Optional Medicaid and CHIP Coverage for Lawfully Present Immigrant Children Could Mitigate Coverage Losses Due to 2025 Reconciliation Law

Authors: Carlos Cruz, Drishti Pillai, and Samantha Artiga
Published: Aug 14, 2026

Summary

Actions taken by the Trump administration and Congress will likely have major impacts on health and health care for immigrant families, including reducing the number of lawfully present immigrants eligible for federally funded health coverage under the 2025 reconciliation law. While undocumented immigrants have already been ineligible for federally funded health coverage, the law newly limits Medicaid and Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP), subsidized Affordable Care Act (ACA) Marketplace, and Medicare coverage to lawfully present immigrants who are lawful permanent residents (LPRs) or green card holders, certain Cuban or Haitian immigrants, and people residing in the U.S. under Compacts of Free Association (COFA). As such, many lawfully present immigrants, including humanitarian immigrants, such as refugees and asylees, will become ineligible for coverage. However, the law does not eliminate optional Medicaid and CHIP coverage under the Immigrant Children’s Health Improvement Act (ICHIA) for lawfully residing children and pregnant people. This option allows a state to cover a broader group of lawfully present immigrants who meet income and other eligibility requirements. As such, ICHIA coverage could help mitigate potential coverage losses for lawfully present immigrant children and pregnant people.

This brief provides an overview of health coverage of noncitizen children based on KFF analysis of 2024 American Community Survey (ACS) data to provide greater insight into the potential role of ICHIA coverage in limiting the law’s impact on coverage for lawfully present immigrant children. While there are few noncitizen children in the U.S. overall, their access to health coverage has important implications for their health and well-being, including their long-term health and economic stability as adults. Although states can also use ICHIA to expand coverage for lawfully present immigrant pregnant people, this analysis does not include this group since they cannot be separately identified in ACS data. Similarly, the analysis includes all noncitizen children rather than just lawfully present immigrant children, because the data do not provide information on immigration status. However, separate research suggests there are very few undocumented children in the U.S. overall. Key takeaways include the following:

  • As of April 2026, 38 states have implemented ICHIA coverage for lawfully residing immigrant children, and over nine in ten (92%) of the approximately 2.6 million noncitizen children in the U.S. live in a state with ICHIA coverage for children.
  • Noncitizen children are more likely to be uninsured than citizen children. Recent noncitizen children in the U.S. for less than five years are at the highest risk of being uninsured, with 28% lacking coverage compared to 22% of their longer-term noncitizen counterparts and 5% of citizens.
  • The uninsured rate for noncitizen children living in states that have adopted ICHIA coverage for children is lower compared to the rate for noncitizen children living in states that have not (25% vs 37%), likely reflecting a combination of ICHIA coverage and other more expansive coverage policies in these states.

Together, the data show that Medicaid, CHIP, and other public coverage help reduce uninsured rates for noncitizen children, particularly recent noncitizen children living in ICHIA states. Maintaining ICHIA coverage could help mitigate coverage losses for lawfully present immigrant children as the 2025 reconciliation law eligibility restrictions go into effect. Additionally, implementation of ICHIA coverage in the states that have not yet adopted it or that have room to expand it for either children or pregnant people could further limit coverage losses. Even with ICHIA coverage in place, outreach and communication to families and effective processes to screen individuals for eligibility under the option will be important for preventing administrative coverage losses among those eligible as new restrictions are implemented.

Medicaid and CHIP Coverage Under the ICHIA Option

Prior to the 2025 reconciliation law, undocumented immigrants were already ineligible for Medicaid, CHIP, and other federally funded coverage, and lawfully present immigrants faced eligibility restrictions for Medicaid and CHIP. In 1996, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act limited Medicaid and CHIP eligibility to certain groups of lawfully present immigrants deemed to have a “qualified status” and required many of these groups to wait at least five years before they could enroll even if they met other eligibility criteria (Table 1). As such, many lawfully present immigrants faced a five-year waiting period for coverage and others remained ineligible regardless of their length of time in the country, although some groups were exempt from the five-year waiting period. Lawfully present immigrants were eligible for ACA Marketplace coverage with subsidies to offset the cost of this coverage during their five-year waiting period for Medicaid or CHIP.

Table 1: Lawfully Present Immigrants by Qualified Status
Lawfully Present Immigrants With
“Qualified Status”
Lawfully Present Immigrants Without
“Qualified Status”
• Lawful permanent resident (LPR or green card holder)
• Refugee
• Asylee
• Cuban/Haitian entrant
• Paroled into the U.S. for at least one year
• Conditional entrant granted before 1980
• Granted withholding of deportation
• Battered noncitizen, spouse, child, or parent
• Victims of trafficking and their spouse, child, sibling, or parent or individuals with pending application for a victim of trafficking visa
• Member of a federally recognized Indian tribe or American Indian born in Canada
• Citizens of the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and Palau who are living in one of the U.S. states or territories (referred to as Compact of Free Association or COFA migrants)
• Granted Withholding of Deportation or Withholding of Removal, under the immigration laws or under the Convention against Torture (CAT)
• Individual with Non-Immigrant Status, includes worker visas, student visas, U-visa, and other visas, and citizens of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, and Palau
• Temporary Protected Status (TPS)
• Deferred Enforced Departure (DED)
• Deferred Action Status
• Lawful Temporary Resident
• Administrative order staying removal issued by the Department of Homeland Security
• Resident of American Samoa
• Applicants for certain statuses
• People with certain statuses who have employment authorization

Since 2009, states have had the option to expand Medicaid and CHIP coverage for lawfully residing children and pregnant people under ICHIA. This option extends eligibility to lawfully residing children and/or pregnant people beyond those with “qualified status” and eliminates the five-year waiting period for coverage. As of April 2026, 38 states including DC have taken up this option for children and pregnant people or for children only and 2 states have taken it up for pregnant people only (Figure 1).Most states that have taken up ICHIA for children have taken up other coverage expansion options. These include options such as the ACA Medicaid expansion to low-income adults and fully state-funded coverage for certain groups of immigrants, such as children, regardless of immigration status (Appendix Table 1.)

Most States Have Expanded Coverage to Lawfully Residing Immigrant Children (Choropleth map)

Health Coverage Among Noncitizen Children

As of 2024, there were approximately 2.6 million noncitizen children ages 0 to 18 residing in the U.S. This includes 61% or 1.6 million who are recent noncitizen children in the U.S. for less than five years and 39% or 1 million who have been in the U.S for five or more years. This group includes both lawfully present and undocumented immigrants, although other research suggests there are very few undocumented children in the U.S. overall.

Noncitizen children are significantly more likely to be uninsured than their citizen counterparts (Figure 2). Recent noncitizen children are at the highest risk of being uninsured, with 28% lacking coverage compared to 22% of their longer-term noncitizen counterparts and 5% of citizens. The higher uninsured rate among noncitizen children reflects a lower rate of private coverage. Rates of public coverage for children are similar across citizenship status and length of time in the country. However, noncitizen children are more likely than their citizen counterparts to live in a low-income family and, therefore, are more likely to be eligible for public coverage yet enrolled at lower rates.

Noncitizen Children are More Likely to Be Uninsured Than Their Citizen Counterparts (Stacked Bars)

The uninsured rate for noncitizen children is significantly lower in states that have adopted the ICHIA option for children compared to the rate for noncitizen children in states that have not adopted this option (25% vs. 37%). This pattern holds true across both recent noncitizen children (27% vs. 35%) as well as longer-term noncitizen children (21% vs. 40%). The lower uninsured rate in these states is largely driven by higher rates of public coverage, particularly among recent noncitizen children. This likely reflects the expanded coverage to recent lawfully residing immigrant children who would otherwise be in the five-year waiting period as well as broader groups of lawfully residing immigrant children who do not have “qualified status.” Additionally, as noted, some of these states have implemented other coverage expansions for immigrant children, such as fully state-funded programs, as well as broader expansions for the low-income population, including the ACA Medicaid expansion to low-income adults, which may have spillover effects on children’s coverage. States with ICHIA coverage for children also cover a much larger number of noncitizen children than states without ICHIA, as over nine in ten (92%) of noncitizen children live in these 38 states.

Noncitizen Children in States with ICHIA Coverage Are Less Likely to be Uninsured than Those in States Without ICHIA Coverage (Stacked Bars)

ICHIA Coverage Under the 2025 Reconciliation Law

The 2025 reconciliation law limits eligibility for federally funded coverage, including Medicaid, CHIP, subsidized ACA Marketplace, and Medicare coverage, to LPRs (green card holders), certain Cuban and Haitian entrants, and people residing in the U.S. under COFA. This change eliminates eligibility for many groups of lawfully present immigrants such as refugees, U visa holders and applicants, and people with Temporary Protected Status, and is expected to lead to 1.4 million lawfully present immigrants becoming uninsured by 2034. The Medicaid and CHIP eligibility restrictions will take effect as of October 1, 2026, and are expected to lead to 100,000 individuals becoming uninsured by 2034.

The 2025 reconciliation law did not eliminate optional Medicaid and CHIP coverage for lawfully residing children and/or pregnant people under ICHIA. ICHIA coverage provides eligibility for a broader group of lawfully present immigrants in these groups who would otherwise no longer be eligible under the reconciliation law and also extends eligibility to recent immigrants who would otherwise be subject to the five-year waiting period for Medicaid and CHIP.

States could mitigate coverage losses for lawfully present immigrant children and pregnant people by maintaining or expanding ICHIA coverage. Overall, 11 states have not taken up ICHIA coverage for either children or pregnant people, 8 states have taken up the option for children but could expand it to pregnant people, and 2 states have taken up the option for pregnant people only but could expand it to children. Conversely, elimination of ICHIA coverage could exacerbate coverage losses for these groups. Some states facing budget pressures have recently cut back on state-funded coverage for immigrants. While no state has eliminated ICHIA coverage to date, states continue to face increasing budget pressures. ICHIA cannot mitigate coverage losses among non-pregnant adults who will no longer be eligible for Medicaid based on their immigration status.

Even with ICHIA coverage in place, outreach and education to families and effective eligibility screening processes will be important to prevent administrative losses among those still eligible as the reconciliation law changes are implemented. For example, as states implement new eligibility restrictions, it will be important to effectively screen people for eligibility under the ICHIA option to make sure they do not lose coverage if they are still eligible. Families may also be confused about shifting eligibility rules, which may be compounded by confusion and fears stemming from recent changes to public charge policies. Additionally, a couple of states almost inadvertently eliminated this coverage through state legislation to implement the 2025 reconciliation law, although these changes were eventually avoided. 

Methods

Data sources: This brief is based on KFF analysis of federal survey data, namely the American Community Survey 1-year Public Use Microdata Sample. The ACS is a nationally representative household survey conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau. ACS PUMS data are available on a yearly basis. State-level data on immigrant subpopulations were excluded due to sample size.

Identifying citizenship status: U.S. citizens were defined as naturalized citizens or U.S.-born citizens. Naturalized citizens are individuals who indicate becoming a U.S. citizen by naturalization. Noncitizen immigrants are individuals who say that they are not a U.S. citizen, including both lawfully present and undocumented immigrants.

Defining insurance coverage categories: Private insurance coverage included employer-sponsored and direct purchase insurance plans. Public insurance coverage included Medicare, Medicaid, and military-sponsored insurance plans.

Defining state take-up of ICHIA: Information on state take-up of ICHIA is based on KFF and Georgetown University’s 2026 Medicaid Eligibility and Enrollment Survey. For the purposes of this analysis, the 38 states that have taken up ICHIA for lawfully residing children were grouped into “States with ICHIA Coverage” for children.

Appendix Table 1: State Take-Up of Health Coverage Expansions
StateICHIA OptionACA Medicaid ExpansionFCEP OptionState-Funded Coverage
ChildrenPregnant PeopleChildren or Pregnant PeopleAdults
States That Have Adopted ICHIA Coverage for Children
ArkansasYesYesYesYesNoNo
CaliforniaYesYesYesYesYesYes
ColoradoYesYesYesYesYesYes
ConnecticutYesYesYesYesYesNo
DelawareYesYesYesNoNoNo
District of ColumbiaYesYesYesYesYesYes
FloridaYesNoNoNoNoNo
GeorgiaYesYesNoNoNoNo
HawaiiYesYesYesNoNoNo
IllinoisYesNoYesYesYesYes
IowaYesNoYesNoNoNo
KentuckyYesYesYesNoNoNo
LouisianaYesNoYesYesNoNo
MaineYesYesYesYesYesNo
MarylandYesYesYesYesNoNo
MassachusettsYesYesYesYesYesNo
MichiganYesYesYesYesNoNo
MinnesotaYesYesYesYesYesNo
MontanaYesNoYesNoNoNo
NebraskaYesYesYesYesNoNo
NevadaYesYesYesNoNoNo
New HampshireYesYesYesNoNoNo
New JerseyYesYesYesNoYesNo
New MexicoYesYesYesNoNoNo
New YorkYesYesYesYesYesYes*
North CarolinaYesYesYesNoNoNo
OhioYesYesYesNoNoNo
OregonYesNoYesYesYesYes
PennsylvaniaYesYesYesNoNoNo
Rhode IslandYesYesYesYesYesNo
South CarolinaYesYesNoNoNoNo
TexasYesNoNoYesNoNo
UtahYesNoYesNoYesNo
VermontYesYesYesNoYesNo
VirginiaYesYesYesYesNoNo
WashingtonYesYesYesYesYesYes
West VirginiaYesYesYesNoNoNo
WisconsinYesYesNoYesNoNo
States that Have Not Adopted ICHIA Coverage for Children
AlabamaNoNoNoYesNoNo
AlaskaNoNoYesNoNoNo
ArizonaNoNoYesNoNoNo
IdahoNoNoYesNoNoNo
IndianaNoNoYesNoNoNo
KansasNoNoNoNoNoNo
MississippiNoNoNoNoNoNo
MissouriNoNoYesYesNoNo
North DakotaNoYesYesNoNoNo
OklahomaNoNoYesYesNoNo
South DakotaNoNoYesYesNoNo
TennesseeNoNoNoYesNoNo
WyomingNoYesNoNoNoNo
Note: "ICHIA Option" for children or pregnant people includes states that implement ICHIA for these populations as of January 2026. "Medicaid Expansion" includes states that have adopted the Affordable Care Act’s (ACA) expanded Medicaid coverage to nearly all adults with incomes up to 138% of the Federal Poverty Level as of May 2026. "FCEP Option" includes states that adopted the CHIP From-Conception-to-End-of-Pregnancy (FCEP) option. "State-Funded" includes states that provide any state-funded health coverage to income-eligible adults or children regardless of immigration status as of April 2026. State-funded coverage for adults in New York is limited to individuals 65 or older.
Source: KFF/Georgetown University, 2026 Medicaid Eligibility and Enrollment Survey (April 2026); KFF, “Status of State Medicaid Expansion Decisions” (May 2026); KFF, “Medicaid and CHIP Income Eligibility Limits for Pregnant Women as a Percent of the Federal Poverty Level” (January 2026); KFF, “State Health Coverage for Immigrants and Implications for Health Coverage and Care” (May 2026).

