in private plans, Marketplace plans, and Medicaid.

Federal and State Laws Regarding Coverage or Payment for Abortion

Over 1.1 million abortions occurred in the United States in 2025. Federal and state laws, as well as insurers’ coverage policies, shape the extent to which individuals can have coverage for abortion services under both publicly funded programs and private health insurance plans. People who seek an abortion but do not have coverage for the service have to shoulder the out-of-pocket costs of the services (though some clinics offer abortion services on a sliding scale based on income). The cost of an abortion varies depending on factors such as location, facility, timing, and type of procedure. The median cost of a medication abortion is $563, whereas the median cost of a second-trimester abortion is $1,000. Though the vast majority (~93%) of abortions are performed in the first trimester of pregnancy, the costs are challenging for people with lower incomes. Approximately 4% of abortions are performed at 16 weeks or later in the pregnancy. For people with medically complicated health situations or who need abortions later in pregnancy, the costs can be prohibitive. In some cases, individuals find they have to delay their abortion while they take time to raise funds, or they may first learn of a fetal anomaly later in pregnancy when the costs are considerably higher. Prior analysis has found that 43% of women ages 18-49 could not handle a $500 emergency expense using their savings. Across the U.S. abortion coverage restrictions disproportionately affects low-income people, who have limited ability to pay for abortion services with out-of-pocket funds.

Since 1977, federal law has banned the use of any federal funds for abortion unless the pregnancy is a result of rape, incest, or if it is determined to endanger the pregnant person’s life. This rule, also known as the Hyde Amendment, is not a permanent law; rather it has been attached annually to Congressional appropriations bills for the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and has been approved every year by Congress. The Hyde Amendment restricts federal abortion funding under Medicaid, Indian Health Service, Medicare, and the Children’s Health Insurance Program. Over the years, similar language has been incorporated into a range of other federal programs that provide or pay for health services for people who could become pregnant, including the military TRICARE program, the Peace Corps, the Federal Employees Health Benefits program and federal prisons. The Department of Veteran Affairs, which provides coverage for military veterans and their families, does not cover abortion nor abortion counseling for their beneficiaries, with limited exceptions for people whose life is endangered. State level policies also have a large impact on how insurance and Medicaid cover abortions, particularly since states are responsible for operating Medicaid programs and regulating insurance plans.

Medicaid

The Medicaid program, a federally and state funded program, serves millions of low-income women and is a major funder of reproductive health services nationally. Approximately two-thirds of adult women enrolled in Medicaid are in their reproductive years. As discussed earlier, the federal Hyde Amendment restricts state Medicaid programs from using federal funds to cover abortions beyond the cases of life endangerment, rape, or incest, however, a state may use its own funds to cover abortions in other circumstances. Currently, 20 states use state-only funds to pay for abortions for women on Medicaid in circumstances different from those federal limitations set in the Hyde Amendment. In the years following the Dobbs decision, four states—Colorado, Delaware, Nevada and Rhode Island—have eliminated Medicaid abortion coverage restrictions, either via a new state law or a court decision. On April 24, 2026, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court ruled that the state’s ban on Medicaid coverage for abortion services was unconstitutional, but following an appeal from the state’s Attorney General on May 20, 2026, the court’s decision is paused while the appeal is pending. In 17 states that do not prohibit the provision of abortion and the District of Columbia, Medicaid programs do not pay for any abortions beyond the Hyde exceptions. The 13 states that currently have laws prohibiting abortion provision also follow the Hyde restrictions. Nearly half of women with Medicaid coverage live in states that use their own funds to pay for abortion services, beyond the federal Hyde limitations (Figure 1).

Over Half of Women of Reproductive Age with Medicaid Coverage Live in a State that Follows Hyde Amendment Standards or Currently Bans the Provision of Abortion (Donut Chart)

Since the Dobbs ruling, many states have enacted laws that prohibit or highly restrict abortion and do not necessarily allow exceptions for rape or incest. As of March 2026, thirteen states have laws that ban the provision of abortion, and while all of these laws contain exceptions to safeguard the life of the pregnant person, most do not have exceptions for cases of rape or incest, and therefore, would not allow for the provision of those services to Medicaid enrollees in those states. Most Medicaid enrollees living in states where abortion provision is prohibited are not able to use their coverage in their state for an abortion that qualifies as a Hyde circumstance and those who can travel out of state will most likely not be able to find a provider able to bill their home state’s Medicaid program.

Additionally, some states have extensive reporting requirements for cases of rape and incest. A 2019 GAO study found that some states have requirements for people claiming abortion coverage under Hyde that include provider certification of rape, incest, or life endangerment; beneficiary certification of rape or incest; official documentation (such as police report or report with a public health agency) of rape or incest; prior authorization by the state Medicaid program; and prior certification of counseling for the abortion. Since 2013, Iowa has required formal approval from the Office of the Governor to secure reimbursement for any abortions covered by Medicaid.

