How Many People Use Medicaid Long-Term Services and Supports and How Much Does Medicaid Spend on Those People?

Published: Aug 14, 2023

Data Note

In 2020, KFF estimates that 4.2 million people used Medicaid long-term services and supports (LTSS) delivered in home and community settings and 1.6 million used LTSS delivered in institutional settings (Figure 1). LTSS encompass the broad range of paid and unpaid medical and personal care services that assist with activities of daily living (such as eating, bathing, and dressing) and instrumental activities of daily living (such as preparing meals, managing medication, and housekeeping). They are provided to people who need such services because of aging, chronic illness, or disability and may be provided in institutional settings such as nursing facilities or in people’s homes and the community. Services provided in non-institutional settings are usually referred to as home- and community-based services (HCBS) and include a wide range of services such as adult daycare, home health, personal care, transportation, and supported employment. In 2020, Medicaid was the primary payer for LTSS, covering over half of all LTSS spending in in the U.S. Despite Medicaid’s significant role in funding LTSS in the U.S., eligibility for Medicaid LTSS is complex and varies widely by state. This data note provides an overview of Medicaid coverage of LTSS, KFF estimates of how many Medicaid enrollees used LTSS in 2020, how much Medicaid spent on enrollees who used LTSS, and policy issues to watch in the coming years. Key takeaways include:

  • In 2020, there were 5.6 million people who used Medicaid LTSS, of which 4.0 million (72%) used only HCBS, 1.4 million (24%) used only institutional care, and 0.2 million used both (4%) (Figure 1). The share of people using Medicaid LTSS only in home and community-based settings ranged from 45% in Maine to 94% in North Carolina (Figure 2).
  • Medicaid spending per-person was nearly nine times higher for people who used LTSS than for those who did not use LTSS ($38,769 vs. $4,480), with particularly high spending for people who used institutional LTSS (Figure 4).
  • People who used Medicaid LTSS comprised 6% of Medicaid enrollment but 37% of federal and state Medicaid spending, reflecting the generally high cost of LTSS and more extensive health needs that lead to higher use of other health care services and drugs (Figure 5).

KFF’s estimates differ from the number of people using Medicaid LTSS reported by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), which found that about 11 million Medicaid enrollees used LTSS in 2019. CMS counts are higher than KFF counts because CMS defines LTSS more broadly and includes enrollees who may only use LTSS on a single day. CMS counts include people who are using services such as behavioral health, rehabilitation, health homes, and case management, but no other LTSS, whereas KFF only included enrollees if they were using the services identified in the data note below. CMS also counted people as using LTSS if they had one or more claims for a service, but KFF’s definition aims to capture only people who are using the services on an ongoing basis.

Nearly 6 Million Medicaid Enrollees Used LTSS in 2020

What are Medicaid Long-Term Services and Supports?

Medicaid LTSS are generally classified by the location in which they are provided: either in an institutional setting or in home- and community-based settings, also known as HCBS. Institutional care includes care provided in a nursing facility, which is a mandatory Medicaid benefit, and care provided in an intermediate care facility for people with intellectual disabilities, which is an optional benefit that all states currently choose to cover. HCBS include a broader range of benefits, which are all optional except for home health care. HCBS first became available as a Medicaid “waiver” option and in that capacity, services were generally available to certain types of Medicaid enrollees such as those with intellectual disabilities or those with physical disabilities.

In the last 20 years, several new authorities have been created, allowing states to also offer HCBS through the Medicaid state plan (see Appendix Table 1 for a list of HCBS authorities). If services are provided through a state plan, they must be offered to all eligible individuals. In contrast, services provided under waivers, such as 1115s or 1915(c)s, may be restricted to specific groups based on geographic region, income, or type of disability. Waivers may also include a wider range of service types than can be provided under state plans. Historically, Medicaid spent more money on LTSS in institutional settings than on LTSS delivered in home and community-based settings, but initiatives to balance HCBS and institutional care have changed that trend. Since 2013, Medicaid has spent more on HCBS than institutional care.

How Many People Used Medicaid LTSS in 2020?

In 2020, there were 5.6 million people who used Medicaid LTSS, of which 4.0 million (72%) used only HCBS, 1.4 million (24%) used only institutional care, and 0.2 million used both (4%) (Figure 1). These counts and shares did not change notably between 2018 and 2020. KFF’s current count of the number of people using Medicaid LTSS is lower than the number of people using LTSS reported by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) because KFF only counted people as using LTSS if they used institutional care or HCBS on an ongoing basis. CMS included a broader set of services in their definition of LTSS and did not require people to use the services on an ongoing basis. KFF’s current counts also differ somewhat from KFF’s annual HCBS survey on account of differences in how states report data in surveys versus how they are reflected in the claims. For example, states do not report unduplicated counts of total enrollees across different types of benefits in KFF’s survey data. See methods for more detail.

In 2020, nearly three-quarters (72%) of people who used Medicaid LTSS were exclusively served in home and community-based settings, but this ranged from 45% in Maine to 94% in North Carolina (Figure 2). The larger share of people receiving care in the community as opposed to in an institution reflects initiatives to make home and community-based care more widely available in recent years and to remove what has been referred to as the “institutional bias” in Medicaid. The shift towards HCBS is readily apparent in analyses of Medicaid spending on LTSS: The percentage of LTSS spending that pays for HCBS has increased from only 12% in 1988 to 59% in 2019. While the number of people using Medicaid HCBS exceeds the number who use institutional care nationally, several states still serve fewer than half of people in exclusively home and community-based settings. Over 5% of Medicaid LTSS users in eight states (MN, IN, TN, NJ, IL, CT, KS, and OH) used both institutional care and HCBS. Such people may have transitioned between institutional and community-based settings due to changes in their level of need during the year.

The Percentage of People Who Used Medicaid LTSS in Only Home and Community Settings Was 72% Nationally But Varied Across States

Among the 4.2 million people who used HCBS in 2020, at least 1.9 million used services provided through a state plan such as home health and personal care and at least 1.7 million received services through a waiver (Figure 3). Federal Medicaid statute requires states to cover home health, but the remainder of HCBS are optional. An additional 837,000 people used other HCBS services that were a mix of state plan and waiver services. Among people who used home health, personal care, and “other” HCBS, 0.5 million used more than one type of HCBS. (KFF categorized people using waiver services as only using waiver services, although in some states, people could potentially receive services through a waiver and through the state plan.) In most states, the range of benefits available through a waiver are more comprehensive than those available through the state plan (see Appendix Table), but most states limit the number of people who may use waiver services, often resulting in waiting lists. In a 2022 survey of states HCBS programs, states reported that there were 656,000 people on waiting lists, with people waiting an average of 45 months to receive waiver services.

Similar Numbers of Medicaid Enrollees Used HCBS Provided Through Medicaid State Plans and Through Waivers

What Do We Know About Spending for People Who Used Medicaid LTSS in 2020?

Medicaid spending per-person is higher for people who use institutional LTSS and people who use HCBS when compared to those who do not use any LTSS, but spending for people using institutional LTSS is particularly high (Figure 4). In 2020, Medicaid spending—including LTSS and other services such as hospital care and prescription drugs—for the 5.6 million enrollees who used Medicaid LTSS, totaled nearly $217 billion. Per-person spending for these enrollees was $38,769. In comparison, Medicaid spent $4,480 per enrollee who did not use Medicaid LTSS, although that total includes children who comprise 40% of Medicaid enrollees and tend to have much lower spending per person. Medicaid spent an average of $36,275 per person for people who used HCBS and $47,279 per person for people who used institutional LTSS.

Medicaid Enrollees Who Used LTSS Had High Per-Enrollee Spending

People who used Medicaid LTSS comprised 6% of Medicaid enrollment but 37% of federal and state Medicaid spending (Figure 5). The 5% of Medicaid enrollees who used HCBS comprised 26% of Medicaid spending and the 2% of Medicaid enrollees who used institutional LTSS comprised 13% of Medicaid spending. High per-person Medicaid spending among enrollees who use LTSS likely reflects the generally high cost of LTSS and more extensive health needs among such groups that lead to higher use of other health care services and drugs as well.

Medicaid Enrollees Who Used LTSS Had Disproportionately High Medicaid Spending in 2020

What Current Policy Questions Could Affect People Who Use Medicaid LTSS?

The COVID-19 pandemic greatly exacerbated shortages of LTSS workers, and many policy questions pertain to expanding the workforce caring for people who use Medicaid LTSS. Recent analysis on the Peterson-KFF Health System Tracker shows that, as of June 2023, the number of workers in LTSS settings was measurably lower than in early 2020. Shortages and high turnover among LTSS workers reflect demanding working conditions and relatively low wages. Workforce shortages have negative effects on the quality of care provided in institutional LTSS settings, and often result in people getting fewer hours or types of HCBS than they need. During the pandemic, states relied on family caregivers to help fill some of those gaps, but many pandemic-era policies will end in November 2023 if they are not transitioned into permanent policies.

The federal government may use its authority to require increased staffing for Medicaid LTSS, but it is not clear what the exact policies will be or how they will be implemented. The Biden Administration is expected to release a proposed rule that would increase nursing facility staffing levels in the near future, but it is unknown what the new staffing levels might be. KFF analysis finds that although nearly all facilities would meet a requirement of 2.5 or fewer HPRD and 85% of facilities would meet a requirement of 3.0 HPRD, but close to half (45%) of all nursing facilities would not meet a 3.5 HPRD requirements, and only 29% would meet an HPRD of 4.0. For HCBS, the Biden Administration recently released a proposed rule aimed at ensuring access to Medicaid services, which has several notable provisions aimed at addressing HCBS workforce challenges. Notably, the states would be required to report payment rates for certain HCBS, to demonstrate that payment rates are “adequate” to provide the level of services in enrollees’ personalized care plans, and to ensure at least 80% of payments are passed through to worker compensation for certain types of HCBS. Higher staffing levels could increase payment rates and spending for LTSS, but it’s unknown who would pay those additional costs.

Although most states have increased payment rates for LTSS, it is unclear where additional funding would come from to further increase payment rates and engage additional staff. In an FY 2022 survey conducted of Medicaid officials in all 50 states and D.C., 44 states implemented Medicaid rate increases in FY 2022 for nursing facilities. Similarly, a 2022 survey of Medicaid HCBS programs found that nearly all states reported experiencing shortages of direct care workers and many reported adopting policies to bolster the HCBS workforce, such as providing recruitment or retention bonuses and increasing provider payment rates. Many of the HCBS initiatives were funded by extra federal funding available through the American Rescue Plan Act, but as that funding expires, states will have to find alternative funding sources if they want to maintain spending levels.

Looking ahead, as the population continues to age, it is likely that more people will need Medicaid LTSS and that workforce challenges will persist. The data on LTSS users provide a rich source of information about who is using LTSS and this data note highlights how many people are currently using LTSS and what types of LTSS they are using.

Appendix Table 1: Medicaid Authorities for Home and Community-Based Services
State Plan Benefits
Home Health ServicesRequired
  • Part-time or intermittent nursing services, home health aide services, and medical supplies, equipment and appliances suitable for use in the home
  • At state option – physical therapy, occupational therapy, and speech pathology and audiology services
Home Health in T-MSIS
Personal CareOptional
  • Assistance with self-care (e.g., bathing, dressing) and household activities (e.g., preparing meals)
Personal Care in T-MSIS
Section 1915(i)Optional
  • Case management, homemaker/home health aide/personal care services, adult day health, habilitation, respite, day treatment/partial hospitalization, psychosocial rehabilitation, chronic mental health clinic services, and/or other services approved by the Secretary
  • Beneficiaries must be at risk of institutional care
  • Population targeting permitted
Personal Care or Other in T-MSIS
Section 1915(j)Optional
  • Allows people who are using HCBS to “self-direct” their services
  • Self-direction allows people to choose their own providers, establish payment rates, and allocated different services within a fixed budget
Home Health, Personal Care, or Other in T-MSIS
Community First Choice (1915(k))Optional
  • Attendant services and supports for beneficiaries who would otherwise require institutional care
  • Income up to 150% FPL or eligible for benefit package that includes nursing home services; state option to expand financial eligibility to those eligible for HCBS waiver
Personal Care or Other in T-MSIS
HCBS Waivers
Section 1915(c)Optional
  • Same services as available under Section 1915 (i)
  • Beneficiaries must otherwise require institutional care
  • Secretary can waive regular program income and asset limits
  • Cost neutrality required (average per enrollee cost of HCBS cannot exceed average per enrollee cost of institutional care)
  • Enrollment caps and waiting lists permitted
  • Geographic limits permitted
  • Population targeting permitted
1915(c) in T-MSIS*
Section 1115Optional
  • Secretary can waive certain Medicaid requirements and allow states to use Medicaid funds in ways that are not otherwise allowable under federal rules for experimental, pilot, or demonstration projects that are likely to assist in promoting program objectives
  • Federal budget neutrality required
  • HCBS enrollment caps permitted
1115 Waiver in T-MSIS*
NOTES: *Indicates the primary category in which KFF categorizes people who use HCBS, though not all states use all fields, so in some cases, many people will be grouped with home health or personal care even though they are using those services under another authority.

Methods

Methods

Data: The KFF State Health Facts on people who use LTSS use the T-MSIS Research Identifiable Demographic-Eligibility and Claims Files (T-MSIS data). Current State Health Facts include data from CY 2018, 2019, and 2020, but the methodology is intended to be applied in all years from 2016 onwards. Each year of data generally has multiple different releases and different releases will produce different counts of people using LTSS.

Overview of Methods: KFF included all people with at least one month of Medicaid enrollment who were using the following types of LTSS: institutional care (care provided in a nursing facility or intermediate care facility) and HCBS (home health, personal care, 1915(c) waiver, 1115 waiver, and “other” HCBS). Several summary level indicators categorize people who used specific types of LTSS as using only institutional care, only HCBS, or both types of care. KFF categorized claims using the type-of-service code from the first line claim, which was applied to the header claim in a merged dataset. More details are below.