VOLUME 52

Many Adults Are Unaware of the Abortion Pill’s Safety and Prevalence as Misleading Claims Link the Medication to Wastewater Contamination


Highlights

Recently released findings from KFF’s July Health Tracking Poll show that much of the public is unsure of the abortion pill mifepristone’s safety, and most lack awareness that most abortions in the U.S. are performed via medications. These findings come as some groups opposed to abortion are citing a misleading paper in an effort to classify mifepristone as a water contaminant, despite criticism of the paper’s methodology and a lack of evidence demonstrating the drug poses an environmental risk.


The latest KFF Health Tracking Poll examines the public’s knowledge and views of mifepristone – or medication abortion – amid an ongoing FDA re-review of the medication’s safety.

Much of the public is unaware of mifepristone’s long-standing safety record. While larger shares of adults say medication abortion is safe (44%) than say it is unsafe (15%) when taken as directed by a health care provider, about four in ten (41%) say they are unsure. This uncertainty is higher among Black women, with half (51%) saying they are unsure whether abortion pills are safe. Among women of reproductive age – or those ages 18-49 – roughly half (52%) view the abortion pills as safe while three in ten are not sure.

Republicans (50%) and independents (42%) are most likely to be uncertain about mifepristone’s safety, while a majority of Democrats (61%) view the medication as safe.

Stacked bar chart showing share of adults who believe abortion bills are very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe, very unsafe, or are unsure of the correct answer. Results shown by total, women of reproductive age, and party.

In addition to the lack of awareness of mifepristone’s safety record, just about a quarter (26%) of the public is aware that most abortions in the U.S. are performed via abortion pills, while 26% incorrectly say most abortions are performed via medical procedure and about half of the public (48%) are unsure. Larger shares of Democrats, independents, women of reproductive age, and those who identify as “pro-choice” correctly say that most U.S. abortions are performed with abortion pills, though uncertainty is still high among these groups, with roughly half saying they are unsure. 

Stacked bar chart showing share of adults who believe most abortions in the United States are done using abortion pills, a medical procedure, or are unsure of the correct answer. Results shown by total, women of reproductive age, party, and view on abortion.

As the FDA undertakes a re-evaluation of mifepristone’s safety, slightly more than half (54%) of the public say they have little to no confidence in the FDA to make decisions based on science when it comes to reviewing the drug’s safety. This lack of confidence is shared among roughly half of Democrats (47%) and Republicans (53%), while nearly six in ten (57%) independents lack confidence in the agency in this regard. These findings are in line with KFF’s past health information and trust polling, which has found that fewer than half of the public and partisans express confidence in federal health agencies to carry out core responsibilities, such as acting independently or making decisions based on science rather than personal views of officials. Trust in federal agencies such as the FDA and CDC as health information sources declined precipitously after the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic.


What We’re Watching

Misleading Wastewater Claims Cited in Effort to Classify Mifepristone as a Contaminant

A paper purporting to show mifepristone contaminating wastewater in three U.S. cities is being cited by an activist group opposed to abortion as the group attempts to persuade the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to classify the drug as a water contaminant and to push the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to restrict or pull it from the market.

The paper was posted as a preprint in a journal run by physicians who oppose abortion. Environmental health scientists, including a former scientist at the EPA’s Office of Water, have said that it uses a testing method that does not distinguish between compounds that interact with progesterone receptors. Because of this limitation, the paper cannot accurately distinguish mifepristone from other chemicals, like bisphenol A (BPA), which is found in many plastics. An FDA environmental assessment of mifepristone conducted during the drug’s approval process estimated its environmental concentration at less than one part per billion, a level that the agency described as a likely overestimate and still too low to affect standard test organisms.

Using environmental claims to call for new restrictions on access to mifepristone is among the latest efforts in ongoing attempts to portray the drug as unsafe, despite those claims not being supported by evidence. Mifepristone’s safety has been extensively studied, with serious adverse events occurring in fewer than 0.5% of patients. Still, though, a report published by a group opposed to abortion last year that claimed to show a much higher rate of adverse events is still being cited in legislative challenges to mifepristone access, despite that report similarly being met with criticism over its methodology.


AI & Emerging Technology

AI-Generated “Doctors” and Deepfakes of Real Physicians Are Being Used to Sell Supplements Online

A series of recent investigations have found networks of AI-generated “doctors” across social media platforms promoting supplements and unproven treatments as supposed “miracle cures” for a range of conditions. A New York Times video investigation found hundreds of entirely AI-generated wellness influencers and doctors on social media, not based on any real person and with fabricated names, faces, and credentials. These videos often target older women with before-and-after transformation videos and fake diplomas displayed in fake offices. In Spain, the fact-checking organization Maldita.es found more than 1,000 AI-generated “doctor” channels on YouTube and 25 similar accounts on Instagram, often promoting the same types of unproven cures.

One 71-year-old woman interviewed by the Times said she began taking a supplement after seeing an AI-generated ad for a product she was led to believe could help treat symptoms of an autoimmune disease. The product was later recalled after being linked to salmonella contamination. In other cases, ads made dangerous health claims, including that a supplement could be more effective in treating Stage 3 kidney disease than medication. In addition to these synthetic personas, deepfake videos of actual, named physicians have also been used to promote unproven treatments.

Medical Organizations Call for Legislative Protections Against AI Physician Deepfakes

Legislative efforts to prevent such impersonation have been introduced at both the federal and state level, with the American Medical Association (AMA) endorsing a bill that would hold individuals or platforms liable for distributing an unauthorized digital replica of a person’s voice or likeness. In California, a bill supported by the California Medical Association would require ads using an AI-generated or altered likeness of a real person to include a clear disclosure that the content was AI-generated.

Social Media Platform Enforcement of AI-Generated Content Remains Inconsistent

Social media platforms, including Meta and TikTok, have said that they label AI-generated content and remove ads making misleading health claims, but the Times investigation found uneven enforcement. Maldita.es found some flagged Instagram accounts carrying the platform’s blue verification badge, typically reserved for confirming a user’s identity. A separate audit that posted more than 200 AI-generated images and videos across five platforms similarly found inconsistent labeling, with Instagram correctly labeling only 15 of 105 synthetic images posted to the platform, while TikTok labeled about a third.

Why This Matters

AI-generated videos that imitate the credibility of real or fabricated health professionals may exploit both the public’s high trust in doctors as purveyors of health information and the confidence that some social media users have in their ability to discern false health claims. June KFF polling found that fewer than four in ten (36%) adults who seek health information on social media follow up with a doctor or health professional at least most of the time to verify what they’ve seen, and a majority of those who use social media for health (65%) say they’re confident in their ability to tell whether health information posted on these platforms is true or false.

About The Health Information and Trust Initiative: the Health Information and Trust Initiative is a KFF program aimed at tracking health misinformation in the U.S., analyzing its impact on the American people, and mobilizing media to address the problem. Our goal is to be of service to everyone working on health misinformation, strengthen efforts to counter misinformation, and build trust. 


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Support for the Health Information and Trust initiative is provided by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation (RWJF). The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of RWJF and KFF maintains full editorial control over all of its policy analysis, polling, and journalism activities. The data shared in the Monitor is sourced through media monitoring research conducted by KFF.

Prior Authorization Metrics Provide New Insights into Insurer Practices, but Gaps Remain

Published: Aug 13, 2026

The use of prior authorization by health insurers has come under increased scrutiny in recent years, as nearly 7 in 10 insured adults say prior authorization is a burden when it comes to getting health care. Health insurers use prior authorization to reduce the use of low-value or unnecessary care, and in the complex and fragmented U.S. health care system is one of the primary tools used to restrain costs. Nevertheless, this practice may result in delays or denials in receiving necessary care, as well as administrative burdens for patients and providers.

In 2024, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) published a final rule (“2024 regulation”) aimed at streamlining and automating the prior authorization process for almost all insurance programs it oversees: Medicare Advantage, Medicaid and CHIP fee-for-service and managed care plans, and Affordable Care Act (ACA) Marketplaces on the federally facilitated exchanges (HealthCare.gov). As part of these requirements, every year, payers in these programs are now required to publicly post on their websites specified prior authorization metrics, including approval and denial rates and response times, aggregated for all medical items and services (excluding prescription drugs) for the previous calendar year.

Insurers were required to post the first year of data, for the 2025 calendar year, by March 31, 2026. KFF collected and analyzed these metrics from the largest insurers in most market segments for which reporting is required, including Medicare Advantage, Medicaid managed care, and the Affordable Care Act (ACA) federally facilitated Marketplace. This issue brief summarizes the data by market segment and insurer and discusses the challenges interpreting the data as well as emerging policy changes that may address some of them.

  • Medicare Advantage insurers denied 12% of standard prior authorization requests, Medicaid managed care insurers denied 14%, and ACA Marketplace insurers denied 18%. Denial rates for expedited requests were slightly lower. However, the aggregated approval statistics do not allow for further analysis into which services are being denied.
  • Prior authorization denials are rarely appealed, but when they are, a considerable share are overturned. Sixty-seven percent of prior authorization denials were overturned upon appeal in Medicare Advantage, 47% were overturned upon appeal in Medicaid managed care, and 43% were overturned in the ACA federally facilitated Marketplace.
  • Median response times in all markets were about 1 day for standard prior authorization requests, and about half a day for expedited prior authorization requests for Medicare Advantage, and approximately 1 day for Medicaid managed care and the ACA Marketplace. Insurers are not required to report response time ranges or differences by service category.  
  • Despite the regulatory intent to make insurer prior authorization practices more transparent, difficulty locating and interpreting metrics on insurer websites and gaps in how (e.g., a standardized template that insurers are required to use) and what metrics (e.g., denominators and breakouts by service category) must be reported limit the usability of this information directly by the public.

Overview of the 2024 Regulation’s Prior Authorization Metrics Requirements

The regulation states that the overall goal of this public reporting requirement is to promote “accountability for payer prior authorization practices” and envisions consumers using the data when shopping for health insurance. The regulation requires payers to which it applies — Medicare Advantage organizations, Medicaid and CHIP fee-for-service and managed care plans, and insurers on the ACA federally facilitated Marketplace (FFM), hereafter collectively referred to as insurers — to provide a list of all medical items and services that require prior authorization (excluding prescription drugs) and report the following metrics aggregated for all medical items and services (excluding prescription drugs) for each line of business:

  • Percentage of standard and expedited prior authorization requests that were approved and denied
  • Percentage of standard prior authorization requests that were approved after appeal (i.e., overturned denials)
  • Percentage of all prior authorization requests where review timeframes were extended and the request was approved
  • Average (i.e., mean) and median timeframes between submission of a prior authorization request and determination for standard and expedited prior authorization requests

Additional metrics were made optional, including:

  • Percentage of expedited prior authorization requests that were approved after appeal
  • Percentage of prior authorization requests where decision timeframes were extended and then the requests were approved, broken out by standard and expedited requests
  • Percentage of prior authorization requests approved within 7 days for standard requests and 72 hours for expedited requests
  • Numeric counts for metrics, including total number of requests and appeals received

Describing “Standard” and “Expedited” Prior Authorization Requests

The 2024 regulation refers to “standard” prior authorization as non-expedited, non-urgent requests and to ‘‘expedited’’ prior authorization as urgent requests. Other federal regulations generally base these terms on whether the standard timeframe could seriously jeopardize an enrollee’s life, health, or ability to regain maximum function. In 2025, the year for which prior authorization metrics are reported, insurers were required to send a determination for standard requests within 14 calendar days for Medicare Advantage and Medicaid managed care and within 15 days for the ACA Marketplace. Determinations for expedited requests had to be sent within 72 hours for insurers in all three markets.1

The 2024 regulation introduced new prior authorization reporting requirements for some business segments and expanded them for others.

  • For Medicare Advantage, insurers have been required to report information about the use of prior authorization – including the number of requests, denials, and appeals – for several years, with data available to researchers for 2019 through 2024. Data on the share of prior authorizations approved, denied, and approved upon appeal are largely duplicative of the information Medicare Advantage insurers already report. The regulation adds new requirements to provide information on response times and to report metrics separately for standard and expedited requests.
  • For Medicaid and the ACA FFM, uniform federal reporting requirements for prior authorization are new,2 though an existing patchwork of state laws and regulations has required some insurers to report certain prior authorization data at the state level.

Prior Authorization Metrics

Data collected for this analysis represent the largest insurers in each business segment — those with at least 2.5% market share in each of their respective markets: Medicare Advantage, Medicaid managed care, and the ACA FFM.3,4 In total, this analysis includes data from 14 unique insurers, representing 25 million Medicare Advantage enrollees (69% of all enrollment), more than 35 million Medicaid managed care organization (MCO) enrollees (54% of all enrollment), and nearly 11 million enrollees in the ACA FFM (hereafter referred to as the ACA Marketplace for simplicity), which included 28 states in 2025 (74% of all enrollment in FFM states). KFF weighted the data by enrollment within each market segment. See the Methodology section for more details.

This analysis includes the share of standard and expedited prior authorization requests that were approved and denied, the share of standard prior authorization requests that were approved after appeal, and the median response times for standard and expedited prior authorization requests. We do not report the share of prior authorization requests approved after extension because some insurers reported the data only for standard requests, while others reported data separately for standard and expedited. Optional metrics are not included because they were not consistently reported by insurers.

Approval and Denial Rates

Across market segments, insurers denied between 12% and 18% of standard prior authorization requests in 2025. On average, 12% of standard prior authorization requests and 10% of expedited prior authorization requests were denied in Medicare Advantage; 14% of standard requests and 12% of expedited requests were denied in Medicaid managed care; and 18% of standard prior authorization requests and 16% of expedited prior authorization requests were denied in the ACA Marketplace (Figure 1). Across all markets, the share of standard prior authorization requests that were denied was similar to or slightly higher than the share of expedited prior authorization requests that were denied.

Figure 1

Prior authorization denial rates varied widely across the largest insurers (Figure 2).