Although Hyde abortions are not accessible in states where laws prohibit the provision of abortion, federal courts have ruled that the Medicaid statute, as modified by the Hyde Amendment, requires states to pay for abortions that fall under the Hyde Exceptions and have blocked enforcement of state statutes that prohibit coverage for these exceptions. The Hyde Amendment requires coverage in cases of rape, incest, and life endangerment. In 1998, in a letter to all the state Medicaid directors explaining a change to the Hyde Amendment, Health and Human Services stated that: “All abortions covered by the Hyde Amendment, including those abortions related to rape or incest, are medically necessary services and are required to be provided by states participating in the Medicaid program.” However, a 2022 Congressional Research Service (CRS) overview of the Hyde Amendment, published after the Dobbs decision, lists open questions, such as whether payment for travel for abortion services also falls under the scope of the Hyde Amendment and conjectures that the interplay of state abortion laws and the Amendment may be relitigated. Despite this clear guidance, and court precedent, historically the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) has not taken any enforcement action against states for failing to comply with covering abortion in all of the circumstances required by Hyde.

Private Insurance

States are responsible for regulating fully insured individual, small, and large group plans issued in their state. This includes plans available through the ACA marketplace and plans purchased by some employers for their workers. State laws have jurisdiction over whether abortion coverage is included or excluded in private plans that are not self-insured (which are regulated by the federal government under ERISA). Four states (Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska, Utah) that do have laws prohibiting the provision of abortion impose restrictions on the circumstances under which insurance will cover abortions (Appendix Table 1). Six states with highly restrictive abortion laws—Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, North Dakota, Oklahoma, and Texas—also have private insurance restrictions in place. Utah limits private insurance plans regulated by the state from covering abortion unless the abortion is necessary to save the life of the mother or avert serious risk of loss of a major bodily function, if the fetus has a defect as documented by a physician that is uniformly diagnosable and lethal, and in cases of rape or incest. Kansas, Missouri, and Nebraska only allow fully insured private plans regulated by the state to cover abortion when it is necessary to save the woman’s life, and abortions under all other circumstances are not covered.

While some states allow insurers to sell riders for abortion coverage on the private market, a KFF analysis conducted prior to the Dobbs decision found that no insurers offered abortion riders to people insured through individually purchased plans, and only one insurance company in one state offered an abortion rider in the group market. The lack of abortion riders leaves people insured by private plans in these states with no option to secure coverage for abortion services. Utah law specifically prohibits abortion coverage riders.

Just as some states proscribe insurance plans from covering abortion, other states require plans to include abortion as a covered service. Currently, 13 states require all state-regulated private health plans, including Marketplace plans, to include coverage for abortion. Ten of these states also require no cost-sharing for abortion services—Illinois and Minnesota allow cost-sharing if there is cost-sharing for similar services in the plan, and Delaware only prohibits cost-sharing for abortions over $750. California and Washington require all plans, including individual and employer plans, to treat abortion coverage and maternity coverage neutrally, meaning that all plans are required to include both maternity and abortion coverage.

ACA Marketplace Plans

All plans offered on the ACA Marketplaces must provide coverage for 10 Essential Health Benefits (EHB), including maternity care and prescription drugs. Abortion services, however, are explicitly excluded from the list of EHBs that all plans are required to offer. Under federal law, no plan is required to cover abortion and states can enact laws that bar all plans participating in the state Marketplace from covering abortions. As of January 2026, 25 states have passed laws that prohibit abortion coverage in their ACA Marketplace plans and an additional 12 states and D.C. are silent on the issue. The remaining 13 states require all ACA plans to cover abortion (Figure 2). All 13 states with laws prohibiting the provision of abortion, except for West Virginia, have laws in place that also prohibit abortion coverage. Most state laws include narrow exceptions for pregnant people whose pregnancies endanger their life or are the result of rape or incest. The ACA prohibits plans in the state Marketplaces from discriminating against any provider because of “unwillingness” to provide abortions.

In 31 States, ACA Exchange Plans Do Not Offer Plans With Abortion Coverage (Choropleth map)

In a KFF review of the 2026 Marketplace plan statement of benefits and plan brochures in the 12 states and D.C. that have no laws requiring or prohibiting abortion coverage, six states (Iowa, Michigan, New Mexico, Nevada, West Virginia, and Wyoming) do not have any Marketplace plans that include abortion coverage (Figure 3). Six states (Alaska, Connecticut, Hawaii, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Virginia) and D.C. have at least one plan in their 2026 ACA Marketplace that includes abortion coverage. Although Michigan repealed their state’s ban on abortion coverage in Marketplace plans in 2023, this analysis found that while many plans in the state do not cover abortion, the statement of benefits in many other plans are silent regarding coverage or exclusion of abortion services. As a combined result of the state laws and insurance company choices, individuals in 31 states currently do not have access to a qualified health plan that includes coverage for abortions.

