Introduction

Recently, there has been increased interest at the federal and state level to expand the use of premiums and cost sharing in Medicaid. Current rules limit premiums and cost sharing in Medicaid to facilitate access to coverage and care for the low-income population served by the program, who have limited resources to spend on out-of-pocket costs. Proponents of increasing premiums and cost sharing in Medicaid indicate that doing so will promote personal responsibility, prepare beneficiaries to transition to commercial and private insurance, and support consumers in making value-conscious health decisions.¹ 

This brief, which updates an earlier brief “Premiums and Cost-Sharing in Medicaid: A Review of Research Findings,” reviews research on the effects of premiums and cost sharing on low-income populations in Medicaid and CHIP. It draws on findings from 65 papers published between 2000 and March 2017, including peer-reviewed studies and freestanding reports, government reports, and white papers by research and policy organizations. This research has primarily focused on how premiums and cost sharing affect coverage and access to care; some studies also have examined effects on state savings. The effects on individuals, providers, and state costs reflect varied implementation of premiums and cost sharing across states as well as differing premium and cost sharing amounts.

Premiums and Cost Sharing in Medicaid and CHIP Today

Currently, states have options to charge premiums and cost sharing in Medicaid and CHIP that vary by income and eligibility group (Box 1). Reflecting these options, premiums and cost sharing in Medicaid and CHIP vary across states and groups. As of January 2017, 30 states charge premiums or enrollment fees and 25 states charge cost sharing for children in Medicaid or CHIP.²  Most of these charges are limited to children in CHIP since the program covers children with higher family incomes than Medicaid and has different premium and cost sharing rules. States generally do not charge premiums for parents in Medicaid, but 39 states charge cost sharing for parents and 23 of the 32 states that implemented the Affordable Care Act (ACA) Medicaid expansion to low-income adults charge cost sharing for expansion adults.³  Six states have waivers to charge premiums or monthly contributions for adults that are not otherwise allowed.⁴ 

Effects of Premiums (Table 1)

A large body of research shows that premiums can serve as a barrier to obtaining and maintaining Medicaid and CHIP coverage among low-income individuals. Studies show that premiums in Medicaid and CHIP lead to a reduction in coverage among both children and adults.^{5 ,6 ,7 ,8 ,9 ,10}   Numerous studies find that premiums increase disenrollment from Medicaid and CHIP among adults and children, shorten lengths of Medicaid and CHIP enrollment, and deter eligible adults and children from enrolling in Medicaid and CHIP.^{11 ,12 ,13 ,14 ,15 ,16 ,17 ,18 ,19 ,20 ,21 ,22 ,23 ,24 ,25 ,26 ,27 ,28 ,29 ,30 ,31 ,32 ,33 ,34 ,35 ,36 ,37 ,38 ,39} 

Although some individuals who disenroll from Medicaid or CHIP following premium increases move to other sources of coverage, others become uninsured and face negative effects on their access to care and financial security. Those with lower incomes and those without a worker in the family are more likely to become uninsured compared to those with relatively higher incomes or with a worker in the family, reflecting less availability of employer coverage.^{40 ,41 ,42 ,43 ,44 ,45 ,46 ,47 ,48 ,49}  Studies also show that those who become uninsured following premium increases face increased barriers to accessing care, have greater unmet health needs, and face increased financial burdens.^{50 ,51 ,52  ,53 ,54}  Several studies suggest that these negative effects on health care are largest among individuals with greater health care needs.^55 ,56 

Premium effects are largest for those with the lowest incomes, particularly among those with incomes below poverty. Given that most states limit premium charges to children in CHIP, most studies of premium effects have focused on children in CHIP, who generally have incomes above 100% or 150% of the federal poverty level. A range of these studies show that premium effects are larger among children at the lower end of this income range, who have greater disenrollment and increased likelihood of becoming uninsured.^{57 ,58 ,59 ,60 ,61 ,62 ,63 ,64 ,65}  Reflecting the more limited use of premiums among Medicaid enrollees with incomes below poverty, fewer studies have focused on this population. However, studies that have focused on poor Medicaid enrollees found substantial negative effects on enrollment from premiums.^{66 ,67 ,68 ,69}  For example, in Oregon, nearly half of adults disenrolled from Medicaid after a premium increase with a maximum premium amount of $20, with many becoming uninsured and facing barriers to accessing care, unmet health needs, and increased financial burdens.^70 ,71 ,72  Similarly, a more recent study of the Healthy Indiana Plan waiver program for Medicaid expansion adults with incomes below 138% FPL, which requires premiums that range from $1-$100 to enroll in a more comprehensive plan, found that 55% of eligible individuals either did not make their initial payment or missed a payment.⁷³  Research also finds that premium effects may vary by other factors beyond income. For example, one study finds larger effects of premiums among families without an offer of employer-sponsored coverage.⁷⁴  Some research also suggests that increases in Medicaid and CHIP premiums may have larger effects on coverage for children of color and among children whose families have lower levels of educational attainment.^75 ,76 ,77 

Research finds varying implications of premiums for individuals with significant health needs. Overall, individuals with greater health needs are less likely to disenroll from Medicaid or CHIP coverage and are more likely to have longer periods of Medicaid or CHIP coverage compared to those with fewer health needs.^{78 ,79 ,80 ,81}  However, findings vary regarding how individuals with health needs respond to premium increases. Some studies show that individuals with greater health needs are less sensitive to premium increases compared to those with fewer health needs, reflecting their increased need for services.^82 ,83  These findings suggest that individuals with greater health needs are more likely than those with less significant health needs to remain enrolled following premium increases, but then face increased financial burdens to maintain their coverage. Other studies find that children with increased health needs are as likely or more likely than those with fewer health needs to disenroll from coverage following premium increases, suggesting premiums may lead to children going without coverage despite ongoing health needs.^84 ,85 

Effects of Cost Sharing (Table 2)

A wide range of studies find that even relatively small levels of cost sharing, in the range of $1 to $5, are associated with reduced use of care, including necessary services. The RAND health insurance experiment (HIE), conducted in the 1970s and still considered the seminal study on the effects of cost sharing on individual behavior, shows a reduction in use of services after cost sharing increased, regardless of income.⁸⁶  Since then, a growing body of research has found that cost sharing is associated with reduced utilization of services,⁸⁷  including vaccinations,⁸⁸  prescription drugs,^{89 ,90 ,91 ,92}  mental health visits,⁹³  preventive and primary care,^{94 ,95 ,96 ,97 ,98}  and inpatient and outpatient care,^99 ,100  and decreased adherence to medications.^{101 ,102 ,103}  In many of these studies, copayment increases as small as $1-$5 can effect use of care. Some studies find that lower-income individuals are more likely to reduce their use of services, including essential services, than higher-income individuals.^104 ,105  Research also suggests that copayments can result in unintended consequences, such as increased use of other costlier services like the emergency room.¹⁰⁶  Two studies have found that copayments do not negatively affect utilization.^107 ,108  In one case, the authors suggest that increases in provider reimbursement may have negated effects of the copayment increases, particularly if not all copayments were being collected by providers at the point of care.¹⁰⁹ 

Research points to varying effects of cost sharing for people with significant health needs. Some studies find that utilization among individuals with chronic conditions or significant health needs is less sensitive to copayments compared to those with fewer health needs. As such, these individuals face increased cost burdens associated with accessing care because of copayment increases.^110 ,111  Other research finds that even relatively small copayments can reduce utilization among individuals with significant health needs.^{112 ,113 ,114} 

Numerous studies find that cost sharing has negative effects on individuals’ ability to access needed care and health outcomes and increases financial burdens for families.^{115 ,116 ,117 ,118 ,119 ,120 ,121 ,122}  For example, studies have found that increases in cost sharing are associated with increased rates of uncontrolled hypertension and hypercholesterolemia¹²³  and reduced treatment for children with asthma.¹²⁴  Increases in cost sharing also increase financial burdens for families, causing some to cut back on necessities or borrow money to pay for care. In particular, small copayments can add up quickly when an individual needs ongoing care or multiple medications.^125 ,126 

Findings on how cost sharing affects non-emergent use of the emergency room are limited. One study found that these copayments reduce non-urgent visits.¹²⁷  Other studies find that these copayments do not affect use of the emergency room.^128 ,129 

Effects on State Budgets and Providers (Table 3)

Research suggests that state savings from premiums and cost sharing in Medicaid and CHIP are limited. Studies find that potential increases in revenue from premium and cost sharing are offset by increased disenrollment; increased use of more expensive services, such as emergency room care; increased costs in other areas, such as resources for uninsured individuals; and administrative expenses.^{130 ,131 ,132 ,133 ,134 ,135 ,136}  One state study found increased revenues from premiums without significant effects on enrollment, but authors note a range of program-specific factors that may have contributed to this finding, including it being limited to a Medicaid-buy in program for individuals with disabilities with incomes above 150% FPL who may be less price-sensitive to the increase and the state implementing administrative processes designed to minimize disenrollment.¹³⁷ 

Studies also show that increases in premiums and cost sharing in Medicaid and CHIP can increase pressures on safety net providers, such as community health centers and hospitals. Several studies show that coverage losses following premium increases lead to increases in the share of uninsured patients seen by providers^{138 ,139 ,140}  and increased emergency department use by uninsured individuals.^141 ,142  One study also found that increases in copayments led to community health centers having to divert resources for medications for uninsured individuals to help people who could not afford copayments and that copayments increased the rate of “no shows” for appointments at community health centers.¹⁴³ 

Conclusion

Recently, there has been increased interest at the federal and state levels to expand the use of premiums and cost sharing in Medicaid as a way to promote personal responsibility, prepare beneficiaries to transition to commercial and private insurance, and support consumers in making value-conscious health decisions. Current rules limit premiums and cost sharing in Medicaid to facilitate access to coverage and care for the low-income population served by the program, who have limited resources to spend on out-of-pocket costs. This review of a wide body of research provides insight into the potential effects of increasing premiums and cost sharing for Medicaid enrollees. It shows that premiums serve as a barrier to obtaining and maintaining coverage for low-income individuals, particularly those with the most limited incomes, and that even relatively small levels of cost sharing reduce utilization of services. As such, increases in premiums and cost sharing result in increased barriers to coverage and care, greater unmet health needs, and increased financial burdens for families. Further, the research suggests that state savings from premiums and cost sharing in Medicaid and CHIP are limited and that increases in premiums and cost sharing in Medicaid and CHIP can increase pressures on safety-net providers.