Medicare Advantage: Among the six Medicare Advantage insurers examined, the share of standard prior authorization requests that were denied ranged from 5% (Elevance) to 17% (UnitedHealth Group), and the share of expedited requests that were denied ranged from 3% (Elevance) to 13% (Centene). UnitedHealth Group, Centene, Kaiser Permanente, and Elevance all had somewhat higher denial rates for standard requests than expedited requests, while CVS and Humana had higher denial rates for expedited requests than standard requests. These are similar to the overall denial rates found in a previous KFF analysis across Medicare Advantage insurers.5

Medicaid Managed Care: Among the eight Medicaid managed care insurers examined, the share of standardprior authorization requests that were denied ranged from 2% (L.A. Care Health Plan) to 23% (Independence Health Group). For expedited requests, denial rates ranged from 4% (L.A. Care Health Plan) to 21% (CareSource). Three insurers (Centene, Independence Health Group, and UnitedHealth Group) reported higher denial rates for standard requests compared to expedited requests, while three insurers (CVS Health, CareSource, and L.A. Care Health Plan) reported slightly higher denial rates for expedited requests.6

ACA Marketplace: Among the eight ACA Marketplace insurers included in this analysis, the share of standard prior authorization requests that were denied ranged from an average of 3% (GuideWell) to 25% (Centene). Denial rates for expedited requests ranged from 3% (GuideWell) to 23% (Centene). Four insurers (Centene, UnitedHealth Group, Blue Cross and Blue Shield of North Carolina, and Molina) reported higher denial rates for standard requests compared to expedited requests, while two insurers (Elevance and Health Care Service Corporation) reported higher denial rates for expedited requests.7 The remaining two insurers (Oscar and GuideWell) in this analysis had virtually the same rates of denials for both standard and expedited requests.

Market segments inherently have many differences, and the share of prior authorization requests denied also varied for the same insurer participating in multiple markets. For example, UnitedHealth denied 17% of standard requests in Medicare Advantage, 11% in Medicaid managed care, and 21% in the ACA Marketplace.

Figure 2

Appeals Data

Insurers overturned a considerable share of denials upon appeal, with variation by market. Although enrollees or their providers can appeal denied prior authorization requests, research shows that denials are rarely appealed in Medicare Advantage, Medicaid MCOs, or the ACA Marketplace. However, the prior authorization data demonstrate that when denials are appealed, a considerable share are overturned.

The share of standard prior authorization requests initially denied that were then overturned upon appeal8 (referred to in the CMS template as “Requests Approved After Appeal”) was 67% for Medicare Advantage, 47% for Medicaid managed care, and 43% in the ACA Marketplace (Figure 3). We do not present appeals data for expedited requests because that metric is optional, and most insurers did not provide this information. High overturn rates could raise questions about whether the initial request should have been approved or could indicate that the initial request was missing the required documentation to justify the service. Either way, the appeals process can be complicated and time-consuming for providers and patients.

In Medicare Advantage, if the plan upholds its original denial, the case is automatically sent to an independent review entity. In contrast, there is no automatic external medical review of upheld denials in Medicaid managed care and the ACA Marketplace. HHS OIG has suggested that the presence of automatic, independent review could incentivize Medicare Advantage plans to closely review their denials at the first level of appeal and may help explain higher appeal overturn rates in Medicare Advantage compared to Medicaid managed care and the ACA Marketplace.

Stacked bar chart showing the share of appealed standard prior authorization denials that were overturned or upheld in Medicare Advantage, Medicaid managed care and the ACA Marketplace. The chart shows that insurers reversed a substantial share of denied requests when patients or providers appealed, though the likelihood of reversal varied by market segment. In Medicare Advantage, 67% of appealed denials were overturned and 33% were upheld. In Medicaid managed care, appeals were nearly evenly split, with 47% overturned and 53% upheld. In the ACA Marketplace, 43% of appealed denials were overturned and 57% were upheld. Overall, the figure shows that many denials are eventually reversed on appeal, particularly in Medicare Advantage, suggesting that initial prior authorization decisions are not always final.

Appealed prior authorization denials were overturned more often by some large insurers than others (Figure 4).

Medicare Advantage: Across the six largest Medicare Advantage insurers, the share of denied standard prior authorization requests that were approved varied substantially. Denials were overturned upon appeal more than 90% of the time by Centene, while Kaiser Permanente overturned denials upon appeal 40% of the time.

Medicaid Managed Care: Among the Medicaid managed care insurers examined, UnitedHealth Group overturned 81% of denials upon appeal. The remaining insurers overturned between 22% (CVS) and 48% (Molina) of denials upon appeal. (One Medicaid managed care insurer included in this analysis (L.A. Care Health Plan) did not report overturned prior authorization denials as a percentage of standard prior authorization requests that were appealed; therefore, its appeals data are not included here.)

ACA Marketplace: On average, Health Care Service Corporation overturned just 16% of denials upon appeal, while Centene overturned just over half (54%) of denials upon appeal. Six of the eight large insurers reported overturning denials upon appeal less than half the time.

Figure 4

Median Response Times

Median response times for prior authorization determinations were about 1 day for standard requests, with slightly more variation for expedited requests (Figure 5).

The median time between the submission of a prior authorization request and the determination by the insurer, or response time, for standard requests was about 1 day for Medicare Advantage, Medicaid managed care, and the ACA Marketplace (0.9 days or just under 22 hours), substantially less than the federally required maximum time permitted for standard requests.9 The median response time for expedited requests was about half a day (0.4 days or just under 10 hours) for Medicare Advantage, just under 1 day (0.8 days or approximately 19 hours) for Medicaid managed care, and 1 day for the ACA Marketplace. Federal regulations in 2025 required insurers to send a determination for standard requests within 14 calendar days for Medicare Advantage and Medicaid managed care and within 15 days for the ACA Marketplace. Determinations for expedited requests had to be sent within 72 hours for insurers in all three markets.10

Grouped bar chart comparing median prior authorization response times for standard and expedited requests across Medicare Advantage, Medicaid managed care and the ACA Marketplace. The chart shows that insurers typically made prior authorization decisions within about one day regardless of market segment. Median response times for standard requests were 1 day in Medicare Advantage and Medicaid managed care and 0.9 days in the ACA Marketplace. Expedited requests were decided even more quickly in Medicare Advantage, with a median response time of 0.4 days, while response times were 0.8 days in Medicaid managed care and 1 day in the ACA Marketplace. Overall, the figure shows relatively fast prior authorization decision-making across markets, with little variation in standard requests and somewhat greater variation in expedited requests.

Median response times likely reflect (at least in part) the increasing use of technology in the prior authorization process, such as artificial intelligence and electronic prior authorization systems. Still, nearly one-quarter (24%) of insured adults reported in a July 2025 KFF poll that their health insurance company had delayed their ability to get a requested health care service, treatment, or medication in the past two years.And other research and media reports demonstrate that some patients experience much longer response times, sometimes with serious health consequences. In addition to the 2024 regulation’s provisions aimed at streamlining and automating the prior authorization process, in June 2025, a group of health insurers voluntarily pledged to expand real-time responses for prior authorization approvals by 2027.

Median response times for prior authorization determinations varied somewhat among large insurers (Figure 6).

Medicare Advantage: The median response time for standard requests varied from less than 1 day (CVS, Humana, and Kaiser Permanente) to 2 days (Centene). Across the six insurers examined, the response times for expedited requests were similar or slightly shorter than the response times for standard requests.

Medicaid Managed Care: The median response time for standard prior authorization requests varied from 1 day (Centene, Elevance, and Molina) to 4 days (CareSource). Elevance had the same median response time for standard and expedited requests, while the other insurers reported shorter response times for expedited requests.

ACA Marketplace: Among the eight large insurers included in this analysis, median response times for standard requests ranged from less than 1 day (UnitedHealth Group, GuideWell, and Health Care Service Corporation) to 4 days (Molina). All but one insurer reported similar or shorter median response times for expedited requests than standard requests.

Figure 6

Challenges for Consumers Accessing and Interpreting Prior Authorization Data

Uniform federal reporting requirements represent a step toward better understanding insurer prior authorization metrics across insurance markets. While the data provide new insights, particularly for Medicaid managed care and the ACA Marketplace insurers, gaps remain. Although a target audience of prior authorization reporting is consumers, those who do not have a deep understanding of health insurance terminology and concepts may struggle to interpret these reports. In previous KFF research, one-quarter of insured adults reported difficulty understanding specific terms their health insurer uses. Difficulty locating metrics on insurer websites, an absence of more detailed data, and unclear reporting standards could additionally pose challenges for consumers wishing to use the data directly to compare health insurers, as envisioned in the 2024 regulation. However, intermediaries may aggregate and explain the data to make it more accessible for consumers.

Insurers are not required to report the number of prior authorization requests for each metric (only percentages), which limits the ability to make useful comparisons and gauge the scale of requests, denials, and approvals behind reported percentages. For instance, a low denial rate could translate into a large number of denials if the insurer received a substantial number of prior authorization requests. Conversely, a high denial rate might be seen with a relatively low number of prior authorization requests if many of those requests were denied (which could indicate the prior authorization process is better tailored, rather than a concerning number of denials). In a previous KFF analysis of the use of prior authorization in Medicare Advantage, for example, the number of prior authorization determinations per enrollee was inversely related to the share of requests that were denied (i.e., insurers with more prior authorization requests denied a smaller share of the requests than those with fewer requests). As a result, the absolute number of denied prior authorization requests per enrollee was similar across insurers with different denial rates.

Numeric counts would provide more context for understanding whether an apparently high or low denial rate reflects a meaningful volume of prior authorization requests. Additionally, they are also necessary to distinguish a true zero from missing data or inapplicable statistics. For example, the “Approved upon appeal” metric does not include the number of appeals an insurer received. Insurers that report 0% of appeals were approved are not required to indicate whether they received no appeals or that none of the appeals were approved. Furthermore, insurers were not required to report the appeal outcome by service or the reason(s) for the decision, making it difficult to interpret differences across and within markets.

Making comparisons between insurers also requires an understanding of policy nuances.  An insurer might have a high prior authorization approval rate because there are many services requiring prior authorization that are almost always approved. Some insurers exempt providers from at least some prior authorization requirements if they consistently have a high prior authorization approval rate (e.g., 90%), known as “gold card” programs. These programs can further complicate comparisons, as the approval rate no longer reflects the entirety of the procedures that might otherwise have required prior authorization. Insurers that rely heavily on gold carding may, in turn, report lower approval rates: since providers that are most clinically compliant are exempt from prior authorization, reported statistics from these insurers include only providers that may inherently have lower approval rates.

Comparisons between issuers are also challenging because of inconsistencies in how metrics are reported. Although CMS published an example template for reporting the prior authorization metrics, its use by insurers is not mandatory, and most insurers used different formats, which could make comparing metrics across insurers burdensome for the public. Some inconsistencies in reporting level could make comparisons difficult. For example, some ACA Marketplace insurers reported prior authorization metrics at the national level, as opposed to separating their reporting by state, so it is not possible to understand geographic variation in prior authorization practices from the same insurer. A national average denial rate for one insurer may or may not reflect the insurer’s denial rate in the state where the consumer lives.

Response times are difficult to interpret. Comparing response timeframes by type of request can provide some insight into the extent to which insurers are meeting the regulatory timeframe requirements. However, insurers are only required to report median and average response times, which limits the ability to determine how often decisions exceed those timeframes. Also, without a required reporting unit, some insurers reported time in hours, while others used days or fractional days. Although median response times across all three markets were typically well below the required maximums, additional information — such as optional metrics on the percentage of requests approved or denied within the required timeframe and ranges of response times — would allow for a more complete picture of how quickly prior authorization decisions are made and how frequently decision times exceed the required timeframes. Additionally, consumers may not always understand how to interpret the median – that is, by definition, half of the prior authorization requests exceed the median time reported.

Comparing insurers across lines of business requires consideration of differences between enrollee populations. Case mix (how sick the enrollee population is) and service mix (which services are most commonly provided for enrollees) likely vary substantially between lines of business, and potentially between insurers. For example, the older Medicare Advantage population likely differs substantially from the general population covered by ACA Marketplaces and the higher-need populations of Medicaid. If denial rates vary by service type and the services for which denials are more common comprise a larger share of prior authorization requests in a given business segment, the higher denial rate would reflect that difference in service use. However, without more detailed information, it is not possible to identify what is driving the differences.

In July 2026, CMS published an updated metrics reporting overview and template for insurers with changes that address some of the gaps addressed above for the 2027 reporting period. It specifies that posting metrics in locations on insurers’ websites that cannot be reached through ordinary navigation is not considered to meet the regulation’s requirement that the information be “publicly accessible.” While still not required, the updated overview does stress that the numerators and denominators specified in the template are “expected.” It notes that median determination response times that are less than one day must be reported in hours, not rounded to “0 days.” It also recommends that insurers identify and explain in their report any data quality issues or concerns.

In addition, the 2026 CMS Interoperability Standards and Prior Authorization for Drugs proposed rule (“2026 proposed rule”) attempts to address some of the data gaps in the 2024 regulation by expanding the prior authorization data that must be publicly reported. The proposed rule would require the same CMS-regulated insurers to publish new metrics for non-drug items and services (e.g., for both standard and expedited prior authorization requests, the number and percentage of requests that remain denied after appeal), as well as the numeric counts for both the new and existing metrics. Also, while CMS currently provides suggested denominators (or universe of prior authorization determinations to include), the proposed rule would standardize the denominators that insurers must use when calculating different metrics. Together, these changes would provide more insight into prior authorization requests, denials, and appeals; make the data easier to interpret; and improve the ability to make comparisons across insurers. More detailed prior authorization metrics could help assess whether initiatives to improve the prior authorization process more broadly, such as the voluntary commitments made by several insurers in June 2025, are leading to meaningful change. However, the proposed rule does not include a requirement that insurers report prior authorization metrics by service category.

Another significant proposed change would require insurers to report prior authorization metrics for prescription drugs, separate from non-drug items and services, for both standard and expedited requests. (This requirement does not apply to insurers offering Medicare Part D prescription drug plans, where separate reporting requirements for coverage determinations already apply.)

There are additional emerging federal and state data reporting policies that are market-specific:

Medicare Advantage

CMS has announced a pilot program where Medicare Advantage insurers can voluntarily submit more detailed prior authorization data, including data for specific service categories. The Trump administration has indicated that it intends to make more detailed reporting mandatory starting with the 2027 plan year. While that may help understand the impact of prior authorization in Medicare Advantage, the data will not be available for several years.

Federal legislation entitled “Improving Seniors’ Timely Access to Care Act of 2025” aims to improve prior authorization in Medicare Advantage. The bill would require Medicare Advantage plans to report certain prior authorization metrics annually to the Secretary of Health and Human Services, who would publish them on a public website. Some required metrics are similar to those required by CMS under the 2024 regulation, but the bill would also require plans to report the percentage and number of specified requests denied or approved during the previous plan year through the use of technology (e.g., artificial intelligence technology).