Thirteen States Now Require Marketplace Plans to Cover Abortion Services, An Increase from 2019 (Stacked Bars)

While the reasons why issuers in states that permit abortion coverage choose to exclude abortion coverage are not known, it is possible that the complexity of the requirements specific only to abortion coverage could be a deterrent to the plans. Plans that choose to include abortion coverage are also subject to additional reporting standards and audit requirements, and must also charge a separate premium for the coverage.

Compared to 2019, the last time KFF conducted a review of abortion coverage in ACA marketplace plans, more states now require abortion coverage in their marketplace plans (4 states vs 13 states). Six states (Colorado, Delaware, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, Vermont) have passed laws following the Dobbs decision requiring all state regulated private plans, including ACA marketplace plans, to cover abortion services. Overall, 19 states and D.C. currently have Marketplace plans that offer abortion coverage, compared to 16 states and D.C. in 2019. Many of the states that now require coverage previously had no laws requiring or prohibiting coverage but had at least one plan that offered abortion coverage in 2019, including Vermont, Maryland, and Colorado. For individuals living in one of the six states and D.C. that have no laws requiring or restricting coverage and do offer at least one plan with abortion coverage, the actual availability of coverage depends on whether there is a plan offered in their area that includes abortion services since not all plans are offered across the whole state. For example, in Virginia, Kaiser Permanente plans are the only ones that offer abortion coverage for ACA Marketplace enrollees.  

The combination of federal and state abortion provision and coverage policies has constrained options in many states. Not surprisingly, for people living in the 13 states where the provision of abortion is prohibited, regardless of their type of insurance coverage, access to abortion services within their state is extremely limited or essentially nonexistent (except for abortion medications obtained through the mail). However, in many states without these laws, abortion coverage is also limited. In four of those states, people enrolled in Medicaid, private, and Marketplace plans, have practically no abortion coverage options (Figure 4). In eight additional states, individuals who qualify for Medicaid or who are insured through their state Marketplace also do not have access to abortion coverage; in five other states and DC, people enrolled in Medicaid have extremely limited coverage. Six of these states do not offer any 2026 Marketplace plans that include abortion coverage.

State Policies on Abortion Coverage for Medicaid, Private Insurance, and ACA Exchange Plan Enrollees in 2026 (Choropleth map)

Special Rules for Billing and Payment for Marketplace Plans that Include Abortion Coverage

In the 19 states & DC that either require coverage of abortions in Marketplace plans or have no restrictions or requirements for abortion coverage but offer at least one plan that covers abortion, abortion coverage must be paid for using non-federal dollars. Plans must notify consumers of the abortion coverage as part of the Summary of Benefits and Coverage (SBC) explanation at the time of enrollment. The ACA outlines a methodology for states and insurers to follow to ensure that no federal funds are used towards coverage for abortions beyond the Hyde limitations. Any plan that covers abortions beyond Hyde limitations must estimate the actuarial value of such coverage by accounting for the cost of the abortion benefit (valued at least $1 per enrollee per month) and segregate these funds from other premium funds. This estimate cannot take into account any savings that plans may achieve as a result of the patients having abortions (such as the costs of prenatal care or delivery).

The segregated funds for abortion coverage that are sitting with the plans have grown over the last 15 years. In July 2025, Maryland allocated the funds remaining in these accounts to be used to help pay for expenses of patients who travel to Maryland for an abortion. In response to state actions and building interest to reallocate these funds to support abortion services, in December 2025, CMS issued new guidance addressing how ACA Marketplace plans use the segregated funds collected from enrollees for non-Hyde abortion coverage. The new guidance states that ACA plans only need to segregate the funds for the current coverage year. At the end of the plan year, after all claims have been paid, plans may treat the premium funds collected for the coverage of non-Hyde abortions the same as other premiums funds collected, meaning that the plans can keep the funds for other uses, not just for abortion services.

Appendix

Scope of Abortion Coverage in Medicaid and Private Plans, by State as of May 2026 (Table)
News Release

Survey Offers Early Look at States’ Differing Approaches to Implementing Medicaid Work Requirements Amid Cost and Time Constraints and Uncertainty from Delayed Federal Guidance

Many States Seek Less Restrictive Policies and Automated Verification Where Possible, While Seven States Plan for More Restrictive Verification or Early Implementation

Published: Apr 30, 2026

A new KFF survey of state Medicaid officials and focus groups in eight states captures the different choices states are making about how to implement Medicaid work requirements, with seven states planning for a more restrictive approach to verifying work or exemption status or to implement work requirements early. These implementation plans are taking shape as states encounter time, cost, and other constraints as well as uncertainty about how to define and verify certain exemptions due to delayed federal guidance.