The three tables below support the Kaiser Family Foundation Issue Brief titled, “The Effects of Premiums and Cost Sharing on Low-Income Populations: Updated Review of Research Findings.” The tables highlight findings from 65 studies published between 2000 and March 2017, including peer-reviewed studies and freestanding reports, government reports, and white papers by research and policy organizations on the effects of premiums and cost sharing on low-income populations in Medicaid and CHIP. Each table corresponds to one of three sections in the brief: (1) effects of premiums; (2) effects of cost sharing; and (3) effects on state budgets and providers. The table lists studies in reverse chronological order, with the most recent studies first, and groups the studies by nationwide and state-specific studies. Studies that apply to multiple sections are included in more than one table but list only the relevant findings for that section.

Table 1: Effects of PremiumsTable 2: Effects of Cost SharingTable 3: Effects on State Budgets & Providers

National StudiesState Studies

National StudiesState Studies

State Studies

1. See Maine Department of Health and Human Services, 1115 Waiver Application, http://www.maine.gov/dhhs/oms/documents/Draft_MaineCare_1115_application.pdf; State of Wisconsin BadgerCare Reform Demonstration Project, Coverage of Adults Without Dependent Children with Income at or Below 100 Percent of the Federal Poverty Level, Draft 1115 Demonstration Waiver Amendment Application, https://www.dhs.wisconsin.gov/badgercareplus/clawaiver-app.pdf; Office of the Governor, Kentucky Health: Helping to Engage and Achieve Long Term Health, https://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Waivers/1115/downloads/ky/ky-health-pa.pdf; and Indiana Family and Social Services Administration, Health Indiana Plan (HIP) Section 1115 Waiver Extension Application, https://www.in.gov/fssa/hip/files/HIP_Extension_Waiver_FINAL1.pdf. ↩︎
2. Tricia Brooks, et. al., Medicaid and HCIP Eligibility, Enrollment, Renewal, and Cost-Sharing Policies as of January 2017: Findings form a 50-State Survey, (Washington, DC: Kaiser Family Foundation, January 2017), https://modern.kff.org/report-section/medicaid-and-chip-eligibility-enrollment-renewal-and-cost-sharing-policies-as-of-january-2017-introduction/. ↩︎
3. Ibid. ↩︎
4. Ibid. ↩︎
5. Gery P Guy, et. al., “The Role of Public and Private Insurance Expansions and Premiums for Low-Income Parents: Lessons from State Experiences,” Medical Care 55, 3 (March 2017):236-243. ↩︎
6. Salam Abdus, et. al., “Children’s Health Insurance Program Premiums Adversely Affect Enrollment, Especially Among Lower-Income Children,” Health Affairs 33, no.8 (August 2014): 1353-1360. ↩︎
7. Carole R Gresenz, Sarah E Edgington, Miriam J Laugesen and Jose J Escarce, “Income Eligibility Thresholds, Premium Contributions, and Children’s Coverage Outcomes: A Study of CHIP Expansions,” Health Services Research 48:2, Part II (April 2013):884-902. ↩︎
8. Gery P Guy, Jr., E. Kathleen Adams, and Adam Atherly, “Public and Private Health Insurance Premiums: How do they Affect Health Insurance Status of Low-Income Childless Adults?” Inquiry 49 (Spring 2012):52-64. ↩︎
9. Jack Hadley, et. al., “Insurance Premiums and Insurance Coverage of Near-Poor Children,” Inquiry 43, 4 (Winter 2006/2007). ↩︎
10. Genevieve Kenney, Jack Hadley, and Fredric Blavin, “Effects of Public Premiums on Children’s Health Insurance Coverage: Evidence from 1999 to 2003,” Inquiry 43 (Winter 2006/2007):345-361. ↩︎
11. The Lewin Group, Healthy Indiana Plan 2.0: POWER Account Contribution Assessment, Prepared for Indiana Family and Social Services Administration (FSSA), (Washington, DC: Lewin Group, March 2017). ↩︎
12. MaryBeth Musumeci, et. al., An Early Look at Medicaid Expansion Waiver Implementation in Michigan and Indiana, (Washington, DC: Kaiser Family Foundation, January 2017), https://modern.kff.org/report-section/an-early-look-at-medicaid-expansion-waiver-implementation-in-michigan-and-indiana-key-findings/. ↩︎
13. James Marton et. al., “Estimating Premium Sensitivity for Children’s Public Health Insurance Coverage: Selection but No Death Spiral,” Health Services Research 50, 2 (April 2015): 579-598. ↩︎
14. Laura Dague, “The Effect of Medicaid Premiums on Enrollment: A Regression Discontinuity Approach,” Journal of Health Economics 37 (May 2014): 1-12. ↩︎
15. Michael Hendryx, et al., “Effects of a Cost-Sharing Policy on Disenrollment from a State Health Insurance Program,” Social Work in Public Health, 27, 7 (2012):671-686. ↩︎
16. Michael M Morrisey, et.al., “The Effects of Premium Changes on ALL Kids, Alabama’s CHIP Program,” Medicare & Medicaid Research Review 2,3 (2012):E1-E17. ↩︎
17. Bill J Wright, et. al., “Raising Premiums and Other Costs for Oregon Health Plan Enrollees Drove Many to Drop Out,” Health Affairs, 29, 12 (December 2010):2311-2316. ↩︎
18. Michael R Cousineau, Kai-Ya Tsai, and Howard A Kahn, “Two Responses to a Premium Hike in a Program for Uninsured Kids: 4 in 5 Families Stay In as Enrollment Shrinks by a Fifth,” Health Affairs 31, 2 (February 2012):360-366. ↩︎
19. James Marton, Patricia G Ketsche, and Mei Zhou, “SCHIP Premiums, Enrollment, and Expenditures: A Two State, Competing Risk Analysis,” Health Economics 19 (2010):772-791. ↩︎
20. James Marton and Jeffery C Talbert, “CHIP Premiums, Health Status, and the Insurance Coverage of Children,” Inquiry 47, 3 (Fall 2010):199-214. ↩︎
21. Stephen Zuckerman, Dawn M Miller, and Emily Shelton Page, “Missouri’s 2005 Medicaid Cuts: How Did they Affect Enrollees and Providers?” Health Affairs 28, 2, (2009):w335-w345. ↩︎
22. Jill B Herndon, W Bruce Vogel, Richard L Bucciarelli and Elizabeth A Shenkman, “The Effect of Premium Changes on SCHIP Enrollment Duration,” Health Services Research 43, 2 (April 2008):458-477. ↩︎
23. James Marton, “The Impact of the Introduction of Premiums into a SCHIP Program,” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 26 (2007):237-255. ↩︎
24. Genevieve Kenney, et. al., “Assessing Potential Enrollment and Budgetary Effects of SCHIP Premiums: Findings from Arizona and Kentucky,” Health Services Research 42, 6 Part 2 (2007):2354-2372. ↩︎
25. Gina A Livermore, et. al., “Premium Increases in State Health Insurance Programs: Lessons from a Case Study of the Massachusetts Medicaid Buy-in Program,” Inquiry 44 (Winter 2007):428-442. ↩︎
26. Genevieve Kenney, et. al., “The Effects of Premium Increases on Enrollment in SCHIP Programs: Findings from Three States,” Inquiry, 43, 4 (Winter 2006/2007):378-92. ↩︎
27. Tricia J Johnson, Mary Rimsza, and William G Johnson, “The Effects of Cost-Shifting in the State Children’s Health Insurance Program,” American Journal of Public Health, 96, 4 (April 2006):709-715. ↩︎
28. Bill J Wright et. al., “The Impact of Increased Cost Sharing on Medicaid Enrollees,” Health Affairs 24, no. 4 (Jul/Aug 2005):1106-1116. ↩︎
29. Matthew J Carlson and Bill Wright, “The Impact of Program Changes on Enrollment, Access, and Utilization in the Oregon Health Plan Standard Population,” Prepared for the Office for Oregon Health Policy and Research, Sociology Faculty Publications and Presentations, Paper 14 (March 2005). ↩︎
30. Rachel Solotaroff, et. al., “Medicaid Programme Changes and the Chronically Ill: Early Results from a Prospective Cohort Study of the Oregon Health Plan,” Chronic Illness 1, (2005): 191-205. ↩︎
31. Gene LeCouteur, Michael Perry, Samantha Artiga and David Rousseau, The Impact of Medicaid Reductions in Oregon: Focus Group Insights, (Washington, DC: Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, December 2004). ↩︎
32. Utah Department of Health Center for Health Data, Utah Primary Care Network Disenrollment Report, (Salt Lake City, UT: Utah Department of Health Center for Health Data, Office of Health Care Statistics, August 2004). ↩︎
33. Mark Gardner and Janet Varon, Moving Immigrants from a Medicaid Look-Alike Program to Basic Health in Washington State: Early Observations, (Washington, DC: Kaiser Family Foundation, May 2004). ↩︎
34. Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, Maryland Children’s Health Insurance Program: Assessment of the Impact of Premiums, (Baltimore, MD: Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, April 2004). ↩︎
35. John McConnell and Neal Wallace, Impact of Premium Changes in the Oregon Health Plan, Prepared for the Office for Oregon Health Policy & Research, (Portland, OR: Oregon Health & Science University, February 2004. ↩︎
36. Norma I Gavin, et. al., Evaluation of the BadgerCare Medicaid Demonstration, Prepared by RTI International and MayaTech Corp. for the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, (Research Triangle Park, NC: RTI International and MayaTech Corporation, December 2003). ↩︎
37. Monette Goodrich, Joan Alker, and Judith Solomon, Families at Risk: The Impact of Premiums on Children and Parents in Husky A, Policy Brief (Washington, DC: Georgetown Center for Children and Families, November 2003), http://ccf.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Far%20-%20impact%20of%20premiums.pdf. ↩︎
38. Elizabeth Shenkman, et. al., “Disenrollment and Re-Enrollment Patters in a SCHIP Program,” Health Care Financing Review 23, 3 (Spring 2002):47-63. ↩︎
39. Leighton Ku and Teresa A Coughlin, “Sliding-Scale Premium Health Insurance Programs: Four States’ Experiences,” Inquiry 36, 4 (Winter 1999/2000). ↩︎
40. Gery P Guy, et. al., “The Role of Public and Private Insurance Expansions and Premiums for Low-Income Parents: Lessons from State Experiences,” Medical Care 55, 3 (March 2017):236-243. ↩︎
41. Salam Abdus, et. al., “Children’s Health Insurance Program Premiums Adversely Affect Enrollment, Especially Among Lower-Income Children,” Health Affairs 33, no.8 (August 2014): 1353-1360. ↩︎
42. Carole R Gresenz, Sarah E Edgington, Miriam J Laugesen and Jose J Escarce, “Income Eligibility Thresholds, Premium Contributions, and Children’s Coverage Outcomes: A Study of CHIP Expansions,” Health Services Research 48:2, Part II (April 2013):884-902. ↩︎