Institutional LTSS: KFF defined enrollees who used institutional LTSS if they had a claim for care provided at either a nursing facility or intermediate care facility (see table below).

TOS_CD ValuesKFF Categorization Of Type of Institutional LTSS Description
9Nursing FacilityNursing facility services for individuals age 21 or older (other than services in an institution for mental disease)
45Nursing FacilityNursing facility services for individuals age 65 or older in institutions for mental diseases
46Intermediate Care FacilityIntermediate care facility (ICF)/Intermediate Care Facilities for individuals with Intellectual Disabilities (IIDICF)/Individuals with Intellectual Disabilities (IID) services
47Nursing FacilityNursing facility services, other than in institutions for mental diseases
59Nursing FacilitySkilled nursing facility services for individuals under age 21

Home and Community-Based Services: KFF used eligibility information and claims files to identify people who used HCBS.

  1. Enrollees who had at least one month of 1915(c) enrollment (WVR_1915C_MOS > 0) were identified as using 1915(c) waiver services.
  2. For people who did not have any enrollment in a 1915(c) waiver, KFF used the claims to determine whether they were using HCBS, including home health, personal care, or other HCBS (see table below).
  3. If enrollees used home health, personal care, or other HCBS; and were enrolled in an 1115 waiver (WVR_TYPE_CD equal to 01 or 29), and lived in a state that provided HCBS through an 1115 waiver, they were identified as using 1115 waiver services. From 2018-2020, the following states provided HCBS through an 1115 waiver: AZ, AR, CA, DE, HI, KS, MD, MN, NJ, NM, NY, RI, TN, TX, VT, and WA.
  4. For enrollees who used HCBS but were not enrolled in a 1915(c) or 1115 waiver as described above, KFF categorized the types of services they were using as home health, personal care, or other HCBS. Enrollees could use multiple types of HCBS in those categories. KFF compared the T-MSIS data to older HCBS surveys from 2018 and 2020 and identified discrepancies which suggest that the “other HCBS” group likely includes some people using HCBS through a 1915 state plan authority and some people using HCBS through a waiver in states that did not populate 1915(c) information on the eligibility file.
    • KFF counted only the enrollees with the top 50% of home health claims in each state as people who used home health to exclude people who used short-term home health. The cut-off point reflects the distribution of home health claim counts per enrollee in each state and was selected to calibrate counts such that the number of people using LTSS in each state was similar to the number identified in the older KFF surveys. The specific claim count cut-off varied by state and year. In 2020, the claim counts for the top 50% of people who used home health services in each state ranged from 1 claim in Utah to 28 claims in Massachusetts.
    • Similarly, KFF counted only enrollees with the top 75% of personal care claims as people who used personal care in each state. The claim count cut-off varies by state and year. In 2020, the claim counts for the top 75% of people who used personal care services in each state ranged from 2 claims in Illinois and Delaware to 126 claims in Massachusetts.
TOS_CD ValuesKFF Categorization Of Type of HCBS Description
16Home HealthHome health services — Nursing services
17Home HealthHome health services — Home health aide services
18Home HealthHome health services — Medical supplies, equipment, and appliances suitable for use in the home
19Home HealthHome health services — Physical therapy provided by a home health agency or by a facility licensed by the State to provide medical rehabilitation services
20Home HealthHome health services — Occupational therapy provided by a home health agency or by a facility licensed by the State to provide medical rehabilitation services
21Home HealthHome health services — Speech pathology and audiology services provided by a home health agency or by a facility licensed by the State to provide medical rehabilitation services
51Personal CarePersonal care services
62Other HCBSHCBS — Case management services
63Other HCBSHCBS — Homemaker services
64Home HealthHCBS — Home health aide services
65Personal CareHCBS — Personal care services
66Other HCBSHCBS — Adult day health services
67Other HCBSHCBS — Habilitation services
68Other HCBSHCBS — Respite care services
69Other HCBSHCBS — Day treatment or other partial hospitalization services, psychosocial rehabilitation services and clinic services (whether or not furnished in a facility) for individuals with chronic mental illness
70Other HCBSHCBS — Day Care
71Other HCBSHCBS — Training for family members
72Other HCBSHCBS — Minor modification to the home
73Other HCBSHCBS — Other services requested by the agency and approved by CMS as cost effective and necessary to avoid institutionalization
74Other HCBSHCBS — Expanded habilitation services — Prevocational services
75Other HCBSHCBS — Expanded habilitation services — Educational services
76Other HCBSHCBS — Expanded habilitation services — Supported employment services, which facilitate paid employment
77Other HCBSHCBS65-plus — Case management services
78Other HCBSHCBS-65-plus — Homemaker services
79Home HealthHCBS-65-plus — Home health aide services
80Personal CareHCBS-65-plus — Personal care services
81Other HCBSHCBS-65-plus — Adult day health services
82Other HCBSHCBS-65-plus — Respite care services
83Other HCBSHCBS-65-plus — Other medical and social services
144Other HCBSPayments to individuals for personal assistance services under 1915(j)
Notes: Only people who were not enrolled in either an 1915(c) or 1115 waiver were grouped into home health, personal care, and other HCBS based on the types of service they were using.

Key Limitations: For HCBS, where there are few established benchmarks on the number of people using services, KFF calibrated the selection criteria such that state-level counts were similar to the results from KFF’s HCBS survey. For most states, the approach yielded reasonable results but in several cases, there were significant discrepancies between the survey data and the T-MSIS output. Examples include Maine (where the 1915(c) enrollees appear to be showing up as people who used state plan services), Rhode Island (which has low counts of people using HCBS in all categories), and Wisconsin (where the 1915(c) enrollees are showing up as people who used other HCBS).

Do State Decisions to Prioritize Renewals for Medicaid Enrollees Who are Likely Ineligible Affect Early Disenrollment Rates?

Authors: Bradley Corallo, Jennifer Tolbert, and Robin Rudowitz
Published: Aug 11, 2023

As states resumed disenrolling people from Medicaid earlier this year as part of the “unwinding” of the continuous enrollment provision, early data have shown wide variation in disenrollment rates across states, ranging from 82% of completed renewals in Texas to 10% in Michigan. Although there are a range of state policy choices and other factors contributing to this variation, this policy watch examines which states are prioritizing renewals for enrollees that were flagged as likely ineligible and what effect that may have on disenrollment rates early in the unwinding period.

Prior to the start of the unwinding, many states flagged enrollees they deemed as likely ineligible. Although states could not disenroll anyone while the continuous enrollment provision, many states identified people as likely ineligible if there was information available showing the enrollee had a change in circumstance (e.g., aged out of children’s coverage), a change in income that would make them ineligible, or if they did not respond to renewal requests.

Early data from three states (Arizona, Idaho, and Pennsylvania) show that disenrollment rates for flagged enrollees are higher than for other enrollees. While several states publish total disenrollments among flagged enrollees, only Arizona, Idaho, and Pennsylvania publish enough information to be able to compare disenrollment rates for flagged enrollees to overall disenrollment rates. Based on early unwinding data, the disenrollment rate for flagged enrollees in each of these states exceeded the overall disenrollment rate by about 20 percentage points (Figure 1).

State-Reported Medicaid Disenrollments as a Share of Total Completed Renewals, Flagged Enrollees versus All Enrollees

Some states are prioritizing renewals for enrollees flagged as likely ineligible early in the unwinding period. States have taken different approaches to processing renewals during the unwinding period and some states have chosen to prioritize renewals for enrollees they identified as likely no longer eligible during the first six months. Based on unwinding plans submitted to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), a total of 17 states indicated that they would prioritize renewals for enrollees that the state flagged as likely ineligible at the start of their unwinding period (Figure 2). Of these, 11 states plan to work through renewals for flagged enrollees during the first two-to-six months of the unwinding, while the remaining six states will spread renewals for flagged enrollees over the first seven-to-nine months.

Timeframes for When States Plan to Conduct Renewals for Enrollees Flagged as "Likely Ineligible"

State approaches to renewing flagged enrollees may explain some – but not all – variation in disenrollment rates across states. Consistent with the data from Arizona, Idaho, and Pennsylvania showing higher disenrollment rates for flagged enrollees, states that prioritize renewals for flagged enrollees in the first two-to-six months have a higher median disenrollment rate (48%) compared to all other states with available data (33%). However, there is still considerable variation in disenrollment rates among these states, ranging from 82% in Texas to 27% in Maryland (Figure 3). Some variation may reflect how states identified likely ineligible enrollees and the share of flagged enrollees undergoing a renewal each month. Other state policies likely contribute to the variation as well, such as the approach states take to increase the number of automatic (or ex parte) renewals, how states use temporary flexibilities made available by the federal government during the unwinding, and the effectiveness of states’ outreach to enrollees.

Medicaid Disenrollments Rates Among States Renewing All Flagged Enrollees in the First 2-to-6 Months of the Unwinding Period

For states prioritizing likely ineligible enrollees, additional data may be required to identify potential reasons for high Medicaid disenrollments. Generally, states that heavily frontload renewals with flagged enrollees can be expected to have higher early disenrollment rates relative to states that spread out renewals for flagged enrollees over a longer period. But, over time, as these states work through renewals for flagged enrollees, disenrollment rates should moderate. However, if these higher disenrollment rates are because of other issues with a state’s renewal process, waiting several months to see whether disenrollment rates decrease could mean many eligible enrollees may lose coverage. More complete information on the reasons why individuals were flagged as likely ineligible, the share of flagged enrollees being renewed each month, as well as disenrollment data broken out by flagged enrollees versus all other enrollees could help identify the factors that underpin disenrollment rates early in the unwinding period.

News Release

Medicare Advantage Insurers Will Collect at Least $12.8 Billion in Federal Bonus Payments in 2023—a Nearly 30% Increase from 2022

New KFF Analyses Highlight Trends in Enrollment, Benefits and Cost-Sharing, and Bonus Payments for Medicare Advantage Plans

Published: Aug 9, 2023

Federal spending on bonus payments to insurance companies that offer Medicare Advantage plans will reach at least $12.8 billion in 2023, according to a new KFF analysis. That is a nearly 30% increase from 2022, and more than quadruple the spending in 2015.

These data come from one of three analyses released today by KFF that examine various facets of the Medicare Advantage program, which provides health insurance coverage to nearly 31 million Americans. KFF examined trends in enrollment, premiums, out-of-pocket limits, cost sharing, supplemental benefits, prior authorization, star ratings and bonus payments.

Bonus payments, which were established by the Affordable Care Act, are based on a five-star rating system and are intended to encourage Medicare Advantage plans to compete for enrollees based on quality. The payments vary substantially across firms, with UnitedHealthcare receiving the largest total payments ($3.9 billion) and Kaiser Permanente the highest payment per enrollee ($523).

Eighty-five percent of Medicare Advantage enrollees are in plans that are receiving bonus payments in 2023. The impact of star ratings on bonus payments lags a year, and several policies in place during the COVID-19 Public Health Emergency have expired, reducing 2023 star ratings relative to 2022, which will likely lead to a smaller share of enrollees in plans that receive bonuses in the 2024 plan year. 

Enrollment in Medicare Advantage in 2023 comprises more than 51% of the eligible Medicare population — more than twice the share enrolled in 2007 (19%), as noted in a companion analysis that provides the latest information about Medicare Advantage enrollment, by plan type and firm, and shows how enrollment varies by state and county.

Enrollment continues to be highly concentrated among a handful of firms, with UnitedHealthcare (29%) followed by Humana (18%), comprising nearly half of all Medicare Advantage enrollees nationwide, according to the analysis. Blue Cross Blue Shield (BCBS) affiliates (including Anthem BCBS plans) account for another 14%. And four other firms (CVS Health, Kaiser Permanente, Centene, and Cigna) account for another 23%.

Additional research released by KFF today shows that 73% of Medicare Advantage enrollees are in plans with prescription drug coverage (MA-PDs) that require no premium other than the Medicare Part B premium. KFF also documents that the vast majority of enrollees in Medicare Advantage plans have access to some benefits not covered by traditional Medicare, such as eye exams and/or glasses, hearing exams and/or aids, a fitness benefit, dental care, and reduced cost-sharing.

Plans are able to offer these extra benefits, often for no additional premium, largely due to the current Medicare payment system that provides an additional $2,350 per enrollee above plans’ estimated costs of providing Medicare-covered services, on average.

One tradeoff of enrolling in Medicare Advantage is that many plans routinely require patients to obtain prior authorization for services. Virtually all Medicare Advantage enrollees (99%) are in plans that require authorization for some services, according to the analysis.

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Understanding the Role of the FTC, DOJ, and States in Challenging Anticompetitive Practices Of Hospitals and Other Health Care Providers

Published: Aug 7, 2023

Policymakers and the media have been increasingly attentive to mergers and acquisitions and other potentially anticompetitive practices of hospitals, physicians, and other health care providers. Consolidation has the potential to increase efficiency and help some struggling providers to keep their doors open in relatively underserved areas, but it can also reduce market competition and ease pressure on providers to lower prices or invest in quality improvements. A substantial body of evidence shows that consolidation has led to higher prices without clear evidence of improvements in quality, which has implications for consumers and employers. As a result, some have proposed strengthening antitrust regulation—which aims to protect competitive markets—as a tool for tackling rising health care costs, increasing the affordability of care, and reducing the large number of adults with medical debt.

Federal and state antitrust agencies play a role in challenging anticompetitive practices of health care providers and other businesses. At the federal level, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) share responsibility for enforcing federal antitrust laws, including the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and the FTC Act. State attorneys general (AG) offices also have the authority to bring action under federal antitrust law, as well as under state statutes, which sometimes expand upon federal law.

This issue brief explains the role of federal and state antitrust agencies in challenging anticompetitive practices among health care providers, including the legal authority of federal and state agencies, the role that they play in enforcing antitrust laws, and proposed options for strengthening their authority. The brief focuses on health care providers, though many of the principles discussed in this issue brief apply to the practices of other health care entities as well, such as health insurers and pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) (which are currently being reviewed by the FTC).  While the focus of this brief is on the role of government agencies, antitrust law also authorizes private parties, such as employer health plans, to challenge anticompetitive practices in the courts.