Medicaid Managed Care

Beginning July 2026, CMS requires states to collect and report prior authorization metrics for Medicaid managed care plans in Managed Care Program Annual Reports (MCPARs) submitted to CMS. In addition to the metrics required by the 2024 regulation, states are required to include the total number of standard and expedited prior authorization requests received. CMS makes MCPARs publicly available on Medicaid.gov, which may make data easier to locate in the future, though there will be a lag between state submission and CMS public posting.

The 2026 proposed rule would align prior authorization metric reporting for Medicaid and CHIP managed care with contract rating periods (which vary across states) and would require Medicaid and CHIP managed care plans to publicly post metrics no later than 90 days after each rating period ends. The rule would also require plans to report metrics by program (defined by a specified set of benefits and eligibility criteria identified in managed care plan contracts), as well as by plan. This proposal aligns with MCPAR reporting requirements and could provide more meaningful information on prior authorization performance by plan and program than aggregate information across programs within a state.

Private Insurance Market

Federal efforts to increase transparency into prior authorization practices in commercial coverage have so far been limited to ACA plans on the FFM. There is no publicly available prior authorization data for self-funded plans sponsored by private employers, which cover the majority of workers with employer-sponsored health insurance. Some states have taken action to increase transparency into prior authorization practices, including by collecting more granular prior authorization data from state-regulated insurers than the 2024 federal regulation requires and using the data to inform future actions aimed at curbing certain insurer practices.

For example, in 2025, Massachusetts conducted a special examination requiring insurers offering fully insured health plans in the state’s private insurance market to submit detailed prior authorization data (including numeric counts and prescription drugs) broken out by service category. The state published an analysis of the data in 2026, noting that it intended to use the data to inform future regulatory guidance. Following this examination, the state updated its insurance regulations to prohibit prior authorization requirements for a wide variety of services provided in-network, including some identified in the state’s analysis as having the most prior authorization requests and high approval rates, such as radiology (for enrollees with cancer) and physical, occupational, and speech therapy.

Similarly, in 2025, Iowa enacted a law requiring state-regulated insurers to submit certain prior authorization data to the state annually, which will be made available to the public, and requiring utilization review organizations to eliminate prior authorization requirements for health care services that meet certain criteria.

Going forward, more states may build upon the federal requirements by requiring insurers in their state to provide more detailed information about prior authorization practices and use that information to address the scope of prior authorization requirements.

This analysis includes data collected from the websites of Medicare Advantage, Medicaid managed care, and ACA federally facilitated Marketplace (FFM) insurers that each had at least 2.5% market share of enrollment in their respective market segments. In total, we collected data from 14 unique insurers in these markets, representing approximately 71 million enrollees. See Appendix Table 1 for more details.

We reported prior authorization metrics at the parent company level. Subsidiary insurers may have a different name from the parent company, and the parent company may own more than one insurer. For ease of reading, we refer to the parent company as the “insurer” in this analysis.

Medicare Advantage

Public reports were collected for Medicare Advantage insurers enrolling at least 2.5% of all Medicare Advantage enrollees in 2025. Altogether, these insurers comprised 72% of Medicare Advantage enrollment in 2025. In some cases, reports could not be located, and so the data included in this analysis reflects information provided for Medicare Advantage contracts covering 69% (25 million) of Medicare Advantage enrollees in 2025. Specifically, reports covering at least 95% of enrollment were identified for each insurer included in the analysis, with the exception of Elevance-sponsored plans, where reports covering 83% of enrollment were identified. Medicare Advantage organizations are required to report metrics at the contract level. CMS December 2025 enrollment was used to weight contract-level data when aggregating to the insurer and total market level.

Medicaid Managed Care

Public reports were collected for Medicaid MCO insurers enrolling at least 2.5% of all Medicaid MCO enrollees as of July 2024 (the latest available national Medicaid managed care enrollment data). Reports for limited benefit prepaid ambulatory health plans (PAHPs) and prepaid inpatient health plans (PIHPs) were not included. Altogether, these insurers comprised 57% of Medicaid MCOs as of July 2024. In some cases, reports could not be located, and so the data included in this analysis reflects information provided for Medicaid MCO contracts covering 54% (nearly 36 million) of Medicaid MCO enrollees as of July 2024. Specifically, reports covering at least 92% of enrollment were identified for each insurer included in the analysis, with the exception of Molina and Independence Health Group plans, where reports covering 87% and 84% of enrollment, respectively, were identified. CMS July 2024 enrollment was used to weight plan-level data when aggregating to the insurer and total market level.

Although the 2024 regulations require Medicaid and CHIP fee-for-service (FFS) programs and CHIP managed care plans to publicly report prior authorization metrics, these entities are not included in this analysis because reports were difficult to locate and comprehensive national plan-level enrollment data are not available for CHIP managed care. Additionally, the populations and services covered under FFS vary substantially across states, limiting comparability.

ACA Marketplace

We searched for public reports for the nine ACA Marketplace insurers with at least 2.5% market share in the 28 states that used the FFM (HealthCare.gov) in 2025. (Federal reporting requirements do not extend to states that operate their own Marketplaces, including state-based Marketplaces that use the HealthCare.gov platform). Prior authorization metrics could not be located for one of these insurers (CVS, which had 5% market share). UnitedHealth Group, which reported prior authorization data at the state level, did not include data for its plans sold in Oklahoma (less than 1% of its enrollment). Altogether, the data in this analysis reflect information provided for Marketplace insurers covering 74% (10.8 million) of ACA FFM enrollees in 2025.

Marketplace insurers are required to report metrics at the issuer level. Some insurers broke out their prior authorization metrics by state, while others provided national averages. ACA Marketplace enrollment was obtained from Mark Farrah Associates Health Coverage Portal, including mapping insurers to parent companies. To weight insurer-level data to the total market, enrollment was first filtered to FFM states and then aggregated to parent company.

Due to the large number of smaller insurers in the ACA Marketplace, relative to Medicare Advantage and Medicaid managed care, we also collected and analyzed data for ACA FFM insurers that had at least 1% market share in 2025, compiled in Table 2 of the Appendix. For consistency across market segments, however, only data from insurers with at least 2.5% market share were included in the overall analysis.

Table showing enrollment and market share for major Medicare Advantage insurers and the share of enrollment included in KFF’s prior authorization analysis. UnitedHealth Group is the largest Medicare Advantage insurer, with 10.3 million enrollees and a 28.8% market share, followed by Humana at 16.3% and CVS at 11.8%. The analysis includes data representing 24.7 million enrollees, or 69.0% of the Medicare Advantage market. The included insurers account for nearly all of the enrollment attributed to UnitedHealth Group, Humana, CVS and Kaiser Permanente, while included enrollment is somewhat lower for Elevance and Centene. Overall, the table shows that the prior authorization analysis covers insurers representing more than two-thirds of total Medicare Advantage enrollment.
Table comparing reported prior authorization metrics for ACA Marketplace insurers with at least a 1% market share in HealthCare.gov states. The table presents approval rates, denial rates, appeal overturn rates and median response times for standard and expedited prior authorization requests. Across insurers, standard request approval rates range from 73% to 97%, while denial rates range from 3% to 27%. The share of denied requests approved on appeal ranges from 16% to 61%, indicating substantial variation in appeal outcomes. Median response times for standard requests range from 0 to 4 days. Expedited requests generally have higher approval rates, ranging from 77% to 97%, and lower denial rates, ranging from 3% to 23%, with median response times typically 0 to 1 day. Overall, the table shows that most prior authorization requests are approved, but denial rates, appeal success rates and response times vary considerably across ACA Marketplace insurers.
  1. The turnaround time for standard requests in Medicare Advantage and Medicaid managed care was shortened to 7 calendar days beginning in 2026. Timeframes for the ACA Marketplace remain the same. ↩︎
  2. CMS makes data on post-service (not pre-service/prior authorization) claims denials available for plans on the ACA FFM. ↩︎
  3. Except CVS (which had 5% market share on the ACA FFM in 2025), as the company’s prior authorization metrics for that market could not be located. ↩︎
  4. Due to the large number of smaller insurers in the ACA Marketplace, relative to Medicare Advantage and Medicaid managed care, we collected data for ACA FFM insurers that have at least 1% market share, compiled in Appendix Table 2. For consistency across market segments, only data from insurers with at least 2.5% market share were included in this analysis. ↩︎
  5. Centene includes Wellcare, Elevance includes Anthem BCBS and Wellpoint, and CVS includes Aetna. ↩︎
  6. Elevance includes Amerigroup, Independence Health Group includes AmeriHealth Caritas, and CVS includes Aetna. ↩︎
  7. Centene includes Ambetter Health; GuideWell includes Capital Health Plan (FL), BCBS of FL, Health Options (FL), and Florida Health Care Plan; Health Care Service Corp. includes BCBS plans in Montana, Oklahoma, and Texas; Elevance includes Wellpoint and Anthem BCBS. ↩︎
  8. FAQs currently on the CMS website indicate that appeals metrics should aggregate all levels of appeals, including internal and external reviews. Note that this clarification appears to have been added in early 2026. ↩︎
  9. Some insurers reported response times in days while others used hours. To standardize, we converted hours to days and report time in days. ↩︎
  10. The turnaround time for standard requests in Medicare Advantage and Medicaid managed care was shortened to 7 calendar days beginning in 2026. Timeframes for the ACA Marketplace remain the same. ↩︎

Medicare Will Spend More Than $13 Billion on the Medicare Advantage Quality Bonus Program in 2026

Published: Aug 12, 2026

Editorial Note: Originally published on July 1, 2026, this brief was updated August 12, 2026 to include additional information about the impact of the recent recalculation of star ratings by CMS on 2027 Medicare Advantage quality bonus program spending. 

The Medicare Advantage quality bonus program, established by the Affordable Care Act, increases Medicare payments to Medicare Advantage plans that qualify by having a star rating of 4 or above (on a five-star rating system). (See the KFF brief on Medicare Advantage payments for more detail.) Plans may, but are not required to, use the increase in payments to cover the cost of supplemental benefits, including reduced cost sharing, extra benefits not covered by traditional Medicare (e.g., vision, hearing and dental), lowering Part B premiums, and/or subsidizing Part D prescription drug coverage. The star ratings are intended to help consumers make informed decisions when choosing among Medicare Advantage plans and the potential for additional funding is intended to encourage plans to improve quality. However, the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) and others have suggested that the star ratings incorporate too many measures, do not adequately account for social risk factors, and may not be a useful indicator of quality because star ratings are reported at the contract rather than the plan level. Medicare Advantage contracts typically include multiple plans, which may have different benefits, costs, networks, service areas, and enroll different populations (i.e., plans that are open for general enrollment and special needs plans that limit enrollment to dual-eligible individuals).

Critiques of the quality bonus program have led to calls to replace, reform or end the program. In 2018, the Congressional Budget Office estimated that eliminating the quality bonus program would lower federal spending by almost $100 billion over ten years. Given the sharp increase in both actual and projected Medicare Advantage enrollment since CBO’s analysis, the savings from eliminating the quality bonus program could be substantially higher. For example, 35 million people are enrolled in Medicare Advantage in 2026, which is 5 million more than CBO projected at the time of the analysis. The degree to which changes to the quality bonus program would impact plan quality or the availability of supplemental benefits would depend on the specifics of any proposal and how insurers modified plan offerings in response.

Recently, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) finalized changes to the star ratings system (effective for 2029 star ratings, based on the 2027 plan year performance) that include removing several administrative measures and others that CMS stated no longer meaningfully differentiate plan quality. Though this change is a step toward simplifying the quality measurement system, because it is not combined with other changes to the Medicare Advantage payment system, the change is projected to increase Medicare Advantage spending by $18.6 billion over the next 10 years. That increase in spending is in part because more Medicare Advantage plans are expected to qualify for a payment increase under the quality bonus program as a result of the changes.

This analysis examines trends in Medicare spending resulting from the quality bonus program, enrollment in plans in bonus status (plans that qualify for a benchmark increase based on their quality star rating), and how these measures vary across plan types and insurers using publicly available information on Medicare Advantage enrollment, payment rates, and quality ratings (see methods).

Key Takeaways:

  • Federal spending related to the Medicare Advantage quality bonus program will reach at least $13.4 billion in 2026, somewhat more than in 2025 ($12.7 billion), and more than four times higher than in 2015.
  • More than two-thirds of Medicare Advantage enrollees (68%) are in plans that qualify for the quality bonus program in 2026, a decline from 75% in 2025, and the lowest share since 2018.
  • The average increase in payment per enrollee because of the quality bonus program is highest for employer- and union-sponsored Medicare Advantage plans ($466) and lowest for special needs plans ($318).  
  • Medicare spending under the quality bonus program varies across firms with UnitedHealth Group receiving the largest increase in payments ($3.9 billion) because of the quality bonus program (relative to what payments would have been otherwise) and Kaiser Foundation Health Plans receiving the largest increase in payments per person ($577). The variation is largely due to the share of enrollees in plans that qualify for increases under the quality bonus program but also relates to the average star ratings of plans that qualify.

Medicare will spend more than $13 billion on the Medicare Advantage quality bonus program in 2026.

Estimated federal spending on the Medicare Advantage quality bonus program will total at least $13.4 billion in 2026, somewhat more than 2025 ($12.7 billion). Spending on the quality bonus program has increased sharply since the program started, more than quadrupling from $3.0 billion in 2015 to $13.4 billion in 2026 (Figure 1). Total spending on the quality bonus program is 2.3% of the projected payments to Medicare Advantage plans in 2026 ($574 billion).

Total Medicare Spending Under the Medicare Advantage Quality Bonus Program Will Increase to Over  Billion in 2026 (Column Chart)

These estimates are a lower bound because they assume that, on average, Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in each plan that qualifies for additional payments under the quality bonus program are of average health status as measured by their risk score (that is, having a risk score equal to 1). However, increased coding intensity in Medicare Advantage suggests the risk scores are likely higher, which would increase the additional payments. For example, MedPAC estimates the increase to risk-adjusted benchmarks under the quality bonus program will add about $16 billion in Medicare spending in 2026. The estimates also do not include additional Medicare spending that results if plans increase their bids when their benchmark is higher because of being in bonus status (See Box 1 for more detail on star ratings and Medicare Advantage payments). For example, a plan might increase its bid to increase payments to providers, add more expensive providers to its network, or retain a larger amount as profit, provided they meet medical loss ratio requirements. (The medical loss ratio is the share of premium revenues going to pay for claims versus administrative overhead and profit.)   

Medicare spending under the quality bonus program has grown faster than enrollment in Medicare Advantage, which has doubled since 2015. This spending comes at a time when the Medicare program is facing growing fiscal pressures. Medicare Advantage benchmarks (and corresponding spending) grew faster than traditional Medicare spending between 2017 and 2024 in part because of the increase in spending under the quality bonus program. The quality bonus program also exacerbates the impact of higher coding intensity and favorable selection in Medicare Advantage, which together add $76 billion to Medicare spending in 2026. (Note, the higher spending under the quality bonus program is not additive to the $76 billion.)