43. Bill J Wright, et. al., “Raising Premiums and Other Costs for Oregon Health Plan Enrollees Drove Many to Drop Out,” Health Affairs, 29, 12 (December 2010):2311-2316. ↩︎
44. James Marton, Patricia G Ketsche, and Mei Zhou, “SCHIP Premiums, Enrollment, and Expenditures: A Two State, Competing Risk Analysis,” Health Economics 19 (2010):772-791. ↩︎
45. Genevieve Kenney, et. al., “Assessing Potential Enrollment and Budgetary Effects of SCHIP Premiums: Findings from Arizona and Kentucky,” Health Services Research 42, 6 Part 2 (2007):2354-2372. ↩︎
46. Bill J Wright et. al., “The Impact of Increased Cost Sharing on Medicaid Enrollees,” Health Affairs 24, no. 4 (Jul/Aug 2005):1106-1116. ↩︎
47. Matthew J Carlson and Bill Wright, “The Impact of Program Changes on Enrollment, Access, and Utilization in the Oregon Health Plan Standard Population,” Prepared for the Office for Oregon Health Policy and Research, Sociology Faculty Publications and Presentations, Paper 14 (March 2005). ↩︎
48. Gene LeCouteur, Michael Perry, Samantha Artiga and David Rousseau, The Impact of Medicaid Reductions in Oregon: Focus Group Insights, (Washington, DC: Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, December 2004). ↩︎
49. Utah Department of Health Center for Health Data, Utah Primary Care Network Disenrollment Report, (Salt Lake City, UT: Utah Department of Health Center for Health Data, Office of Health Care Statistics, August 2004). ↩︎
50. Michael Hendryx, et al., “Effects of a Cost-Sharing Policy on Disenrollment from a State Health Insurance Program,” Social Work in Public Health, 27, 7 (2012):671-686. ↩︎
51. Bill J Wright et. al., “The Impact of Increased Cost Sharing on Medicaid Enrollees,” Health Affairs 24, no. 4 (Jul/Aug 2005):1106-1116. ↩︎
52. Matthew J Carlson and Bill Wright, “The Impact of Program Changes on Enrollment, Access, and Utilization in the Oregon Health Plan Standard Population,” Prepared for the Office for Oregon Health Policy and Research, Sociology Faculty Publications and Presentations, Paper 14 (March 2005). ↩︎
53. Gene LeCouteur, Michael Perry, Samantha Artiga and David Rousseau, The Impact of Medicaid Reductions in Oregon: Focus Group Insights, (Washington, DC: Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, December 2004). ↩︎
54. Utah Department of Health Center for Health Data, Utah Primary Care Network Disenrollment Report, (Salt Lake City, UT: Utah Department of Health Center for Health Data, Office of Health Care Statistics, August 2004). ↩︎
55. Matthew J Carlson and Bill Wright, “The Impact of Program Changes on Enrollment, Access, and Utilization in the Oregon Health Plan Standard Population,” Prepared for the Office for Oregon Health Policy and Research, Sociology Faculty Publications and Presentations, Paper 14 (March 2005). ↩︎
56. Rachel Solotaroff, et. al., “Medicaid Programme Changes and the Chronically Ill: Early Results from a Prospective Cohort Study of the Oregon Health Plan,” Chronic Illness 1, (2005): 191-205. ↩︎
57. Gery P Guy, et. al., “The Role of Public and Private Insurance Expansions and Premiums for Low-Income Parents: Lessons from State Experiences,” Medical Care 55, 3 (March 2017):236-243. ↩︎
58. Genevieve Kenney, Jack Hadley, and Fredric Blavin, “Effects of Public Premiums on Children’s Health Insurance Coverage: Evidence from 1999 to 2003,” Inquiry 43 (Winter 2006/2007):345-361. ↩︎
59. Michael M Morrisey, et.al., “The Effects of Premium Changes on ALL Kids, Alabama’s CHIP Program,” Medicare & Medicaid Research Review 2,3 (2012):E1-E17. ↩︎
60. Jill B Herndon, W Bruce Vogel, Richard L Bucciarelli and Elizabeth A Shenkman, “The Effect of Premium Changes on SCHIP Enrollment Duration,” Health Services Research 43, 2 (April 2008):458-477. ↩︎
61. Genevieve Kenney, et. al., “The Effects of Premium Increases on Enrollment in SCHIP Programs: Findings from Three States,” Inquiry, 43, 4 (Winter 2006/2007):378-92. ↩︎
62. Bill J Wright et. al., “The Impact of Increased Cost Sharing on Medicaid Enrollees,” Health Affairs 24, no. 4 (Jul/Aug 2005):1106-1116. ↩︎
63. Matthew J Carlson and Bill Wright, “The Impact of Program Changes on Enrollment, Access, and Utilization in the Oregon Health Plan Standard Population,” Prepared for the Office for Oregon Health Policy and Research, Sociology Faculty Publications and Presentations, Paper 14 (March 2005). ↩︎
64. Rachel Solotaroff, et. al., “Medicaid Programme Changes and the Chronically Ill: Early Results from a Prospective Cohort Study of the Oregon Health Plan,” Chronic Illness 1, (2005): 191-205. ↩︎
65. John McConnell and Neal Wallace, Impact of Premium Changes in the Oregon Health Plan, Prepared for the Office for Oregon Health Policy & Research, (Portland, OR: Oregon Health & Science University, February 2004. ↩︎
66. The Lewin Group, Healthy Indiana Plan 2.0: POWER Account Contribution Assessment, Prepared for Indiana Family and Social Services Administration (FSSA), (Washington, DC: Lewin Group, March 2017). ↩︎
67. Bill J Wright et. al., “The Impact of Increased Cost Sharing on Medicaid Enrollees,” Health Affairs 24, no. 4 (Jul/Aug 2005):1106-1116. ↩︎
68. Matthew J Carlson and Bill Wright, “The Impact of Program Changes on Enrollment, Access, and Utilization in the Oregon Health Plan Standard Population,” Prepared for the Office for Oregon Health Policy and Research, Sociology Faculty Publications and Presentations, Paper 14 (March 2005). ↩︎
69. Office of the Executive Director, 2003 Utah Public Health Outcome Measures Report, (Salt Lake City, UT: UT Department of Health, December 2003), http://www.hpm.umn.edu/ ambul_db/db/pdflibrary/ DBfile_49007.pdf ↩︎
70. Rachel Solotaroff, et. al., “Medicaid Programme Changes and the Chronically Ill: Early Results from a Prospective Cohort Study of the Oregon Health Plan,” Chronic Illness 1, (2005): 191-205. ↩︎
71. Gene LeCouteur, Michael Perry, Samantha Artiga and David Rousseau, The Impact of Medicaid Reductions in Oregon: Focus Group Insights, (Washington, DC: Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, December 2004). ↩︎
72. John McConnell and Neal Wallace, Impact of Premium Changes in the Oregon Health Plan, Prepared for the Office for Oregon Health Policy & Research, (Portland, OR: Oregon Health & Science University, February 2004. ↩︎
73. The Lewin Group, Healthy Indiana Plan 2.0: POWER Account Contribution Assessment, Prepared for Indiana Family and Social Services Administration (FSSA), (Washington, DC: Lewin Group, March 2017). ↩︎
74. Salam Abdus, et. al., “Children’s Health Insurance Program Premiums Adversely Affect Enrollment, Especially Among Lower-Income Children,” Health Affairs 33, no.8 (August 2014): 1353-1360. ↩︎
75. Genevieve Kenney, Jack Hadley, and Fredric Blavin, “Effects of Public Premiums on Children’s Health Insurance Coverage: Evidence from 1999 to 2003,” Inquiry 43 (Winter 2006/2007):345-361. ↩︎
76. Michael M Morrisey, et.al., “The Effects of Premium Changes on ALL Kids, Alabama’s CHIP Program,” Medicare & Medicaid Research Review 2,3 (2012):E1-E17. ↩︎
77. Genevieve Kenney, et. al., “The Effects of Premium Increases on Enrollment in SCHIP Programs: Findings from Three States,” Inquiry, 43, 4 (Winter 2006/2007):378-92. ↩︎
78. James Marton et. al., “Estimating Premium Sensitivity for Children’s Public Health Insurance Coverage: Selection but No Death Spiral,” Health Services Research 50, 2 (April 2015): 579-598. ↩︎
79. Michael M Morrisey, et.al., “The Effects of Premium Changes on ALL Kids, Alabama’s CHIP Program,” Medicare & Medicaid Research Review 2,3 (2012):E1-E17. ↩︎
80. James Marton and Jeffery C Talbert, “CHIP Premiums, Health Status, and the Insurance Coverage of Children,” Inquiry 47, 3 (Fall 2010):199-214. ↩︎
81. Jill B Herndon, W Bruce Vogel, Richard L Bucciarelli and Elizabeth A Shenkman, “The Effect of Premium Changes on SCHIP Enrollment Duration,” Health Services Research 43, 2 (April 2008):458-477. ↩︎
82. Ibid. ↩︎
83. Rachel Solotaroff, et. al., “Medicaid Programme Changes and the Chronically Ill: Early Results from a Prospective Cohort Study of the Oregon Health Plan,” Chronic Illness 1, (2005): 191-205. ↩︎
84. James Marton et. al., “Estimating Premium Sensitivity for Children’s Public Health Insurance Coverage: Selection but No Death Spiral,” Health Services Research 50, 2 (April 2015): 579-598. ↩︎
85. Michael M Morrisey, et.al., “The Effects of Premium Changes on ALL Kids, Alabama’s CHIP Program,” Medicare & Medicaid Research Review 2,3 (2012):E1-E17. ↩︎
86. Joseph P Newhouse and the Insurance Experiment Group, Free For All? Lessons from the RAND Health Insurance Experiment, (Arlington, VA, RAND, 1993). ↩︎
87. Amitabh Chandra, Jonathan Gruber and Robin McKnight, “The Impact of Patient Cost-Sharing on Low-Income Populations: Evidence from Massachusetts,” Journal of Health Economics 33 (2014): 57-66. ↩︎
88. Charles Stoecker, Alexandra M Stewart, and Megan C Lindley, “The Cost of Cost-Sharing: The Impact of Medicaid Benefit Design on Influence Vaccination Uptake,” Vaccines 5, 8, (March 2017). ↩︎
89. Bisakha Sen, et. al., “Can Increases in CHIP Copayments Reduce Program Expenditures on Prescription Drugs?” Medicare & Medicaid Research Review 4, 2 (May 2014). ↩︎
90. Bisakha Sen, et. al., “Did Copayment Changes Reduce Health Service Utilization among CHIP Enrollees? Evidence from Alabama,” Health Services Research 47, 4 (September 2012):1303-1620. ↩︎
91. Daniel M Hartung, et. al., “Impact of a Medicaid Copayment Policy on Prescription Drug and Health Services Utilization in a Fee-for-service Medicaid Population,” Medical Care 46, 6 (June 2008):565-572. ↩︎
92. Office of the Executive Director, 2003 Utah Public Health Outcome Measures Report, (Salt Lake City, UT: UT Department of Health, December 2003), http://www.hpm.umn.edu/ ambul_db/db/pdflibrary/ DBfile_49007.pdf ↩︎
93. Ibid. ↩︎