What types of anticompetitive practices do governments challenge and why?

Governments challenge anticompetitive practices to promote competitive markets, often for the benefit of consumers (e.g., patients and health plan enrollees).1  Governments seek to address a variety of anticompetitive practices that may lead to higher prices without commensurate improvements in quality of care. These include anticompetitive mergers and acquisitions (referred to as “mergers” in this brief), and other activities that hinder competition (referred to as “nonmerger anticompetitive practices” in this brief).

Provider consolidation can be beneficial to consumers in some instances and detrimental in others. On the one hand, consolidation has the potential to increase efficiency, such as by allowing providers to purchase supplies in bulk at a discount or by facilitating the coordination of care across different providers. On the other hand, consolidation has the potential to lead to worse outcomes for consumers by increasing providers’ market power and decreasing competition, which enhances the ability of providers to negotiate for higher prices (increasing costs for consumers and employers) and reduces the pressure on providers to invest in quality improvements. A substantial body of evidence shows that consolidation has led to higher prices without clear indications of quality improvements, though the strength of this evidence varies based on the type of consolidation and provider.

There are three main types of mergers:

  • Horizontal mergers occur when there is consolidation between providers that offer the same or similar services, such as when a health system acquires a hospital or when two physician practices that provide overlapping services merge. Horizontal mergers can raise concerns about competition because they, by definition, reduce competitiveness when occurring between providers in the same market, and because consolidated entities can take actions to increase and protect their market power.
  • Vertical mergers occur when there is consolidation between providers that offer different services along the same supply chain, such as when a hospital acquires a physician practice. Vertical mergers can raise anticompetitive concerns, for example, if physicians refer patients to hospitals within their health system rather than to competing hospitals. Some mergers may entail both vertical and horizontal consolidation (e.g., if a health system acquires a physician group that provides services offered by the system’s existing physician group).
  • Cross-market mergers occur when there is consolidation between providers that operate in different geographic markets.2  Cross-market mergers may raise concerns about competition, for example, if a health system with providers in different areas of a state is able to use its dominant position in one market to negotiate higher prices in another when contracting with a given health plan (e.g., a state employee plan with enrollees that reside in several markets).

Governments also challenge other types of anticompetitive practices, such as the use of anticompetitive clauses in contracts between providers and insurers or providers and workers. Anticompetitive contract clauses give dominant parties an unfair advantage over potential competitors and can lead to higher prices. For example, some health systems have highly regarded hospitals (also known as “must have” hospitals) that insurers need to include in their provider networks in order to attract enrollees, which gives these systems substantial bargaining leverage over insurers. These health care systems can in turn use this bargaining leverage to pressure insurers to contract with all providers in the system (through “all-or-nothing clauses”), shielding expensive or low-quality members from competition with more desirable providers. The textbox below provides definitions of various anticompetitive contract clauses.

Common Types of Anticompetitive Contract Clauses3 

  1. All-or-nothing clauses require an insurer that wants to contract with a particular provider in a system (such as a must-have hospital) to contract with all providers in that system.
  2. Anti-tiering/anti-steering clauses prevent an insurer from putting a given provider in a non-preferred provider network tier or from using other incentives or tools to steer patients to competing providers. This can incentivize patients to use that provider, even if a higher-value provider is also in-network.
  3. Exclusive contracting clauses prohibit an insurer from including competing providers in their provider network, so that a given provider is the only in-network option in a given area.
  4. Non-compete clauses prevent a worker employed with a given provider from taking a job with a competing provider or starting a new practice within a certain distance for some duration of time.
  5. Most favored nation clauses require a provider to offer an insurer the lowest rates of all the insurers with which it has contracted. While the examples above create favorable terms for providers in their contracts with insurers, most favored nation clauses create favorable terms for insurers in their contracts with providers.4 

What federal antitrust laws govern anticompetitive practices?

There are three primary federal antitrust laws—the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and the FTC Act—that prohibit anticompetitive mergers and other anticompetitive practices.

  • The Sherman Act (1890) broadly prohibits anticompetitive practices. It has been used to challenge various anticompetitive practices, such as mergers, wage suppression, agreements among competing businesses to fix prices, and anticompetitive contracting clauses.
  • The Clayton Act (1914) builds on the Sherman Act by explicitly prohibiting anticompetitive mergers as well as other types of anticompetitive practices that are not clearly addressed by the Sherman Act (such as by barring the same individual from serving on the board of directors for two competing health systems, with some exceptions). Additionally, as amended under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act in 1976, the law requires that merging entities report their plans in advance to federal regulators in certain cases where the transaction exceeds a specified value ($111.4 million in 2023), which gives regulators time to investigate and intervene if needed.
  • The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act (1914) created the FTC and prohibits “unfair methods of competition” and “unfair or deceptive acts or practices.” The FTC Act encompasses the same types of violations that are covered by the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act, in addition to other anticompetitive practices, and grants the FTC regulatory authority. Unlike the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act, the Act generally cannot be applied to nonprofit entities.5 

Some forms of business practices, such as almost all instances where competitors coordinate to raise prices, are inherently illegal under federal law. The legality of other types of business practices depends on the context. For instance, when government agencies challenge a merger, courts assess whether the merger would likely harm competition in a given market.

What is the FTC’s role in enforcing federal antitrust law?

Two federal agencies—the FTC and DOJ—have overlapping, as well as distinct, authority to challenge anticompetitive practices under federal law. The FTC is the only entity that can enforce the FTC Act. Although this Act generally cannot be applied to nonprofit entities, the FTC has the authority to enforce the Clayton Act against nonprofit entities (in addition to for-profit entities), such as by challenging anticompetitive mergers among nonprofits. The DOJ has the authority to enforce the Sherman and Clayton Acts. States can also bring lawsuits under federal antitrust law, as can some private parties, such as competing providers.

The FTC focuses on “protecting the public from deceptive or unfair business practices and from unfair methods of competition.” This includes challenging activities such as misleading advertisements, violations of consumers’ data privacy, and efforts to accumulate market power through mergers and other anticompetitive practices. For instance, the FTC sued Facebook in 2020, alleging, in part, that the company had sought to maintain its monopoly power by buying up competitors, such as Instagram and WhatsApp.

The FTC plays a larger role than the DOJ in enforcing federal antitrust law in health care provider markets, though there are gaps in its authority. The FTC and DOJ have each developed expertise in certain areas and have tended to divide merger oversight accordingly, with the FTC typically overseeing provider markets and the DOJ typically overseeing insurance markets (see more below). However, although the FTC has broad authority to challenge anticompetitive mergers, its authority to challenge other anticompetitive practices often excludes nonprofits. Nonprofit ownership is common in provider markets. For example, nonprofits account for about three-fifths (58%) of community hospitals in 2023. The DOJ may fill in for the FTC when the FTC does not have the authority to challenge nonprofit providers that are engaging in certain anticompetitive practices (see example of Atrium Health below).

The FTC has successfully challenged several hospital mergers over the past two decades. Beginning in the 1990s and for several years afterwards, the FTC had difficulty challenging hospital mergers in the courts, allowing rapid consolidation in the hospital sector to continue unabated.6  Since the late 2000s, the FTC has since been more successful in challenging hospital mergers, reflecting advances in both economics and the FTC’s new legal strategies.7  However, the FTC challenges only a fraction of hospital mergers, and it is difficult to know the extent to which mergers that go unchallenged have an adverse impact on consumers, in terms of costs and quality. For instance, in 2022, the FTC challenged 3 hospital mergers and, in each case, the hospitals abandoned their plans to merge, while one analysis documented 53 hospital merger announcements in that year. The same analysis identified more hospital merger announcements in the years prior to the start of the COVID-19 pandemic (e.g., 92 in 2019).

Example: FTC & Advocate Health Care Network

In 2015, the FTC brought a legal challenge against a proposed merger of two Chicago-area health systems: Advocate Health Care Network and NorthShore University Health System. The FTC argued that the combined entity would control over half of the market for general acute care inpatient hospital services, compared to the next largest provider, which would have only controlled 15% of the market. The court placed a temporary block on the merger, and the systems ultimately abandoned their plans to merge before the case went to trial.

The FTC has played a smaller role in challenging physician mergers. A key challenge is that physician mergers tend to be smaller, and physician groups often grow slowly over time by acquiring small group practices and hiring new physicians. As a result, physician groups often do not need to report mergers to federal regulators as their transactions tend to fall below Hart-Scott-Rodino reporting thresholds (though regulators can still challenge mergers that they learn about in other ways). Additionally, because they tend to be small, any given merger may not have an appreciable effect on market power, even if the cumulative effect of these mergers leads to a large concentration of market power over time.

Vertical mergers in health care provider markets have largely escaped FTC enforcement and the FTC has never challenged a cross-market merger, though it has expressed interest in both practices. For instance, in 2021, the FTC announced that it would begin to study the effect of vertical mergers between health care facilities and physician groups. The FTC previously conducted studies of horizontal mergers in advance of successful litigation. The FTC has also investigated specific instances of cross-market mergers, although it has yet to bring a challenge.

Example: FTC & St. Luke’s Health System

In 2012, St. Luke’s Health System in Idaho attempted to acquire Saltzer Medical Group, a physician practice group. Although this proposed acquisition had elements of a vertical merger, the FTC challenged it as a horizontal merger, i.e., on the basis that St. Luke’s would obtain a dominant market share for adult primary care physician services. Courts ruled in favor of the FTC and ordered that St. Luke’s divest Saltzer Medical Group.  This was the first time that the FTC received a court decision for a case challenging a hospital or health system’s acquisition of competing physician practices.

The FTC has not played a large role in overseeing nonmerger anticompetitive practices in nonprofit health care provider markets, such as the use of anticompetitive contract clauses. This may reflect the fact that the FTC’s authority to challenge and regulate nonmerger anticompetitive practices generally excludes nonprofit entities. Nonetheless, the FTC has brought legal challenges in some instances, such as cases where separate physician groups have coordinated with each other to raise prices. Relatedly, the FTC drew on its regulatory authority when it proposed a rule in 2023 that would ban non-compete clauses between employers and workers.

What is the DOJ’s role in enforcing federal antitrust law?

The DOJ enforces a wide range of laws on behalf of the federal government, including—through its Antitrust Division—anticompetitive practices. For instance, in one landmark antitrust case in the 1990s, the DOJ sued Microsoft, alleging that the company had illegally sought to protect its monopoly power. The DOJ argued that the company had done so, in part, by requiring computer manufacturers that wanted to use Microsoft’s popular Windows operating system to also include Internet Explorer as a default.

Although the FTC typically oversees the conduct of health care providers, the DOJ has occasionally done so as well (see example below).

Example: DOJ & Atrium Health

In 2016, the DOJ filed a lawsuit against Carolinas Healthcare System, also known as “Atrium Health.” The DOJ claimed that Atrium had violated federal antitrust law by, among other things, entering into contracts with insurers that contained anti-steering and anti-tiering clauses. Atrium Health system and the DOJ reached a settlement agreement before trial where the system agreed, in part, to stop using these contract clauses.

The DOJ typically takes the lead in promoting competition in health insurance markets. For instance, in 2017, the DOJ, along with some state governments, successfully prevented a proposed merger between Anthem and Cigna—which would have been the largest merger of health insurance companies on record—and a proposed merger between Aetna and Humana.

How do the FTC and DOJ work together on antitrust issues?

The FTC and DOJ have a clearance process to determine which agency will investigate and challenge a given merger. The FTC and DOJ have each developed expertise in different areas and have tended to divide merger oversight accordingly, with the FTC typically overseeing provider markets and the DOJ typically overseeing insurance markets. The division of labor is formalized through a clearance process that determines which agency will investigate a proposed transaction based on its expertise and other factors, such as its capacity and ties to a given case.

The FTC and DOJ collaborate on guidelines that establish how they determine whether to challenge a given merger. This includes the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, which, as the name suggests, outline the criteria that the FTC and DOJ consider when reviewing horizontal mergers. For instance, the guidelines indicate that the agencies evaluate the effects of a merger on market concentration based on a measure known as the “Herfindahl-Hirschman Index” (HHI) (see textbox below). The guidelines also indicate that the agencies consider the possible benefits of a given merger, such as whether a merger might allow research to be conducted more effectively.

Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)

The HHI is calculated based on provider market shares for a given product—such as inpatient general acute care services or inpatient orthopedic surgical services—and geographic market. The HHI for a market can range from nearly 0 (a perfectly competitive market) to 10,000 (a market with a single provider).  The Horizontal Merger Guidelines define the level of market concentration as follows:

Unconcentrated: HHI < 1,500

Moderately concentrated: HHI between 1,500 and 2,500

Highly concentrated: HHI > 2,500

Although markets for inpatient hospital services are now often highly concentrated, there is wide variation across the country. For instance, one study estimated that, in 2021, the New York City metro area had an HHI of 753 for inpatient hospital services, while the Wilmington, North Carolina metro area had an HHI of 7,600.

The FTC and DOJ have also released a set of Vertical Merger Guidelines, though the FTC withdrew from these guidelines in 2021. Some economists are more critical of the Vertical Merger Guidelines than the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, perhaps reflecting the fact that there is less consensus about the effects of vertical consolidation and the proper role of antitrust enforcement.

In July 2023, the FTC and DOJ released a draft version of their updated merger guidelines, which would apply to both horizontal and vertical mergers and which indicate that the agencies will be scrutinizing a broader range of mergers. Among other changes, the draft guidelines expand the definition of highly concentrated markets, rely on a lower threshold for identifying large changes in market concentration, consider the combined effect of a series of acquisitions (e.g., of a health system acquiring several small physician practices over time), and add an explicit discussion of the agencies’ views on how workers may be negatively impacted when their employers merge. These guidelines might also be used to challenge cross-market mergers, although this is not yet clear. The deadline for public comments on the draft guidelines is September 18, 2023.