The 2025 reconciliation law requires adults in the 43 states (including DC) covered through the Affordable Care Act (ACA) Medicaid expansion and partial expansion waiver programs (Georgia and Wisconsin) to meet work requirements starting January 1, 2027.

Though planning for the implementation of work requirements continues, states have reported making several important policy choices—all of which can affect the level of burden placed on Medicaid enrollees and applicants as well as Medicaid staff capacity:

  • Additional verification: Four states (Arkansas, Idaho, Indiana, and New Hampshire) currently plan to adopt more restrictive compliance verification policies than required by law by applying longer look-back periods at application or renewal. Two of these states (Indiana and New Hampshire) will also conduct more frequent (quarterly) compliance checks.
  • Early implementation: Three states report plans to implement work requirements earlier than required by law (January 2027): Iowa, Montana, and Nebraska. Arkansas says it will launch a “soft implementation” of work requirements in 2026, with no disenrollments occurring until the official start in January 2027.
  • Automating verification: Eighteen states say they will use new data sources to further automate verification of work requirements and non-medical exemptions, including data sources to verify school attendance, community service, and exemptions for veterans and individuals recently released from incarceration, while half of states have not yet made a decision. States are also exploring ways to verify who is medically frail and exempt from work requirements, with most indicating they will use Medicaid claims data and other data sources to automate the process. Many would also like to allow “self-attestation” from enrollees and applicants. States will not be able to implement the exemption until they have a detailed federal definition of who qualifies as medically frail and whether statements that attest to medical frailty (known as “self-attestation”) will be allowed under federal rules.
  • Hardship exceptions: Twenty-nine states plan to adopt at least one of four types of hardship exception for individuals facing extenuating circumstances, including exemptions for individuals who live in high-unemployment areas or areas experiencing a natural disaster, individuals receiving care in a hospital or nursing facility, and those who must travel for medical care. Only two states (Iowa and Indiana) do not plan to adopt any hardship exceptions.

Amid these early implementation decisions and plans, states face a variety of challenges and uncertainties:

  • Resource constraints: To reduce Medicaid enrollee and administrative burden, states are required to use data from available and reliable sources to check for compliance with or exemption from work requirements. However, states say their efforts to leverage new data to automate verification processes are constrained by time, costs, staff capacity, and other limitations.
  • Federal guidance: States are waiting for federal guidance about how to define certain exemptions as well as community engagement activities and what verification methods will be accepted. In particular, states would like more federal guidance on who qualifies as medically frail and as a caregiver as well as how to define caregiving. Even as they move forward with new systems and other changes, states expressed concerns about the risks and added costs of making decisions before guidance has been finalized.

In addition to information on work requirements, KFF’s survey collected information on a wide range of eligibility, enrollment, and renewal policies, some of which may affect how states implement work requirements. Those findings are included in a related report, some of which are highlighted below:

  • Artificial intelligence: Six states (Arkansas, California, Maryland, Missouri, New Mexico, and Oklahoma) say they are using artificial intelligence (AI) to assist with implementing work requirements, while most other states are still exploring options. A small but growing number of state Medicaid programs are also using AI to support consumer assistance, most often through a chatbot to answer questions or by assisting enrollees in updating their contact information, saving eligibility or call center workers time in manually collecting and updating the information.
  • SNAP data: Fifteen states use verified income data from the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) to enroll individuals into or renew enrollees’ Medicaid coverage. SNAP data can also be used to verify compliance with work requirements or exemptions.

A companion survey from KFF provides a baseline for Medicaid eligibility, enrollment, and renewal policies for seniors and people with disabilities ahead of potential changes to the program stemming from the 2025 reconciliation law.

The 24th annual survey of state Medicaid and Children’s Health Insurance (CHIP) program officials was conducted between January and March 2026 by KFF and the Georgetown University Center for Children and Families. The Survey of Medicaid Financial Eligibility for Older Adults & People with Disabilities was conducted in March 2026 by KFF and Watts Health Policy Consulting. Overall, 49 states and the District of Columbia responded to both surveys. (Florida was the only state that did not respond).

For the latest and most comprehensive information on Medicaid work requirements, visit KFF’s interactive tracker, which includes state-level data on Medicaid enrollment and renewal outcomes as well as current state enrollment and renewal policies. KFF’s tracker also offers the latest federal guidance, key policy and operational questions, and information on current 1115 work requirements waiver requests and approvals.