94. Bisakha Sen, et. al., “Did Copayment Changes Reduce Health Service Utilization among CHIP Enrollees? Evidence from Alabama,” Health Services Research 47, 4 (September 2012):1303-1620. ↩︎
95. Bill J Wright, et. al., “Raising Premiums and Other Costs for Oregon Health Plan Enrollees Drove Many to Drop Out,” Health Affairs, 29, 12 (December 2010):2311-2316. ↩︎
96. Leighton Ku, et. al., The Effects of Copayments on the Use of Medical Services and Prescription Drugs in Utah’s Medicaid Program, (Washington, DC: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, November 2004). ↩︎
97. Gery P Guy Jr., “The Effects of Cost Sharing on Access to Care among Childless Adults.” Health Services Research, 45, 6 Pt. 1 (December 2010): 1720-1739. ↩︎
98. Vicki Fung, et. al., “Financial Barriers to Care Among Low-Income Children with Asthma: Health Care Reform Implications,” JAMA Pediatrics 168, 7 (July 2014):649-656. ↩︎
99. Office of the Executive Director, 2003 Utah Public Health Outcome Measures Report, (Salt Lake City, UT: UT Department of Health, December 2003), http://www.hpm.umn.edu/ ambul_db/db/pdflibrary/ DBfile_49007.pdf ↩︎
100. Leighton Ku, et. al., The Effects of Copayments on the Use of Medical Services and Prescription Drugs in Utah’s Medicaid Program, (Washington, DC: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, November 2004). ↩︎
101. Deliana Kostova and Jared Fox, “Chronic Health Outcomes and Prescription Drug Copayments in Medicaid,” Medical Care, published ahead of print (February 2017). ↩︎
102. Marisa Elena Domino, et. al., “Increasing Time Cost and Copayments for Prescription Drugs: An Analysis of Policy Changes in a Complex Environment,” Health Services Research 46, 3 (June 2011):900-919. ↩︎
103. Joel F Farley, “Medicaid Prescription Cost Containment and Schizophrenia: A Retrospective Examination,” Medical Care 48, 5 (May 2010): 440-447. ↩︎
104. Bisakha Sen, et. al., “Can Increases in CHIP Copayments Reduce Program Expenditures on Prescription Drugs?” Medicare & Medicaid Research Review 4, 2 (May 2014). ↩︎
105. Michael Chernew, et. al., “Effects of Increased Patient Cost Sharing on Socioeconomic Disparities in Health Care,” Journal of General Internal Medicine 23, 8 (August 2008):1131-1136. ↩︎
106. Sujha Subramanian, “Impact of Medicaid Copayments on Patients with Cancer,” Medical Care 49, 9 (September 2011): 842-847. ↩︎
107. Office of the Executive Director, 2003 Utah Public Health Outcome Measures Report, (Salt Lake City, UT: UT Department of Health, December 2003), http://www.hpm.umn.edu/ ambul_db/db/pdflibrary/ DBfile_49007.pdf ↩︎
108. James Marton, et. al., “The Effects of Medicaid Policy Changes on Adults’ Service Use Patterns in Kentucky and Idaho,” Medicare & Medicaid Research Review 2, 4 (February 2013). ↩︎
109. Ibid. ↩︎
110. Bisakha Sen, et. al., “Can Increases in CHIP Copayments Reduce Program Expenditures on Prescription Drugs?” Medicare & Medicaid Research Review 4, 2 (May 2014). ↩︎
111. Amitabh Chandra, Jonathan Gruber and Robin McKnight, “The Impact of Patient Cost-Sharing on Low-Income Populations: Evidence from Massachusetts,” Journal of Health Economics 33 (2014): 57-66. ↩︎
112. Deliana Kostova and Jared Fox, “Chronic Health Outcomes and Prescription Drug Copayments in Medicaid,” Medical Care, published ahead of print (February 2017). ↩︎
113. Sujha Subramanian, “Impact of Medicaid Copayments on Patients with Cancer,” Medical Care 49, 9 (September 2011): 842-847. ↩︎
114. Daniel M Hartung, et. al., “Impact of a Medicaid Copayment Policy on Prescription Drug and Health Services Utilization in a Fee-for-service Medicaid Population,” Medical Care 46, 6 (June 2008):565-572. ↩︎
115. Deliana Kostova and Jared Fox, “Chronic Health Outcomes and Prescription Drug Copayments in Medicaid,” Medical Care, published ahead of print (February 2017). ↩︎
116. Jessica Greene, Rebecca M Sacks, and Sara B McMenamin, “The Impact of Tobacco Dependence Treatment Coverage and Copayments in Medicaid,” American Journal of Preventive Medicine 46, 4 (April 2014):331-336. ↩︎
117. Vicki Fung, et. al., “Financial Barriers to Care Among Low-Income Children with Asthma: Health Care Reform Implications,” JAMA Pediatrics 168, 7 (July 2014):649-656. ↩︎
118. Leah Zallman, et. al., “Affordability of Health Care Under Publicly Subsidized Insurance After Massachusetts Health Care Reform: A Qualitative Study of Safety Net Patients,” International Journal for Equity in Health 14 (October 2015):112. ↩︎
119. Leah Zallman, et.al., “Perceived Affordability of Health Insurance and Medical Financial Burdens Five Years in to Massachusetts Health Reform,” International Journal for Equity in Health 14 (October 2015):113. ↩︎
120. Bill J Wright, et. al., “Raising Premiums and Other Costs for Oregon Health Plan Enrollees Drove Many to Drop Out,” Health Affairs, 29, 12 (December 2010):2311-2316. ↩︎
121. Gene LeCouteur, Michael Perry, Samantha Artiga and David Rousseau, The Impact of Medicaid Reductions in Oregon: Focus Group Insights, (Washington, DC: Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, December 2004). ↩︎
122. Office of the Executive Director, 2003 Utah Public Health Outcome Measures Report, (Salt Lake City, UT: UT Department of Health, December 2003), http://www.hpm.umn.edu/ ambul_db/db/pdflibrary/ DBfile_49007.pdf ↩︎
123. Deliana Kostova and Jared Fox, “Chronic Health Outcomes and Prescription Drug Copayments in Medicaid,” Medical Care, published ahead of print (February 2017). ↩︎
124. Vicki Fung, et. al., “Financial Barriers to Care Among Low-Income Children with Asthma: Health Care Reform Implications,” JAMA Pediatrics 168, 7 (July 2014):649-656. ↩︎
125. Peter J Cunningham, Affording Prescription Drugs: Not Just a Problem for the Elderly, (Washington, DC: Center for Studying Health System Change, April 2002), http://www.hschange.org/CONTENT/430/430.pdf. ↩︎
126. Rachel Solotaroff, et. al., “Medicaid Programme Changes and the Chronically Ill: Early Results from a Prospective Cohort Study of the Oregon Health Plan,” Chronic Illness 1, (2005): 191-205. ↩︎
127. Lindsay M Sabik and Sabina Ohri Gandhi, “Copayments and Emergency Department use Among Adult Medicaid Enrollees,” Health Economics 25 (May 2016):529-542. ↩︎
128. Karoline Mortensen, “Copayments Did Not Reduce Medicaid Enrollees’ Nonemergency Use of Emergency Departments,” Health Affairs 29, 9 (September 2010): 1643-1650. ↩︎
129. Mona Siddiqui, Eric T Roberts, and Craig E Pollack, “The Effects of Emergency Department Copayments for Medicaid Beneficiaries Following the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005,” JAMA Internal Medicine 175,3 (March 2015):393-398. ↩︎
130. Bisakha Sen, et. al., “Health Expenditure Concentration and Characteristics of High-Cost Enrollees in CHIP,” Inquiry 53 (May 2016):1-9. ↩︎
131. Marisa Elena Domino, et. al., “Increasing Time Cost and Copayments for Prescription Drugs: An Analysis of Policy Changes in a Complex Environment,” Health Services Research 46, 3 (June 2011):900-919. ↩︎
132. Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, Estimated Medicaid Savings and Program Impacts of Service Limitations, Copayments, and Premiums, (Baltimore, MD: Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, December 2010), https://mmcp.dhmh.maryland.gov/Documents/medicaidsavingsJCRfinal12-10.pdf. ↩︎
133. Health Management Associates, Co-pays for Nonemergent Use of Hospital Emergency Rooms: Cost Effectiveness and Feasibility Analysis, Prepared for the Texas Health and Human Services Commission, (Austin, TX: Health and Human Services Commission, May 2008). ↩︎
134. Neal T Wallace, et. al., “How Effective are Copayments in Reducing Expenditures for Low-Income Adult Medicaid Beneficiaries? Experience from the Oregon Health Plan,” Health Services Research 43, 3 (April 2008):515-530. ↩︎
135. Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System, Fiscal Impact of Implementing Cost Sharing and Benchmark Benefit Provisions of the Federal Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, (Phoenix, AZ: Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System, December 2006), http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.482.6057&rep=rep1&type=pdf. ↩︎
136. Steven Crawford and Garth L Splinter, It’s Health Care, Not Welfare: Appropriate Rate Structure for Services Rendered and Estimated Percent of Co-Pays Collected Under the Medicaid Program, Prepared for the Oklahoma Health Care Authority, (Oklahoma City, OK: Oklahoma Health Care Authority, January 2004). ↩︎
137. Gina A Livermore, et. al., “Premium Increases in State Health Insurance Programs: Lessons from a Case Study of the Massachusetts Medicaid Buy-in Program,” Inquiry 44 (Winter 2007):428-442. ↩︎
138. Stephen Zuckerman, Dawn M Miller, and Emily Shelton Page, “Missouri’s 2005 Medicaid Cuts: How Did they Affect Enrollees and Providers?,” Health Affairs 28, 2, (2009):w335-w345. ↩︎
139. Mark Gardner and Janet Varon, Moving Immigrants from a Medicaid Look-Alike Program to Basic Health in Washington State: Early Observations, (Washington, DC: Kaiser Family Foundation, May 2004). ↩︎
140. Pamela Hines, et. al., Assessing the Early Impacts of OHP2: A Pilot Study of Federally Qualified Health Centers Impact in Multnomah and Washington Counties, Prepared for Office for Oregon Health Policy & Research, (Salem, OR: Office for Oregon Health Policy & Research, December 2003). ↩︎
141. Robert A Lowe, et. al. “Impact of Medicaid Cutbacks on Emergency Department Use: The Oregon Experience,” Annals of Emergency Medicine 52, 6 (December 2008):626-534. ↩︎
142. Mark Gardner and Janet Varon, Moving Immigrants from a Medicaid Look-Alike Program to Basic Health in Washington State: Early Observations, (Washington, DC: Kaiser Family Foundation, May 2004). ↩︎
143. Pamela Hines, et. al., Assessing the Early Impacts of OHP2: A Pilot Study of Federally Qualified Health Centers Impact in Multnomah and Washington Counties, Prepared for Office for Oregon Health Policy & Research, (Salem, OR: Office for Oregon Health Policy & Research, December 2003). ↩︎