In addition to working together on general merger guidelines, the DOJ and FTC have in the past collaborated on antitrust policy statements that are specific to health care, though both agencies withdrew from these statements in February 2023 and July 2023, respectively, arguing that the statements are outdated based on changes in health care markets.8 

What is the role of states in enforcing antitrust law?

States can bring legal challenges under federal antitrust law. States may do so through their AG offices as either a purchaser of health care (for instance, through state employee health plans) or on behalf of their residents. States sometimes file lawsuits jointly with each other or with the federal government, which can help overcome resource constraints. States and the federal government may play complementary roles, with the federal government providing greater resources and general antitrust expertise and states providing more specialized knowledge of local market conditions.

Most states have passed laws that expand oversight of provider mergers, which may lead to additional legal challenges. Thirty-four states and DC require that at least some hospitals notify state AG offices of their plans to merge, expanding on federal reporting requirements. For instance, Rhode Island requires all hospitals to do so, regardless of the value of the transaction. Additionally, thirteen states and DC require that some or all types of providers receive approval from the government prior to merging, instead of requiring that the government file a lawsuit to challenge a merger. Eleven states require AG offices to consider relatively expansive criteria when reviewing health care mergers. For instance, California law requires the AG office to consider criteria such as the general public’s interest and the effect of a merger on access to care.

Some states have prohibited certain types of anticompetitive contract clauses. These laws either broadly prohibit a given type of clause or ban their use in only specific circumstances. Regarding contracts between insurers and dominant providers, two states (Massachusetts and Nevada) have laws restricting at least some all-or-nothing clauses and anti-tiering or anti-steering provisions, and five states (Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, and Wisconsin) have laws restricting exclusive contracting. Additionally, 22 states restrict non-compete provisions—which dominant providers sometimes use in contracts with their workers—and 20 states restrict most favored nation clauses, which dominant insurers sometimes use in their contracts with providers.

Example: California & Sutter Health

In 2018, the California AG joined a lawsuit that had been initiated on behalf of some group health plans against Sutter Health, a large nonprofit health system in the state. The parties argued that Sutter had used anticompetitive contract clauses—such as all-or-nothing and anti-tiering provisions—to increase prices. In 2019, Sutter agreed to a settlement agreement that required the system to abandon the relevant contract clauses and to pay $575 million in damages, among other things.

Some states have enacted laws that have the potential to shield health care providers from antitrust scrutiny in certain instances.  For example, 19 states have Certificate of Public Advantage (COPA) laws, which immunize a merger from antitrust challenges while directly regulating the merged entity for a period of time, such as by limiting price increases or prohibiting certain contracting practices. The intent of COPA laws is to facilitate mergers that are perceived as being beneficial overall while mitigating anticompetitive concerns through state oversight. However, the FTC and some researchers have been critical of these laws, arguing, for example, that states have not followed through in providing ongoing oversight following a given merger. Other state policies, such as Certificate of Need (CON) statutes—which attempt to reduce costs by restricting, for example, the construction of new facilities when they do not meet a community need—may also play a role in limiting competition or preventing antitrust scrutiny.

What are the potential remedies in antitrust enforcement?

Federal or state agencies challenging a merger can seek structural remedies or conduct remedies (also known as “behavioral remedies”).

  • Structural remedies mitigate consolidation by preventing a merger from moving forward, breaking up mergers that have already taken place, or requiring a merged entity to sell off a portion of its business.
  • Conduct remedies entail restrictions or requirements imposed on providers after a merger, such as by limiting the prices providers can charge, prohibiting providers from engaging in certain contracting practices, or requiring providers to spend a minimum amount on community benefits.

Conduct remedies may be less effective than structural remedies in certain circumstances, as they tend to be time-limited and government agencies may not have the resources to monitor and enforce them. However, where markets are already concentrated and regulators are reluctant to break up merged entities, conduct remedies may be the only option.

When the government challenges proposed mergers before they occur, the recourse is typically to prevent the merger from moving forward. Antitrust enforcers have only infrequently attempted to unwind mergers that have already taken place, which the FTC describes as a “difficult and potentially ineffective” process.

There are other ways in which the government can be successful in challenging anticompetitive mergers. For example, the government and merging providers may avoid trial through a settlement agreement or consent decree. In this scenario, the government drops its legal challenge in exchange for structural or conduct remedies. Additionally, providers may abandon a merger after a lawsuit is announced or a court makes a preliminary ruling against the merger or may decide not to attempt to merge in the first place in anticipation that doing so would be successfully challenged in court.

Example: FTC & Phoebe Putney Health System

In 2011, Phoebe Putney Health System acquired a hospital from HCA in Albany, Georgia. The FTC challenged the merger and eventually reached a settlement agreement with the providers. The settlement agreement allowed the merger to persist but imposed conduct remedies, including that Phoebe Putney notify the FTC before acquiring other health care providers in the area.

The outcomes of successful legal challenges to nonmerger anticompetitive practices are similar, though the remedy would involve abandoning the relevant business practice (e.g., no longer using anticompetitive contract clauses).

What are some practical challenges facing antitrust enforcement?

There are at least a few challenges that may limit the ability of the federal government and states to foster competitive provider markets through antitrust enforcement:

  • It is difficult to break up mergers after they have already occurred, and many provider markets are already highly concentrated. For example, one study estimated that the vast majority (90%) of metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) had highly concentrated hospital markets in 2016 (i.e., with an HHI above 2,500), most (65%) had highly concentrated specialist physician markets, and nearly two in five (39%) had highly concentrated markets for primary care physicians. Breaking up a merger after providers have already consolidated can be difficult. At the same time, regulating the behavior of merged providers—such as through restrictions on the prices they charge—may be difficult to do on an ongoing basis.
  • Some regions cannot support competitive provider markets. For instance, rural communities may not have enough residents to support several providers that offer the same service.
  • Antitrust litigation can be complex and expensive. Without adequate funding, it may be impractical to challenge a large number of provider business practices that raise anticompetitive concerns.
  • Antitrust agencies may have difficulty staying ahead of market trends. For example, it could take time for the government to develop strong guidelines for challenging vertical or cross-market mergers and to accumulate enough evidence to convince courts that these practices harm competition. In the meantime, these mergers will likely continue.
  • The benefits of competitive provider markets for individuals with health insurance will depend in part on the competitiveness of health insurance markets. The study referenced above also estimated that most MSAs (57%) had highly concentrated insurance markets in 2016. When insurance markets are not competitive, cost savings from competitive provider markets might not be fully passed along to consumers.

What policies have been proposed to strengthen antitrust law and enforcement?

Several federal and state policy proposals have been floated to help antitrust regulators more easily identify and challenge anticompetitive mergers and regulate markets that are already concentrated. One set of policies would make it easier for governments to enforce antitrust law, such as by requiring more providers to report any planned mergers, lowering the legal standards by which mergers are deemed anticompetitive, and mandating that providers receive approval from the government before merging. Another set of policies would increase the scope of antitrust law, such as by giving the FTC full authority to regulate nonprofit providers and outlawing certain anticompetitive contracting clauses. A third set of proposals would improve the infrastructure of antitrust enforcement, such as by increasing funding for antitrust agencies, creating agencies to monitor health care markets (as some states have done), and establishing specialized courts for antitrust cases.

Discussion

The FTC, DOJ, and states seek to promote competition in health care markets to encourage providers to lower costs for consumers and provide high quality medical care. Over the years, FTC, DOJ, and some states have challenged mergers as well as other anticompetitive practices. Nonetheless, there are inherent challenges to an approach that relies solely on efforts to foster competitive provider markets through antitrust regulation, particularly given the already high level of market concentration of providers across the country.

Several policy ideas have been floated at the federal and state level that are intended to strengthen antitrust regulation. However, given the challenges facing antitrust regulation and pro-competition policies, some policymakers have proposed a more direct regulatory approach, such as by capping prices or price growth or by establishing global budgets for hospitals. Some proponents of these approaches have highlighted that antitrust efforts and regulatory approaches could play complimentary roles. For instance, caps on health care prices could serve as a backstop in concentrated markets where at least some providers would not otherwise offer competitive rates or in small markets that are unable to support competition. Antitrust regulation may also play a useful role under price regulation, for example, by encouraging providers to compete for patients by offering higher quality care.

This work was supported in part by Arnold Ventures. KFF maintains full editorial control over all of its policy analysis, polling, and journalism activities.

  1. Among other objectives, there has also been increasing interest in promoting competition to protect workers from large, dominant employers. For example, SEIU Healthcare Pennsylvania recently filed a complaint with the DOJ that UPMC, a large health system in Pennsylvania, had used its market power to suppress the wages of nurses and other health care workers, increase workloads, and restrict the ability of health care workers to seek better employment elsewhere. ↩︎
  2. For example, BJC Healthcare—which is based in St. Louis, Missouri—recently announced plans to merge with Saint Luke’s Health System, which is based across the state in Kansas City. ↩︎
  3. Gag clauses, which prevent insurers and providers from disclosing negotiated rates, are an additional type of anticompetitive contracting clause. However, these have been prohibited by the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2021. ↩︎
  4. The benefits of these clauses to different parties may be more complicated in practice. For instance, while some dominant insurers may require most favored nation clauses in their contracts with providers, some dominant providers may offer these clauses to insurers to help facilitate increases in their prices. ↩︎
  5. One exception is that the FTC Act can be applied to nonprofit health insurance companies (in addition to for-profit health insurance companies), as authorized by the Competitive Health Insurance Reform Act of 2020. ↩︎
  6. The FTC and DOJ lost six consecutive cases against hospital mergers during this time and then refrained from bringing legal challenges for several years. Part of the reason for their limited success reflected the reliance of courts on an older economic framework that tended to suggest that geographic markets for hospital care were large, and therefore appeared to be more competitive than they were in reality. Courts at the time also questioned whether mergers between nonprofit hospitals would raise prices, though more recent research suggests that this may be the case. ↩︎
  7. One turning point occurred when the agency successfully challenged a merger between Evanston Hospital and Highland Park Hospital (both nonprofits) in the Chicagoland area. The FTC first filed a complaint in 2004 after the merger had already taken place, which allowed the FTC to introduce direct evidence that the merger had led to increases in prices. The agency also provided evidence suggesting that previous methods for defining geographic markets resulted in boundaries that were too large, and it presented new models developed by economists that implied much narrower geographic markets, with greater market concentration. Relatedly, the agency’s evidence of actual price changes weakened arguments that hospitals would behave differently because of their nonprofit status. Courts have continued to rely on the new economic models used in this case, and the evidence that hospital mergers lead to price increases has grown over time. ↩︎
  8. This included withdrawing from several statements that had discussed various scenarios involving providers, such as hospital mergers, certain joint ventures, information sharing arrangements, and joint purchasing agreements. These statements had described how the agencies would conduct antitrust analyses and identified scenarios, known as “safety zones,” that would have generally been exempt from antitrust scrutiny (e.g., hospital mergers involving small, low-volume hospitals). The FTC and DOJ also withdrew from a policy statement that had described the agencies’ approach to regulating accountable care organizations (and which had been timed with the release of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services final rules for the Medicare Shared Savings Program). ↩︎

A Look at the Latest Suicide Data and Change Over the Last Decade

Published: Aug 4, 2023

Note: This data note was updated on Aug. 4, 2023, to correct a data error in Figure 4.

From 2011 to 2022, over half a million lives (539,810) were lost to suicide, with 2022 showing the highest number of deaths on record. Within this period, the adjusted suicide rate increased by 16%. Recognizing the mounting mental health crisis and demand for accessible crisis care, the federal government introduced a new crisis number, 988, available nationwide in July 2022. This easy to remember three-digit number connects callers who are suicidal or experiencing a mental health emergency to a crisis counselor at one of 200+ local crisis call centers. There, they may access crisis counseling, resources, referrals, and connections to other crisis services. Though suicide deaths slowed in 2019 and 2020, they began to increase again in 2021 and 2022, but the cause of this recent rise in suicides is unclear.

Key takeaways from an analysis of aggregate provisional data from 2022 and CDC WONDER data from 2011 to 2021, which represents the most recent and comprehensive data available before the mid-2022 launch of 988, include the following:

  • CDC’s provisional data for 2022 show a record high of 49,369 suicide deaths, coming after modest declines in 2019 and 2020.
  • In 2022, provisional data indicates the highest number of gun-related suicides on record; increases in firearm suicides are driving the increases in overall suicide deaths in recent years.
  • Suicide death rates in 2021 were highest among American Indian and Alaska Native people, males, and people who live in rural areas.
  • Suicide deaths are increasing fastest among people of color, younger people, and those who live in rural areas with many groups seeing increases of 30% or more from 2011 to 2021.
  • Suicide death rates varied considerably by state in 2021, as did the rate of change between 2011 and 2021.

Provisional CDC data show that the number of suicide deaths in 2022 is the highest recorded, exceeding the next closest year (2018) by over 1,000 deaths (Figure 1). When adjusted for population growth and age, the suicide rate has risen by 16% from 2011 to 2022, moving from 12.3 to 14.4 deaths per 100,000 individuals. Looking back further to 1999, there is a substantial 37% increase from a rate of 10.57 per 100,000. Notably, while 2022 had the highest recorded number of suicide deaths, its rate is similar to 2018 (14.5 in 2022 vs. 14.2 in 2018 per 100,000) but higher than the rate in 2020—the year before suicide deaths began to climb again. Increases in the number of suicide deaths follow high levels of mental health symptoms during COVID, rising financial stressors, and longstanding difficulty accessing needed mental health care—particularly for some populations. Total suicide numbers may be undercounted, as some research suggests that suicides may be misclassified as drug overdose deaths since it can be difficult to determine whether drug overdoses are intentional.