More than two-thirds of Medicare Advantage enrollees (68%) are in plans that qualify for the quality bonus program.

In 2026, nearly 24 million people, or 68% of Medicare Advantage enrollees, are in plans that qualify for higher payments under the quality bonus program. That compares to just under 9 million people (55%) in 2015 (Figure 2). Both the number and share of enrollees in plans that receive bonuses in 2026 declined from the previous year (26 million or 75% of Medicare Advantage enrollees) and is the lowest share since 2018. That is a result of changes to the cut points, or scores plans are required to achieve to get higher quality ratings, values that CMS recalculates every year. In particular, substantially fewer Medicare Advantage contracts achieved at least a 4-star rating in 2026 compared to the previous year (209 vs 261). Star ratings are based on a Medicare Advantage contract’s performance on about 40 different measures, such as the share of enrollees that receive certain cancer screenings and annual flu vaccinations, whether people with chronic conditions are getting recommended services, enrollees’ ratings of their health plan, and customer service. For each measure, CMS establishes “cut points”, which are used to assign a rating between one and five stars for that measure. These are then combined into an overall rating for the Medicare Advantage contract. 

More Than Two-Thirds of Medicare Advantage Enrollees (68%) are in Plans That Qualify for Bonuses in 2026, a Somewhat Smaller Share Than in 2025 (Stacked column chart)

The average annual increase in payments per person under the quality bonus program are highest for employer- and union-sponsored plans.

Employer- and union- sponsored Medicare Advantage plans account for a larger share of spending under the quality bonus program (20%, or $2.6 billion) than enrollment in Medicare Advantage (16%) (Appendix Table 1). Consistent with this, and similar to previous years, the average increase in payments per person as a result of the quality bonus program to group employer- and union-sponsored plans ($466) are higher than for individual ($381) or special needs plans ($318) (Figure 3).     

Annual Increase in Payments Per Person Under the Medicare Advantage Quality Bonus Program are Highest for Employer Plans (Line chart)

The increase in payments per enrollee stemming from the quality bonus program are higher for employer- and union-sponsored plans because these plans have higher average star ratings, resulting in a larger share of enrollees receiving coverage from plans that qualify for bonuses. Across the entire period of 2015 to 2026, the share of all enrollees in employer- or union-sponsored plans that qualified for the quality bonus program never dropped below 80%. In contrast, the share of enrollees in individual and special needs plans that qualified for the quality bonus program exceeded 80% in only one year – 2023 (Figure 4).

The Share of Enrollees in Medicare Advantage Plans Sponsored by Employers That Qualified for the Quality Bonus Program has Exceeded 80% Since 2015 (Line chart)

Special needs plans serve higher need beneficiaries, including people who are dually eligible for Medicare and Medicaid and people who require an institutional level of care. Despite critiques of the quality star rating system, lower star ratings for special needs plans, on average, raise questions about how well these plans are serving the needs of their enrollees. The higher share of employer- and union-sponsored plans that qualify for the quality bonus program also raises questions about whether these plans, which are restricted to retirees of specific employers or unions, include more generous coverage or extra benefits. However, gaps in Medicare Advantage data, including the lack of information about the costs and benefits of employer- and union-sponsored plans, mean it is difficult to examine these questions.

Total Medicare spending under the quality bonus program varies across Medicare Advantage parent organizations.

UnitedHealth Group enrolls just over one-quarter (26%) of Medicare Advantage enrollees and is expected to receive 29% of total Medicare spending under the quality bonus program, or $3.9 billion dollars in 2026 (Figure 5). Humana Inc., which has the second largest share of Medicare Advantage enrollment (20%), will receive a disproportionately smaller share of bonus spending (11%), or $1.5 billion in 2026. Humana’s average star rating dropped considerably for the 2025 plan year (which is the year used for 2026 bonus eligibility), after the star rating for one of its largest contracts dropped from 4.5 to 3.5. Humana sued CMS over the change, but to date, the courts have sided with the Administration.

The average increase in payments per enrollee under the quality bonus program ranges from $23 for people in Centene Corporation plans to $577 for those in plans sponsored by Kaiser Foundation Health Plans. The variation in total bonus spending across firms corresponds to differences in the share of enrollees in plans that are eligible for the quality bonus program, which is based on the ratings of those plans. Virtually all of the more than 2 million enrollees in a plans sponsored by Kaiser Foundation Health Plans (100%) are in a plan that receives increased payments under the quality bonus program because it has a quality rating of at least four stars, while just 6% of Centene’s 938,000 Medicare Advantage enrollees are in a plan that receives bonus payments in 2026. The only Centene sponsored Medicare Advantage contracts that qualify for the quality bonus program payments in 2026 are those that are too new or have too low enrollment to receive star ratings. Differences also reflect variation in the star ratings of plans that qualify for the quality bonus program, because plans with at least 4.5 stars get a larger increase.

Total Medicare Spending Under the Quality Bonus Program Varies Across Medicare Advantage Parent Organizations (Table)

The recent recalculation of star ratings by CMS will increase spending under the quality bonus program in 2027.

In recent years, Medicare Advantage insurers have increasingly challenged the star ratings calculations, and have prevailed in a handful of cases, prompting CMS to recalculate the ratings on occasion. Most recently, in response to a decision following a legal challenge from Clover Health, CMS recalculated the 2026 star ratings for all plans (which will affect the 2027 payment year). CMS has only revised the star ratings for plans that saw an increase as a result of the recalculation.

Higher star ratings have three potential effects: 1) New eligibility for benchmark increases under the quality bonus program when the recalculated rating is at least 4 stars and the previous rating was less than 4 stars; 2) increased rebate percentage if recalculated star rating is associated with a higher rebate category (the rebate percentage is 70% of the difference between the benchmark and bid when the rating is at least 4.5 stars, 65% when the rating is 3.5 to 4.5 stars, and 50% when the rating is less than 3.5 stars); and 3) new 5-star special enrollment period (SEP) when the recalculated star rating is 5 stars and previous star rating was less than 5 stars.

KFF estimates that federal Medicare Advantage payments to insurers under the quality bonus program will be about $600 million higher in 2027 than they would have been if CMS had not recalculated the star ratings, with additional impacts for plans that receive higher rebate percentages but do not qualify for the quality bonus program. UnitedHealth Group will see the largest increase, followed by Clover Health, Blue Cross Blue Shield of Alabama, Humana, and CVS Health Corporation. Higher payments to Medicare Advantage insurers as a result of benchmark and rebate increases could translate into more generous benefits, lower cost sharing, or higher plan margins, while the additional SEP gives impacted plans an opportunity to attract new enrollees mid-year. CMS has appealed the decision, however, so there is uncertainty as to whether changes in methodology and their impact on payments will continue beyond the 2027 plan year.

Box 1. Medicare Advantage Star Ratings

A key feature of the quality bonus program is the star rating system. Star ratings are used to determine two parts of a Medicare Advantage plan’s payment: (1) whether the plan is eligible for a bonus, and (2) the portion of the difference between the benchmark and the plan’s bid that is paid to the plan. The benchmark is the maximum amount the federal government will pay for a Medicare Advantage enrollee and is a percentage of estimated spending in traditional Medicare in the same county, ranging from 95 percent in high-cost counties to 115 percent in low-cost counties. The bid is the plan’s estimated cost for providing services covered under Medicare Parts A and B.

Since 2015, plans that receive at least four (out of five) stars have their benchmark increased. For most plans in bonus status, the benchmark is increased by five percentage points. Plans in “double bonus” counties – defined as urban counties with low traditional Medicare spending and historically high Medicare Advantage enrollment—have their benchmark increased by 10 percentage points. In addition, the benchmarks for plans without ratings due to low enrollment or being too new are increased by 3.5 percentage points. The benchmarks are capped and cannot be higher than they would have been prior to the ACA. This can result in plans that are eligible under the quality bonus program receiving a smaller increase to their benchmark, or in some cases, no increase at all.

The benchmark increases under the quality bonus program for qualifying plans mean that per enrollee payments are higher than if the plan did not qualify. There is no separate bonus payment. Rather, the bid and/or rebate components of the payment are higher.

This work was supported in part by Arnold Ventures. KFF maintains full editorial control over all of its policy analysis, polling, and journalism activities.

This work was supported in part by Arnold Ventures. KFF maintains full editorial control over all of its policy analysis, polling, and journalism activities.

Appendix

Total Medicare Spending Under the Quality Bonus Program by Type of Medicare Advantage Plan, 2015 - 2026 (Table)
Average Annual Increase in Payment Per Enrollee Under the Quality Bonus Program by Medicare Advantage Plan Type, 2015 - 2026 (Table)

Methods

This analysis uses data from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) Medicare Advantage Enrollment, Crosswalk and Landscape files for the respective year.This analysis includes HMO, POS, local PPO, regional PPO, and PFFS plans. Enrollment counts in publications by firms operating in the Medicare Advantage market, such as company financial statements, might differ from KFF estimates due to inclusion or exclusion of certain plan types, such as SNPs or employer plans.To calculate federal spending on the quality bonus program, we first obtained information on star ratings from the Part C and Part D Performance Data, Star Ratings Data Table for the previous plan year. These are the ratings on which a plan’s benchmark is based. We then determined each plan’s benchmark using these data and information from the Medicare Advantage Rate Book, Rate Calculation Data, which provides the benchmark by county for plans with a 5%, 3.5% and 0% bonus. A plan’s increase in payment per enrollee under the quality bonus program is equal to the difference between its quality adjusted benchmark (either the 5% or 3.5% bonus rate) and the benchmark if the plan was not in bonus (0% bonus rate), multiplied by the relevant percentage based on its star rating and year (for example, 65% for plans with 4 stars and 70% for plans with at least 4.5 stars in 2026). The increase per enrollee is multiplied by enrollees in March of each year to get total spending. Actual bonus spending will depend on the risk scores of Medicare Advantage enrollees. According to the plan payment data release by CMS, the average risk score of MA enrollees was above 1 for every year from 2015 through 2024 (the most recent year for which data are available), meaning our estimates likely understate actual spending.

The White House Takes Another Shot at Changing U.S. Childhood Vaccine Recommendations

Published: Aug 11, 2026

A new Executive Order (EO) released by the White House on Monday is the latest in a series of administration actions seeking to change U.S. childhood vaccine recommendations. It follows:

The new EO reiterates several previously issued recommendations, including that U.S. childhood vaccines should be “aligned with scientific evidence and best practices from peer, developed countries” and that childhood immunizations should fall into the three categories outlined above. As with the January 5 memo, the EO reduces the number of diseases targeted by routine childhood vaccination from 17 to 11 and the number of routine vaccines from 13 to 7. But it also contains new directives, including calling on the HHS Secretary to offer some childhood vaccines such as measles, mumps, and rubella (MMR) as “single vaccines rather than combination products”; aligning vaccine recommendations with findings to be released by a federal panel known as the “HHS Task Force on Safer Childhood Vaccines”; and directing the Attorney General to advance legal actions challenging state laws that conflict with “parental authority, religious freedom, disability accommodations, and equal protection under the law.” 

The administration has indicated these actions are intended to align the U.S. with peer countries, particularly Denmark. Prior KFF analysis has found, however, that Denmark itself is an outlier among “peer” nations, recommending vaccines against 10 diseases while most European countries recommend vaccines for 15 or more. Moreover, the EO’s directive to split the MMR vaccine into separate shots (a policy that could not be put into practice yet as no single component vaccine is currently licensed in the U.S.) would actually cause the U.S. to diverge from the policies of peer, developed nations, including Denmark. No European country, Canada, or Australia recommend separate vaccines over combination MMR vaccines (Japan currently recommends a combination measles rubella vaccine and this year began producing MMR for domestic use for the first time in 30 years).

President Trump said in a Monday press conference that the MMR shot can be “quite lethal” and that splitting up and giving the shots over multiple appointments is safer, although there is no evidence to support this claim. When countries have moved away from combination MMR vaccinations in the past, such as Japan beginning in the 1990s, measles, mumps, rubella outbreaks increased – a sobering prospect given the U.S. is already facing a historically high and growing number of measles cases this year.

The EO empowers a HHS Task Force – comprised of federal officials rather than external experts – to assess “timing and sequencing of all core childhood vaccines” and adjust the federal vaccine schedule. This could, in effect, bypass the CDC and its external Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP), the traditional vehicles for federal vaccine recommendations, perhaps an attempt to implement administration vaccine priorities that have so far stymied by federal courts. Even so, it is not clear how many U.S. states, which have primary responsibilities in determining which childhood vaccines are required for school entry and other key vaccine policies, would adopt recommendations from this relatively unknown Task Force. In fact, most states – 30 including DC – have already made moves to decouple their vaccine policies from federal government recommendations for one or more childhood vaccines, instead relying on prior recommendations, state recommendations, and/or those of external entities such as American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP). Any recommendations from the Task Force are also unlikely to change how insurance covers childhood vaccinations given that private insurers have pledged to maintain existing childhood vaccine coverage through the end of 2027, and coverage through federal programs such as Vaccines for Children are not expected to change even with the recategorization of childhood vaccines contained in the order, a point confirmed by the White House itself on Monday.

Given ongoing legal challenges to the administration’s vaccine actions and declining influence of federal recommendations on states vaccine policy decisions, it is not clear how much the new EO can shift U.S. vaccine policy. Still, it could sow further confusion among parents already distrustful of federal guidance, and serve to exacerbate the existing partisan divide in the country on vaccine policy, and prove to be unpopular. A KFF poll from January this year, after HHS announced its earlier changes to the federal childhood vaccine schedule, found that adults who had heard about those changes were twice as likely to say it would have a negative impact on children’s health than a positive one. Ultimately, the effect of implementing these changes could be to raise the risk for further outbreaks of childhood diseases such as measles.