KEY FINDINGS:

• With Congress currently discussing the American Health Care Act (AHCA), a plan that would repeal and replace the 2010 health care law, this month’s Kaiser Health Tracking Poll finds that more Americans have an unfavorable view of the plan than a favorable one (55 percent vs. 31 percent, respectively). The share with favorable views of the AHCA is about 20 percentage points lower than the share with favorable views (49 percent) of the 2010 Affordable Care Act (ACA). The majority of Republicans (67 percent) have a favorable view of the AHCA.
• This month’s survey finds the public has increasingly negative views of how their health care will be affected by proposed changes. In December 2016, after the presidential election but before the release of the Republican plan, less than one-third of the public thought their health care would get worse if the 2010 health care law was repealed. This month’s survey, fielded after House Republicans passed the AHCA, finds larger shares say the cost of health care for them and their family (45 percent), their ability to get and keep health insurance (34 percent), and the quality of their own health care will get worse if Congress passes the AHCA (34 percent).
• About one in ten (8 percent) think the Senate should pass the AHCA as is, without making any changes to the plan passed by the House. Similar shares – about one-fourth of the public – think the Senate should make either major changes to the legislation (26 percent) or minor changes to it (24 percent), while about three in ten (29 percent) say they do not think the Senate should pass this bill.

The American Health Care Act

On May 4, 2017, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the American Health Care Act (AHCA), the House Republicans’ plan to repeal and replace the Affordable Care Act (ACA).¹  With the Senate currently debating the plan and discussing their own approach, the most recent Kaiser Health Tracking Poll finds more Americans have an unfavorable view of the AHCA than a favorable one (55 percent vs. 31 percent, respectively). There is also a considerable enthusiasm gap with a larger share saying that they have a “very unfavorable” view (40 percent) than saying they have a “very favorable” view (12 percent).

Majority of Republicans Hold A Favorable View of the AHCA

The AHCA has solid support among the Republican base. Two-thirds of Republicans say they have a favorable view of the plan including three in ten (29 percent) who say they have a “very favorable” view.

Few See AHCA As Fulfilling President Trump’s Promises About Health Care

Three-fourths (76 percent) of the public thinks the health care plan recently passed by the House does not fulfill most of the promises President Trump has made about health care while 14 percent say it fulfills most or all of his promises.

This viewpoint is shared regardless of party identification with majorities of Democrats (86 percent), independents (79 percent), and Republicans (59 percent) saying the AHCA fulfills some or none of the promises President Trump has made about health care.

More Americans View The ACA Favorably Than The AHCA

The Kaiser Family Foundation has been tracking public opinion on the ACA since its passage in 2010. This month’s survey continues to find the public leans more favorable than unfavorable in their views of the 2010 health care law, with 49 percent expressing a favorable view of the ACA compared to 42 perecent expressing an unfavorable view.

In fact, more of the public is favorable in their overall views of the ACA than in their views of the Republican plan to replace the 2010 health care law. About half of Americans have a favorable view of the ACA compared to about three in ten who have a favorable view of the new Republican plan.

Partisanship is the main driver behind support for either the ACA or the AHCA, with a majority of Republicans viewing the AHCA favorably (67 percent), while a majority of Democrats view the ACA favorably (78 percent). More independents view the ACA favorably (48 percent) than view the AHCA favorably (30 percent).

Despite the lack of support for the House Republican plan, a majority of the public (74 percent) say they think it is either “very likely” (37 percent) or “somewhat likely” (36 percent) that the president and Congress will repeal and replace the ACA. About one-fourth of the public say it is either “not too likely” (15 percent) or “not likely at all” (9 percent).

Most Americans Want Changes to the AHCA Before Senate Passes the Bill

About one in ten (8 percent) think the Senate should pass the AHCA as is, without making any changes to the plan passed by the House. Similar shares – about one-fourth of the public – think the Senate should make either major changes to the legislation (26 percent) or minor changes to it (24 percent), while about three in ten say they do not think the Senate should pass this bill.

Attitudes toward what the Senate should do when it comes to the AHCA are largely driven by partisanship with most Republicans (60 percent) saying they think it should pass as is (15 percent) or with minor changes (45 percent) while half of Democrats (51 percent) say the Senate should not pass this bill. Independents are more divided but one-third (34 percent) say the Senate should make major changes to the bill.

Attitudes Towards AHCA Provisions

The AHCA – like other health care plans – includes complex policies that the public may not fully understand or pay attention to. In an effort to examine general attitudes towards several of the more well-known provisions, we ask respondents whether after hearing about the specific provision they are “more likely” or “less likely” to support the plan. Much like overall attitudes towards the AHCA, various provisions of the law asked about in this survey do not garner large levels of support from the public. When asked whether individual elements of the Republican replacement plan would make them “more likely” or “less likely” to support the plan, none of the elements receive a majority of the public saying it would make them “more likely” to support it.  The only provision that has a larger share of the public saying it makes them “more likely” than say it makes them “less likely” to support the law is allowing states to implement a Medicaid work requirement (42 percent compared to 28 percent).

There are several provisions currently included in the plan that a majority of the public say makes them “less likely” to support the legislation. These include allowing states to decide if health insurance companies can charge sick people more than healthy people if they haven’t had continuous coverage (65 percent), eliminating the individual mandate and instead allowing insurance companies to charge people 30% higher premiums for a year if they haven’t had continuous coverage (62 percent), allowing states to eliminate the essential health benefit requirement (60 percent), and making changes that would generally decrease what younger people pay for insurance and increase what older people pay (58 percent).

Republican Support for Some Aspects of the AHCA

There is some support for aspects of the AHCA among Republicans. For example, a majority of Republicans say that the Medicaid work requirement (75 percent) and federal funding for states to set up high-risk pools (59 percent) makes them more likely to support the plan. In addition, about four in ten Republicans say the same about the provisions which stop federal Medicaid payments to Planned Parenthood (45 percent), change Medicaid funding to a per capita cap or block grant system (45 percent), allow states to change the essential health benefits (42 percent), and end the funding for Medicaid expansion (40 percent).

Perceived Effects of the AHCA

Overall, about half of Americans say the quality of their own health care (48 percent) and their own ability to get and keep health insurance (47 percent) will stay about the same if the president and Congress pass the health care plan currently being discussed. When it comes to the cost of health care for them and their family, almost half say it will get worse (45 percent) while about one-third say it will stay about the same (36 percent) and 16 percent say it will get better.