Number of Deaths Due to Suicide, 2011 to 2022

Provisional data from 2022 show the highest number of firearm-related suicides on record, driving the overall increases in suicide deaths to record levels. Firearm-related suicides have been increasing in recent years. In 2021, firearm-related suicides increased by 8% from 2020 and went up another 3% in 2022, while deaths from other suicide methods remained more stable (Figure 2). Firearm-related suicides are now the most common method of suicide, accounting for 55% of all suicide fatalities in both 2021 and 2022. The availability of guns (measured indirectly by the number of gun laws in a state) is linked to firearm suicide rates – with states with fewer gun laws having higher rates. Suicide deaths accounted for more than half (55%) of all deaths involving a firearm in 2021.

Number of Deaths Due to Suicide, by Firearm or Other Means, 2011 to 2022

Suicide death rates in 2021 were highest among American Indian and Alaska Native (AIAN) people, males, and people who live in rural areas. As of 2021, AIAN people had the highest suicide death rate at 28.1 per 100,000 people, one and a half times higher than the rate for White people (17.4 per 100,000 people). Suicide death rates for Black, Hispanic, and Asian and Pacific Islander people were at least half the rate of White people. Females are more likely to report mental illness and are more likely to attempt suicide, but male suicide death rates are four times higher (22.8 versus 5.7 per 100,000). Non-metropolitan areas have a higher suicide rate (20.2 per 100,000) than metro areas (13.6 per 100,000). There are similar suicide rates across adult age groups in 2021 (Figure 3). Because younger people are less likely to die of other causes, suicides are the second leading cause of death in adults under the age of 45, accounting for 16% of deaths in people 18-25 and 9% of deaths in people 26-44 in 2020. 

Suicide deaths are increasing fastest among people of color, younger individuals, and people who live in rural areas. Between 2011 and 2021, suicide death rates increased substantially among people of color, with the highest increase among AIAN people (70% increase, from 16.5 to 28.1 per 100,000), followed by Black (58% increase, from 5.5 to 8.7 per 100,000), and Hispanic (39% increase, 5.7 to 7.9 per 100,000) people (Figure 3). Other studies show a particularly large increase in suicide deaths among Black youth and adolescents. Underdiagnosis of mental health conditions, structural barriers to care, stereotypes and discrimination associated with poor mental health, racism and discrimination, and disparities in the use of mental health services may all contribute to rising suicide rates among people of color. Among adolescents, emergency department visits for suicide attempts have increased in recent years, primarily driven by females. And a KFF/CNN survey found that roughly half of parents said the pandemic had a negative impact on their child’s mental health, including 17% who said it had a “major negative impact.” In rural areas, suicide death rates increased significantly, possibly due to acute shortages of mental health workers in these areas. The suicide death rate also increased in adolescents (48% increase, from 4.4 to 6.5 per 100,000) and young adults (39% increase, from 13.0 to 18.1 per 100,000) between 2011 and 2021 (Figure 3).

Suicide Death Rates by Demographics and Location, 2011 to 2021

Suicide death rates varied substantially by state in 2021, as did the rate of change from 2011 to 2021. Suicide death rates by state range from a low of 6.21 per 100,000 population in Washington, D.C. to a high of 32.34 in Wyoming, with a median death rate of 15.3 per 100,000 in 2021 (Figure 4). The suicide rate may vary by state due to factors such as demographics, firearm availability (involved in over half of suicides), mental health status, and access to mental health services. Between 2011 and 2021, suicide death rates increased by 25% or more in 12 states, with the largest increases in Alaska (54% increase, from 20.0 to 30.8 per 100,000), South Dakota (48% increase, from 15.7 to 23.4 per 100,000), Nebraska (43% increase, from 10.5 to 15.0 per 100,000), and Montana (42% increase, from 22.5 to 32.0 per 100,000).

Suicide Death Rate per 100,000 Population in 2021, Age-Adjusted

While the exact cause for the rise in suicides in recent years is unknown, it may reflect, in part, increasing stressors and longstanding unmet mental health needs—challenges that coincide with 988’s launch. In its first year, 988 improved answer rates and reduced wait times while handling nearly 5 million contacts due to surging demand; however, its influence on overall suicide rates, particularly among people of color or other vulnerable populations, is yet to be seen. Since its introduction in July 2022, 988 has received almost 5 million contacts, including almost 1 million from the Veteran’s Crisis Line. While early nationwide metrics look positive, disparities in state performance and questions about long-term funding for state call centers and crisis infrastructure persist. Current publicly available data on 988 gives only a partial view of its implementation and possible access challenges. Analysis of more comprehensive 988 metrics, coupled with future data on suicide attempts and deaths may help shed light on the impact of 988 and related crisis services in addressing escalating suicide deaths.

If you or someone you know is considering suicide, contact the 988 Suicide & Crisis Lifeline at 988.

This work was supported in part by Well Being Trust. KFF maintains full editorial control over all of its policy analysis, polling, and journalism activities.

News Release

New KFF Analysis Shows Number of Suicide Deaths at Record Levels, Driven by an Increase in Firearm-Related Suicides

Published: Aug 4, 2023

More than 49,000 people died by suicide across the country in 2022, a record number driven largely by an increase in the number of firearm-related deaths, a new KFF analysis of provisional CDC data shows.

Firearm-related suicide deaths have been increasing in recent years and are now the most common method of suicide, accounting for 55% of all suicide deaths in both 2021 and 2022. Deaths from other suicide methods have remained relatively steady.

The recent increase in suicide deaths follows high levels of mental health symptoms during the COVID pandemic, financial stressors, and difficulty accessing needed mental health care—particularly for some populations.  

Suicide deaths are increasing fastest among people of color, younger individuals, and people who live in rural areas. Between 2011 and 2021, suicide death rates increased substantially among people of color, with the highest increase among American Indian or Alaska Native people (70%), followed by Black people (58%) and Hispanic people (39%). The suicide death rate also increased among adolescents (48%), young adults (39%), and people who live in rural areas (26%) during the same period.

In July 2022, a three-digit crisis number, 988, launched nationally to provide an easy-to-remember way for people who are suicidal or experiencing a mental health emergency to connect with a crisis counselor and other resources. In its first year, 988 improved answer rates and reduced wait times while handling nearly 5 million contacts because of surging demand; however, its influence on overall suicide rates, particularly among people of color or other vulnerable populations, remains to be seen.

From 2011 to 2022, over half a million people (539,810) died by suicide, with 2022 showing the highest number of deaths on record. Within this period, the adjusted suicide rate increased by 16%. The rate increased by 37% since 1999.

Read “A Look at the Latest Suicide Data and Change Over the Last Decade” for more information about suicide death rates between 2011 and 2022.

News Release

Marketplace Insurers are Proposing a 6% Average Premium Hike for 2024 and Pointing to Inflation as a Key Driver of Costs

Published: Aug 4, 2023

ACA Marketplace insurers are requesting a median premium increase of 6% for 2024, according to a new KFF analysis of the preliminary rate filings. Insurers’ proposed rate changes – most of which fall between 2% and 10% – may change during the review process.

Although most Marketplace enrollees receive subsidies and are not expected to face these added costs, premium increases could result in higher federal spending on subsidies.

Insurers cite price increases for medical care and prescription drugs as a key driver of premium growth in 2024, according to KFF’s examination of publicly-available documents from 58 insurers.

In addition to inflation’s impact on medical costs, insurers point to growth in the utilization of health care, which fell in 2020 but has since returned to more normal levels.

Meanwhile, the impact of COVID-19-related costs on premiums remains much more uncertain. While some of the 320 ACA Marketplace insurers expect vaccine commercialization to increase costs on a per-dose basis, drops in COVID treatments and new cost sharing for testing may lower insurer costs and offset some growth in premiums.

A small number of insurers cite other potential drivers of premium hikes, including the unwinding of the Medicaid continuous enrollment provision (which has already led to the disenrollment of at least 3.8 million people from Medicaid) and new high-cost weight loss drugs.

The full analysis and other data on health costs are available in the Peterson-KFF Health System Tracker, an online information hub dedicated to monitoring and assessing the performance of the U.S. health system.

Poll Finding

KFF Health Tracking Poll July 2023: The Public’s Views Of New Prescription Weight Loss Drugs And Prescription Drug Costs

Published: Aug 4, 2023

Findings

Key Findings

  • As a relatively new class of prescription drugs, initially approved to treat type 2 diabetes, have been gaining attention for their use as effective weight loss drugs, the latest KFF Health Tracking Poll finds that nearly half of adults (45%) say they would generally be interested in taking a safe and effective prescription weight loss drug, including nearly six in ten (59%) of those who are currently trying to lose weight and half (51%) of those who are trying to lose less than 10 pounds. About seven in ten adults say they have heard at least “a little” about this new class of weight loss drugs, which include Ozempic, Wegovy and Mounjaro.
  • While there is overall interest in taking a prescription weight loss drug, interest decreases substantially once people are asked if they would take a drug administered as routine injection (23% of all adults would still be interested), if it was not covered by their insurance (16%), if it was not approved by the FDA for weight loss specifically (16%), or if they heard they may gain weight back after stopping use (14%).
  • Most adults (80%) say that insurance companies should cover the cost of weight loss drugs for adults who are overweight or obese, while half of adults (53%) say insurance should cover the cost of these drugs for anyone who wants them to lose weight. Half of adults continue to say that health insurance should cover the cost of weight loss drugs, even if it meant that monthly health insurance premiums increased for everyone, including larger shares of Democrats (62%).
  • Interest and demand for these new weight loss drugs comes at a time when a majority of the public say they trust pharmaceutical companies to develop new drugs (75%) and provide reliable information about safety and side effects (66%) as well as drug effectiveness (64%) – but far fewer adults (22%) say they trust these pharmaceutical companies to price their products fairly. A large majority of adults (83%), including majorities across partisans, see pharmaceutical profits as a major factor contributing to the cost of prescription drugs.
  • Notable shares of adults (28%) report difficulty affording prescription drugs, with another three in ten adults (31%) reporting not taking their medicine as prescribed in the past year due to the cost. Lower income adults are more likely than those with higher household incomes to report experiencing these cost-related prescription drug issues.
  • Majorities across partisans say there is not enough regulation over drug pricing, however, just under a year after the passage of the Inflation Reduction Act, few adults in the U.S. are aware of the law’s provisions aimed at reducing the cost of prescription drugs in Medicare. While adults ages 65 and older – the group who will be most affected by the law’s Medicare provisions – are more likely than younger adults to know about some of these aspects of the law, a majority of older adults are still unaware whether these provisions are currently in place. About four in ten (44%) of those ages 65 and older say they are aware of insulin caps for people with Medicare, and about three in ten say they are aware of annual out-of-pocket prescription drug limits for people with Medicare (34%) or the requirement that the federal government negotiate the price of some prescription drugs for people with Medicare (31%), while just 5% say they are aware of penalties for drug companies for increasing prices faster than inflation for people with Medicare.

Public Opinion On A New Class Of Weight Loss Drugs

A new class of prescription drugs, initially developed to treat type 2 diabetes, have been garnering an increasing amount of attention due to their ability to act as highly effective weight loss drugs for overweight or obese adults. This class of drugs includes different medications, such as Ozempic, Wegovy, and Mounjaro.1  The latest KFF Tracking Poll examines public interest and awareness of these drugs as well as how views change once people hear more information about the accessibility and administration of the medications.

Seven in ten adults say they have heard at least “a little” about a new class of drugs being used for weight loss, such as Ozempic, Wegovy, and Mounjaro, with about one in five (19%) saying they have heard “a lot” about these drugs.

Awareness of the new weight loss drugs is high among all groups, but older adults are some of the most aware with at least eight in ten adults ages 65 and older (79%) saying they have heard about them. Three in four adults (76%) who have been told by a doctor in the past five years that they are overweight or obese are also aware of this new class of drugs being used for weight loss. Awareness is also high among adults who are currently trying to lose weight, with three in four (74%) saying they have heard about these drugs.

Most Adults Have Heard About New Weight Loss Drugs, Including Larger Shares Older Adults And Those Trying To Lose Weight

While most adults report having heard at least “a little” about this new class of weight loss drugs, very few report having ever taken any prescription drug to lose weight, with even fewer who report currently taking a prescription drug for weight loss. Just 4% of adults say they are currently taking a prescription drug to lose weight and one in ten say they have previously taken prescription drugs for weight loss but are not currently using them, leaving about nine in ten adults (87%) who say they have never taken any prescription weight loss drugs.

Overall, about six in ten adults (61%) say they are currently trying to lose weight, including 28% who are trying to lose more than 20 pounds. About four in ten (39%) adults say a doctor or other health care provider has told them that they are overweight or obese2  in the past five years. Prior use of weight loss drugs is also more common among these groups.

One in ten of those who are currently trying to lose more than 20 pounds and a similar share of adults who have been told by a doctor in the past five years that they are obese or overweight say they are currently taking medications for weight loss. An additional one in six among each of these groups say they have taken medications for weight loss in the past.

Women are about twice as likely as men to say they have ever used any prescription drug to lose weight (18% v. 8%) and are also more likely to say they are currently using these drugs to lose weight (5% v. 2%). Notably, women are also more likely than men to say that a doctor or other health care provider told them they were overweight or obese in the past five years (47% v. 32%).

Few Adults Are Currently Using Or Have Ever Used Any Prescription Drugs To Lose Weight

Nearly half of adults (45%) say they would be interested in taking a prescription drug to lose weight if they heard that it was safe and effective, including about one in five (18%) who say they are “very interested.” Women are significantly more likely than men to say they would be interested in taking a prescription drug for weight loss (51% v. 38%). About four in ten Black adults (41%), nearly half of White adults (45%), and just over half of Hispanic adults (55%) say they would be interested in taking a prescription weight loss drug. While similar shares of Black adults, Hispanic adults and White adults report being told by a doctor or health care provider in the past five years that they are overweight or obese, KFF’s analysis of Centers for Disease Control (CDC) data shows that Black and Hispanic adults in the U.S. have a higher rate of obesity than White adults. For additional information on obesity rates and racial disparities, see KFF’s policy watch: What are the Implications of New Anti-Obesity Drugs for Racial Disparities?