Variability in Reimbursement Rates for State-funded Abortion Services for Medicaid Enrollees: A 2026 Update

Authors: Brittni Frederiksen, Olivia Podber, and Alina Salganicoff
Published: Aug 7, 2026
  • Among states that use state-appropriated funds to pay for abortion for Medicaid enrollees, variability in abortion payment rates for the same procedures is considerable. Twenty-one states currently use their own funds to cover abortion services for Medicaid enrollees beyond the limits imposed by the federal Hyde Amendment, which bans federal funding of abortions in cases other than pregnancies that result from rape, incest, or are a life threat. In these states, Medicaid medication abortion rates range from $162 (RI) to $869 (WA) (median $597); dilation and curettage (D&C) procedure rates go from $126 (RI) to a high of $1,000 (NY) (median $378); and dilation and evacuation (D&E) procedure rates vary from $126 (RI) to $1,920 (IL) (median $636).  
  • Only a few states significantly increased their state-funded reimbursement rates for abortion services for Medicaid enrollees in the past two years. Most states that cover abortions for their enrollees have not changed or only modestly increased their reimbursement rates. Among the states that increased D&C rates, only 5 did so at or above the rate of health care inflation. Similarly, among states that increased D&E reimbursement rates, only 6 increased rates at or above the rate of health care inflation over the past two years. Over half (57%, 12 states) have not increased D&C procedure reimbursement rates, and 52% (11 states) have not increased D&E procedure reimbursement rates. 
  • Despite the increased complexity of abortion procedures later in pregnancy, Medicaid reimbursement rates are not substantially higher than rates for earlier-stage procedures in most states. Reimbursement rates for abortions later in pregnancy typically do not reflect the increased complexity and costs associated with later-stage care. The median reimbursement rate for states that fund abortions for Medicaid enrollees was $378 for D&C—typically used earlier in pregnancy—vs. $636 for D&E, which is generally used for abortion procedures performed later in pregnancy. These rates are considerably lower than previously published research on self-pay abortion charges for the same procedures.

Since the Dobbs decision in 2022 overturning Roe v. Wade, 13 states have banned the provision of abortion with few exceptions. In the remaining states where abortion is legal, another barrier to abortion services has been the federal Hyde Amendment, which prohibits the use of federal Medicaid funds for abortion with limited exceptions for pregnancies that endanger the life of the pregnant person, or that result from rape or incest. States may use their own revenues to pay for abortion services for Medicaid enrollees beyond the federal financing restrictions, and 21 currently use their own state funds to pay for abortions for Medicaid enrollees, while 16 states & DC where abortion provision is not banned follow the Hyde Amendment restrictions (Figure 1). Medicaid reimbursement rates are established by the states under broad federal guidelines and have historically been lower than those paid by Medicare and are even lower relative to private insurance rates.

In the case of Medicaid, lower reimbursement rates can lead to abortion providers experiencing financial shortfalls, challenging their long-term sustainability and ability to serve Medicaid enrollees. Lower reimbursement rates have been linked to higher out-of-pocket costs for Medicaid beneficiaries, who are overwhelming low-income, further constraining their access to abortion care. 

To understand the status of Medicaid payment for abortion services four years post-Dobbs, KFF researchers reviewed Medicaid physician fee schedules for medication and procedural abortions in states that do not ban abortion, updating an analysis first published in 2024. This analysis focuses on states where abortion provision is not banned, including those using state funds to pay for abortions for Medicaid enrollees as well those that only cover abortions under Hyde exceptions, and it excludes the 13 states where abortion provision is banned. 

Figure 1 is a map of the United States titled, “21 States Provide Funds to Pay for Abortion Services for Medicaid Enrollees.” States are color-coded into three categories: blue indicates states that use their own funds to pay for abortions under Medicaid (21 states), orange indicates states that follow the federal Hyde Amendment restrictions (16 states and Washington, DC), and red indicates states where abortion is banned (13 states). States that use their own state funds to pay for abortions under Medicaid (blue states) are concentrated on the West Coast, the Northeast, and parts of the Midwest and Southwest. States where abortion is banned (red states) are concentrated across the South and parts of the Great Plains. States that follow the federal Hyde Amendment restrictions, but do not ban abortion (orange states) are primarily located in the Mountain West, Midwest, and Southeast. The map includes data current as of July 16, 2026.

How Abortion Payment Rates Are Structured

Medicaid services are financed via two pathways: fee-for-service (FFS) and managed care arrangements. The reimbursement rates presented in this brief are for FFS claims, as contracted managed care rates are not typically publicly available. The FFS reimbursement rates reported in this brief are for non-facility (e.g., outpatient clinics or physician offices), provider-only rates (e.g., excluding any facility rates), since most abortions are performed outside of a hospital setting. States such as Connecticut, Massachusetts, Nevada, and Washington use different reimbursement fee schedules for family planning and abortion clinics. These reimbursement rates are often higher than physician fee schedules. This analysis uses the family planning and abortion clinic rates, when available.

State Medicaid programs also differ in the payment structures they use for abortion services. Some states use a bundled reimbursement structure for abortion services, where ancillary services provided alongside the abortion are included in the bundled payment rate. Other states use unbundled billing, and providers can bill separately for all services provided with the abortion. Additional services often billed for on the day of the abortion in states that use unbundled codes may include an ultrasound, administered medication, a nerve block, and Rh testing, which are outlined in coding guides developed by the Reproductive Health Access Project for manual vacuum aspiration abortion and medication abortion. Median reimbursement rates for each of these services from state Medicaid physician fee schedules are reported in the tables throughout this brief.

Even when Medicaid reimburses for abortion services, providers have reported that Medicaid reimbursement rates are substantially lower than what they receive from self-pay patients. Because there are limited and outdated data on the actual cost of providing abortion care, self-pay prices can serve as a useful proxy for provider costs, although they may underestimate true costs if they reflect discounts provided to patients by abortion funds. Research conducted before the Dobbs decision illustrates the breadth of this reimbursement gap. A 2020 study reviewed 2017 Medicaid and Medicare physician fees schedules for D&C and D&E procedures across 45 states and D.C. and found that median Medicaid reimbursement rates for first- and second-trimester abortions covered only 37% and 41% of the amount charged to self-pay patients for the procedures, respectively. The study did not address reimbursement rates for abortions after the second trimester. Providers also reported instances in which they received no reimbursement for abortions that were eligible for Medicaid coverage under the Hyde Amendment. The study's authors concluded that this reimbursement gap, particularly when combined with inconsistent reimbursement practices, may further discourage providers from participating in Medicaid.

More recent data on self-pay prices support these findings. A 2024 report on self-pay charges for abortion services from 2017 to 2023 found median charges of $563 for medication abortion, $650 for a first-trimester procedural abortion (D&C), and $1,000 for a second-trimester abortion (D&E). These quoted self-pay prices are substantially higher than Medicaid reimbursement rates in many states, reinforcing that a gap exists between what providers typically charge and what Medicaid pays. 

In 2023, medication abortion, a two-drug regimen using mifepristone and misoprostol that is FDA-approved to terminate pregnancies up to 10 weeks in the U.S., accounted for 65% of all abortions. This share has increased since the FDA removed the in-person dispensing requirements in 2021, making medication abortion via telehealth, mail, and pharmacies more accessible. 

Medication abortion can be billed using three separate procedure codes, and often all three codes are billed at the same time. There are codes for two pharmaceuticals—mifepristone (HCPCS S0190) and misoprostol (HCPCS S0191)—as well as a global medication abortion code (HCPCS S0199) that includes all affiliated services and supplies (e.g., patient counseling, office visits, confirmation of pregnancy by HCG, ultrasound to confirm duration of pregnancy, ultrasound to confirm completion of abortion). 

States typically take two approaches to reimburse for medication abortion services: (1) a bundled payment using the global medication abortion code plus the medications (billed either through medical services or pharmacy billing channels); or (2) payment for separate services, like office visits and ultrasounds, plus the medications. 

Twenty out of 21 states that use state funds to pay for abortion services for Medicaid enrollees list reimbursement rates for at least one of the three medication abortion codes, with 16 listing rates for the global medication abortion code, 13 listing rates for mifepristone, and 12 listing rates for misoprostol. The one state not accounted for is New York; while they do not reimburse for the global medication code, on their publicly available fee schedule they reimburse at the “cost” of the drugs to abortion providers for both mifepristone and misoprostol. The median Medicaid reimbursement rate for the global medication abortion code is $514, ranging from a low of $81 in Rhode Island to a high of $825 in Washington (Figure 2). The median reimbursement rate for mifepristone is $81, ranging from a low of $43 in Washington to a high of $128 in New Jersey. The median reimbursement rate for misoprostol is $2, which ranges from less than $1 in Washington to $22 in Illinois. When the median amounts for all three medication abortion codes are summed together, the median reimbursement rate for medication abortion is $597. However, the range of summed codes across states is quite large, from $162 in Rhode Island to $869 in Washington.

Figure 2 is a horizontal bar chart titled, “Fee-For-Service Reimbursement Rates for Medication Abortion in States That Cover Abortion Services for Medicaid Enrollees.” The chart shows Medicaid reimbursement rates for three procedure codes: S0190 (mifepristone), S0191 (misoprostol), and S0199 (global medication abortion) for 16 of  the 21 states that use state funds to cover abortion services for Medicaid enrollees and list reimbursement for the global medication abortion code. Each state's total reimbursement is shown as a stacked horizontal bar with dollar amounts labeled.

At the top, the 2026 median reimbursement totals 7, consisting of  for mifepristone and 4 for the global medication abortion code. The 2026 mean reimbursement totals 4, consisting of  for mifepristone and 1 for the global code.

Among the states shown, Washington has the highest total reimbursement at 9 and Rhode Island has the lowest at (2).

Most of the reimbursement in each state comes from the global medication abortion code, while reimbursement for mifepristone is generally much smaller, and misoprostol reimbursement is minimal or not separately shown in most states.

For the five states that do not use the bundled, global code for medication abortion, the sum of the rates for mifepristone and misoprostol alone range from $44 in Minnesota1 to $131 in New Jersey. In these states, providers may bill separately for ancillary services, which could potentially add additional reimbursement (Table 1).

Table 1 titled, "Median Fee-For-Service Reimbursement Rates for Services Typically Billed with Unbundled Medication Abortion in States That Cover Abortion Services for Medicaid Enrollees." The table includes states that use unbundled reimbursement for medication abortion, including Alaska, Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, and New York. The table lists medication abortion services billed alongside mifepristone and misoprostol, including transvaginal ultrasounds, limited ultrasounds, transabdominal ultrasounds, Micro Rhogam, and/or office visits. The table lists the specific billing codes, median reimbursement rates, and the number of state fee schedules used to calculate each median.

The medication abortion reimbursement rates reported in this brief apply to services provided in outpatient clinics or physicians’ offices and do not specifically address reimbursement rates for telehealth medication abortion for either bricks-and-mortar or online-only providers. Telehealth has become an increasingly common mode of medication abortion provision; in 2025, approximately 28% of all abortions were medication abortions provided through telehealth, representing a 27% overall increase from 2024. Although research on Medicaid reimbursement rates for telehealth medication abortion is limited, a 2024 report from the National Health Law Program found that, across six states (Illinois, Minnesota, New Mexico, New York, Rhode Island, and Washington), there was overall payment parity for synchronous video telehealth service delivery under Medicaid compared to in-person medication abortion service delivery. However, many of these states adopted temporary telehealth payment parity policies in response to the COVID-19 public health emergency, and some of those policies have not yet been made permanent, limiting the generalizability of these findings. 

While most states that use their own funds to pay for abortion services for Medicaid enrollees list reimbursement rates for medication abortion, only half of the states that follow Hyde restrictions list reimbursement rates for medication abortion, and median reimbursement in these states is substantially lower (see Appendix Table 1). Beyond the issue of failing to publish reimbursement rates for medication abortion, a 2025 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) report found that 14 states participating in the Medicaid Drug Rebate Program (MDRP) were not complying with federal requirements to cover FDA-approved medication abortion drugs, even in circumstances permitted under the Hyde Amendment, such as rape, incest, or life-endangerment. The GAO reported these instances of noncompliance to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) in late 2025. 

Dilation and curettage (D&C) is a common abortion procedure that can be used up to approximately 16 weeks of pregnancy. Medicaid physician fee schedules for fee-for-service reimbursement rates were published online for D&C procedures in all 21 states that use state funds to reimburse for abortion services for Medicaid enrollees beyond Hyde exceptions (Figure 3). The median reimbursement rate for a D&C procedure in these states was $378, ranging widely from $126 in Rhode Island to $1,000 in New York. Since 2024, Pennsylvania2 and Colorado have shifted from following Hyde restrictions to using state funds to pay for abortion for Medicaid enrollees. In the past two years, Pennsylvania increased their rate for D&C procedures by 833%, Colorado increased their reimbursement rate by 378%, and Maryland increased their rate by 154%. Beyond these outliers, most states have not increased their rates or increased them only slightly. Nine of 21 states that use state funds to cover abortion for Medicaid enrollees increased rates, but of those, only 5 states increased rates at or above the health care inflation rate over the past two years. Of the remaining 12 states that did not increase rates, 6 states have not changed their D&C reimbursement rates, and 6 states have decreased their rates between 2024 and 2026. In states that only reimburse for abortions in cases of pregnancies resulting from rape, incest, and life endangerment, payment rates were considerably lower (see Appendix Table 2).

Figure 3 is a table titled, "Fee-For-Service Reimbursement Rates for D&C Procedures in States That Fund Abortion Services for Medicaid Enrollees." The table lists, by state, Medicaid reimbursement rates for dilation and curettage (D&C) abortion procedures in 2024 and 2026 and includes a line graph depicting the change in rates over the two time periods. It also includes a percentage change column that ranges from -10% in New Jersey (7 to 8) to 833% in Pennsylvania ( to 5) that recently started using state funds to pay for abortion services for Medicaid enrollees.

Other services may be billed and reimbursed on the day of a procedural abortion including ultrasound, anesthetic medication administration like lidocaine and methergine, or a nerve block for pain. In some states, the reimbursement rates for these additional services are not publicly posted (Table 2). Illinois and New Mexico reimburse procedural abortions (CPT codes 59840 and 59841) as bundled codes and will not pay for other related services when these codes are billed. Therefore, Illinois and New Mexico were removed from the calculations in the table below detailing median ancillary rates for services that may be provided at the time of the abortion. 

Table 2 is titled, "Median Fee-For-Service Reimbursement Rates for Services Typically Billed with a D&C Procedure in States That Cover Abortion Services for Medicaid Enrollees." The table lists dilation and curettage abortion services billed alongside D&C procedures, including insertion of cervical dilator, transvaginal ultrasound, limited ultrasound, lidocaine, methergine, nerve block injection, surgical tray, specimen handling, and Micro Rhogam. The table lists the billing codes associated with those services, median reimbursement rates, and the number of state fee schedules included to calculate each median.

For a dilation and evacuation (D&E) procedure, which is often used in the second trimester, the reimbursement rates similarly varied widely by state (Figure 4). In states that fund abortion services for Medicaid enrollees, the median reimbursement rate for a D&E procedure was $636, ranging from a low of $126 in Rhode Island to a high of $1,920 in Illinois. Since 2024, Colorado increased their D&E reimbursement rate by 492%, Pennsylvania increased their rate by 227%, and Massachusetts by 99%. Beyond those substantial reimbursement rate increases, 10 of 21 states that use state funds to pay for abortion for Medicaid enrollees increased D&E reimbursement rates for Medicaid providers between 2024 and 2026, but only 6 increased their rates at or above the rate of health care inflation. Of the remaining 11 states that did not increase rates, 7 have not changed their D&E reimbursement rates, and 4 have decreased their rates over the past two years. As with D&C procedures, the median reimbursement rate for D&E procedures in states that pay for abortions for Medicaid enrollees is higher than in states that limit abortion coverage to those cases permissible under the Hyde Amendment (see Appendix Table 3).