Immediately following the 2016 presidential election and prior to the release of the Republican plan, most Americans thought that their health care would stay about the same if the 2010 health care law was repealed. Yet, in this month’s survey which was fielded after House Republicans passed the AHCA, larger shares say the cost of health care for them and their family, their ability to get and keep health insurance, and the quality of their own health care will get worse if Congress passes the AHCA.

KEY FINDINGS:

• The American Health Care Act (AHCA) includes substantial changes to Medicaid – the program that provides coverage for medical care and long-term care services to low-income people. Overall, six in ten Americans (58 percent) say Medicaid is either “very” or “somewhat” important for them and their family – including a majority of Democrats (64 percent) and independents (57 percent) and nearly half (46 percent) of Republicans.
• The AHCA reduces federal funding for Medicaid expansion in states. The vast majority of the public – including a majority of Democrats (93 percent), independents (83 percent), and Republicans (71 percent) – say it is important that states that received federal funds to expand Medicaid continue to receive those funds.
• Currently, Medicaid is jointly financed by federal and state governments, with each state deciding how to structure benefits, eligibility, and care delivery within guidelines set by the federal government. Seven in ten (71 percent) Americans prefer keeping Medicaid largely as it is today while fewer (26 percent) support changing Medicaid to allow states more flexibility in determining which groups of people and what services are covered under the program.

Proposed Changes to Medicaid

This month’s Kaiser Health Tracking Poll examines attitudes towards the AHCA’s changes to Medicaid²  – the program that provides coverage for medical care and long-term care services to low-income people. Overall, six in ten Americans (58 percent) say Medicaid is either “very” or “somewhat” important for them and their family – including a majority of Democrats (64 percent) and independents (57 percent) and 46 percent of Republicans.

Those who say Medicaid is either “very” or “somewhat” important for them and their family are more pessimistic about how their own health care will be affected if the president and Congress pass the health care plan currently being discussed. About half (53 percent) of those who say Medicaid is important for them and their family say their cost of health care will get worse compared to one-third of those who say Medicaid is not important for them. The shares who say their ability to get and keep health insurance and the overall quality of their own health care would get worse are also larger among those who say Medicaid is important compared to those who say it is not important for them (42 percent vs. 23 percent, 41 percent vs. 25 percent, respectively).

Public Supports Continued Funding for Medicaid Expansion

The 2010 Affordable Care Act expanded Medicaid coverage to over 11 million low-income, uninsured adults.³  The AHCA reduces federal funding for Medicaid expansion by 2020. The vast majority of the public – including a majority of Democrats, independents, and Republicans – say it is important that states that received federal funds to expand Medicaid continue to receive those funds.

Support for continued funding for Medicaid expansion is even popular among individuals living in states that have not expanded their Medicaid program.

Changes to Federal Funding for Medicaid

Currently, Medicaid is jointly financed by federal and state governments, with each state deciding how to structure benefits, eligibility, and care delivery within guidelines set by the federal government. The federal government matches state spending on an open-ended basis but the AHCA proposes changing this system so that instead of matching state Medicaid spending, the federal government would limit the amount it gives states to help pay for Medicaid coverage but could allow states more flexibility in determining which groups of people and what services are covered under the program.

When asked about a change to the financing structure, 71 percent say they think Medicaid should largely continue as it is today with the federal government guaranteeing coverage, setting standards and benefits, and matching state spending while fewer (26 percent) say Medicaid should be changed. Democrats and independents largely favor the status quo (90 percent and 70 percent, respectively) while Republicans are more divided, with a similar share supporting the status quo (47 percent) as do the proposal to change the funding structure (48 percent).

Partisanship Affects Basic Perceptions of Medicaid

Partisanship contributes to the public’s general perceptions of the Medicaid program. When asked whether Medicaid is more similar to other health insurance programs or to welfare programs, more Americans view Medicaid like other health insurance programs (60 percent) that help people pay for health care than view it as a welfare program (37 percent). Yet, these perceptions are largely driven by partisanship with Democrats and independents more likely to view Medicaid as a health insurance program and Republicans more likely to view it as a welfare program.

This Kaiser Health Tracking Poll was designed and analyzed by public opinion researchers at the Kaiser Family Foundation (KFF). The survey was conducted May 16-22, 2017, among a nationally representative random digit dial telephone sample of 1,205 adults ages 18 and older, living in the United States, including Alaska and Hawaii (note: persons without a telephone could not be included in the random selection process). Computer-assisted telephone interviews conducted by landline (421) and cell phone (784, including 470 who had no landline telephone) were carried out in English and Spanish by Princeton Data Source under the direction of Princeton Survey Research Associates International (PSRAI). Both the random digit dial landline and cell phone samples were provided by Survey Sampling International, LLC. For the landline sample, respondents were selected by asking for the youngest adult male or female currently at home based on a random rotation. If no one of that gender was available, interviewers asked to speak with the youngest adult of the opposite gender. For the cell phone sample, interviews were conducted with the adult who answered the phone. KFF paid for all costs associated with the survey.

The combined landline and cell phone sample was weighted to balance the sample demographics to match estimates for the national population using data from the Census Bureau’s 2015 American Community Survey (ACS) on sex, age, education, race, Hispanic origin, and region along with data from the 2010 Census on population density. The sample was also weighted to match current patterns of telephone use using data from the January-June 2016 National Health Interview Survey. The weight takes into account the fact that respondents with both a landline and cell phone have a higher probability of selection in the combined sample and adjusts for the household size for the landline sample. All statistical tests of significance account for the effect of weighting.

The margin of sampling error including the design effect for the full sample is plus or minus 3 percentage points. Numbers of respondents and margins of sampling error for key subgroups are shown in the table below. For results based on other subgroups, the margin of sampling error may be higher. Sample sizes and margins of sampling error for other subgroups are available by request. Note that sampling error is only one of many potential sources of error in this or any other public opinion poll. Kaiser Family Foundation public opinion and survey research is a charter member of the Transparency Initiative of the American Association for Public Opinion Research.

1. H.R. 1628 – American Health Care Act of 2017,  115th Congress https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/1628 ↩︎
2. Kaiser Family Foundation, Compare Proposals to Replace the Affordable Care Act. https://modern.kff.org/interactive/proposals-to-replace-the-affordable-care-act/ ↩︎
3. Kaiser Family Foundation, Key Facts About the Uninsured Population. https://modern.kff.org/uninsured/fact-sheet/key-facts-about-the-uninsured-population/ ↩︎

Repealing and replacing the Affordable Care Act (ACA) is a top priority of the Trump Administration and the Republican leadership, and is a prominent issue on the agenda of the 115^th Congress. The ACA includes many provisions affecting the Medicare program, and lawmakers have taken different approaches to the ACA’s Medicare provisions. Some proposals would fully repeal the ACA, including all Medicare provisions. Other proposals, including the “American Health Care Act of 2017” (AHCA) as passed by the House of Representatives on May 4, 2017, would repeal some but not all Medicare provisions in the ACA.

This brief provides a side-by-side comparison of the Medicare-related provisions in seven bills and proposals that would repeal the ACA, excluding proposals that would not directly affect Medicare. Two of these proposals would repeal the ACA in its entirety, including all Medicare provisions. Three of the proposals, including the AHCA, would repeal some but not all Medicare provisions in the ACA, one proposal would retain all Medicare provisions in the ACA, and one does not specify. The first part of the side-by-side describes the Medicare provisions in the ACA that would be retained or repealed in each bill or proposal. The second part of the side-by-side describes the additional ways in which the bills and proposals would change Medicare, such as structural modifications to the Medicare program (e.g., premium support).

The bills and proposals in this comparison include:

• “American Health Care Act of 2017,” H.R. 1628, introduced on March 20, 2017 by Rep. Black (R-TN) as chairperson of the House Budget Committee and passed by the House on May 4, 2017.
• “American Health Care Reform Act of 2017,” H.R. 277, introduced by Rep. Roe (R-TN), on behalf of the Republican Study Committee, in January 2017.
• “A Better Way,” released by Speaker Ryan (R-WI) in June 2016.
• “World’s Greatest Healthcare Plan Act of 2016,” H.R. 5284 and S. 2985, introduced by Rep. Sessions (R-TX) and Sen. Cassidy (R-LA) in May 2016.
• “A Balanced Budget for a Stronger America,” FY2017 Budget Resolution, released by the House Budget Committee, chaired by former Rep. Price (R-GA) (now HHS Secretary), in March 2016.
• “Restoring Americans’ Healthcare Freedom Reconciliation Act of 2015,” H.R. 3762, introduced by former Rep. Price (R-GA) (now HHS Secretary), passed by the House and Senate, and vetoed by the President in February 2016.
• “Empowering Patients First Act of 2015,” H.R. 2300, introduced by former Rep. Price (R-GA) (now HHS Secretary) in May 2015.

Each of these bills and proposals make changes to the Medicare program that could have important implications for Medicare beneficiaries, the federal budget, health care providers, or private plans. This brief focuses on the key provisions in each of these bills and proposals that would directly affect Medicare, but is not a comprehensive summary of these bills and proposals.

Comparison of Medicare Provisions in Recent Bills and Proposals to Repeal and Replace the Affordable Care Act (ACA)

The Congress is currently debating the American Health Care Act (AHCA), which would not only repeal and replace the Affordable Care Act (ACA) but also make far-reaching changes to the structure and financing of Medicaid. The AHCA would use a per capita cap policy or block grants to cap federal funds to states for Medicaid. Facing reductions in federal Medicaid funding, states could offset lost federal dollars by raising taxes or reducing other state spending (like K-12 education), or states could reduce spending in Medicaid by finding savings or (more likely) by restricting eligibility, benefits, or payments to providers. However, many efficiencies were adopted by state Medicaid programs during the last two major recessions when revenues dropped and budgets were constrained leaving states with few options for easy ways to trim additional spending in the future. On March 13, 2017 the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that the AHCA would reduce federal Medicaid spending by $880 billion over the 2017-2026 period. By 2026, Medicaid spending would be about 25% less than what CBO projects under current law.