The share who say they are interested in taking prescription drugs for weight loss increases to two-thirds (67%) among those who have been told by a doctor or health care provider that they are overweight or obese in the past five years. In addition, about six in ten (59%) adults who say they are currently trying to lose weight say they would be interested in taking a weight loss drug.

Interest in taking a prescription drug for weight loss is even more common among those who say they are trying to lose relatively larger amounts of weight, however, notable shares of those who are trying to lose 10 pounds or less also say they would be interested in taking a safe, effective prescription drug for weight loss. About seven in ten (68%) adults who say they are currently trying to lose 20 pounds or more say they would be interested in taking a prescription drug for weight loss if they heard it was safe and effective, compared to about half of adults who are trying to lose 10 to 20 pounds (50%) or less than 10 pounds (51%). But interest for taking such medications isn’t limited to those currently trying to lose weight; a quarter (23%) of those who say they are not currently trying to lose weight say they would be interested in taking a drug to lose weight if they heard it was safe and effective.

While notable shares of adults who say they are trying to lose relatively small amounts of weight say they would be interested in taking a prescription drug for weight loss if they heard it was safe and effective, it is worth noting that among the relatively new class of drugs being used for weight loss, Wegovy, which is approved by the FDA for weight loss, is intended for chronic weight management in adults who are obese, or adults who are overweight and have one weight-related condition, such as type 2 diabetes.

About Half Of Adults Say They Would Be Interested In Taking A Safe, Effective Weight-Loss Drug

While about half of adults express interest in taking safe, effective prescription drugs for weight loss, some people are no longer interested after hearing additional information about these drugs. Similar to the share of adults who are interested in taking a drug for weight loss if it was safe and effective, nearly half of all adults (44%) continue to be either “very” or “somewhat” interested in taking medication like this if it could be taken it as a pill.3   But interest drops more than twenty percentage points when adults are asked if they would be interested if they had to administer it themselves as a weekly injection (23%), if it was not covered by their insurance (16%), or if it was not approved by the FDA for weight loss but was approved for another use (16%). Interest in taking a medication for weight loss drops to 14% when people hear they may gain weight back after stopping use.4 

About Half Of Adults Are Interested In Taking Weight Loss Drugs As A Pill, Fewer Are Interested If They May Gain Weight Back After Stopping

Eight in ten adults say they think health insurance should cover the cost of prescription weight loss drugs for adults who have been diagnosed as overweight or obese, while about half (53%) of adults say health insurance should cover the cost of these drugs for anyone who wants to take them to lose weight. Half of adults continue to say they think health insurance should still cover these costs even if they heard that it could generally increase monthly health insurance premiums for everyone.

Majority Of Adults Say Health Insurance Should Cover The Cost Of Prescription Weight Loss Drugs For Overweight And Obese Adults

While majorities across partisans say that health insurance should cover the cost of prescription weight loss drugs for either anyone who wants them or for adults diagnosed as overweight or obese, larger shares of Democrats say this (88%) compared to independents (81%) and Republicans (77%). Additionally, about six in ten Democrats (62%) say insurance should still cover the cost of weight loss drugs even at the expense of higher premiums for everyone compared to about half of independents (48%) and four in ten Republicans (39%).

While large majorities across age groups say health insurance should cover the cost of prescription weight loss drugs for either anyone who wants them or for adults diagnosed as overweight or obese, people under the age of 65 are more likely than those ages 65 and older to say they still think insurance should cover the cost of prescription weight loss drugs even if they heard that it might increase insurance premiums for everyone (53% v. 39%).

Views On Pharmaceutical Companies And Concerns Over Prescription Drug Pricing

Alongside public interest in new weight loss drugs and notable shares of adults saying they think health insurance should cover the cost of these drugs – even at the expense of increasing monthly premiums for everyone – most adults report a lack of trust in pharmaceutical companies to price their drugs fairly and say there is not enough regulation when it comes to prescription drug costs. Notable shares also experienced cost-related issues with prescription drugs in the past year, with three in ten adults reporting not taking their prescription medicine as prescribed due to the cost. Most adults, however, are trusting of drug companies when it comes developing new drugs and communicating reliable information about the safety and effectiveness of their drugs.

Three-quarters (75%) of adults say they trust pharmaceutical companies either “a lot” or “somewhat” to develop new, effective drugs, and just over six in ten say they trust drug companies to offer reliable information about the side effects and safety of their drugs (66%) or to offer reliable information about how well their drugs work (64%). Fewer, or about half (48%), of all adults say they trust pharmaceutical companies to inform the public quickly when they learn of a safety concern with their drugs. Adults are least trusting when it comes to drug pricing, with one in five (22%) saying they trust drug companies “a lot” or “somewhat” to price their products fairly.

Most Adults Trust Drug Companies On Development, Providing Reliable Information, But Few Trust Companies To Price Drugs Fairly

Most adults, including majorities across partisans, cite profits made by pharmaceutical companies as a “major factor” contributing to the price of prescription drugs. About eight in ten adults (83%) say profits made by pharmaceutical companies are a “major factor” contributing to the price of prescription drugs, compared to fewer who say the cost of research and development (54%) or the cost of marketing and advertising (45%) are major contributing factors. Additionally, majorities across partisans cite profits made by pharmaceutical companies as the main factor contributing prescription drug prices, including nine in ten Republicans (89%) and similar shares of Democrats (84%) and independents (78%).

At Least Eight In Ten Across Parties Say Pharmaceutical Company Profits Are A Major Factor Contributing To Prescription Drug Costs

While many adults report a lack of trust in pharmaceutical companies to price their products fairly, notable shares of adults also report experiencing problems affording prescription drugs, with three in ten (28%) saying it is either “somewhat” or “very difficult” to afford prescription drugs, including larger shares of those with annual household incomes of less $40,000 a year (40%).

Another three in ten adults (31%) say they haven’t taken their medicine as prescribed due to cost. This includes one in five adults who say they have not filled a prescription for a medicine due to the cost (21%) or taken an over-the-counter drug instead of getting a prescription filled because of the cost, and about one in ten (12%) who say they have cut pills in half or skipped doses of medicine because of the cost in the past year.

Lower income adults are more likely than those with higher incomes to experience these cost-related prescription drug issues. Just under four in ten (37%) of those with annual household incomes of less than $40,000 say they haven’t taken their medicine as prescribed due to the cost in the past year compared to three in ten (30%) of those with annual incomes between $40,000 and less than $90,000 and a quarter (24%) of those with incomes of $90,000 or more.

Three In Ten Adults Say They Didn't Take Their Medicine As Prescribed Due To Costs, Including Larger Shares Wither Lower Incomes

Public Opinion on Prescription Drugs

KFF has a long history of examining public opinion on prescription drugs including the latest update to our Public Opinion on Prescription Drug And Their Prices.

Most adults say there should be more regulation when it comes to prescription drug costs. Three quarters (73%) of adults say there is not enough government regulation when it comes to limiting the price of prescription drugs, with just 13% saying there is “about the right amount” of regulation in this area. About half (47%) of adults say there is not as much government regulation as there should be when it comes to making sure prescription drugs are safe for people to use, while four in ten say there is the right amount of government regulation in this area. The share of adults currently saying there is not as much regulation as there should be in each of these areas has increased by about 10 percentage points since 2021.

About Seven In Ten Adults Say There Is Not Enough Regulation Limiting Prescription Drug Prices, Half Say Not Enough Regulation Over Safety

Majorities of adults across partisans agree that there is not enough regulation over prescription drug prices, with eight in ten Democrats (82%) and just over two-thirds of Republicans (68%) and independents (67%) saying there is not as much regulation as there should be when it comes to limiting the price of prescription drugs. Similar to increases among the total population, the shares of Democrats and Republicans saying there is not enough regulation in limiting the price of prescription drugs has increased by about ten percentage points since 2021.

Compared to 2021, Larger Shares Of Democrats And Republicans Now Say There Is Not Enough Regulation Over Prescription Drug Prices

Half (49%) of adults ages 18 to 64 say there is not as much regulation as there should be when it comes to making sure prescription drugs are safe for people to use, while two in five (40%) of those ages 65 and older say there is not enough regulation in this area. When it comes to regulation over prescription drug prices, similar shares of those under the age of 65 (73%) and those 65 and older (72%) say there is not as much regulation as there should be.

The Public’s Knowledge of the Inflation Reduction Act

Even as many adults, regardless of partisanship or age, say there is not enough regulation over limiting prescription drug prices, few adults are aware of new prescription drug regulations included in the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA). Signed into law in August of 2022 by President Joe Biden, the IRA contains several provisions related to lowering prescription drug costs for people with Medicare. Namely, the law caps the cost of insulin for people with Medicare at $35 a month, requires the federal government to negotiate the price of some prescription drugs for people with Medicare, places an annual limit on out-of-pocket prescription drug costs for people with Medicare, and penalizes drug companies for increasing prices faster than the rate of inflation for people with Medicare. For more information, see KFF’s issue brief on the IRA’s prescription drug provisions.

Nearly a year after being signed into law, few adults are aware of the IRA’s provisions related to prescription drug costs in Medicare. A quarter of adults say they are aware there are federal laws in place that cap monthly insulin costs at $35 for people with Medicare (25%), that require the federal government to negotiate the price of some prescription drugs for people with Medicare (25%), or that place a limit on annual out-of-pocket drug costs for people with Medicare (24%). Even fewer adults are aware there is a law in place that penalizes drug companies for increasing prices faster than the rate of inflation for people with Medicare (10%).

Few Adults Are Aware That Medicare Prescription Drug Provisions In The Inflation Reduction Act Are Currently Law

Adults ages 65 and older – most of whom are covered by Medicare– are more likely than younger adults to know these regulations are currently in place. But still, fewer than half of older adults are aware of these provisions. Twice the share of older adults (those ages 65 and older) are aware of the cap on monthly insulin costs for people with Medicare (44%) compared to those under the age of 65 (20%). Older adults are also more likely than younger adults to know there is a law that sets an annual limit on out-of-pocket drug costs for people with Medicare (34% v. 21%) and government negotiation requirements for some prescription drugs for people with Medicare (31% v. 23%). However, few adults in either age group are aware there is a law in place that penalizes drug companies for increasing prices faster than the rate of inflation (5% of those ages 65 and older and 11% of those under age 65).

Awareness Of Most Medicare Provisions In The Inflation Reduction Act Is Higher Among Adults Ages 65 And Older

Methodology

This KFF Health Tracking Poll was designed and analyzed by public opinion researchers at KFF. The survey was conducted July 11-19, 2023, online and by telephone among a nationally representative sample of 1,327 U.S. adults in English (1,246) and in Spanish (81). The sample includes 1,043 adults reached through the SSRS Opinion Panel either online or over the phone (n=46 in Spanish). The SSRS Opinion Panel is a nationally representative probability-based panel where panel members are recruited randomly in one of two ways: (a) Through invitations mailed to respondents randomly sampled from an Address-Based Sample (ABS) provided by Marketing Systems Groups (MSG) through the U.S. Postal Service’s Computerized Delivery Sequence (CDS); (b) from a dual-frame random digit dial (RDD) sample provided by MSG. For the online panel component, invitations were sent to panel members by email followed by up to three reminder emails. 1,022 panel members completed the survey online and panel members who do not use the internet were reached by phone (21).

Another 284 (n=35 in Spanish) interviews were conducted from a random digit dial telephone sample of prepaid cell phone numbers obtained through MSG. Phone numbers used for the prepaid cell phone component were randomly generated from a cell phone sampling frame with disproportionate stratification aimed at reaching Hispanic and non-Hispanic Black respondents. Stratification was based on incidence of the race/ethnicity groups within each frame. Respondents in the phone samples received a $15 incentive via a check received by mail, and web respondents received a $5 electronic gift card incentive (some harder-to-reach groups received a $10 electronic gift card).

The online questionnaire included two questions designed to establish that respondents were paying attention. Cases that failed both attention check questions, those with over 30% item non-response, and cases with a length less than one quarter of the mean length by mode were flagged and reviewed. Cases were removed from the data if they failed two or more of these quality checks. Based on this criterion, no cases were removed.

The combined cell phone and panel samples were weighted to match the sample’s demographics to the national U.S. adult population using data from the Census Bureau’s 2022 Current Population Survey (CPS). Weighting parameters included sex, age, education, race/ethnicity, region, and education. The sample was weighted to match patterns of civic engagement from the September 2019 Volunteering and Civic Life Supplement data from the CPS and to match frequency of internet use from the National Public Opinion Reference Survey (NPORS) for Pew Research Center.  Finally, the sample was weighted to match patterns of political party identification based on a parameter derived from recent ABS polls conducted by SSRS polls. The weights take into account differences in the probability of selection for each sample type (prepaid cell phone and panel). This includes adjustment for the sample design and geographic stratification of the cell phone sample, within household probability of selection, and the design of the panel-recruitment procedure.

The margin of sampling error including the design effect for the full sample is plus or minus 3 percentage points. Numbers of respondents and margins of sampling error for key subgroups are shown in the table below. For results based on other subgroups, the margin of sampling error may be higher. Sample sizes and margins of sampling error for other subgroups are available by request. Sampling error is only one of many potential sources of error and there may be other unmeasured error in this or any other public opinion poll. KFF public opinion and survey research is a charter member of the Transparency Initiative of the American Association for Public Opinion Research.