Figure 4 is a table titled, "Fee-For-Service Reimbursement Rates for D&E Procedures in States That Fund Abortion Services for Medicaid Enrollees." The table lists, by state, Medicaid reimbursement rates for dilation and evacuation (D&E) abortion procedures in 2024 and 2024 and includes a line graph depicting the rate of change over the two time periods.  It also includes a percentage change column that ranges from -8% in New Jersey (4 to 6) to 492% in Colorado (5 to 68), which recently started using state funds to pay for abortion services for Medicaid enrollees.

As with D&C procedures, providers will often bill for other services provided with the D&E procedure if the code is not a bundled code (Table 3). In line with D&C procedures, Illinois and New Mexico use bundled rates for D&E procedures that include ancillary services and, therefore, are not included in the calculations in the table below.  

Table 3 is titled, "Median Fee-For-Service Reimbursement Rates for Services Typically Billed with a D&E Procedure in States That Cover Abortion Services for Medicaid Enrollees." The table lists common dilation and evacuation abortion services billed alongside D&E procedures, including insertion of cervical dilator, transvaginal ultrasound, limited ultrasound, lidocaine, methergine, nerve block injection, surgical tray, specimen handling, and Micro Rhogam. The table lists the billing codes associated with those services, median reimbursement rates, and the number of state fee schedules included to calculate each median.

Abortion Financing, Cost, and Medicaid Policy Considerations

Given that D&E procedures are typically provided later in pregnancy and are more costly and complex procedures, it would follow that reimbursement would be substantially higher than for D&C procedures, which are typically done earlier in pregnancy. The majority of states (27 of 38) without bans—including Hyde and non-Hyde states—reported a Medicaid reimbursement rate difference that was less than $200 (Figure 5). Three states (Rhode Island, Nebraska, & Wisconsin) reimburse for first and second trimester abortions at the exact same rate, failing to account for the differences in cost and complexity of these different procedures, leaving providers to either be exposed to financial losses if they provide abortions later in pregnancy or decline to accept Medicaid patients.

Figure 5 is a horizontal bar chart titled, “Difference Between Reimbursement Rates for D&C and D&E Procedures, 2026.” The chart compares Medicaid reimbursement rate differences in first and second trimester abortions per state, split up by Non-Hyde and Hyde states. Non-Hyde states range from reimbursement rate differences from alt=

In analyzing the role of Medicaid in abortion financing, the Guttmacher Institute’s 2021-2022 Abortion Patient Survey found 62% of abortion patients living in states that funded abortion beyond Hyde restrictions used Medicaid to pay for their abortion. Comparatively, for abortion patients living in Hyde restricted states, 82% paid out of pocket for their care, with two-thirds of those surveyed reporting they had to raise money to afford their abortion, often through accruing debt, relying on financial subsidies from abortion funds or clinic discounts, or asking friends and family. Abortion funds have long been relied on as a safety-net option for those in need of assistance in paying for their abortion, but a post-Dobbs trend of increased requests for support coupled with decreased donations leaves funds in precarious and depleted financial positions.  

These disparities in how abortion care is financed highlight the fact that insurance coverage alone is insufficient to assure access, particularly when providers’ reimbursement policies inadequately support the costs of the full range of abortion services. While reimbursement for care after the second trimester is not directly addressed in this report, a recent study investigated self-pay prices paid by patients seeking later abortion care and found that prices increased with gestational stage, while, inversely, provider and clinic availability and Medicaid coverage declined. Low Medicaid reimbursement for these services may further exacerbate reproductive access inequities for Medicaid enrollees.  

Beyond implications on patient affordability, reimbursement rates also affect providers’ ability to provide abortions to all patients regardless of payor. As with all health services, the cost of providing abortions has grown in all states as the costs of medical equipment and personnel increase annually. In addition, abortion providers face expenses that are not incurred by most other outpatient clinics such as security costs to keep their staff and patients safe from anti-abortion activities, such as extra security guards, cameras, staff background checks, and bulletproof windows. Increased safety concerns and costs have also made it difficult to retain the abortion clinic workforce.  

Appendix table 1 is titled, "Medicaid Fee-For-Service Physician Fee Schedule Reimbursement Rates for Medication Abortion, 2026." The table lists, by state (split into Non-Hyde and Hyde States) reimbursement rates for S0190 (mifepristone), S0191 (misoprostol), and S0199 (global medication abortion), and a link to each state's Medicaid physician fee schedule.
Appendix table 2 is titled, "Medicaid Fee-For-Service Physician Fee Schedule Reimbursement Rates for D&C Procedures, 2017 to 2026." The table lists, by state (split into Non-Hyde and Hyde States) reimbursement rates for D&C (CPT code 59840) in 2017, 2024, and 2026, includes the percent change from 2017 to 2024, 2017 to 2026, and 2024 to 2026, and a link to each state's Medicaid physician fee schedule.
Appendix table 3 is titled, "Medicaid Fee-For-Service Physician Fee Schedule Reimbursement Rates for D&E Procedures, 2017 to 2026." The table lists, by state (split into Non-Hyde and Hyde States) reimbursement rates for D&E (CPT code 59841) in 2017, 2024, and 2026, includes the percent change from 2017 to 2024, 2017 to 2026, and 2024 to 2026, and a link to each state's Medicaid physician fee schedule.

A prior version of this brief was originally posted March 2024. If interested in a copy of the prior brief, please to write to womenshealth@kff.org.

  1. MN reimbursement reflects data from the publicly available fee schedule, but the state legislature increased abortion payments by 20% as of January 2024. These updated rates are not reflected in this reporting.  ↩︎
  2. Under the recent Commonwealth Court ruling, Pennsylvania Medicaid is legally required to cover abortion care as of July 15, 2026. However, the Pennsylvania Department of Human Services (DHS) is still in the process of establishing the necessary billing and reimbursement system to process coverage. ↩︎

State and Federal Reproductive Rights and Abortion Litigation Tracker

Last updated on

The Supreme Court’s Dobbs ruling, overturning Roe v. Wade, returned the decision to restrict or protect abortion to states. In many states, abortion providers and advocates are challenging state abortion bans contending that the bans violate the state constitution or another state law. Additionally, new questions have arisen regarding the intersection of federal and state authority when it impacts access to abortion and contraception.

This litigation tracker presents up-to-date information on the ongoing litigation in state and federal courts involving access to contraception and abortion. Use the buttons below to navigate between cases related to: Pregnancy and Work, Emergency Care, Family Planning, Privacy, Medication Abortion, Minors Access, and State Abortion Bans. 

Litigation Involving Reproductive Health and Rights in the Courts, as of August 6, 2026 (Table)

The Trump Administration’s Foreign Aid Review: Status of U.S. Global Tuberculosis Efforts

Published: Aug 6, 2026

Editorial Note: Originally published in May 2025, this resource has been updated as new information became available.

Starting on the first day of his second term, President Trump issued several executive actions that have fundamentally changed foreign assistance. These included: an executive order which called for a 90-day review of foreign aid; a subsequent “stop-work order” that froze all payments and services for work already underway; the dissolution of USAID, including the reduction of most staff and contractors; and the cancellation of most foreign assistance awards. Although a waiver to allow life-saving humanitarian assistance was issued, it was limited to certain services only and difficult for program implementers to obtain. Since then, responsibility for remaining global health programs has been transferred to the State Department. While there have been several legal challenges to these actions, there has been limited legal remedy to date. As a result, U.S. global health programs were disrupted and, in some cases, ended. Changes to the Department of Health and Human Services, including proposed cuts and reorganization, are also likely to affect these programs. This fact sheet is part of a series on the status of U.S. global health programs.

Background on U.S. Global Tuberculosis (TB) Efforts

  • The U.S. government has been involved in global TB activities for decades and began ramping up its efforts in the late 1990s when a global TB program was created. The U.S. had been the top donor to TB efforts.
  • TB, an infectious disease caused by bacteria, causes more deaths than any other infectious agent worldwide, including 1.23 million people who died in 2024, and is among the 10 leading causes of death worldwide. TB is the leading cause of death among people with HIV.
  • Recent decades have seen improvement, and U.S. government investments have contributed significantly to improving TB health outcomes, including an almost 25% decline in TB incidence between 2000 and 2023, and a significant drop in TB deaths.  
  • Prior to its dissolution in 2025, USAID had served as the lead implementing agency for U.S. global TB efforts, focusing on 24 priority countries – with activities in 50 (including at least 20 of the 30 high burden countries) – to support prevention, detection, and treatment of TB, including drug-resistant TB. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) also had carried out global TB efforts, and the State Department’s Bureau of Global Health Security and Diplomacy (GHSD), which oversees PEPFAR, leads U.S. efforts to address TB-HIV co-infection.
  • Prior to the start of the Trump administration, U.S. funding for global bilateral TB activities in FY 2024 was $406 million; funding for the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (Global Fund) was $1.65 billion.                                                    

Current Status of U.S. Global TB Efforts

The following administration actions have had a significant impact on TB program operations:

  • Stop-work order: The stop-work order initially froze all bilateral TB programming and services, halting existing work in the field. Because it halted payments, many implementers had to terminate staff and end some services.
  • Limited waiver: Some TB activities were included in a limited waiver issued by the State Department on February 4, 2025, allowing “life-saving services” to continue, which are defined as “Essential screening, testing, and treatment for tuberculosis (TB) and drug resistant TB (DR-TB) including provision and monitoring of laboratory services, drug susceptibility testing, clinical visits, dispensing of essential medicines to avert near-term mortality and spread of infection.” HIV/TB activities were also allowed under PEPFAR’s limited waiver. Even with the waivers, services remained disrupted and implementers faced challenges in getting permission to resume programming and difficulties in getting paid.
  • Dissolution of USAID: As the main government implementer of TB efforts, the dissolution of USAID and loss of most staff have significantly affected TB program implementation capacity and operations. Without USAID and most of its staff, TB efforts’ implementation capacity and operations have been affected. In addition, announcements of reductions at CDC could further affect global TB efforts.
  • Canceled awards: In early 2025, it was reported that the administration canceled 86% of all USAID awards. KFF analysis found that of the 770 global health awards identified, 162 included TB activities, 79% of which were terminated.
  • Legal actions: In response to two lawsuits filed against the administration’s actions, a federal judge issued a preliminary injunction ordering the government to pay for work completed by February 13, 2025, although not all payments have been made and the court did not stop the government from canceling awards. The government appealed the ruling and after several subsequent rulings in the case, the Supreme Court ultimately allowed the government to rescind (cancel) a portion of expiring global health funds before the end of the fiscal year. Further proceedings have been stayed, pending the outcome of a separate case.
  • Reorganization: The administration notified Congress on March 28, 2025, of its intent to permanently dissolve USAID and that any remaining USAID operations would be absorbed by the State Department with global health activities, including for TB, to be integrated into its Bureau of Global Health Security and Diplomacy (GHSD) which oversees PEPFAR. On May 29, 2025, the State Department further notified Congress of its proposed reorganization plan, and with the dissolution of USAID, programs moved in July 2025.
  • America First Global Health Strategy: In September 2025, the administration released the America First Global Health Strategy, its roadmap for future U.S. government global health engagement. Per the strategy, the U.S. is negotiating bilateral, multi-year agreements with countries receiving U.S. global health assistance with an aim to transition the majority of countries to full self-reliance by the end of the agreement period. TB has been included in some of the agreements signed to date, although there is little information available on activities and funding.
  • Policy restrictions: In January 2025, the Trump administration reinstated the expanded Mexico City Policy from Trump’s first term and further expanded it in January 2026 to apply to almost all non-military foreign assistance, many more entities, and additional areas of restrictions including activities related to diversity, equity and inclusion and “gender ideology” under a broader umbrella known as the “Promoting Human Flourishing in Foreign Assistance” (PHFFA) Policy.
  • Funding: The Trump administration has requested significantly less funding for TB in its budget requests and canceled funding for numerous TB-related projects and awards. Despite this, Congress has continued to appropriate funding for bilateral global TB activities at close to prior year levels, including $390 million (at the State Department and CDC) in FY 2026. It also appropriated $1.25 billion for contributions to the Global Fund in FY 2026.

Impact on Global TB Services and Outcomes

  • An internal USAID memo from 2025 estimated that the cessation of USAID’s TB control programs could increase global TB incidence by 28-32% and have a similar effect on new cases of multi-drug-resistant TB.
  • According to WHO, the 30 highest TB-burden countries reported in 2025 that U.S. funding withdrawals were affecting services, including the loss of thousands of health workers, and disruptions of the drug supply chain and laboratory services.
  • A rapid assessment survey of 108 WHO country offices in 2025 found that approximately 40% reported moderate or severe disruptions to TB services, including for medicines and health products, due to the U.S. foreign aid freeze and other shortages. A more recent 2025 WHO survey found that among 17 high-burden countries, 11 reported that cuts in external support undermined TB-related community engagement and TB screening efforts, 7 reported an impact on TB preventive treatment, and 3 reported an impact on TB treatment.
  • In addition, several modeling studies have found that cuts in or termination of U.S. TB funding could result in significant increases in TB cases and deaths, and greater economic burden on households, in coming years.

What to Watch

  • Implementation of the America First Global Health Strategy multi-year agreements with countries
  • Status of U.S. funding appropriated by Congress for bilateral TB efforts and contributions to the Stop TB Partnership and the Global Fund
  • Impact of the PHFFA Policy on U.S. funding and programs
  • Impact of U.S. changes to global health programs on health outcomes

The Trump Administration’s Foreign Aid Review: Status of PEPFAR

Published: Aug 6, 2026

Editorial Note: Originally published in May 2025, this resource has been updated as new information became available.

Starting on the first day of his second term, President Trump issued several executive actions that have fundamentally changed foreign assistance. These included: an executive order which called for a 90-day review of foreign aid; a subsequent “stop-work order” that froze all payments and services for work already underway; the dissolution of USAID, including the reduction of most staff and contractors; and the cancellation of most foreign assistance awards. Although a waiver to allow life-saving humanitarian assistance was issued, it was limited to certain services only and difficult for program implementers to obtain. Since then, responsibility for remaining global health programs has been transferred to the State Department. While there have been several legal challenges to these actions, there has been limited legal remedy to date. As a result, U.S. global health programs were disrupted and, in some cases, ended. Changes to the Department of Health and Human Services, including proposed cuts and reorganization, are also likely to affect these programs. This fact sheet is part of a series on the status of U.S. global health programs.