In this analysis, we examine the fiscal implications of state actions to offset the loss of federal Medicaid funding to maintain rather than cut Medicaid programs. This analysis is intended to be illustrative and not predictive of actual state outcomes. In contrast, the CBO estimate of a 25% reduction in federal Medicaid funding by 2026 reflects projections and accounts for federal changes in policy, state responses to the policy change, and reductions in coverage.

What does this analysis do? In this analysis, we present three scenarios of reductions in federal Medicaid spending and examine fiscal implications if all reductions had been in full effect in FFY 2015 (the most recent year for which Medicaid spending data is available). In these scenarios, we assume states fill the gaps caused by federal funding reductions by increasing state spending for Medicaid. To achieve those increases, we examine potential implications for state taxes and education spending by state and by groups of states including expansion status, political party, region and poverty quartile and highlight the groups that could experience the largest effects. These results are illustrative: each state would likely make different policy choices, and states could implement a combination of approaches, or choose not to completely offset the federal reduction.

What does this analysis not do? Unlike the CBO estimates, this analysis does not make projections or anticipate changes to state Medicaid programs through reducing eligibility levels, benefits, or reimbursement rates. If states do undertake these changes to their Medicaid programs, federal reductions would likely be larger. This analysis of the impact in FFY 2015 does not assume that states will drop coverage and does not account for states that may have adopted the expansion in the future.

What were the estimated reductions in federal spending in three scenarios? This analysis estimated reductions in federal Medicaid spending under three scenarios: (1) repeal of the ACA enhanced match rate for expansion adults ($27 billion), (2) repeal of the ACA plus a 10% reduction in federal Medicaid spending for the non-expansion population ($53 billion), and (3) repeal of the ACA plus a 20% reduction in federal Medicaid spending for the non-expansion population ($79 billion). All estimates assume that the full effect of the reductions are experienced in FFY 2015. Beyond the repeal of the ACA enhanced matching funds, the reductions are not based on specific policy changes but rather are based on illustrative potential federal Medicaid spending reductions. If states were to maintain Medicaid services, these reductions would require increases in state Medicaid funding to fill in the gaps in federal funding. Median state Medicaid spending per resident was $534 in FFY 2015. Under the three scenarios, the reduction in federal Medicaid funds would result in a median increase of state Medicaid spending per resident ranging from 17.2% to 40.3%.

What are the potential implications for state taxes and education? States could choose to respond in many ways. For example, they could raise taxes or reduce education spending to fill in gaps in federal funding for Medicaid. Median state tax per resident was $2,715 in 2015. If states opt to raise taxes, the median increase in state taxes per resident would range from 3.5% to 8.1% under the three scenarios; if states increased the largest state tax, the median would range from 8.4% to 18.1%. For most states (29 states), the income tax is the largest state tax followed by sales tax (15 states). Median total spending per pupil for education was $10,961 in 2015. If states opted to fill the gap by reducing state government spending for education, states could face median reductions in state funding for K-12 education per pupil of 10.9% to 24.1% and total funding for K-12 education spending per pupil of 5.5% to 13.7%.

How are different groups of states affected by reductions? Due to the changes in the enhanced match rate, states that have adopted the Medicaid expansion will experience larger federal funding reductions; this outcome is true across states with Republican and Democratic governors. For example, in the scenario that would repeal the ACA enhanced match rate and reduce traditional Medicaid spending by 20%, expansion states would face higher median tax increases and larger reductions in education to fill the federal funding gaps compared to non-expansion states (ES 1). This increased budget pressure could make it difficult for states to maintain the Medicaid expansion. Funding reductions that go beyond eliminating the enhanced match for the ACA Medicaid expansion and entail cuts to the traditional Medicaid program could have a disproportionate effect on states with high poverty. Even though these poorer states spend less per resident on Medicaid, their federal reimbursement rate is relatively high, and so the impact of federal cuts is large.

Introduction

Medicaid has a unique role in state budgets. As a result of the federal matching structure, Medicaid is a spending item but also the largest source of federal revenues for state budgets. In FY 2015, Medicaid accounted for 28.2% (or $523 billion) of total state spending (including state and federal funding) for all items in the state budget, but 15.6% (or $193 billion) of all state spending (from general fund and other state funds), a far second to spending on K-12 education (24.8%, or $307 billion). Medicaid is the largest single source of federal funds for states, accounting for more than half (56.8%, or $329 billion) of all federally supported spending by states in SFY 2015, according to data from the National Association of State Budget Officers (Figure 1). Due to the federal match rate, as state Medicaid spending increases during economic downturns, so does federal funding. The match rate also gives states support and flexibility to address health care emergencies, needs and state health priorities without a pre-set limit on federal funds. States must balance their budgets annually. Since states pay for more than 40% of total Medicaid on average, states have incentives to constrain Medicaid spending by restricting provider payment rates, controlling prescription drug costs and implementing payment and delivery system reforms.

Congress is debating the AHCA, which includes reductions to federal financing combined with fundamental restructuring of Medicaid financing. On March 13, 2017 the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that the AHCA would reduce federal Medicaid spending by $880 billion over the 2017-2026 period. By 2026, Medicaid spending would be about 25% less than what CBO projects under current law. The CBO estimate reflects projections and accounts for federal changes in policy, state responses to the policy change, and reductions in coverage.

In this analysis, we present three scenarios of reductions in federal Medicaid spending and examine fiscal implications if states fill these financing gaps to maintain their programs and if all reductions are assumed to be in full effect in FFY 2015 (the most recent year for which Medicaid spending data is available). To fill these gaps in financing and maintain current Medicaid programs, we assume states will increase state spending for Medicaid by increasing state taxes or reducing education spending. This analysis is unlike the CBO estimate, which makes projections and accounts for changes in policy, state responses to make changes to Medicaid programs, and reductions in coverage (Figure 2).

Study Design

This brief explores three scenarios of federal Medicaid spending reductions and the potential fiscal implications of different state responses to offset such losses. The analysis was conducted by the Kaiser Program on Medicaid and the Uninsured and the Rockefeller Institute of Government. We assumed that policies were fully effective in FFY 2015 (the most recent year for which Medicaid spending data is available). As noted earlier, unlike the CBO estimate, this analysis does not make projections and does not assume that states make changes to Medicaid programs or reduce coverage.

Scenarios

This analysis examined three scenarios of reductions in federal Medicaid spending. The magnitude of the reductions was calculated by adjusting the match rate for the expansion population from an estimated 90% when fully implemented to a state’s traditional match rate. We used estimated spending for the expansion group for FFY 2015 (spending data for states that expanded mid-year in FFY 2015 or in FFY 2016 were adjusted to account for increases in enrollment and spending for the expansion population). Beyond the repeal of the ACA enhanced matching funds, the reductions are not based on specific policy changes but rather based on estimates of potential federal Medicaid spending reductions. The total amount of federal Medicaid reductions in each scenario is displayed in Figure 3 and described below:

(1) Repeal ACA enhanced matching funds. Assumes states would get the traditional match rate for the expansion population and only includes states that have expanded Medicaid, since there would be no effect on states that did not expand. Total federal cut: $26.7 billion.

(2) Repeal ACA enhanced matching funds + 10% cut in Medicaid for non-expansion populations. Total federal cut: $52.8 billion.

(3) Repeal ACA enhanced matching funds + 20% cut in Medicaid for non-expansion populations. Total federal cut: $78.9 billion.

For each of these scenarios, we examined the outcomes (increased state-financed Medicaid spending per resident) and responses (increased state taxes or decreased K-12 education spending) by state and by groups of states including state expansion status, by political party of the governor (or mayor, for DC), by region and poverty rate. (See Table 1 for more information on state groupings). See Table 1 for median reductions by group and Appendix Table 2 for reductions by state in each of these scenarios. As noted above, the first scenario calculates medians across groups for only expansion states since non-expansion states are not affected.

Outcome and Potential Responses

To fill the gaps created by reductions, states would need to increase state-financed Medicaid spending per resident (outcome). To achieve those increases, states could opt to increase state taxes or reduce education spending (potential responses). These outcomes and responses are illustrative. In reality, faced with reductions in federal Medicaid funding, each state would make different policy choices and states could implement a combination of approaches, or not completely offset the federal reduction. For more details on the methods and data sources, see the Appendix.

Key Findings

Outcome: Implications for State-Financed Medicaid Spending Per Resident

Median state-financed Medicaid spending per resident was $534 in FFY 2015. To fill gaps in federal Medicaid funding assumed in the three scenarios, states would need to increase in state-financed Medicaid spending. Median increases in state-financed spending per resident would range from 17.2% if the enhanced match were repealed up to 40.3% to offset reductions from both the repeal of the matching funds and a 20% reduction of federal funds (Figure 4). These increases for the largest reduction scenario would range from a 20.5% increase in state per resident spending in Virginia to an 68.2% increase in Kentucky.

The federal cuts under all of the scenarios would result in larger state spending increases per resident in expansion states compared to non-expansion states (across states with Republican and Democratic governors). High poverty states, where median state Medicaid spending per resident is the lowest ($458) compared to low-poverty states ($655), would experience the largest percent increase, particularly under the largest reduction scenario (Figures 5 and 6).

For median results by group for each scenario, see Table 2. For state-by-state results of changes in state Medicaid spending per resident, see Figure 7 and Appendix Table 3.

Potential State Responses

Fill the Funding Gap with Increases in State Government Taxes

One potential state response to offset the loss of federal Medicaid funds is to increase state taxes. We examine the percent increase in state government taxes that would be required if states were to raise taxes to offset the entire federal Medicaid spending reduction—measured by the Medicaid cut as a percentage of state tax revenue. We also examined the percent increase that would be required in a state’s largest state-government tax, if the state raised that tax to offset Medicaid cuts—measured by the Medicaid cut as a percentage of the state’s largest tax revenue.