GroupN (unweighted)M.O.S.E.
Total1,327± 3 percentage points
Race/Ethnicity
White, non-Hispanic727± 4 percentage points
Black, non-Hispanic203± 9 percentage points
Hispanic276± 8 percentage points
Health care provider told them they are overweight or obese in past five years
Yes542± 5 percentage points

Endnotes

  1. Both Ozempic (semaglutide) and Mounjaro (tirzepatide) have been approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for treatment of type 2 diabetes; Wegovy (semaglutide) has been approved by the FDA for chronic weight management in adults who are obese or are overweight with at least one weight-related condition. These medications, all known as GLP-1 agonists, are typically administered as a routine injection. Currently, these prescription drugs come with a price tag for many adults, as insurance coverage is limited, out-of-pocket costs remain high and current US law prohibits Medicare from covering drugs used for weight loss. The most common side effects of these drugs include mild to moderate gastrointestinal issues, such as nausea and vomiting. ↩︎
  2. This is based upon adults who said a doctor or other health care provider has told them they are overweight or obese in the past five years and may differ from clinical estimates of obesity rates. For additional information on obesity rates in the U.S., see KFF’s State Health Facts on obesity. ↩︎
  3. Recent clinical trials have been studying the efficacy of these drugs when taken in pill form. ↩︎
  4. A recent study showed that participants regained most of their lost weight back after discontinuing semaglutide (the active ingredient in Ozempic and Wegovy) ↩︎
News Release

Poll: Nearly Half of Adults Would Be Interested in Prescription Weight-Loss Drugs, But Enthusiasm Fades Based on Lack of Coverage and Risk of Regaining Weight 

Most Adults, Including Most Seniors, are Unaware of Provisions Aimed at Lowering Medicare Drug Costs in Last Year’s Politically Contentious Inflation Reduction Act

Published: Aug 4, 2023

Nearly half (45%) of the public are at least somewhat interested in taking a prescription weight-loss drug, including many who say they only want to lose a little weight, though many people lose interest when presented with potential financial and medical drawbacks, the latest KFF Health Tracking Poll reveals.The poll gauges the public’s interest in using prescription drugs to lose weight as a relatively new class of drugs, initially approved to treat diabetes, is garnering attention for their potential to aid weight loss. Among those trying to lose weight, six in 10 (59%) say they would be interested in a safe and effective weight-loss drug, including half (51%) of those who say they are trying to lose less than 10 pounds.People’s interest in trying such drugs drops significantly when asked about potential obstacles and drawbacks. For instance, about one in six say they would remain interested if it were not covered by their insurance (16%) or if the U.S. Food and Drug Administration had not approved the drug for weight loss but for a different condition (16%). A similar share (14%) say they would still be interested if they might gain back the weight they lost if they stopped taking the drug. 

A large majority (80%) of the public says insurers should cover the cost of weight-loss drugs for adults who have been diagnosed as overweight or obese while half of adults (53%) says insurers should cover the cost of these drugs for anyone who wants to lose weight. Half (50%) say that insurers should cover the drugs’ cost even if it could increase monthly insurance premiums for everyone. Few Aware of Medicare Drug-Price Provisions Included in Last Year’s Inflation Reduction ActNearly a year after President Biden signed the Inflation Reduction Act into law, relatively few people are aware of its provisions aimed at lowering prescription drug costs in Medicare.For example, a quarter of the public are aware that there’s a law requiring the federal government to negotiate some drug prices for people with Medicare (25%); capping insulin costs for people with Medicare (25%); and placing an annual limit on Medicare enrollees’ out-of-pocket drug costs (24%). Fewer know that there’s a law penalizing drug companies that raise Medicare drug prices faster than the rate of inflation (10%).People ages 65 and older, who are largely covered by Medicare, are more likely than younger adults to be aware of most of these provisions, but still the shares are modest. For instance, among people who are at least 65 years old, 44% know about the insulin price caps and 34% know about the annual limit on out-of-pocket drug spending.The poll also gauges the public’s views about drug manufacturers and drug prices.

Key findings include:

  • About three in 10 (28%) adults, including 40% of those with annual household incomes under $40,000, say it’s difficult for them to afford prescription drugs. A similar share of adults (31%) say that they did not take their medicine as prescribed in the past year due to their costs.
  • About eight in 10 (83%) adults say drug companies’ profits are a major factor contributing to the price of prescription drugs, including large majorities of Republicans (89%), Democrats (84%), and independents (78%). Fewer adults say that research and development costs (54%) or marketing and advertising (45%) are major factors affecting drug prices.
  • Nearly three-quarters (73%) of the public say there is not enough regulation of prescription drug prices, up from 63% in May 2021. This includes two thirds of Republicans (68%), up from 57% in May 2021.

Designed and analyzed by public opinion researchers at KFF, the survey was conducted from July 11-19, 2023, online and by telephone among a nationally representative sample of 1,327 U.S. adults. Interviews were conducted in English and in Spanish. The margin of sampling error is plus or minus 3 percentage points for the full sample. For results based on other subgroups, the margin of sampling error may be higher.

How Do Dual-Eligible Individuals Get Their Medicare Coverage?

Published: Jul 31, 2023

Issue Brief

Medicare and Medicaid provide health coverage to 12.5 million individuals who are enrolled in both programs, known as “dual-eligible individuals.” Medicare is their primary source of health insurance coverage, and Medicaid, jointly funded by federal and state governments, provides supplemental coverage. Under the broad umbrella of Medicare coverage, dual-eligible individuals can be covered under a variety of different arrangements, including traditional Medicare, Medicare Advantage plans that are available to all Medicare beneficiaries, and plans that are designed specifically for this population (referred to here as “dual-eligible plans”).

Together, Medicare and Medicaid cover a range of services and financial supports to help meet the diverse needs of the dual-eligible population, which is more racially and ethnically diverse, and more likely to be in poor health than Medicare beneficiaries without Medicaid. At the same time, there are ongoing concerns about a lack of integration of services across the two programs that may contribute to fragmentation of care, poor outcomes, and high costs. In response to these concerns, federal and state lawmakers have been working to develop, test and implement a variety of coverage and financing options to improve coordination of care for this population.

To inform consideration of these coverage and financing options, including what they might mean for how dual-eligible individuals get their Medicare and Medicaid benefits, and who would be most affected, this brief presents national and state-level sources of Medicare coverage for dual-eligible individuals, by demographic characteristics, based on the 2020 Medicare Beneficiary Summary File (See Methods for details and Appendix Table 1).

Key takeaways:

  • Just over half (51%) of dual-eligible individuals received their Medicare benefits through traditional Medicare in 2020, while the remaining 49% were enrolled in Medicare Advantage plans (Figure 1).
  • Three in 10 (30%) dual-eligible individuals were enrolled in a dual-eligible plan, most of whom (24%) were in coordination-only dual eligible special needs plans (D-SNPs). Coordination-only D-SNPs are designed for dual-eligible individuals and are required to coordinate with state Medicaid programs, with some variation in the specific requirements across states.
  • Enrollment of dual-eligible individuals in traditional Medicare ranged from less than 30% in Hawaii and Puerto Rico to 70% or over in 11 states (Alaska, Delaware, Maryland, Montana, North Dakota, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming).
  • Among dual-eligible individuals, Medicare Advantage enrollment rates were higher among beneficiaries who were age 65 and older than those under age 65 (53% vs 41%) and among beneficiaries who were Black (54%), Hispanic (65%), and Asian/Pacific Islander (48%) than non-Hispanic White beneficiaries (41%).
Figure 1: Just Over Half (51%) of Dual-Eligible Individuals Received Their Medicare Coverage Through Traditional Medicare in 2020

Overview of Medicare Coverage Options for Dual-Eligible Individuals

Like all Medicare beneficiaries, dual-eligible individuals may choose to receive their Medicare benefits through traditional Medicare or a Medicare Advantage plan. This decision may have implications for how dual-eligible individuals receive their Medicaid benefits and the degree to which that coverage is coordinated with Medicare. State Medicaid programs cover benefits that Medicare does not cover, such as long-term services and supports and non-emergency transportation, as well as a broader set of behavioral health services through Medicaid fee-for-service or Medicaid managed care. Most (73%) dual-eligible individuals are eligible for the full range of Medicaid benefits not otherwise covered by Medicare and are referred to as “full-benefit” dual-eligible individuals. Medicaid also provides most full-benefit dual-eligible individuals premium and in many cases, cost-sharing assistance through the Medicare Savings Program. “Partial-benefit” dual-eligible individuals are not eligible for full Medicaid benefits but are eligible for assistance with Medicare premiums and, in many cases, cost sharing, also through the Medicare Savings Programs.

The various Medicare coverage options for dual-eligible individuals are summarized below and in Appendix Table 1.

Traditional Medicare

In traditional Medicare, beneficiaries can obtain care from any provider that participates in Medicare. The payment and delivery of care in traditional Medicare has evolved over the last several decades, with payment including a mix of fee-for-service, bundled, and prospective payments, as well as value-based payment models, such as Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs). ACOs are a group of doctors, hospitals and providers that form partnerships to be collectively responsible for the care coordination of their patients.

Medicare Advantage

Medicare Advantage plans receive a payment from the federal government to deliver Medicare Part A and Part B benefits, and, typically, Part D drug coverage. Medicare Advantage plans often provide some coverage of supplemental benefits, such as vision and dental. These plans are permitted to limit provider networks and may require prior authorization for certain services or referrals for certain types of providers. In this brief, all private plans are referred to as Medicare Advantage plans, including cost contract plans, health care prepayment plans, Program of All-Inclusive Care for the Elderly, and Medicare-Medicaid plans. Medicare Advantage plans have been categorized into dual-eligible plans and non-dual-eligible plans (described below).

Dual-eligible plans

In this brief, dual-eligible plans are defined as private plans or programs that are designed for people who are dually enrolled in Medicare and Medicaid and, to varying degrees, coordinate benefits across the two programs. Dual-eligible individuals are not required to enroll in a dual-eligible plan, although in some states, Medicare-Medicaid plans (MMPs) and fully integrated dual-eligible (FIDE) SNPs have the option to passively enroll dual-eligible individuals, which means individuals would need to opt-out if they prefer a different Medicare coverage arrangement. Financing of dual-eligible plans also varies across plan types, and often within plan types depending on the degree of coordination in coverage and benefits.

In this analysis, dual-eligible plans include:

  • Dual eligible special needs plans (D-SNPs) are a type of Medicare Advantage plan that provide Medicare coverage and may coordinate or cover Medicaid benefits depending on the type of D-SNP. D-SNPs have contracts with the federal government to provide coverage to Medicare beneficiaries and receive a capitated payment to cover the cost of all Medicare-covered services and supplemental benefits included in the plan. When supplemental benefits duplicate Medicaid-covered benefits, the Medicare payment covers these costs. D-SNPs are required by Medicare to have contracts with Medicaid programs in the states in which they operate and must meet minimum requirements, including those related to coordinating the delivery of benefits with the Medicaid program. States have the option to limit enrollment in these plans to full-benefit dual-eligible individuals. There are three types of D-SNPs:
    • Coordination-only D-SNPs must meet the minimum federal requirements but provide varying levels of coordination, depending on state requirements. These D-SNPs provide Medicare-covered services and in most cases supplemental benefits, and the state Medicaid agency or a Medicaid managed care plan provides Medicaid-covered services. Most D-SNPs fall into this category.
    • Fully Integrated Dual-Eligible (FIDE) SNPs provide Medicare- and included Medicaid-covered services through a single managed care organization. The same organization that offers the FIDE SNP must also offer a Medicaid managed care plan for any Medicaid benefits not included in the FIDE SNP. In some cases, certain Medicaid benefits may be provided by the state or by a different health plan. FIDE SNPs are paid by Medicare for Medicare-covered services and included supplemental benefits, and by Medicaid for Medicaid-covered services. It is possible for people to enroll in a FIDE SNP but not the companion Medicaid plan or vice versa. Starting in 2025, FIDE SNPs may only enroll full-benefit dual-eligible individuals if they are enrolled in both the FIDE SNP and the Medicaid plan sponsored by the same organization.
    • Highly Integrated Dual-Eligible (HIDE) SNPs must meet the requirements of coordination-only D-SNPs and must also have a Medicaid plan operating in the same counties as the D-SNP. The parent organization provides both Medicare and Medicaid services, but there is no requirement that the same people enroll in both plans. HIDE SNPs were not available until 2021 and are not included in this analysis.
  • Medicare-Medicaid Plans (MMPs) were established as a demonstration under the Financial Alignment Initiative where a single health plan provides all Medicare- and Medicaid-covered benefits. Enrollment in MMPs is limited to full-benefit dual-eligible individuals. Recent regulations require that all states end their demonstration programs of the MMP model by the end of 2025 and transition remaining plans to HIDE or FIDE SNPs.
  • Program of All-Inclusive Care for the Elderly (PACE) provides comprehensive medical and social services to individuals who: (1) are 55 years of age or older, (2) need a nursing home level of care but can live safely in the community, and (3) live in a PACE organization service area. Most people in PACE are dual-eligible individuals. PACE was made a permanent part of the Medicare and Medicaid programs by the Balanced Budget Act of 1997.

Non-dual-eligible plans

Non-dual-eligible plans are other Medicare Advantage and private plans that may enroll dual-eligible individuals but do not coordinate Medicare and Medicaid benefits. These include individual Medicare Advantage plans that are generally available for enrollment to all people with Medicare, group plans sponsored by employers and unions, and other SNPs for Medicare beneficiaries with specialized health needs, including institutional special needs plans (I-SNPs) and chronic condition special needs plans (C-SNPs).

What share of dual-eligible individuals were enrolled in traditional Medicare and Medicare Advantage plans?

Just over half (51%) of all dual-eligible individuals were in traditional Medicare and 49% were enrolled in Medicare Advantage plans in 2020.

A smaller share of dual-eligible individuals were enrolled in traditional Medicare than the share of Medicare beneficiaries without Medicaid coverage in traditional Medicare (51% vs. 57%, respectively) (Figure 2 and Appendix Table 2).

Of the 10.9 million dual-eligible individuals enrolled in Medicare Part A and B in 2020, 5.6 million were in traditional Medicare and 5.3 million were enrolled in Medicare Advantage plans. However, among 5.3 million dual-eligible individuals enrolled in a Medicare Advantage plan, the majority (61%) were enrolled in a dual-eligible plan, and the remaining 39% were in a non-dual-eligible plan (data not shown).