Background on PEPFAR

  • The U.S. President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), first authorized in 2003, is the largest commitment by any nation to address a single disease, working in more than 50 countries and the U.S. has been the top donor to HIV efforts, through PEPFAR and contributions to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (Global Fund).
  • PEPFAR is credited with having saved 26 million lives and enabling 7.8 million babies to be born without HIV infection. Studies have also found that PEPFAR funding is associated with several “spillover” effects including significant reductions in all-cause mortality, increases in childhood immunizations and in GDP growth, and retention of children in school.
  • PEPFAR has been reauthorized by Congress four times, most recently in March 2024 for one year. Although that authorization expired on March 25, 2025, PEPFAR is a permanent part of U.S. law and, other than a set of eight time-bound provisions, continues as long as Congress appropriates funding.
  • PEPFAR, per its authorizing statute, is to be overseen by a U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator, a Senate-confirmed position appointed by the President and holding the rank of ambassador, at the State Department’s Bureau of Global Health Security and Diplomacy (GHSD). GHSD is charged with coordinating its implementation through other government agencies (primarily USAID – before its dissolution – and CDC) and, historically, with implementing partners, civil society, and recipient countries.
  • Prior to the start of the Trump administration, U.S. funding for PEPFAR in FY 2024 was $4.9 billion; funding for the Global Fund was $1.65 billion.

Current Status of PEPFAR

The following administration actions have had a significant impact on PEPFAR operations:

  • Stop-work order: The stop-work order initially froze all PEPFAR programming and services, halting existing work in the field, including provision of antiretroviral therapy. Because it halted payments, many implementers had to terminate staff and end some services.
  • Limited Waiver: PEPFAR received a limited waiver on February 1, 2025 (with additional information on February 6, 2025), allowing it to continue “life-saving HIV services”. However, the waiver only permitted certain activities: HIV treatment and care, prevention of mother-to-child transmission (PMTCT), pre-exposure prophylaxis (PrEP) for pregnant and breastfeeding women, and HIV testing. Other services, including PrEP for anyone else (including those already on PrEP) and HIV prevention more generally, as well as non-clinical programming for orphans and vulnerable children, were not permitted. Even with the waiver, implementers faced challenges in getting permission to resume HIV programming and difficulties getting paid.
  • Dissolution of USAID: USAID was the main government implementing agency for PEPFAR, obligating 60% of its bilateral assistance in FY 2023. Without USAID and most of its staff, PEPFAR’s implementation capacity and operations have been affected. In addition, announcements of reductions at CDC, PEPFAR’s second largest implementing agency (obligating 37% in FY 2023), and questions about the stability of CDC’s funding, could further affect PEPFAR.
  • Canceled awards: In early 2025, it was reported that the administration canceled 86% of all USAID awards. KFF analysis found that of the 770 global health awards identified, 379 included HIV activities, 71% of which were terminated, including several HIV treatment awards as well as most HIV prevention.
  • Legal actions: In response to two lawsuits filed against the administration’s actions, a federal judge issued a preliminary injunction ordering the government to pay for work completed by February 13, 2025, although not all payments have been made and the court did not stop the government from canceling awards. The government appealed the ruling, and after several subsequent rulings in the case, the Supreme Court ultimately allowed the government to rescind (cancel) a portion of expiring global health funds before the end of the fiscal year. Further proceedings have been stayed, pending the outcome of a separate case.
  • Reorganization: The administration notified Congress on March 28, 2025, of its intent to permanently dissolve USAID and that any remaining USAID operations would be absorbed by the State Department with global health activities to be integrated into GHSD. On May 29, 2025, the State Department further notified Congress of its proposed reorganization plan, and with the dissolution of USAID, programs moved in July 2025.
  • America First Global Health Strategy: In September 2025, the administration released the America First Global Health Strategy, its roadmap for future U.S. government global health engagement. Per the strategy, the U.S. is negotiating bilateral, multi-year agreements with countries receiving U.S. global health assistance with an aim to transition the majority of countries to full self-reliance by the end of the agreement period. HIV programs are an anchor of the strategy, and HIV has been included in most of the agreements signed to date, although there is little information available on activities and funding. A U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator has yet to be nominated.
  • Long-acting injectable PrEP: On September 4, 2025, the administration announced that PEPFAR would partner with the Global Fund to support provision of long-acting injectable PrEP to up to 2 million people in high-burden countries by 2028.
  • Policy restrictions: In January 2025, the Trump administration reinstated the expanded Mexico City Policy from Trump’s first term and further expanded it in January 2026 to apply to almost all non-military foreign assistance, many more entities, and additional areas of restrictions including activities related to diversity, equity and inclusion and “gender ideology” under a broader umbrella of the “Promoting Human Flourishing in Foreign Assistance” (PHFFA) Policy.
  • Funding: The Trump administration has requested significantly less funding for PEPFAR in its budget requests and canceled funding for numerous HIV-related projects and awards. Despite this, Congress has continued to appropriate funding at or close to prior year levels for PEPFAR, including $4.8 billion in FY 2026. It also appropriated $1.25 billion for the Global Fund in FY 2026.

Impact on PEPFAR Services and Outcomes

Numerous reports have documented the impacts of these actions on services and outcomes:

  • An analysis conducted shortly after the stop-work order was issued found that many PEPFAR implementing partners reported the cancellation of at least one category of activities; staff reductions; and risks to operations. 
  • A rapid assessment survey of 108 WHO country offices, conducted in 2025, found that almost half reported moderate or severe disruptions to HIV services, including for medicines and health products, due to the U.S. foreign aid freeze and other shortages.
  • A recent analysis in 14 countries found that the disruption in PEPFAR funding was associated with significant drops in access from early 2025 through early 2026 and that recovery remains limited, with ongoing reduced access to HIV services and commodities, including antiretroviral treatment, PrEP, HIV tests, and clinical monitoring tests.
  • A tracking survey found that PrEP initiations declined by 13% and 66% in five high-burden countries between January-September 2024 and January-September 2025.
  • A summary of available data as of December 2025 found that while some recovery had been reported in service uptake for HIV testing and treatment services, funding cuts and disruptions were continuing to have negative consequences for coverage of PrEP and other HIV prevention services, programs for adolescent girls and young women, and community-led HIV responses.
  • In addition, several modeling studies have estimated that cuts in or termination of U.S. HIV funding could result in significant increases in new HIV infections and HIV-related deaths over the coming years.
  • A recent analysis surveyed almost 170 PEPFAR-funded organizations in 46 countries, finding that more than 1,700 HIV service sites “closed entirely after terminated or delayed PEPFAR payments” since funding cuts in 2025 and that among organizations that lost funding almost none were able to find alternative funding support. It also found a range of HIV services, including those directed at key populations, HIV prevention such as PrEP and condom distribution, and PMTCT, were stopped, interrupted, or disrupted.
  • A KFF analysis of the latest PEPFAR data provides a snapshot of PEPFAR results after the Trump administration’s changes: For some indicators, progress declined in FY 2025 Q4, including support for prevention services such as PrEP and the DREAMS program for adolescent girls and young women, both of which were significantly scaled back by the administration. There was also a drop in the number of people with HIV newly enrolled on antiretroviral therapy (ART), an important measure of access. There were areas where progress has been maintained or potentially improved, including the total number of people with HIV on ART, which was stable, and an increase in the number of people living with both HIV and TB who are receiving ART.

What to Watch

  • Implementation of the America First Global Health Strategy multi-year agreements with countries
  • Status of U.S. funding appropriated by Congress for PEPFAR and contributions to the Global Fund
  • Impact of the PHFFA Policy on U.S. funding and programs
  • Impact of U.S. changes to global health programs on health outcomes
  • The future of transparent PEPFAR data monitoring and reporting

The Trump Administration’s Foreign Aid Review: Reorganization of U.S. Global Health Programs

Published: Aug 6, 2026

Editorial Note: Originally published in May 2025, this resource has been updated as new information became available.

Starting on the first day of his second term, President Trump issued several executive actions that have fundamentally changed foreign assistance. These included: an executive order which called for a 90-day review of foreign aid; a subsequent “stop-work order” that froze all payments and services for work already underway; the dissolution of USAID, including the reduction of most staff and contractors; and the cancellation of most foreign assistance awards. Although a waiver to allow life-saving humanitarian assistance was issued, it was limited to certain services only and difficult for program implementers to obtain. Since then, responsibility for remaining global health programs has been transferred to the State Department. While there have been several legal challenges to these actions, there has been limited legal remedy to date. As a result, U.S. global health programs were disrupted and, in some cases, ended. Changes to the Department of Health and Human Services, including proposed cuts and reorganization, are also likely to affect these programs. This fact sheet is part of a series on the status of U.S. global health programs.

Background on U.S. Global Health Programs

  • Historically, U.S. global health programs have been overseen and managed by three main federal departments and agencies: the State Department, USAID (now dissolved), and CDC.
    • The State Department is home to the Bureau of Global Health Security and Diplomacy (GHSD), which leads and oversees PEPFAR (which receives direct appropriations from Congress) as well as global health security and, more recently, other global health programs.
    • USAID, an independent agency established by Congress, had housed and managed most other U.S. bilateral global health programs (before its dissolution in 2025), including TB, malaria, maternal and child health, and nutrition, receiving direct appropriations from Congress for these efforts. Because the State Department had not historically served as an implementing agency, USAID also managed more than half of PEPFAR’s funding, through State Department transfers and direct appropriations from Congress.
    • CDC has global programs for HIV, TB, polio, and global health security, which receive direct Congressional appropriations and also manages and implements PEPFAR funding transferred by State and USAID.
  • To carry out global health programs, federal agencies had funded other organizations, including non-profits, foreign governments, and international and multilateral health organizations, such as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (Global Fund) and Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance.
  • Prior to the start of the Trump administration, U.S. funding for global health, across multiple federal agencies and for bilateral and multilateral programs, including global health research, had totaled $12.0 billion in FY 2025.

Current Status of U.S. Global Health Programs

The following administration actions have or are likely to have a significant impact on the structure and operations of U.S global health programs:

  • Stop-work order: The stop-work order, as part of the foreign aid review, initially froze all bilateral global health programming and services, halting existing work in the field (it was not applied to the Global Fund or Gavi). Because it halted payments, many implementers had to terminate staff and end some services.
  • Limited waivers: Certain bilateral global health programs received waivers to allow “life-saving services” to continue, including a limited set of PEPFAR services and TB, malaria, maternal and child health, nutrition and infectious disease outbreak response services. Even with these waivers, services remained disrupted, and implementers faced challenges in getting permission to resume programming and difficulties in getting paid.
  • Dissolution of USAID: Because USAID was the main implementing agency for global health efforts, its dissolution and loss of most of its staff reduced program implementation capacity and operations. Announcements of reductions at CDC could further affect global health efforts.
  • Cancelled awards: In early 2025, it was reported that the administration canceled 86% of USAID awards. KFF analysis found that of the 770 global health awards identified, 80% were listed as terminated, totaling $12.7 billion in unobligated funding.
  • Other executive orders and actions: In addition to the foreign aid review, several other orders and actions have or will likely affect global health, including: a review of international organization participation, the reinstatement and further expansion of the Mexico City Policy (now under a broader umbrella called the Promoting Human Flourishing in Foreign Assistance (PHFFA) Policy) and withholding of UNFPA funding, and withdrawal from the World Health Organization.
  • Legal actions: In response to two lawsuits filed against the administration’s actions, a federal judge issued a preliminary injunction ordering the government to pay for work completed by February 13, 2025, although not all payments have been made and the court did not stop the government from canceling awards. The government appealed the ruling, and after several subsequent rulings in the case, the Supreme Court ultimately allowed the government to rescind (cancel) a portion of expiring global health funds before the end of the fiscal year. Further proceedings have been stayed, pending the outcome of a separate case.
  • Reorganization: The administration moved to restructure and/or reduce global health efforts as follows:
    • On March 28, 2025, Secretary of State Rubio announced that the State Department and USAID had notified Congress of their intent to “restructure certain Department bureaus and offices that would implement programs and functions realigned from USAID” as follows:
      • Proposing legislation to abolish USAID as an independent agency.
      • Separating almost all USAID personnel from federal service within the current fiscal year.
      • Identifying USAID programs that “continue to advance the Administration’s foreign policy objectives,” including a subset of global health activities to be transferred to GHSD. These include programs that help reduce health disparities, deliver lifesaving vaccines, promote maternal and child health, and control malaria, TB, and other diseases.
    • On April 22, 2025, Secretary Rubio announced a reorganization of the State Department to “empower the Department from the ground up, from the bureaus to the embassies”, including removing redundant offices and non-statutory programs that are “misaligned with America’s core national interests.” On May 29, 2025, the State Department notified Congress with further details, including that GHSD would be reorganized to include three major divisions: Health Programs (with the Office of Health Programs and the Office of Program Transition and Supply Chain), Health Policy and Diplomacy (with the Office of Health Diplomacy and the Office of Program Planning and Evaluation), and Global Health Security (with the Office of Outbreak Detection and Response). With the dissolution of USAID in July 2025, U.S. global health programs were moved to the State Department.
  • America First Global Health Strategy: In September 2025, the administration released the America First Global Health Strategy, its roadmap for future U.S. government global health engagement, with 3 broad pillars – making America safer, stronger, and more prosperous – and focusing on HIV, TB, malaria, polio, and global health security. Per the strategy, the U.S. is negotiating bilateral, multi-year agreements with countries receiving U.S. global health assistance. The agreements include co-investment by countries and aim to transition the majority of countries to full self-reliance by the end of the agreement period. The U.S. will provide 100% of current levels of funding for health commodities and frontline healthcare workers for HIV, TB, malaria, and polio through FY 2026 and reduced funding thereafter (and rapidly reduce funding for activities other than health commodities and frontline health personnel). Global health security activities focus on surveillance, data sharing and laboratory capacity, to enable early detection and rapid containment of outbreaks originating outside the U.S. A KFF analysis of the MOUs finds that the administration plans to reduce funding to countries by billions over the next five years, relative to the prior five-year period.
  • Funding: While the Trump administration has requested significantly less funding for global health in its budget requests, Congress has continued to appropriate funding at close to prior year levels, including $11.3 billion in FY 2026.

What to Watch

  • Implementation of the America First Global Health Strategy bilateral, multi-year agreements with selected countries (see KFF tracker)
  • Status of U.S. funding appropriated by Congress for global health programs
  • Impact of the new policies on U.S. funding and programs, including the PHFFA Policy
  • Impact of U.S. changes to global health programs on health outcomes