Median state tax per resident was $2,715 in 2015. The analysis shows that the median state would need to increase taxes per resident by 3.5% to 8.1% to offset reductions in federal Medicaid funding under the three scenarios, with increases ranging from 2.4% in Wyoming to 32.1% in Alaska for the largest reduction scenario (Figure 8). When only looking at the largest state tax, the median state tax per resident was $1,144 in 2015 and the median increase would be 8.4% to 18.1%. Under the largest reduction scenario, the increase in the largest state tax would range from 6.3% in Wyoming to 121.6% in Alaska. For most states, the income tax is the largest state tax (29 states), followed by sales tax (15 states), corporate taxes (AK), property taxes (DC and VT), and severance taxes (in ND and WY).

All of the scenarios would result in larger increases in state taxes in expansion states compared to non-expansion states (across states with Republican and Democratic governors). High poverty states could experience the highest median percentage increase in state taxes to offset federal reductions in federal Medicaid funding under the largest reduction scenario (Figures 9 and 10).

For median results by group for each scenario, see Table 3. For state-by-state results of changes in state taxes per resident, see Figure 11 and Appendix Table 4.

Fill the Funding Gap with Decreases in Education Spending

Another potential state response to decreased federal Medicaid funds is to shift state dollars from other spending, such as education spending. This analysis assesses the percentage cut in state spending for K-12 education per pupil that would be required if state governments were to reduce spending on education (essentially school aid) to offset Medicaid cuts. Median state funding for education per pupil was $5,961 in 2015. The analysis shows that states could experience median decreases in per pupil state funding for K-12 of 10.9% to 24.1% to offset federal Medicaid reductions under the three scenarios (Figure 12).

Total spending for education is primarily from state and local governments, with a small share financed by the federal government. Reductions in state government spending for K-12 education would have a direct impact on total spending per-pupil. Median total spending per pupil was $10,961 in 2015. For total spending on K-12 education per pupil, states could face reductions in spending of 5.4% to 13.7% (Figure 12). Reductions would vary significantly across states.

All of the scenarios would result in larger decreases in total K-12 per pupil spending for expansion states compared to non-expansion states (across states with Republican and Democratic governors). Mid- to high poverty states, could experience the largest reductions in per pupil spending to offset federal reductions in Medicaid. Figures 13 and 14 show estimated reductions in total spending for education to fill gaps in federal Medicaid funding.

For median results by group for each scenario, see Table 4. For state-by-state results of changes in K-12 education spending per pupil, see Figure 15 and Appendix Table 5.

Conclusion

The Congress is currently debating the American Health Care Act (AHCA), which would not only repeal and replace the Affordable Care Act (ACA) but also make far reaching changes to the structure and financing of Medicaid. The AHCA would use a per capita cap policy or block grants to cap federal funds to states for Medicaid. These reductions in federal Medicaid funding, could have implications for other areas of the state budget if states chose to offset the decreases in federal spending with state funds by raising taxes or reducing other state spending (like K-12 education). States could also reduce spending in Medicaid by finding savings but more likely by restricting eligibility or benefits.

This analysis found that under various scenarios of reductions in federal Medicaid funding in FFY 2015, states would have to increase their per resident state Medicaid spending by a median of 17.2% to 40.3% to maintain total Medicaid spending. To pay for these increases, states could increase total state tax revenue per resident by a median of 3.5% to 8.1% or decrease K-12 education funding per pupil by a median of 10.9% to 24.1%. Because states have different starting points for taxes and education spending, the effects could vary by state and by groups of states. However, due to assumptions about changes in the ACA enhanced match rate, states that have adopted the Medicaid expansion will experience larger implications from the federal Medicaid funding reductions; this is true across states with Republican and Democratic governors. This increased budget pressure could make it difficult for states to maintain the Medicaid expansion. Federal funding reductions could have a disproportionate effect on states that spend less per resident on Medicaid and education, and have lower tax revenues, typically high poverty states. The responses presented in the report are illustrative. In reality, each state would make different policy choices and states could implement a combination of approaches, or not completely offset the federal reductions. However, the results show that depending on the size of the gap to fill, the responses could be significant.

The following details the methods and data used to examine the outcomes for reductions in federal Medicaid spending.

• Estimated Reductions in federal Medicaid spending. FY 2015 spending for each state was obtained from the Medicaid Budget and Expenditure System (MBES). Adjustments were made for states that expanded mid-year in FY 2015 or in FY 2016. Since Indiana and Pennsylvania expanded early in FY 2015, spending for the expansion population was adjusted to represent a full year of spending. Enrollment data for Alaska (as of April 2017), Louisiana (as of February 2017), and Montana (as of October 2016) were obtained from state resources. The latest enrollment data for these three states were multiplied by the federal per enrollee spending across all Medicaid enrollees in the state to estimate spending for the expansion population.-Using the adjusted FY 2015 spending for the expansion group, we assumed a 90% match rate (the rate when the ACA is in full effect) and then took the difference between that match rate and spending assuming a state’s traditional match rate. For the other effects, we estimated a 10% and a 20% reduction in federal funding off of FY 2015 spending for the traditional Medicaid population. We did not estimate the specifics of per capita cap or block grant proposals.-(KFF analysis of Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Expenditure Reports from MBES, https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/financing-and-reimbursement/state-expenditure-reporting/expenditure-reports/index.html; Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Quarterly Medicaid Enrollment Report, https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/program-information/medicaid-and-chip-enrollment-data/enrollment-mbes/index.html; Alaska Department of Health and Social Services, Medicaid in Alaska Dashboard, accessed May 23, 2017, http://dhss.alaska.gov/HealthyAlaska/Pages/dashboard.aspx; Louisiana Department of Health, Medicaid Dashboard, accessed March 3, 2017, http://ldh.la.gov/healthyladashboard/; Montana Department of Public Health and Human Services, Monthly enrollments, accessed March 3, 2017, http://dphhs.mt.gov/StatisticalInformation.)
• Change in Medicaid spending per state resident: Medicaid cut divided by state population as of July 1, 2015. (U.S. Bureau of the Census, State Population Totals Tables: 2010-2016, https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/popest/tables/2010-2016/state/totals/nst-est2016-01.xlsx.)
• Change in state government taxes: The percentage increase in state government taxes that would be required if states were to raise taxes to offset Medicaid cuts. The calculation is the Medicaid cut as a percentage of state taxes, based upon state fiscal year 2015 state government tax collections. For the District of Columbia, which does not have a state government, we used District tax collections. (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2015 Annual Survey of State Government Tax Collections, https://www.census.gov/govs/statetax/.)
• Change in largest state government tax: The percentage increase that would be required in a state’s largest state-government tax, if the state raised that tax to offset Medicaid cuts. The calculation is the Medicaid cut as a percentage of the state’s largest tax, where the largest tax is determined based upon detailed item-code data for state fiscal year 2015. For the District of Columbia, which does not have a state government, we used the largest District tax. (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2015 Annual Survey of State Government Tax Collections, https://www.census.gov/govs/statetax/.)
• Change in state aid for K-12 education: The percentage cut in state aid for K-12 education that would be required if states were to cut this aid to offset Medicaid cuts. The calculation is the Medicaid cut as a percentage of state aid for K-12 education. Revenue of public schools from state governments is used as a proxy for state aid because data that explicitly measure state aid and that are both timely and comparable across states are not available. (Revenue from the state government may differ from what states show in their budgets for state aid. For example, Hawaii operates all of its schools, rather than providing aid to school districts. This approach treats revenue from the state of Hawaii as state aid.) For the District of Columbia, which does not have a state government, we used District revenue used to support schools. The latest available data for revenue of public schools is for 2014, from the National Center for Education Statistics NCES. (NCES, Revenues for public elementary and secondary schools, by source of funds and state or jurisdiction, https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d16/tables/dt16_235.20.asp.) We estimated values for 2015 by adding one year of estimated growth to each state’s value for 2014, based on the compound annual growth rate for the prior five years (2009 to 2014).
• Change in K-12 education per-pupil spending: The cut that would be required in K-12 education spending per pupil if the entire Medicaid cut were offset by cuts in spending by school districts. The per-pupil cut is calculated as the Medicaid cut divided by the number of public school pupils in the state in the 2014-15 school year, excluding adult education enrollment. (National Center on Education Statistics, Digest of Education Statistics, K-12 Enrollment – Total Students, All Grades (Excludes AE) [Public School], http://nces.ed.gov/ccd/elsi.) To provide context for these numbers, we then compute this cut as a percentage of total public school expenditures per pupil (excluding adult education enrollment). The latest available data for revenue of public schools is for 2014, from the National Center for Education Statistics NCES. We estimated values for 2015 by adding one year of estimated growth to each state’s value for 2014, based on the compound annual growth rate for the prior five years (2009 to 2014).

Grouping States by Characteristics

• Medicaid expansion status: ACA Medicaid expansion status, as of January 2017. https://www.kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/state-activity-around-expanding-medicaid-under-the-affordable-care-act/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D
• Political party: Political party of the state governor or mayor, as of January 25, 2017 (in the case of the District of Columbia). https://www.nga.org/files/live/sites/NGA/files/pdf/GOVLIST.PDF
• Region: Major geographic divisions of the United States as defined by the Bureau of the Census http://www2.census.gov/geo/docs/maps-data/maps/reg_div.txt
• Poverty quartile: The poverty-rate quartile that each state is based upon the 2013-2015 three-year-average CPS poverty-rate. (U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Poverty Tables: People and Families – 1959 to 2015, Table 19. Percent of Persons in Poverty, by State, https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/cps/tables/time-series/historical-poverty-people/hstpov19.xls.)

Appendix Table 1. State Characteristics, as of January 2017

Appendix Table 2. Federal Medicaid Cuts by State, FFY 2015

Appendix Table 3. Increase in State Medicaid Spending per Resident by State, 2015

Appendix Table 4. Increase in State Taxes per Resident by State, 2015

Appendix Table 5. Decrease in Spending for K-12 Education per Pupil by State, 2015