Among all dual-eligible individuals, 3 in 10 (30%) were enrolled in dual-eligible plans (Figure 2). Enrollment in dual-eligible plans consisted primarily of enrollment in coordination-only D-SNPs (24%), followed by MMPs (3%), FIDE SNPs (3%), and PACE (0.4%). Higher enrollment in coordination-only D-SNPs than other dual-eligible plan types is likely driven by higher plan availability, since the other types of plans were only available in a limited number of states, and often in a subset of counties in 2020 (e.g., FIDE SNPs, 11 states; MMPs, 9 states; and PACE, 31 states).

About 1 in 5 (19%) dual-eligible individuals were enrolled in a Medicare Advantage plan that was not designed for people with both Medicare and Medicaid, primarily individual Medicare Advantage plans available to all Medicare beneficiaries (17% of all dual-eligible individuals). Another 2% were in an I-SNP or C-SNP. In 2020, most people enrolled in I-SNPs (91%) were dual-eligible individuals, while just over one-quarter (26%) of enrollees in C-SNPs were dual-eligible individuals.

3 in 10 Dual-Eligible Individuals were Enrolled in a Dual-Eligible Plan

In 37 states and the District of Columbia, at least 50% of dual-eligible individuals received their Medicare coverage through traditional Medicare in 2020, including 11 states where 70% or more of dual-eligible individuals were in traditional Medicare (Figure 3). The share of dual-eligible individuals in traditional Medicare ranged from a high of 99% in Alaska to a low of 0.3% in Puerto Rico. The share of dual-eligible individuals in traditional Medicare across states was generally similar to the share of Medicare beneficiaries without Medicaid in traditional Medicare, except in 6 states (Arizona, Florida, Hawaii, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Tennessee) and Puerto Rico (Appendix Table 2). For example, in Arizona, 30% of dual-eligible individuals were in traditional Medicare versus 59% of Medicare beneficiaries without Medicaid.

In five states (Arizona, Florida, Hawaii, Rhode Island, and Tennessee) and Puerto Rico, more than 40% of dual-eligible individuals were enrolled in a dual-eligible plan – higher than the national share of dual-eligible individuals in a dual-eligible plan (30%). In four of these states, the relatively high enrollment in dual-eligible plans was driven by enrollment in coordination-only D-SNPs, including Arizona (39%), Florida (43%), Hawaii (57%) and Tennessee (42%), while in Rhode Island, the enrollment in dual-eligible plans was highest in MMPs (33%). In contrast, in 4 states (Maryland, Montana, North Dakota and Oklahoma), less than 10% of dual-eligible individuals were enrolled in a dual-eligible plan (Figure 3, Appendix Table 3).

In 37 States and the District of Columbia, At Least 50% of Dual-Eligible Individuals were in Traditional Medicare

Box 1: Medicare and Medicaid in Puerto Rico

Puerto Rico is included in this analysis of dual-eligible individuals in Medicare. Notably, Puerto Rico’s Medicare and Medicaid programs differ from the 50 states and the District of Columbia. In Puerto Rico, nearly all Medicare beneficiaries are enrolled in a Medicare Advantage plan. Medicare Advantage penetration is higher across Puerto Rico than in the 50 states and District of Columbia. In 2023 at least 90% of eligible Medicare beneficiaries are enrolled in a Medicare Advantage plan across virtually all Puerto Rican counties. In particular, enrollment in D-SNPs accounts for a much larger share of Medicare Advantage enrollment than in any of the 50 states or the District of Columbia.

Puerto Rico’s Medicaid program eligibility rules, benefits, delivery system and financing differ in some ways from those in the 50 states and the District of Columbia. For example, Puerto Rico does not cover most of the benefits that full-benefit dual-eligible individuals use such as long-term services and supports, and in Puerto Rico, cost-sharing assistance is provided to full-benefit dual-eligible individuals, but not to partial-benefit dual-eligible individuals, because Medicare Savings Programs are not available in Puerto Rico.

The share of dual-eligible individuals in traditional Medicare and Medicare Advantage plans differed across subgroups of beneficiaries by race, age, and area of residence.

A larger share of Black (54%), Hispanic (65%) and Asian/Pacific Islander (48%) dual-eligible individuals were enrolled in Medicare Advantage plans than non-Hispanic White (41%) and American Indian/Alaska Native (25%) dual-eligible individuals. Lower enrollment in coordination-only D-SNPs among non-Hispanic White individuals (16%) compared to Black (28%), Hispanic (37%) or Asian/Pacific Islander (24%) beneficiaries explains lower overall enrollment in Medicare Advantage plans among non-Hispanic White dual-eligible individuals.

A larger share of dual-eligible individuals under age 65 received their Medicare coverage through traditional Medicare than dual-eligible individuals age 65 or older (59% vs 47%) (Figure 5). Higher enrollment in Medicare Advantage plans among dual-eligible beneficiaries age 65 or older compared to those under 65 (53% vs. 41%) is almost entirely accounted for by higher enrollment in individual Medicare Advantage plans (20% vs 13%).

Two-thirds (67%) of dual-eligible individuals living in rural areas received their Medicare coverage through traditional Medicare compared to less than half (48%) of dual-eligible individuals living in metropolitan areas. Traditional Medicare was also the more common source of Medicare coverage for dual-eligible individuals living in a micropolitan area, where 62% were in traditional Medicare. In addition, a larger share of dual-eligible individuals in metropolitan areas were enrolled in coordination-only D-SNPs (25%), FIDE SNPs (3%) and MMPs (4%) than dual-eligible individuals in micropolitan areas (18%, 1% and 1%, respectively) and rural areas (14%, 1% and 0.4%, respectively) (Figure 4).

A Majority of Black and Hispanic Dual-Eligible Individuals were Enrolled in Medicare Advantage Plans

A larger share of full-benefit dual-eligible individuals were in traditional Medicare than partial-benefit dual-eligible individuals.

Among dual-eligible individuals who received full benefits in 2020, nearly 6 in 10 (55%) were enrolled in traditional Medicare, while 45% were enrolled in Medicare Advantage plans. For dual-eligible individuals receiving partial benefits, the pattern was reversed, with 58% enrolled in Medicare Advantage plans and 42% in traditional Medicare (Figure 5).

Three in 10 (33%) full-benefit dual-eligible individuals were enrolled in dual-eligible plans, compared to approximately 2 in 10 (23%) partial-benefit dual-eligible individuals. Among full-benefit dual-eligible individuals, enrollment in dual-eligible plans was largely comprised of enrollment in coordination-only D-SNPs (24% of full-benefit dual-eligible individuals), followed by MMPs (5%), FIDE SNPs (4%), and PACE (1%). All partial-benefit dual-eligible individuals in dual-eligible plans were in coordination-only D-SNPs, largely due to enrollment restrictions in other dual-eligible plan types.

A smaller share of full-benefit dual-eligible individuals were enrolled in non-dual-eligible Medicare Advantage plans than partial-benefit dual-eligible individuals (12% vs 35%). Among dual-eligible individuals receiving full benefits, 10% were in individual Medicare Advantage plans, while among those receiving partial benefits, 34% were in individual Medicare Advantage plans.

33% of Full-Benefit Dual-Eligible Individuals were Enrolled in Dual-Eligible Plans, Compared to 23% of Partial-Benefit Dual-Eligible Individuals

Consistent with the overall enrollment patterns for full-benefit dual-eligible individuals, in most states (39) and the District of Columbia, more than half of full-benefit dual-eligible individuals were in traditional Medicare. In contrast, in half of states (26), more than half of partial-benefit dual-eligible individuals were enrolled in Medicare Advantage plans (Appendix Table 4).

Discussion

In 2020, one third (30%) of dual-eligible individuals were enrolled in a Medicare Advantage plan designed for people with both Medicare and Medicaid, 19% were in another Medicare Advantage plan, and just over half (51%) received their Medicare coverage through traditional Medicare. The source of Medicare coverage for dual-eligible individuals varied by state and by beneficiary characteristics.

Dual-eligible individuals have lower incomes, are more racially and ethnically diverse, and often face greater mental and physical health challenges than the general Medicare population, which can make navigating the health care system and health care coverage challenging for this population. Separate eligibility requirements, benefits, and rules for Medicare and Medicaid may further contribute to what has been described as a “fragmented and disjointed system of care for dual eligibles.”

To address concerns about fragmented care and high costs, some policymakers have proposed to expand the role of Medicare Advantage plans that are designed for dual-eligible individuals (or a subset of these plans). Existing Medicare coverage arrangements for dual-eligible individuals vary in the degree of care coordination and integration of financing between Medicare and Medicaid. Some coverage options may offer a greater degree of coordination and financing (such as FIDE D-SNPs) than others. Plans with generally higher degrees of integration tend to have relatively low enrollment nationwide compared with the more common coverage options, in part because they are not widely available.

Proposals that would require dual-eligible individuals to be covered under a Medicare Advantage plan designed for this population would mean a transition from one source of Medicare coverage to another, potentially disrupting care arrangements between patients and providers depending on network restrictions, for the large share of dual-eligible individuals who are covered under traditional Medicare – a group that is disproportionately non-Hispanic White, under the age of 65 with permanent disabilities, living in rural areas, and living in states where enrollment in dual-eligible plans is currently relatively low.

Higher enrollment among dual-eligible individuals in Medicare Advantage plans designed for this population could potentially address fragmentation challenges between Medicare and Medicaid, though based on current evidence, it is not clear these plans always improve the coordination of care. In addition, it is not clear how such changes would affect expenditures under both programs. Assessing the potential effects of various coverage arrangements on the experiences of dual-eligible individuals, and on Medicare and Medicaid spending is beyond the scope of this analysis but would inform consideration of policy proposals that aim to improve coverage and care for this high-need population.

This work was supported in part by Arnold Ventures. KFF maintains full editorial control over all of its policy analysis, polling, and journalism activities.

Appendix Tables

Medicare Coverage Options for Dual-Eligible Individuals
State-level Shares of Medicare Beneficiaries in Traditional Medicare by Dual Status, 2020
State-level Shares of Dual-Eligible Individuals by Medicare Coverage Option, 2020
State-level Shares of Full and Partial Benefit Dual-Eligible Individuals in Traditional Medicare, 2020

Methods

Methods

Data: Medicare enrollment is based on analysis of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services Chronic Conditions Data Warehouse 2020 research-identifiable Master Beneficiary Summary File (MBSF) Base. The estimates are based on a 20% sample of Medicare beneficiaries.

Sample Definition: Medicare beneficiaries were required to have both Part A and Part B in March 2020 to be included in this analysis. Dual-eligible individuals were identified based on their dual status in March 2020. This analysis includes people in the 50 States, Puerto Rico, and Washington, D.C. Individuals without a valid state and county code were excluded. This approach is consistent with other KFF analysis of Medicare Advantage enrollment in some ways, but differs from previous analyses of dual-eligible individuals in four main ways: first, in previous analyses individuals with Medicare Part A or Part B were included. Second, in previous analyses dual eligibility included individuals who were dually eligible for Medicare and Medicaid at any point during the year, whereas in this study dual eligibility was defined in the month of March. Third, previous analyses included only people living in the 50 states and the District of Columbia, in contrast this analysis includes people living in Puerto Rico as well. Finally, previous analyses did not require a valid county code to identify where individuals lived. As a result, this analysis includes a lower number of dual-eligible individuals (10.6 million) than KFF reports elsewhere (12.5 million).

Traditional Medicare enrollment: Beneficiaries without a valid Medicare Advantage contract ID in March 2020 were defined as enrolled in traditional Medicare. This analysis does not identify beneficiaries who are aligned to an Accountable Care Organization or who receive their Medicare benefits through a Financial Alignment Initiative managed FFS program. Additionally, this analysis is unable to identify traditional Medicare beneficiaries who have employer-sponsored or self-purchased supplemental insurance coverage because this information is not included in the MBSF data.

Medicare Advantage enrollment: This includes enrollment in all private plans including Medicare Advantage plans. Beneficiaries with a valid contract ID in March 2020 were identified as enrolled in Medicare Advantage. To determine the type of plan in which the beneficiary was enrolled, the contract ID and plan ID were matched to the March 2020 Monthly Enrollment by Plan or the Special Needs Plan Report data published by CMS.

Medicare Advantage plans include SNPs (D-SNPs, I-SNPs and C-SNPs), individual plans and employer plans and other types of private plans include: Program for All-Inclusive Care (PACE) plans, Medicare-Medicaid Plans, section 1876 cost contract plans, and section 1833 health care prepayment plans (HCPP plans). In this analysis non-Medicare Advantage plans are included in the Medicare Advantage enrollment totals, in contrast to other KFF analyses, which have excluded these types of plans. When those plans are excluded, the share of Medicare beneficiaries with both Part A and Part B that are in a Medicare Advantage plan is slightly lower.

Identifying Dual-Eligible Individuals: Dual eligibility was identified based on the dual-eligible status code in March 2020. Those who had a dual eligibility code of 02, 04, or 08 were assigned full-benefit dual eligibility status and those with a code of 01, 03, 05, or 06 were assigned partial-benefit dual eligibility status. In Puerto Rico, individuals were also flagged as dual-eligible individuals if they were enrolled in a coordination-only D-SNP in March 2020. All other Medicare beneficiaries were identified as Medicare beneficiaries without Medicaid.

Race/Ethnicity. Race/ethnicity was identified using the variable RTI race code in the MBSF which was developed by the Research Triangle Institute using an algorithm.

Geographical identifiers. A metropolitan statistical area consists of the county or counties (or equivalent entities) associated with at least one urbanized area of at least 50,000 population, plus adjacent counties having a high degree of social and economic integration with the core as measured through commuting ties. A micropolitan statistical area consists of, “the county or counties (or equivalent entities) associated with at least one urban cluster of at least 10,000 but less than 50,000 population, plus adjacent counties having a high degree of social and economic integration with the core as measured through commuting ties. Rural statistical areas are all other non-metropolitan and non-micropolitan areas.